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The process of globalization seems to be among one of the most 
intriguing issues in the modern world. The speed in transport, the 
computerization of society which, through the Internet, is making the 
world more transparent and information easier than ever to acquire, the 
global media which brings almost everything in front of everyone’s eyes, 
the accumulation of capital and enormous production of goods, all this 
appears to have a very strong unifying impact, making the world seem to 
be one as never before. On the other side there are still many aspects of the 
dark side of human nature, conflicts, division, wars. In such a situation it 
seems natural to ask: World governance, do we need it, is it possible, what 
could it (all) mean? This was the title of a conference held at the Belgrade 
University in June 2008, within the project ILECS (International Law and 
Ethics Conference Series). The event triggered the invitation of 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing for editors to compile a volume devoted 
to this theme, and the book before us is the result. We would like to 
express our gratitude for the opportunity to organize this edited volume; 
Amanda Millar was the first who contacted us and Carol Koulikourdi did 
most of correspondence showing a lot of patience and understanding in the 
process leading to the final result. 
Several papers from the Belgrade conference are included in this book 
in their revised form (Pavković, Narveson, Sharon Anderson-Gold, and 
Paul Gilbert), and some others come from a previous conference within 
the same project (Pauline Kleingeld and Ingeborg Maus, both of these 
articles appeared also in Luigi Caranti, ed. Kant’s Perpetual Peace: New 
Interpetive Essays). Most chapters, however, are independently solicited 
articles, some of which are published here in this version for the first time 
(Richard Falk, Otfried Höffe, Jovan Babić, Alfred Rubin, and Petar 
Bojanić). Michael Walzer’s text was published in Dissent, Fall 2000. 
Stanley Hoffmann’s appeared under same title in Daedalus, 2003, 132(1). 
Cambell Craig’s essay has previously been published in Ethics & 
International Affairs, Vol. 22(2), Summer 2008. Thomas Pogge’s paper 
was originally published as “Kant’s Vision, Europe, and a Global 
Federation” in Jean-Christophe Merle, ed.: Globale Gerechtigkeit (Stuttgart: 
Frommann-Holzboog 2005), 500-518, and in Luigi Caranti, ed.: Kant’s 





2006), before it appeared, in a revised version, as “Kant’s Vision of a Just 
World Order,” in The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics edited by Tom Hill 
in 2009. Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane piece was published in 
Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 20(4), Winter 2006. Larry May’s 
text  is a cut from his book-manuscript Global Justice and Due Process. 
Anthony Ellis’ article was partly published as “War Crimes, Punishment 
and the Burden of Proof” in Res Publica, vol. 16 for 2010. Virginia Held’s 
paper is partly based on her books, The Ethics of Care: Personal, 
Political, and Global (2006) and How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and 
Political Violence (2008) both published by Oxford University Press. Luis 
Cabrera’s paper appeared in Journal of International Political Theory, 
4(1) published in April 2008. 
We are very grateful to all of the authors who generously gave us the 
permission to include their pieces in the volume and helped us with the 
copyright issues. We would also like to thank Miloš Babić, Rastko 
Popović, Vojin Rakić and especially Julia MacKay for their help in 
proofreading some of the texts written by those whose native language is 
not English. 
Our hope is that the volume will find its path to readers and be useful. 
It does not reflect a unifying standpoint, on the contrary it contains many 
divergent and contrasting opinions, and it does not offer any final theses or 
solutions. This is so not only because the topic of the book is vague and 
evolving, it is also because we believe that philosophers should keep a 
distance from any standpoint, be ready to listen, let the reasons do their 
work before taking any side, and be prepared to change their beliefs if the 
reasons command it. 
 
 








In the age of globalization and increased interdependence in the world 
that we face today, there is a question we have to raise: Do we need and 
could we attain a world government, capable of insuring peace and facili-
tating worldwide well-being in a just and efficient way. 
We may think that the issue of world governance is something new, 
but it is not. Every era has its version of “globalization”. The “issue” of 
world governance has always existed. There are two main ways in which 
the authority of a state, or a country, can be territorially articulated: first, 
as a “kingdom” (in a sense) where a people claims a right to self-rule and 
independence, and then the jurisdiction should be defined as the territory 
that the people are inhabiting, and, second, as an “empire”, where the 
country is defined just as a territory on which there is a certain law ac-
cepted as a common rule of the social life. In the second case there is no 
space limitation of the territory, and the state might be as big as the central 
government could possibly extend its control and enforcement of its laws. 
In principle an empire could cover the whole world; there is nothing con-
tradictory in that concept. 
So, conceptually, a world government is possible. But many things are 
theoretically possible although not possible in reality. What would cer-
tainly prove that it is really “possible” would be to show an example of its 
factual occurrence. And indeed there are such examples. The Roman Em-
pire was an almost realized world state. Similar in magnitude was the 
Christianization of the then known world accomplished in the first centu-
ries of the new era. Colonialism is but another example, where the parts of 
the world outside of Europe, assumed to be uncivilized and uncultivated 
lawless territories, were put on the path of bringing to civilization in a 
world-wide process of cultivation and introduction of the progress of hap-
piness and well-being to the whole world. The process of colonization was 
fast and impressive in magnitude. We now know that it ended in a col-
lapse, in an even greater and faster process of “decolonization,” when the 
principles of self-determination and nationalism took the primacy, which 
is a social and political development with ongoing consequences. Let us 
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call the reasons for these kinds of globalization “the imperialist reasons.” 
These reasons might be ideological to a great extent, especially on the 
declaratory level, but at the same time they facilitate peace, commerce and 
expediency of the governance. They seem to be present in an efficient way 
in many periods of the history. 
Now, we have again a very powerful process of globalization sup-
ported and facilitated strongly by enormous and fast-paced technological 
and economic developments. However, this process, it seems, is based 
partly on reasons which are not necessarily “imperialist” in the old sense, 
but in the sense of the ever-growing interdependence present in our world 
today. We are currently witnessing tremendous advancements in technol-
ogy that are making the world truly interdependent in a way which might 
not have been the case in the past, like technology related to issues of 
climate change, or economical dependence. This interdependence is, or 
might be seen as a reason for a world government, a reason which cannot 
be reduced to the purpose of the mentioned tendency to make the world 
globalized for the sake of facilitating commerce and making politics more 
expedient, i.e. the imperialist reason. These new reasons seem to be even 
more powerful in support of the concept of world governance. 
Technology has a strange ability to change some aspects of borders be-
tween states, and make some other aspects hard to sustain. Sometimes it 
looks as if national sovereignty is disappearing, and is being replaced by 
globalization in what are some of the most important aspects of life: which 
ends will be the ones we will value and choose, and what will the articula-
tion and organization of our living together on the same planet look like? 
This has become almost the mainstream in contemporary social and politi-
cal theory. The main part of the theory says that the laws which we should 
abide by are not freely set limits of our natural freedom, limits within 
which we can freely set all the aims whose realization makes the legiti-
mate content of our life, but they, the laws, are something we should read 
out from the definition, or description, of what we consider to be “good”. 
This might seem to be necessary if we wish to speak of a unified 
world—there has to be something uniting the world, and this has to be a 
shared common definition of what is “good.” What else could it be? How-
ever, globalization always was a process that was going parallel to another 
process of producing changes and differences, and accumulating them. 
This second process opposed to globalization, is what in essence makes 
the world so big and complex; globalization, on the other hand, is making 
the world more transparent, simpler and in a sense smaller; simplification 
of the world appears to be a price of globalization. 
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So, what is “World governance”? It should be an articulation of power 
that has authority above or superior to all other authority, and it should be 
one. This “oneness” is crucial, as we already know that the world is one 
(as the universe is one), so what might be wrong here? It is a fact that 
today’s world is not one in a political sense; it is rather an international 
society, which is a set or an aggregate of different parts living alongside 
each other. Different goals and values characterize those different parts, 
and their governing laws vary as well. The laws are of special interest—
they presuppose a kind of consensual acceptance without which they can-
not function: they have to be “our laws,” rules that we voluntarily accept 
and this fact of acceptance grants them their validity. 
The international society contains all persons and all states. Therefore 
the expression “The whole world” can designate two radically different 
things: 1) humankind, or 2) international community of states or peoples 
(e.g. United Nations). In the second sense only, it is a set of all sources of 
valid laws, or the set of all legislatures and legislative wills that exist in the 
world. The first meaning, the humankind, is not a political term because it 
does not have, and perhaps cannot have an identity, a collective identity, 
which one political community that has the capacity and the authority to 
issue laws must have. 
So, in a political sense the whole world is a community of states and 
not a universal world-nation. The community of states has not been taken 
as a surrogate for something else, as it would have been if we had con-
ceived the world governance as the ideal state, the only one capable to 
secure true peace, but for some reason not yet existing by now, and what 
now must be considered as something that will, in the long run, be re-
placed by the genuine state of affairs in accordance with the ideal. In this 
picture the states have been perceived as valid holders of legislative wills 
capable of securing peace and justice within their borders. Guaranteeing 
such peace is the actual purpose of any state. 
Peace is a valid articulation and distribution of social power; it is valid 
when it is accepted and when its acceptance is shown through laws. The 
purpose of laws is to provide predictability, the most desirable item in the 
context of living with others. Therefore, the purpose of the state is peace, 
and the purpose of peace is to control (our) future time, which has been 
made possible through the laws. We may say with Plato, or Socrates, that 
the purpose of the laws is to make us better and in fact this is literary true. 
Without laws we couldn’t afford to be “good” at all, as our whole energy 
and time would be spent obtaining security and survival. But laws, as sets 
of legal rules, have to be accepted in order to be valid, and this requires a 
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collective with a unifying identity strong enough to be able to make deci-
sions about the content and character of the laws. 
Therefore, the laws have to be “our laws.” Otherwise, they would not 
be obligatory for us. If not “ours,” they would be imposed by force and 
would not be considered as valid even if they were just or even perfect. 
Nor would they be “obligatory” in a proper sense, even if they were 
obeyed, as the obedience would be the result of fear or calculation, rather 
than consent. (If a group of angels, or for that matter extraterrestrials, 
came here to our planet and saw how imperfect and bad we are, and, there-
fore, used their overwhelming power to make us better, it would still con-
stitute violence and usurpation, and the laws they would try to impose 
would not have validity.) 
“Our laws” presuppose that there is a “we” capable of having laws of 
our own, and for our topic the question is: Can that “we” be the (whole) 
humankind, and not only a part of it? This is very close to the idea of a 
world state and world government, a government that would administer 
the laws of the world state. 
The advantage of such a state is obvious: the conflicts and wars which 
characterize our past and present would be prevented and avoided. These 
conflicts cause most of the misery we experience, and it certainly would 
be good to eradicate them. And their eradication would be complete: even 
the possibility of a war would not be present if we had a world state and 
world government. The aggressive potential of human nature would be 
controlled. There would be no more conflicts, or they would be effectively 
prevented. 
However, it is not clear what the real results would be. British philoso-
pher Bertrand Russell in his Reith Lectures (Russel, 1949) believes that it 
is uncertain whether it is possible to convert human competition—which is 
the source of all or most of our conflicts—into a scheme of benevolence 
and cooperation. We know that cooperation is beneficial, but as a means to 
a greater good, not as the original source of human motivation; coopera-
tion has to be derived from and justified by the goal to which it leads. But 
a great part of our motivation comes from stimulation such as fear or nega-
tive feelings like envy, and other competitive feelings which should be 
replaced by something that provides the same cohesive force which now 
works by creating schemes of caring based on the fear of dangers and risks 
which may threaten existent laws. This is the main energy of patriotism, 
and there is a question as to what would be a replacement for this in world 
state? What patriotism could we expect to find there? In the absence of a 
possible foreign enemy, what nature of cohesion could there be? A tyr-
anny, a dictatorship? How stable would such a construction be? What 
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could prevent some new Christians from mobilizing human desire for a 
tangible meaning of the life and converting it into a destructive force 
which would destroy the state by enjoying being thrown to the lions in 
some new kind of a circus?  
The purpose of the world government would be lasting world peace. 
Conflicts would not be tolerated, and all perpetrators involved in a conflict 
would be treated like criminals. The specificity of criminals is that they are 
a concern of the police, so the police would regulate the peace. There 
would be no need for an army. But this could only be a conceptual issue. 
We have the elements of this already, in the widespread practice of inter-
vening: military interventions, often designated as “humanitarian,” contain 
all the characteristics of a police action. These are not conceived as 
“wars.” The consequences are far-reaching: the other side has been desig-
nated as criminal in its nature, as per supposition weaker, and the “action” 
as an act of punishment. The distribution of power is determined in ad-
vance, and the whole issue is only an internal disturbance as if it exists 
within the scope of the same legal order. It is known in advance who the 
“good guys” and who the “bad guys” are. There is something Manichean 
in this picture, a kind of dualism, very much at odds with our previous 
world-view. It is strange: a hypothesis of a unified world order implies 
dualism, a theory of two worlds, world of good which has the authority 
and entitlement to govern all worldly issues, and the world of evil, which 
is devoid of any such entitlement but seems to be ineradicable despite 
renewed defeats. 
The laws in such a structure would not be “international” (as being 
ratified by sovereign interested parties) but real laws with all the instru-
ments of enforcement and, by hypothesis, based on presumed consent of 
all members of the human race. In a way, it would be everyone’s law. In 
this picture, there would be only one state—the world state. This also 
means that there won’t be any borders. 
Does this look like a viable state of affairs, or only as a utopia? Most 
utopias were called “negative utopias” (dystopias), but could this be a 
“positive utopia”? 
Furthermore, does this mean that the laws of such a state should or 
could not be defended (i.e. defended from change to the point of making a 
different legal and political order)? What would be a constitutional and 
legal arrangement for such a purpose? Or should it be supposed that it 
would function as a kind of a frozen, eternal, system of governance? 
There are several other issues of some interest here: 
In the time of globalization national sovereignty might look like some-
thing that is “overcome,” something that doesn’t fit in the historical 
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scheme of today, and national states, countries, should be phased out and 
replaced by “multinational” agencies and corporations with the rules that 
articulate the game of the balance of power. Contemporary capitalism 
shows a great power of accommodation. It is possible that it will, through 
the principle of maximizing happiness and the need to cultivate the world 
for that purpose, realize a form of this scheme. In this scheme we might 
have an illusion that nothing has really changed, that all of the old cultural 
diversity and all of our collective rights had been preserved, while in fact 
there won’t be any really “living” collective identity, instead of which 
there will be only a simulacrum and decor without any cohesion and with-
out any real decision-making power. To some extent, the world already 
looks like this. 
There is another point of interest here, and this is the size or magnitude 
of the world state: it would be, we may presume, sizable. However, it is 
not clear what is the meaning of that, and which size is the best for a coun-
try; for example, one of the arguments used by opponents of Italian unifi-
cation in the mid 19th century clearly favoured maintaining small princi-
palities: in case you get into a dispute or a conflict with your prince or 
master, it would be impossible to jump on the nearest horse and gallop out 
of the country if the country were too big. This means that really big coun-
tries may have an increased, not diminished—as we might suppose—
power of control over their citizens. Contrary to what we might presume at 
a first glance, a chase is more efficient if the country is bigger: there is a 
greater chance for a chase to end successfully, i.e. to catch a fugitive be-
fore he succeeds in running away. 
However, the notion of a world state is not at all conceptually con-
nected to the magnitude of the state, but to the normative presupposition 
that there should be no other states. The question of size and magnitude 
would then be a matter of factual size of the world, not of the state, and 
would include all inhabitable space. This means a world state could not 
tolerate the existence of any other state, regardless of where that state were 
located, and that it would, normatively, treat all space as being under its 
control. 
Another point: Presumably the world state would promote business, 
workforce mobilization, and social mobility. There is no room for particu-
lar interests beyond those of the universal prosperity and progress in hap-
piness. It is the best suitable context, or environment, for the utilitarian 
thesis that “more is better,” more good, more wealth, more pleasure, more 
real opportunities for those who really may be in the position to exploit 
those opportunities. It is a good basis for maximizing profit. In that sense 
imperialism suppresses partial interests when they hinder this kind of 
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progress and development. Such hindrances nowadays are, among other 
things, national boundaries, which would be absent in a world state. Na-
tionalism and national selfishness would be overcome as well. Also, all 
kinds of sentimentalism and all inclinations towards anything that is not 
productive for business and the progress of general happiness would be 
forbidden. A world state would remove all these hindrances, obstacles, and 
limitations. 
There is a question which deserves special attention: the sovereignty of 
now existing states: what would happen to it? Would this sovereignty just 
disappear or would it be transferred to a supranational level? This issue is 
very sensitive, of course, and it is the central issue at stake here: where 
should the authority reside and how should the governance be articulated? 
We started with the question: Do we need and could we attain a world 
government, capable of insuring peace and facilitating worldwide well-
being in a just and efficient way? This question provokes multitude of 
others: How would the representation in such a political structure func-
tion? How would I be represented in that structure, and for that matter how 
would anyone else? Is such representation possible on the global level? 
Would anything that is mine (or thine) stay preserved there for which I 
could say “It is my government?” Would any of my thoughts, projects, 
desires, anything that constitutes the value and meaning of my life, or 
anyone’s life, still be present there? Or, on the contrary, would there be a 
point of power which takes all, or most, of my power to decide for myself, 
and would start to think, to decide, and to act on my behalf instead of me? 
Would it be that I am a robot living within a program in which I would 
have to take a place and finish my part of it, regardless of what I am and 
what I want? In other words, should we be optimists or pessimists regard-
ing this option for our future, the option which is not yet available but is 
obviously becoming more and more viable? 
* * * 
World governance is broader of an issue than the world state. In the 
world we live in today it is more the matter of the world order of the many 
points of mutual or multilateral interests and those are the issues which 
demand common approach because they are of great importance and can-
not be resolved other than jointly. 
This is the approach of the first contribution, Richard Falk’s 
“(Re)imaging the Global Governance.” Although Falk did not mention the 
world state, his article deals with the most urgent issues of world govern-
ance. It is rather obvious that many of the pressing issues in today’s world 
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have to be settled on a global level. However, Falk’s article offers another 
important insight: he states that we already have a global state as a matter 
of fact. That state is the USA, a political entity which is not confined 
within its geographical borders (having ties with the rest of the world, 
influencing it, etc.); rather it is global in the sense that most of the planet, 
and in some aspects all of it, is under effective and to a great extent official 
control of the US government. The USA is not (only) the leader of the 
world, it “exists” throughout the world. In many ways it exercises its gov-
ernmental power much beyond its borders, governing more than leading, 
and more globally than, e.g., British Empire ever controlled the high seas 
of the world. The pockets outside its control, and globally widespread anti-
Americanism (in many fashionable and less fashionable forms), cannot 
disguise this fact. We may add the control, in a direct way and not only 
through the influence, of many multinational companies, most of which 
are originally American. This “new American orientation toward law and 
power” produces a “need for American military dominance everywhere,” 
while, according to Falk, efforts to implement (new) global norms took on 
a new shape especially after September 11, making the “encounter be-
tween the United States and al Qaeda” borderless, producing a new kind of 
war without a clear concepts of “victory” and vision. This process of shift-
ing patterns also changes the nature of the promise of international institu-
tions, focusing more on enhanced global policing, intelligence gathering, 
and law enforcement” and losing the connection with “values associated 
with human rights and global democracy”. However, Falk sees the world 
becoming “more multipolar but less Western,” and he identifies four new 
emerging global players, besides the worldwide present US: China, India, 
Brazil, and Russia. The declining confidence in capitalism might have a 
role in this process as well. Falk’s timely and comprehensive analysis 
covers a range of problems at the outset of the 21st century, from economi-
cal and security challenges to ecological concerns to the issues of justice 
and equality.  
Michael Walzer in “Governing the Globe” reintroduces the issue of the 
world state by setting up its idealized types located on a continuum going 
from unity to pluralism, from global state to international anarchy. He 
believes, however, that the politics of difference is stronger than any uni-
fying process, that diversity and multitude is a feature of the human world. 
In a unified world diversity and autonomy would lose their political rele-
vance. Borders and sovereignty are means of self-protection and guard 
against insecurity and fear. “Sovereign statehood is a way of protecting 
distinct historical cultures, sometimes national, sometimes ethnic/religious 
in character,” but the identities contained in these distinct political forms 
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are felt to be worth fighting for: “The passion with which stateless nations 
pursue statehood and the driven character of national liberation move-
ments reflect...” the reality of common human life. Walzer draws a very 
interesting and morally important hypothesis from this: “So, the morally 
maximal form of decentralization would be a global society in which every 
[emphasis – J. B.] national or ethnic/religious group that needed protection 
actually possessed sovereign power.” On the other hand, “dividing up the 
world in this way would be (has been) a bloody business.” Nevertheless, 
what also has been a bloody business, and even more than bloody, was 
creating artificial divisions without any respect to real distinctions and 
differences in the world; this was the case in the employment of uti 
posidetis iuris rule in the process of decolonization which produced many 
still-born nationless “countries” worldwide—mostly in Africa—a process 
that could be more unjust than the colonization in the first place, and per-
haps one of the gravest, if not the gravest, and most sinister crimes in the 
last few centuries. It seems that the “passion” with which such “countries” 
fight their civil wars, often incomprehensible to the rest of the humankind, 
are a very good corroboration of this insight of Walzer’s. 
Walzer is more optimistic in the conclusion of his paper, envisioning a 
mixture of two schemes in a hybrid combination of international control 
that preserves some sovereignty in the existing political entities. His strat-
egy is “many avenues of pursuit, many agents in pursuit.” The problem he 
detects here is how to secure any sovereignty to new political, national and 
ethnic/religious, entities, allowing them potential access to the scheme. 
Stanley Hoffmann, who shares this optimism, explores new possibilities, 
such as giving new kinds of tasks to UNESCO and other international 
organizations. He shares with Walzer the belief that the UN should have 
its own military force which would be supranational, along with many 
other instruments (international instruments of global economic control, 
international courts, etc.). Otfried Höffe also shares most of this optimism 
in his contribution, giving a description of an ongoing globalization, and 
of a possible scheme of the world governance that could be attained in 
various fields of our common everyday life from a more historical and 
philosophical perspective. 
Campbel Craig is even more optimistic in his contribution. He believes 
that “the chances of attaining of some form world government have been 
radically enhanced by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a 
unipolar order.” For Craig the deepest and almost conclusive argument for 
world government is the threat of nuclear war. This threat will exist “as 
long as sovereign nations continue to possess nuclear arsenals” and the 
only way to avoid the risk is to create “some kind of world government.... 
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with sufficient power to stop states” from being such a threat by “acquir-
ing nuclear arsenals and waging war with them.” It is not clear, however, 
how the world government would do this, especially in its second part. 
What comes to mind is just the opposite—that the only final defence of an 
independent sovereign entity might become acquiring nuclear weapons, 
and that all those countries without such weapons would easily become 
prey of any kind of international controlling and sanctioning, which would 
not be affordable after the moment of acquiring a nuclear shield. Many 
would say that nuclear deterrence is the main factor in preventing major 
wars in contemporary world. 
On the other hand Craig, unlike Walzer and Pavković, thinks that 
world government would not pose any threat to distinct national cultures. 
He believes that “it is the only entity that can preserve them.” In this he 
closely follows the standpoint of Alexander Wendt, who, in his article 
“Why a World State Is Inevitable” (Wendt, 2003) argues that a world state 
will necessarily come into existence in the foreseeable future. 
Aleksandar Pavković, in his contribution, gives a potentially devastat-
ing critique of the above mentioned text by Alexander Wendt. Pavković 
construes a thought-experiment from a distant future in which a group of 
people actually did usurp the interpretation of the final value of life 
(namely to prolong it as long as possible by using advanced technology). 
They also suppress another group which finds the value of life in some-
thing else, playing a special game and enjoying the life through it. The 
second group is coerced to pay, through high taxes, for the realization of 
the first concept of life. The other group then attempts to secede which 
would lead to reintroduction of the old anarchy, avoidance of which was 
the main reason to create the world state in the first place. According to 
Wendt, and unlike Walzer, the secession is not only bad, but also unneces-
sary because the world state is capable of securing equal recognition of all 
rights, not only individual but also group ones, and also all differences 
except those which aspire to superiority and imply discrimination, would 
be granted in that state. Pavković claims, however, that the superiority is 
not the aim of the seceding party, but as a matter of fact, superiority is 
present in the monopolistic position in the structure of distribution held by 
the group that has the power. The seceding party demands, unsuccessfully, 
equality, not superiority. But Pavković also claims that secession from the 
world state does not necessarily lead to anarchy among states, character-
ized by the (strong) right of states to kill people unilaterally, or to war 
against each other. This is similar to Babić’s thesis, in his interpretation of 
Kant, that truce, a characteristic of the anarchy of contemporary world, is 
more akin to peace than to war. Pavković concludes that the world state 
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could hardly avoid becoming “a ‛bad,’ that is, a murderous agency,” just 
the opposite of what its primary purpose was. 
Jan Narveson is categorically against the world state. Any state is a bad 
thing, and a world state is even worse. We do not actually need a state, the 
state is making our lives worse than they would be without it, but the 
world state is not the remedy. It would not solve any real problems, even if 
it could exist. On the other hand, it “would certainly attempt to impose a 
welter of wrongheaded laws about any number of things.” The world gov-
ernment would contain all the ills of actual governments, but “in much 
higher degree. Who … needs that?” To think otherwise is, according to 
Narveson, only wishful thinking. We may think that the world government 
“would be an overall nanny who could keep her unruly charges in line,” 
but the analogy is farfetched. “Nannies are usually large in relation to their 
charges, but would world government be?” 
* * * 
The second part of the book contains the issues of Kantian approach to 
world governance. Although many philosophers analysed the idea of 
world governance, Kant’s approach appears to be most relevant today. His 
works Metaphysics of Morals and Perpetual Peace are rich sources of 
relevant and valuable ideas regarding this topic. Sometimes his theories 
make rather complex web of concepts and arguments, but always end with 
one which is plausible and revealing. Although a universalist in morality, 
Kant is not a universalist in matters of happiness and wellbeing. What 
constitutes happiness cannot be determined in advance, before people set 
their goals and structure them in some life plan (Kant, 4:418). Political 
diversity and plurality seem to be morally demanded by Kant. Morality is 
only a demarcation line that should not be crossed; but to that point we 
have the terrain of freedom with ample room for all kinds of differences in 
pursuing happiness. Universal respect for moral autonomy requires of me 
to allow others to have different goals. The concept of justice valid within 
these limits is not easy to construe. We have a moral duty of beneficence, 
which requires adopting the happiness of others as our own end if that is 
within our reach. But this duty is constrained by, among other things, our 
primary duty to respect the autonomy of others, i.e. their right to conceive 
and pursue their own idea of good within the limits of the freedom possi-
ble for all. To some this might seem to be a small demand, but after due 
reflection it might turn out to be much more than many of us are prepared 
to sacrifice. 
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In the first selection of this part, Pauline Kleingeld explores the tension 
that exists between different possible interpretations of Kant’s idea of 
world state as world federation. In her interpretation Kant advocates the 
establishment of a non-coercive league of states, and not a strong world 
state with a universal law (which might be more in accordance with the 
demands of reason). Her reasoning is subtle and precise both regarding the 
exegesis of Kantian texts and its relevance to the contemporary world. 
Despite the fact that in international affairs we have anarchy, there are 
important differences between individual persons, who have a moral duty 
to abandon the lawless state of nature by establishing a state with enforce-
able laws, and states, which have the right not to be compelled to establish 
one unified political structure with enforceable universal laws. This right 
is the essence of the principle of non-intervention. When individuals leave 
the state of nature and create civil condition there is always progress, 
while the case of states leaving the state of international anarchy would 
mean the destruction of all established and already existing rights, which 
would lead “to a ‘soulless despotism’ and the peace of graveyard.” The 
international character present in relations among different states could not 
be grounded, “and international right would not be applicable.” And here 
we face the issue that the state of states still would be based on a particular 
conception of justice, which means that any coercive inclusion of a state 
would disrespect the political and personal autonomy even if that occurs 
for the presumed good of those upon whom this law would be imposed. 
Kleingeld however concludes that despite the fact that “a fully legitimate 
world government may remain out of reach,” it is still an ideal toward 
which humankind might strive and the creation of a league of states “con-
stitutes a first important step on the road towards an ever greater transna-
tional regulation of the interaction among states, a process that should be 
guided by the ideal of a global federative state of states”. 
Ingeborg Maus is more critical. Similar to Kleingeld, she believes that 
Kant is against a global state but adds some sharp remarks regarding the 
idea of a world state. She starts from Kant’s thesis that the source of law is 
“only the general united will of the people.” Kants “Cosmopolitan right” is 
“free of contradictions when it provides the rules to be observed in cross-
border exchanges between jurisdictions of various legal systems; it thereby 
actually presupposes the existence of borders.” The idea of international 
law presupposes the plurality of nations. The idea of a unified universal 
state (“universal monarchy”), not based in peoples legislative will, de-
creases the effectiveness of the law and leads to a ‘soulless despotism.’ So 
the attempt to realize peace by setting up a global state would actually lead 
back to a state of nature, or to tyranny. 
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The article by Thomas Pogge is only one of his many works in a series 
dealing with Kantian themes regarding the contemporary world. In his 
“Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” published in 1992, he states that 
Kant would have endorsed a world federation with different levels of po-
litical power if he was not prevented by too strong of a concept of absolute 
and indivisible sovereignty where resides the ultimate political authority. 
In his contribution in this volume Pogge offers an example and illustration 
of how such divisibility could be maintained; it is the European Union, in 
its attempt to unite a rather diverse map of many former kingdoms and 
remnants of former empires. Will this be a process like German unification 
throughout and prior to the 19th century, only without a visible usage of 
force, making Europe just another country among countries, or, as Pogge 
predicts (or hopes) a free federation of independent states, devoted to the 
cause of peace and prosperity? If the second is the case then we have an-
other question: will the world follow the model? Pogge believes that Kant 
did not pay enough attention to economic factors that can influence such a 
project, and therein lies one of the main sources of his, as well as Euro-
pean, optimism—in belief that most important values are in the end eco-
nomic values, and that all values could be reduced to issues of welfare as 
the goal toward which all ambitions of people and peoples are aimed at. 
More optimism, brought almost to perfection (except in the last sen-
tence), we can find in the article by Sharon Anderson-Gold. Her opinion is 
that cosmopolitan right, based in norms of hospitality, “necessarily has 
universal jurisdiction.” Since all individuals have a natural right to “offer 
to trade and to communicate” as part of “original possession in common 
(communio possessionis originaria)” (Kant, 6:262), there is also a need for 
a democratic representation on the global level. “The principle of hospital-
ity …prohibits fraud, force and exploitation.” Institutions in such a scheme 
must not be isolationist; hospitality is the supreme obligation, not self-
centric “nationalist” interests that will inevitably lead to violence and war 
and result in exploitation that can permanently solidify the inequality be-
tween rich and poor. Relying on Pogge, Gold-Anderson criticizes the 
contemporary state of affairs in the world, characterized by an “alliance of 
international recognition of dictatorial power with internal underdevelop-
ment.” But in a state of realized ideal of cosmopolitanism (mutual?) con-
trol, including military interventions, becomes justified and a matter of law 
enforcement, not external aggression. We do not need a global government 
to make this possible, but it seems that we need a true democratic repre-
sentation as required by the principle of universal hospitality. Otherwise, 
we may wonder if we don’t already live in such a state of affairs, as Paul 
Gilbert suggests in his contribution. Gilbert claims that our “fundamental 
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identity, insofar as identity is ethically relevant, is a global identity.” The 
real issue then becomes how to realize viable legitimate democratic repre-
sentation of such a complex body as the whole humankind, without rele-
gating the solution to a distant, or, as the last sentence in Gold-Anderson’s 
article indicates, infinite future. 
Jovan Babić, in his reading of Kant, claims that freedom, as the power 
to decide otherwise, produces differences in addition to changes brought 
by the flow of time, and accumulation of these differences makes a per-
petual structure of the distribution of power impossible and stability and 
longevity of such a structure uncertain and tenuous. Peace is a specific 
articulation of power in a society capable of maintaining that power 
through laws, and part of that structure is a serious determination to en-
force the laws and defend their existence. Therefore, the war is latently 
contained in the peace through the concept of defence. 
* * * 
Institutionalizational articulation of world governance, its cosmopoli-
tan nature and its various aspects, is the subject of third part of the book. 
Perhaps the most important of these issues is the legitimacy of global 
governance institutions, the topic of Alen Buchanan and Robert Keohane’s 
article. Global institutions are novel and still evolving; the requirements 
for their acceptance are more complex and subtle than requirements for the 
acceptance of internal rules. Thus, the legitimacy of these institutions is 
still an urgent and important matter. The principle might be the same as in 
all issues of legitimacy—that acceptance in the end depends on acceptabil-
ity, that the fact of being accepted does not imply the acceptability, and 
that disagreements about both the goals and applicable, or applied, stan-
dards of justice may be deep enough to make claims to authority of such 
institutions unfounded and unviable. Here, moral reasons are especially 
important not only for reasons of justice but also for reasons of stability 
and maintenance of global institutions. The overarching pattern for legiti-
macy seems to be democracy, the main ideological tenet of our time in 
legitimizing states, and now global institutions as well. An informed de-
liberation may help to build global institutions that would require more 
than a minimal moral acceptability, offering benefits only global institu-
tions can provide. This is a two-fold process, including learning what is 
needed and instituting this in an institutional framework, and collective 
learning of how to accept this framework. 
Territorial limits define the domain of the jurisdiction and legal con-
trol. In this context the concept of “piracy” is very important. What is 
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“international crime” may be defined simply as crime across borders, but 
piracy seems to be different. Usually it is restricted to acts committed on 
or from the sea or air. The other part is the lack of “national character” 
inherent in the notion of piracy. On the Internet we have another case of 
crimes committed in a legal space that is difficult to distinguish from theft 
or robbery. Also, it seems important to distinguish between “pirates” and 
“terrorists” (although some pirates may declare or proclaim to have politi-
cal goals). As Alfred Rubin points out, the pitfalls of the definition of 
“piracy” are many. Certainly, it is the basis of an extraordinary jurisdiction 
having a global impact, but being, as it appears, necessarily restricted to 
the “external” aspect of acts or crimes committed. This implies that pirates 
are not considered rebels, and identifying pirates and characterizing their 
affiliation becomes crucial in determining what happens. Although “all 
agree that ‘pirates’ go too far,” Rubin concludes that “the legal conception 
of ‘piracy’ has been so seriously abused over the centuries that it is doubt-
ful that the word retains any useful content in law, whatever its value in 
morality or politics.” For Petar Bojanić, on the other hand, pirates may be 
just latent rebels: “If an act resists the empire [or, for that matter, a world 
government] in a completely asymmetric way, then it can be called and 
treated as being piratical,” an attempt to create or restore the lost “other” 
or “outside” (as there is no such a thing in a borderless world state). In this 
way pirates become “universal enemies” (enemies of the world order), as a 
condition for the very existence of international law. Bojanić cites a So-
mali pirate saying: “We will not stop until we have a central government 
that can control our sea,” presenting himself as a tax collector of sorts, 
declaring, thus, an aspiration for some political aims.1 
We are all human beings. Besides, in the world of divided identities 
and loyalties, we are Americans, Germans, Canadians, Britons, Serbs, etc., 
along with many other affiliations we can maintain. Do we have a right to 
be citizens of the world in the sense of being a subject to international 
law? This is the theme of Larry May’s article. In his opinion it is not nec-
essary to be a citizen of any state “in order to be effectively a rights-
bearer,” but this idea presupposes that there is some other entity that may 
endorse and grant a kind of “universal citizenship.” This is not entirely 
new, this is the case in Europe right now, where some are, and some others 
consider themselves as citizens of Europe more than citizens of their na-
tive states, making Europe a country. There were similar cases in the past: 
Prussians became Germans, Serbs were for a while Yugoslavs, etc. But is 
there a right to be or become a subject of international law? In the case of 
someone who is stateless and, thus, a non-citizen (a rightless outlaw?, a 
pirate?, a refugee?, an emigrant?) this might be important. In the case of 
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someone who is seeking refuge from her own state this might become 
urgent. The third possibility is being deprived of citizenship rights. May 
finds roots of a right to not be forced to lose the protection of one’s rights 
as a ‘citizen of the world’” in a “slight amendation” of the Magna Carta in 
1255. At the bottom line this is the right “not to be deprived of citizenship 
rights,” something that might be added to any list of human rights. It is 
“the right not to be outlawed to something like the right to trial by a jury of 
one’s peers.” May’s claim is that this might be incorporated in the list of 
rules that any government should respect. Moral and legal implications of 
this are rather obvious, for example in the case of Guantanamo detainees, 
but also, obviously, much further than that. The conceptual and normative 
clarifications in this area seem to be of utmost importance perhaps even 
more than ever. 
In close connection with the issues raised in Larry May’s article is An-
thony Ellis’ critique of another of May’s pieces. In the world in which the 
absence of the world government has been substituted by strong national 
sovereignty the idea of an international criminal court (unlike, perhaps, an 
international court of justice) could not find its place. Ellis claims, how-
ever, that the strength of national sovereignty has been eroded, and sees 
the establishment of an International Criminal Court as a symptom of this 
erosion. Although the creation of the ICC might be an experiment, it is 
welcome, at least in showing this particular erosion of national sover-
eignty. Arguably, Ellis contends that the main source of concerns against 
international tribunals is based on theoretical tenets about “rights of juris-
diction and the sovereignty of states.” In a fine analysis of the relation 
between universal and particular properties of those who are harmed, 
group based harms, etc., Ellis criticizes the thesis that a specific “harm to 
humanity” is the justification for the international prosecution, holding that 
what should be justified is the reverse: how to justify not punishing some 
harm outside the supposed scope of sovereign jurisdiction, accepting a 
form of pure utilitarian justification of punishment: “The correct starting 
point is to ask: why should the international community not have a right to 
prosecute and punish certain behaviour? Everyone has a right, within lim-
its, to prevent people from aggressing against others. That is simply a 
commonplace extension of the right of self-defence.” State sovereignty 
does not add anything to this scheme of justification. In the end the articu-
lation of what will be justified depends on many “practicalities, legal, 
political, financial and bureaucratic… (and… traditional habits of 
thought).” 
The articles by Virginia Held and Paul Gilbert develop some other as-
pects of our topic. While Gilbert is searching for “better arguments for 
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cosmopolitanism which do not rely on the idea of a global civil society,” 
Held believes that the best way to “seek change and maintain order as non-
violently as possible” is in “addressing the world as it is, in contrast with 
ideal theories based on hypothetical contract between states.” In her con-
tribution she emphasizes the role of care, without demanding the replace-
ment of justice by care but searching for the place of care, “building the 
trust, and practices of responding to actual needs”. 
The last contribution in the book is a refreshing piece by Luis Cabrera. 
His paper starts with a description of disputes from Arizona. “Thirsty 
people should be given water,” says one party. “The country belongs to us. 
The country doesn’t belong to them,” says the other. Which of these two 
opposite standpoints is right and which is wrong? Is the “global citizen-
ship,” or “a cosmopolitan moral outlook,” possible without creating a 
proper institutional frame of a supra-state capable of providing the global 
citizenship and the cosmopolitan right? In his article Cabrera gives a com-
prehensive survey of modern literature regarding these issues. 
The material contained in this book is diverse and provocative. We 
hope that it will contribute to the debate about world governance in a 
timely and relevant way. Many issues raised in the book will not find a 
complete and satisfying solution for some time, and some others may not 
find solution ever, but what is important is the continuing debate that may 
encourage and inspire further research on this important topic. 
Notes 
1. In John Updike’s novel Toward the End of Time the role of such self-proclaimed 
(?) taxmen was, after some initial tussles, taken by FedEx. 
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I. Preliminary Complexities 
 
There are three sets of concerns that bear upon a discussion of global 
governance, and related discourses on the adequacy of world order to meet 
the challenges of the early 21st century. As used here global governance is 
concerned with the establishment of order in the absence of world gov-
ernment or strong enough international institutions to implement global 
norms in relation to political actors strongly opposed. These governance 
concerns raise a series of difficulties that if left unattended will have seri-
ous negative policy consequences for the peoples of the world. Closely 
related into global governance is the idea of world order, which is primar-
ily focused on the structure of relations and interplay among those political 
actors that are the makers of world history at any given time. 
—regulatory authority in the domain of transnational economic activ-
ity: The era of neoliberal ideological hegemony following the Soviet col-
lapse favoured a minimization of regulatory authority in the world econ-
omy, relying on market forces and crisis management to ensure optimal 
development and economic growth based on the efficient deployment of 
capital. This approach more or less dominated the policy scene in the 
1990s, although coming under increasing scrutiny due to the mobilization 
of social forces dissatisfied with the neoliberal distribution of benefits and 
the hegemonic shaping of global economic policy. The backlash achieved 
notoriety initially in the so-called “battle of Seattle” in 1999 that exhibited 
a growing challenge being mounted by both populist forces (“globaliza-
tion-from-below”) and by many governments of the South no longer will-
ing to defer to Euro-American control over domains of trade and invest-
ment (exclusionary regimes established in accord with the priorities of 
“globalization-from-above”). The worldwide deep recession that started in 
late 2008 was caused mainly by irresponsibly risky and abusive practices 
in the banking, financial, and real estate sectors. The painful impact of 
these market failures has pointed to the urgent need for greater govern-
mental supervision and for socially sensitive forms of economic regulation 
at national, regional, and global levels. The unsatisfactory character of 
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American leadership on matters of trade, finance, and fiscal policy also 
underlay the push for global economic reform, including international 
financial institutions. This push for regulatory authority is strong, but so is 
corporate and banking resistance to interferences with either market self-
management or national sovereignty. At present, governmental actors are 
seeking to shape a more benevolent world economic order by way of di-
plomacy, especially to address issues of alleged currency imbalances, as 
with China, and excess indebtedness, as with Greece. International eco-
nomic institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund, are an 
important part of the governance pattern, but less than previously, having 
somewhat discredited by their handling of the Asian Financial Crisis that 
occurred a decade earlier, but these institutions do offer governments a 
somewhat flexible instrument for international cooperation and crisis man-
agement. As of now, the concern about inadequate regulation of the world 
economy persists on two levels: the continuing unwillingness to address 
claims of an unfair distribution of benefits, including insufficient attention 
to the plight of the poor throughout the world, and the absence of effective 
oversight over devious and imprudent banking and accounting practices 
associated with financing and indebtedness; 
—climate change and nuclear weaponry: In both settings, there is a 
rhetorical commitment by governmental leaders acknowledging the con-
cern, and expressions of a willingness to take appropriate adaptive steps. 
For both climate change and nuclear weaponry the relationship to the 
problem and solution seems concentrated in a very few governmental 
representatives of sovereign states. For nuclear weapons, the nine states 
that possess the weaponry, led by the United States, appear to lack the 
political will to achieve their elimination, or even to embrace a declaratory 
policy that renounces any right of first use.1 Those that possess nuclear 
weapons have devoted most of their political energy to preventing the 
further spread of the weaponry to additional countries, especially those 
countries believed to be challenging Western security interests. The over-
all preoccupation with the nonproliferation regime misleadingly implies 
that the principal danger arises from the countries that do not possess them 
rather from those that do. This diversion of concern serves to remove pres-
sure from the nuclear weapons steps to engage in serious disarmament 
negotiations instead of engaging in a series of endless series of arms con-
trol negotiations whose modest outcomes are designed to provide the effi-
cient and safe management of existing nuclear weapons arsenals. 
When it comes to climate change, the issues raised relate mainly to 
policy priorities and inter-governmental disagreements as to the appropri-
ate allocations of adaptive obligations. To what extent should the level of 
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pre-1990 contributions to the overall build-up of carbon emissions be 
taken into account in assessing relative responsibilities? The insistence of 
China that these earlier patterns of industrial development must be fac-
tored into any overall scheme for global policy coupled with the refusal of 
the United States to accept such an approach was a major reason why the 
Copenhagen Conference was generally viewed as a failure. It is also evi-
dent that a state-centred approach to climate change will neglect the hu-
man security impacts that would be emphasized by a people-centred ap-
proach that accorded emergency priority to the peoples and persons most 
disadvantaged by and vulnerable to global warming. As fundamental as 
these disagreements about apportioning responsibility for reducing carbon 
emissions is a parallel obstacle arising from the determined reluctance on 
the part of most governments and societies to incur large present economic 
costs for the sake of future benefits. Short cycles of political accountability 
greatly hamper the capacity and willingness of governments to meet 
longer term challenges until they produce crisis conditions, and then it 
may be too late. 
Against this background, both in relation to nuclear weaponry and cli-
mate change, sceptics believe that only in response to a catastrophe will it 
become political feasible to meet these challenges of global scope. It also 
appears to be the case that waiting for a catastrophe may well be a matter 
of waiting too long to deal with either nuclear weapons or global warming. 
In the first instance, the damage done by a nuclear war may be so great to 
preclude recovery, while in the second instance; the time lag associated 
with a carbon build-up would mean that the adverse effects would inten-
sify even after a crisis response.2 
—21st century security challenges: since the September 11 attacks on 
the United States there has arisen a preoccupation with the vulnerability of 
even the most powerful states to severe harm inflicted by non-state actors 
with scant resources but a dedicated will and a cadre of warrior ready to 
die for the cause, including even a readiness to sacrifice one’s own life in 
pursuit of political goals. The ideas about security that developed in the 
modern era of inter-state warfare and rivalry do not seem to fit the new 
circumstances of extremist resentments and tactics that cannot be territori-
ally confined, making traditional military doctrine and capabilities of ques-
tionable relevance. Recourse to war by the United States in response to 
September 11 illustrates the enormous costs and uncertain results of treat-
ing threats posed by transnational terrorism as if they created a suitable 
occasion for waging war. From a governance perspective it would have 
made more sense to rely on enhanced global policing, intelligence gather-
ing, and law enforcement. Such a law and intelligence approach seems 
(Re)imaging the Global Governance 23 
more sensitive to the specificities of the terrorist threat and incurs far 
lower economic and political costs. Yet such a soft power approach re-
mains politically suspect in governmental settings as existing political 
bureaucracies are accustomed to relying on their military capabilities when 
addressing a security threat. What does seem correct is that the old delimi-
tations associated with a world of sovereign states now provide almost no 
guidance, either because the preparation of an attack and even the overt 
acts involved in carrying it out may take place anywhere on the planet, 
with or without the support of the territorial sovereign. 
II. Global Governance: Shifting Patterns 
It was the English School of international relations that most effec-
tively conceptualized the dual assertions of the anarchical structure of the 
world political system as complemented by a normative order based on 
international law, diplomatic prudence, and informal linkages of comity.3 
These ideas were particularly appropriate in the setting of various West-
phalian discourses articulating the logic of the state system as a moderat-
ing modification of the Machiavellian worldview associated with various 
forms of unalloyed realism.4 Especially Martin Wight and Hedley Bull 
were keen, as well, on distancing themselves from those who advocated 
more ambitious renderings of the normative dimensions of international 
relations associated with the Grotian tradition in international law. Some 
of these notable international relations specialists and leading statesmen 
stressed the promise of international institutions and favoured the exten-
sion of the coverage of international law even to the point of overriding 
the sovereignty of states and the impunity of governmental leaders.5 This 
view of international relations rested the prospects for good global govern-
ance on prospects for considerable hegemonic self-restraint by leading 
states in the enactment of benevolent managerial roles by leading states, 
taking full advantage of the ordering potentialities of a pluralist framework 
composed of territorial states whose sovereign status was deemed entitled 
to a wide margin of respect. 
With the rise of transnational economic action and human rights, both 
with respect to actors and arenas, and with the multi-dimensional salience 
of transnational networks sustained by a variety of information technolo-
gies, the Westphalian discourse seems outmoded, or at the very least, in 
need of being enlarged to take into account some post-Westphalian per-
spectives.6 This essay seeks to do this in the context of an evolving critical 
understanding of “globalization,” not with the goal of cancelling the pri-
macy of the state system, but in complicating the explication of how poli-
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tics and authority operate on a global level. The pluralist tilt of the English 
School must now be adapted to encompass the role of actors in the global 
marketplace (trade, investment, currency), in the domain of human rights, 
and among civil society actors (transnational voluntary associations, mili-
tant global citizens and their networks). Strict Westphalian understandings 
of power and security were also deeply challenged by the September 11 
attacks and the American response, producing an essentially non-territorial 
war between two actors, neither of which is a state in the generally ac-
cepted sense of a territorially delimited entity. Of course, the United States 
seems a traditional state if we cast our gaze only upon a world map, but if 
we construct its global presence in space, oceans, foreign bases and take 
account of the global scope of its security zone, then it seems more useful 
to abandon the notion of “state” and signal the conceptual rupture by 
adopting the label of “global state.”7 
With suitable qualifications, an international society perspective still 
remains illuminating, principally because it calls our attention to the con-
tinuing absence of either effective centralized authority structures or a 
globally constituted security system operating efficiently under the aegis 
of the United Nations. Some readings of American grand strategy attribute 
to the global stature of the United States a condition of primacy that con-
fers an opportunity, if not a responsibility, for maintaining a global secu-
rity system administered from Washington, which since 2001 has focused 
on what the Pentagon has called “the long war,” and what others describe 
simply as “the war on terror” or counter-terrorism.8 To the extent that an 
American global state achieves coherent control over world politics, it 
would diminish the historical relevance of a pluralist account of world 
politics. Such American pre-eminence would offer the first instance of a 
solidarist world order of global scope, although not necessarily a benevo-
lent or effective version. It would likely be widely regarded by opponents 
and sceptics as a species of dystopia rather than being viewed in positive 
terms as an idealistic or even utopian alternative to the alleged chaos and 
disposition toward violent geopolitics associated with pluralist experience. 
The actual trends with respect to the interplay of sovereign states suggest 
the re-emergence of a more multipolar, but less Western, geopolitical 
pattern featuring the rise of China, but also the emergence of India and 
Brazil, and renewed prowess of Russia, as major global players, as well as 
dominant regional presences.9 
This essay will consider several solidarist tendencies and alternatives 
evident in present world society within the framework of a reconstituted 
discourse on globalization. A final brief section will revisit the question of 
“whither international society?” but under the preferred rhetorical banner 
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of “the future of world society.” This latter language is preferred because 
it frees the political and moral imagination from the bonds of a purely 
statist or materialist framing of political reality that linguistically presup-
poses that relations among “nations” or “states” remains the only fruitful 
focus for an explanation of cooperative and norm-governed behaviour as 
constraining energies. But at the same time, such a terminology does not 
ignore the continuing role of states and the state system, which for many 
dimensions of international life continues to be decisive, including setting 
membership rules for access to almost all important international institu-
tions, arenas, and procedures (including treaty-making). What is currently 
needed given this growing complexity, but is not yet clearly enough dis-
cernible to articulate, is a global imaginary responsive to 21st century be-
liefs, behavioural patterns, and aspirations (see Charles Taylor, 2004). 
III. “Globalization” under Stress 
In the 1990s it was evident that “globalization,” despite objections 
about the unsatisfactory nature of the term as misleading or vague, was 
widely accepted as usefully descriptive and explanatory: namely, that the 
world order sequel to the cold war needed to be interpreted largely from an 
economic perspective, and that the rise of global market forces was dis-
placing the rivalry among sovereign states as the main preoccupation of 
world order. This perception was reinforced by the ascendancy of Western 
style capitalism, ideologized as “neo-liberalism” or geopolitically labelled 
as “the Washington consensus,” a circumstance reinforced by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of a socialist alternative. It 
seemed more illuminating to think of the 1990s in this economistic light 
signified by reference to globalization than it would be to have held in 
abeyance any re-inscription of world politics by the evasive “the post-cold 
war era.” There were other ways of signalling that something new and 
important was taking place in the global setting. Some spoke convincingly 
of the start-up of “the information age” highlighting the re-structuring of 
international life that was being brought about by the computer and Inter-
net. In my judgment such a label, while fare from ridiculous, still seemed 
less resonant with the more pervasive emphasis on economic growth via 
neoliberalism than did the an acceptance of the terminology of globaliza-
tion.10 
But then the September 11 attacks came along to complicate matters 
further. These attacks strangely both revived and revolutionized the mod-
ern discourse of world politics, at once highlighting anew the severity of 
security concerns, war/peace issues, facing leading state, yet also giving 
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rise to doctrines and practices that could not be understood by reference to 
the prior centuries of interaction among territorial sovereign states. The 
concealed transnational terrorist network that displayed the capability to 
inflict severe substantive and symbolic harm on the heartland of the domi-
nant global state could not be comprehended, much less targeted, by re-
sorting to a traditional war of territorial self-defence. There was no suit-
able statist adversary that could be blamed, and then attacked and defeated 
once and for all, although this fundamental and disquieting reality was 
provisionally disguised, by the once plausible designation of Afghanistan 
as responsible for the attacks due to its role in providing a safe haven for al 
Qaeda.11 But with the initial phase of the Afghanistan War producing a 
“victory” in the form of the replacement of the Taliban regime and the 
destruction of the al Qaeda infrastructure situated within the country, it 
became clear that such a campaign was only marginally related to a “vic-
tory” in this new type of “war,” if by victory is meant the elimination of 
the threat. For one thing, most of the al Qaeda leadership and many among 
the cadre apparently escaped, slipping across the border, and quickly relo-
cating in the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. This development under-
scored the novelty of the situation, especially, the absence of any fixed 
territorial base for the enemy or any way to secure a meaningful victory on 
a territorial battlefield. Unable or unwilling to confront the threat accord-
ing to its distinctive features, the US Government shaped in response as if 
the security threat emanated from the “axis of evil” countries rather than 
from a mega-terrorist network with a long agenda of grievances, some 
legitimate, some not. These moves in world politics dramatized the origi-
nality of the global setting as well the confusing interplay of an expansion-
ist grand strategy being executed by the neoconservative operatives in the 
Bush White House with a supposed preoccupation after September 11 with 
al Qaeda and terrorism. Bewildering questions of discourse and terminol-
ogy arose as the Westphalian style of response to the al Qaeda threat 
seemed increasingly misleading and unsuccessful, as well as conceptually 
misdirected.12 At the same time, the central contention of this essay is that 
“globalization” retains its relevance as a descriptive label for the current 
phase of international relations, but that it needs to be interpreted far less 
economistically, and more comprehensively, since the events of 2001. The 
final section will consider approaches to global governance and world 
society given this altered understanding of “globalization.” 
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IV. The Changing Geopolitical Context of Globalization 
and Global Governance 
To set the stage for this extended view of globalization as incorporat-
ing the new geopolitics of post-statist political conflict, it is necessary to 
review briefly the evolution of world politics after the cold war. 
The breakdown of the geopolitical discipline of bipolarity that had 
managed conflict during the cold war era generated a security vacuum that 
could be and was filled in various ways. The Iraqi conquest and attempted 
annexation of Kuwait in 1991 was an initial expression of this breakdown. 
It would have seemed virtually certain that during the cold war epoch, 
without the approval of Moscow and Washington, Iraq would not have 
embarked on a path of aggressive warfare against its small neighbour. The 
American-led coalition that restored Kuwaiti sovereignty was the mark of 
a new era being shaped by essentially uncontested American global lead-
ership, seemingly a geopolitical debut for unipolarity in the global security 
sphere. The fact that the UNSC endorsed the defensive effort, accorded 
America full operational control of the Gulf War, and supported the sub-
sequent ceasefire burdens that Washington insisted on being imposed upon 
Iraq was far more expressive of the actuality of unipolarity than it was a 
sign that Woodrow Wilson’s dream of an institutionalized international 
community upholding the peace collectively was finally coming true. 
What emerged from the Gulf War more than anything else was the extent 
to which the UNSC seemed willing to allow itself to be used as a legiti-
mating mechanism for controversial US foreign policy initiatives that 
seemed to evade the limits on the use of international force contained in 
both international law and the United Nations Charter. 
Another course of action could have been followed, and seemingly was 
even encouraged by the first President Bush’s rhetorical invocation of “a 
new world order” in 1990 as a means of generating public and governmen-
tal support at the UN for authorizing a collective security response to Iraqi 
aggression. Such reliance on the procedures of the Security Council to 
fashion and supervise a response could have represented a genuine expres-
sion of the Wilsonian project to shift the locus of authority and responsi-
bility in war/peace matters from the level of the state to that of the world 
community. But there was no such disposition in the White House of the 
Bush I presidency. Instead, the United States moved to fill the security 
vacuum by acting on its own to the extent that it deemed necessary, while 
seeking Security Council approval so as to possess a legitimating rationale 
that would mobilize support for the use of force and deflect criticism. 
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The initiation of the Kosovo War under NATO auspices in 1999 made 
this new American orientation toward law and power clear, and the fact 
that it was undertaken during the Clinton presidency suggested the biparti-
sanship of this geopolitical unilateralism in the aftermath of the disappear-
ance of the Soviet Union as a state capable of deterring the United States. 
With the prospect of a Russian and Chinese veto in the offing, the US 
Government avoided the UNSC, while organizing “a coalition of the will-
ing” to attack the Serbian presence in and control of Kosovo under the 
formal and operational umbrella of NATO. This created a precedent for 
use of non-defensive force without a mandate from the Security Council. 
This action represented a serious departure from the discipline of interna-
tional law and the UN Charter, although there were extenuating circum-
stances that exerted interventionary pressures. The action taken was con-
troversial, although endorsed by public opinion and governmental policy 
throughout Europe and in the United States.13 It was justified as an excep-
tional claim necessitated by the perceived imminence of an ethnic clean-
sing crisis in Kosovo and against the background of the earlier UN failure 
to protect the Bosnian peoples, as epitomized by the 1995 Srebrenica mas-
sacre of an estimated 7,000-8,000 Bosnian males while UN peacekeepers 
scandalously stood by as disempowered spectators. 
The Iraq Crisis was a more revealing and consequential departure from 
the UN framework of restraint with respect to the use of international force 
in circumstances other than self-defence. Instead of circumventing the 
Security Council as in Kosovo, the US tried hard to enlist the UN in its 
war plans, and initially succeed in persuading the entire membership of 15 
countries to back SC Res. 1441, which implicitly accepted the American 
position that if Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were not found and 
destroyed by Baghdad’s voluntary action or through the United Nations 
inspection process, then an American-led war with UN blessings would 
obtain political backing and international legitimacy. Tensions within the 
Security Council surrounded mainly the timing and the alleged require-
ment that acting on 1441 required a further explicit authorization for re-
course to war. Evidently concerned that inspection might obviate the case 
for war, and that the Security Council additional mandate might never be 
obtained, the US went ahead on its own in March 2003, inducing a rather 
unimpressive coalition of more or less willing partners to join in the mili-
tary effort, which produced a quick, although deceptive, battlefield vic-
tory, followed by a bloody, expensive, and still inconclusive occupation.14 
In an important sense President George W. Bush was implementing a 
vision of a new world order, but not the one that his father appeared to 
favour in 1990-91 or that Wilson pushed so hard for after World War I. 
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Unlike The Gulf War of 1991 when the response, which was endorsed by 
the United Nations Security Council, was an instance of collective defence 
against prior aggression and conquest or the Kosovo War where the mili-
tary action appeared necessary and justified as humanitarian intervention 
in circumstances where there were reasonable grounds to anticipate a 
potential humanitarian catastrophe for the Kosovars, the war against Iraq 
rested on neither a legal nor moral grounding that was persuasive to most 
governments in the world, was opposed by an incensed global public opin-
ion, and even seemed politically imprudent, even perverse, from the per-
spective of meeting the al Qaida challenge of transnational terrorism. The 
Bush Doctrine of preemptive war as applied to Iraq, lacking a persuasive 
factual showing of imminent threat, seemed at the time to be a flagrant 
repudiation of the core international law prohibition of non-defensive 
force. It also established a precedent that, if followed by other states, could 
produce a series of wars and undermine the authority of the UN Charter 
and modern international law.15 The United States approach seemed to be 
filling the security vacuum that existed after the cold war with the unilat-
eralism and lawlessness of hegemonic prerogatives and geopolitical ambi-
tion. This seemed to widen even the already contested claim of preemptive 
defence by resorting to war in the absence of an imminent threat, and 
possibly in the absence of any threat whatsoever, thereby embracing uni-
lateralism and discretionary recourse to war in a manner that went beyond 
the already dangerous expansiveness of so-called “preventive war.” For 
the United States to attack Iraq, a weak state except within the Middle 
East, a state that had been weakened further by its lengthy war with Iran 
during the 1980s, by a devastating defeat in the Gulf War, and by more 
than a decade of harsh sanctions, involved launching a war without inter-
national or regional backing in a context where there was no credible past, 
present, or future threat. 
This display of audacity by the U.S. Government, repeatedly, although 
unconvincingly, rationalized by continuous references to the distinctive 
challenges posed by global mega-terrorism made manifest in the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, was exhibited in efforts to reconstitute world order in three 
crucial respects: seriously eroding the sovereignty of foreign countries by 
potentially converting the entire world into a battlefield for the conduct of 
the American war against al Qaeda; greatly weakening the restraints asso-
ciated with the international law of war and accompanying collective pro-
cedures of the organized world community while carrying on its campaign 
of counter-terrorism; re-establishing the centrality of the role of war and 
force in world politics, while dimming the lights that had been illuminat-
ing the rise of markets, the primacy of corporate globalization, and the 
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displacement of statist geopolitics. In effect, the focus on the terminology 
of globalization and the operations of the world economy were being par-
tially eclipsed by a novel 21st century pattern of geopolitics in which the 
main adversaries were a concealed transnational network of political ex-
tremists and a global state engaging in multiple military interventions and 
operating without consistent regard for the sovereign rights of normal 
territorial states.16 
For both of these political actors the framework of diplomacy and con-
flict that has evolved since the dramatic events of September 11 has radi-
cal, rather than moderate, world order implications. But there are impor-
tant continuities, as well, that give persisting relevance to the role of the 
United Nations and international law. In view of this, it seems far better to 
deal with the current global situation by reference to its distinctive features 
as modifying our understanding of world order, rather than claiming that a 
unique set of circumstances justify the depiction of a new system and the 
adoption of a new political vocabulary. On balance, I believe that despite 
there being some merit in favouring an entirely new set of descriptive 
labels for this early 21st century period as compared to the 1990s, it re-
mains advantageous to retain and revise the globalization discourse, espe-
cially in light of the increasing relevance of global governance as a preoc-
cupation with respect to the complexities of global policy. A different 
conclusion on these conceptual issues might well be preferable if the dis-
cussion was focused exclusively on an appraisal of the “political econ-
omy” or “global security” aspects of world order rather than on the overall 
quality of governance as it affects the wellbeing of the peoples throughout 
the planet. 
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that led over time to an agreed fram-
ing of political behaviour in a world of sovereign states was now being 
treated as more often anachronistic with respect to the resolution of acute 
transnational conflict.17 Seen in this light, reliance on the discourse of 
globalization seems useful to emphasize the extent to which crucial di-
mensions of contemporary world history are being addressed in such a 
way as to underscore the much diminished role for the agency and bounda-
ries of sovereign states in many, but not all, settings. For instance, in ex-
tending control over the oceans and space, as well as insulating borders 
against unwanted and illegal migrants, the state in the early years of the 
21st century is more assertive than it had been in the prior century. Above 
all states provide the boundaries that still shape the political geography of 
the world, and dominate our imaginative projections of how the world is 
organized. We are not likely to abandon this statist map of the world in the 
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foreseeable future despite its exaggerated reliance on territorial demarca-
tions of human and natural activities. 
V. Seven Globalizations for the 21st Century 
Against this background framing the future of global governance is in-
herently problematic. The contours and ideological orientation of global-
ization and governance will remain highly contested and fluid for decades, 
far more so than was the case during the placid 1990s, and the future of 
world order will hang precariously in the balance. The old political lan-
guage of statism will continue to be relied upon in many formal settings, 
including leading international conferences devoted to global policy con-
cerns, but it will not illuminate the multi-layered and transnational com-
plexities of world order nearly as comprehensively as a revamped reliance 
on the language of globalization. 
Six overlapping approaches to global governance can be identified as 
the structural alternatives for the future of world order. These will be 
briefly depicted, and a few conclusions drawn: corporate globalization; 
civic globalization; imperial globalization; apocalyptic globalization; re-
gional globalization; ecological globalization; and normative globaliza-
tion. The emerging structure of world order is a complex composite of 
these interacting and overlapping elements, varying with conditions of 
time and space, and therefore incapable of positing a unified “construc-
tion” as a generalized account of the new reality of the global lifeworld. In 
other words, many partial constructions of world order compete for plau-
sibility and adherence, but none has so far gained the sort of consensus 
that would qualify it as the defining reality. The contours and meanings of 
globalization are embedded in a dialogic process, further complicated by 
sharply divergent perceptual perspectives, uneven material circumstances 
and historical memories, and by a bewildering array of shifting policy 
challenges. Commentators upon the global setting must be content with 
partial, imprecise, tentative formulations of this evolving world order 
articulated by reference to multiple globalizations, and always put forward 
with the realization that changing conditions and unanticipated develop-
ments may require frequent re-formulations (see Talib, 2007). 
Corporate and monetary globalization. In the 1990s, with the resolu-
tion of the East/West conflict, the centre of global attention shifted to the 
ideas, arenas, and practices associated with the functioning of financial 
markets, currency arrangements, and world trade and investment, as 
guided by a privileging of capital formation and efficiency, and a celebra-
tion of capitalist ascendancy. The role of governments was increasingly 
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seen as subordinate to this cultic commitment to the efficiency of capital, 
and expected to play facilitative roles that trusted the mechanisms of self-
regulation. Political elites and elected leaders to achieve and sustain “le-
gitimacy” struggled to win the support and prominent participation in 
government of private sector elites. Ideological adjustments were made to 
upgrade markets, privatize a wide range of undertakings previously situ-
ated within the public sector, and to minimize the role of government in 
promoting social goals associated with health, employment, and security. 
Keynesianism was out, neoliberalism was in. New informal non-
governmental arenas of policy formation emerged to reflect this shift in 
emphasis away from electoral politics or welfare state expectations. The 
nanny state was out, the neoliberal state was in. In this atmosphere great 
weight was given to the pronouncements and outlook of such organiza-
tions as the World Economic Forum, an annual gathering of invited global 
business leaders, reinforced by the participation of top political figures. 
Political leaders seemed eager to receive invitations to speak at Davos, and 
whenever given the opportunity tended to express their enthusiasm for 
promoting the goals of a neoliberal world economy even if it meant subor-
dinating such national priorities as jobs and domestic investment. Gov-
ernments and international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) ac-
cepted and promoted this economistic agenda with enthusiasm, creating 
inter-governmental frameworks dedicated to the goals of the transnational 
private sector, such as the yearly economic summit (Group of Seven, then 
Eight, and later, Twenty) that first brought together the political heads of 
state of the principal advanced industrial countries in the North, and then 
later incorporated rising states in the South. 
In the 1990s there seemed to be a rather neat displacement of the terri-
torial and security features of the state system by the capital-driven con-
cerns of the world economy conceived along these neoliberal lines. It 
appeared that a new non-territorial diplomacy associated with trade, in-
vestment, and monetary flows was taking precedence over older concerns 
with strategic alliances, as well as dividing sovereign states between 
friends and enemies, giving priority to the security and well being of each 
specific territorial community of citizens. As long as corporate and mone-
tary globalization was sustained by impressive growth statistics, even if 
accompanied by evidence of persistent massive poverty, widening dispari-
ties among states and regions with respect to income and wealth, and a 
disturbing neglect of economic stagnancy in sub-Saharan Africa, there was 
little mainstream dissent from the pro-globalization consensus. This 
economistic consensus was also believed to have political side benefits. 
There was a widespread belief that global economic growth would encour-
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age shifts away from authoritarian forms of governance and toward the 
more decentralized patterns of governance associated with various types of 
constitutional democracy and the protection of essential human rights.18 
Such attitudes reflected, in part, the belief that the victory of the West in 
the Cold War, which was ideologically explained by pointing to the supe-
rior economic performance of the liberal economies of the West that was 
itself sustained by constitutional democracy that allowed private sector 
creativity to flourish. 
It was only in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis that began in 
1998, and its reverberations in such disparate countries as Argentina, Ja-
pan, and Russia that serious criticism began to produce a controversy as to 
whether the future of corporate and monetary globalization should be 
entrusted to the untender mercies of neoliberal guidance. In such an altered 
atmosphere, the reformist voices of such insiders as George Soros and 
Joseph Stiglitz began to be heard more widely, lending credibility to the 
previously ignored leftist critics. And then in late 1999, the Seattle demon-
strations directed at an IMF ministerial meeting signalled to the world the 
birth of a wide and multi-faceted anti-globalization movement deeply 
opposed to the basic policies associated neo-liberalism even when it suc-
ceeded in producing global economic growth. The reaction to Seattle fi-
nally generated a serious debate, not yet resolved, about the effects of 
globalization-from-above, assessing its benefits and burdens, and focusing 
especially on whether the poor of the world were being victimized or im-
pressively helped.19 
In the Bush presidency, despite its obsessions with global security and 
the war against mega-terrorism, the US Government dogmatically and 
unconditionally reinforced its commitment to corporate globalization as 
the sole foundation of legitimate governance at the level of the sovereign 
state.20 These policies were promoted without much fanfare because of the 
neoconservative espousal of an expansive grand strategy labelled here “the 
global domination project.” Corporate and monetary globalization at pre-
sent time is the subject to a variety of challenges resulting from a sharp 
global recession and by a robust worldwide grassroots movement that is 
more than a negative response to globalization-from-above, providing 
some vision of more equitable and sustainable forms of globalization. 
In the early 21st century confidence in capitalism has further retreated, 
especially in the aftermath of a global recession that started in 2008, and is 
not yet clearly over, and generates worries that a worse unravelling of the 
world economy might well occur in the years ahead. The seemingly supe-
rior capacity of centralized political order, such as China and Malaysia, to 
withstand economic turbulence and declines in world trade and investment 
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also has weakened the ideological hold of capitalism on the political 
imagination, especially in its neoliberal 1990s form. The high risk banking 
and financial practices that led to the economic collapse and a jobless 
recovery have not disappeared, which has had disillusioning effects on 
claims that market-driven economic policies are to be viewed as socially 
beneficial. At the same time, the business and banking leadership, abetted 
by rising economic nationalism that emphasizes competitive advantages in 
the global marketplace has made it almost impossible to establish appro-
priate forms of national and international regulation to restore confidence 
in corporate and monetary globalization.21 
Civic Globalization. As suggested, the effects of corporate and mone-
tary globalization have generated a counter-movement on the level of 
ideas and practices, a movement that seeks a more equitable and sustain-
able world economy, although not necessarily opposed to “globalization” 
as such despite some elements supportive of local sustainability. That is, if 
globalization is understood as the compression of time and space as a 
result of technological innovation and social/economic integration, and if 
its policy emphasis becomes people-oriented rather than capital-driven, 
then it is more accurate to consider civic globalization as favouring “an-
other globalization” rather than being identified as an anti-globalization 
populism. Over the years, civic globalization has clarified its dominant 
tendencies, despite diverse constituencies from North and South, including 
activist groups with distinct and sometimes clashing priorities, including 
human rights, economic well being, and environmental protection, as well 
as a range of commitments to participatory and substantive democracy. 
Not surprisingly civic globalization has yet to convey a coherent image of 
what is meant by a people-oriented approach.22 
As already suggested, especially through the annual gatherings of the 
World Social Forum in Porto Allegre, Brazil and elsewhere, has been 
exhibiting both its vibrant and its divergent tendencies creating the impres-
sion of anarchic energy but not yet a political project. There is a certain 
negative unity among militants adherents of civic globalization—a sys-
temic repudiation of the main tenets of corporate and monetary globaliza-
tion, and the further belief that capitalism cannot be reformed, but must be 
transformed into a type of political economy that has not previously ex-
isted. In the search for coherence and a positive program, there is an in-
creasing disposition to view civic globalization as essentially a movement 
dedicated to the achievement of global democracy, which emphasizes the 
call for a more participatory, transparent, and accountable process of shap-
ing and implementing global economic policy, especially within regional 
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and global economic institutions, in relation to regulated marketplaces, 
and within the UN System generally. 
As might be expected, those concerned with the impact of corporate 
and monetary globalization are also deeply disturbed by and generally 
opposed to the American response to the September 11 attacks, and view 
resistance to imperial globalization, and its accompanying militarism, as 
ranking with, or even regarded as more serious and urgent, than opposition 
to the predatory effects of corporate and monetary globalization. The mo-
bilization of millions to oppose the Iraq War in early 2003 was mainly a 
phenomenon in the countries of the North, but it attracted many of the 
same individuals who had earlier been part of grassroots campaigns asso-
ciated with opposition to corporate globalization. There is an uncertainty, 
at present, as to whether anti-war and anti-imperial activism will merge 
successfully with the struggle for a transformed world economy and for 
substantive democracy, and whether the experience of global recession, 
will move this struggle forward, or shift attention to incremental reform 
and temporary recovery. 
Imperial Globalization. Even at the high point of corporate and mone-
tary globalization in the mid-1990s, there were a variety of critical assess-
ments that pierced the economistic veil to depict and lament the American 
project of global domination.23 It was notable that during the 1990s the 
United States failed to use its global pre-eminence constructively. It failed 
to promote nuclear and general disarmament or to create a more robust UN 
peacekeeping capability or to address the major unresolved conflicts 
throughout the world. Instead, the United States Government put its ener-
gies into the identification of new enemies whose existence would justify 
high defence spending, the strengthening its worldwide network of mili-
tary bases and regional naval commands, the retention of its nuclear arse-
nal, and the continuation of an expensive program for the militarization of 
space. In retrospect, it seems difficult to deny the charges that US policy, 
whether or not with full comprehension by its leaders and many of its 
citizens, was seeking a structure for world order that rested on American 
imperial authority.24 True, the apparent priority goal in the 1990s for 
American global leadership was to keep the world profitable for corporate 
and financial globalization, deflecting criticism and threatening potential 
opponents. 
The “election” of George W. Bush in 2000 as a representative of the 
radical right in America, a result greatly abetted by the national emergency 
atmosphere following the September 11 attacks gave an unanticipated 
wide opening to the most ardent advocates of imperial globalization situ-
ated within the American policymaking community. It converted the un-
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dertaking from one of indirection and closet advocacy in conservative 
think tanks to that of the most vital security imperative in the history of the 
country with intense popular backing although disguised. There was, of 
course, no official American acknowledgement that was pursuing imperi-
alist ideas and goals. The need for American military dominance every-
where and the associated projection of military force to various corners of 
the globe were justified as essential security adjustments to the post-
September 11 global setting. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks a 
globally aggressive conception of security provided the most powerfully 
persuasive rationale for the global projection of U.S. military power since 
the cold war era, and it did so in a setting where the absence of strategic 
and ideological statist rivalry allowed the U.S. Government to promise a 
future world order without wars and geopolitical rivalry among states, and 
thus assure foreign governments that would be able to enjoy the benefits of 
a reinvigorated corporate and monetary globalization.25 As suggested 
earlier, the counter terrorist consensus loomed large at first, giving rise to 
widespread support at home and abroad for the US decision to wage war 
against Afghanistan, and to dislodge the Taliban regime from control. The 
move toward war with Iraq disclosed the limits of this global consensus as 
well as the diplomatic limits of American power to generate active politi-
cal support for its project of global dominance. As with Afghanistan, the 
Iraqi regime was widely deplored by other governments as oppressive and 
militarist, but unlike Afghanistan, Washington’s claims of pre-emption as 
directed toward Iraq seemed much more connected with plans for unre-
lated geopolitical expansion, especially in the Middle East, than qualifying 
as a sincere response to September 11 justified by claims of defensive 
necessity with respect to the continuing threats posed by the al Qaeda 
network. Indeed, as critics of the Iraq War pointed out during the pre-war 
debate, the probable effect of the war would be to heighten the al-Qaeda 
threat rather than diminish it. This critical view was accompanied by the 
surfacing of many suspicions about what were the real motivation for 
military intervention in Iraq, and explanations relating to ensuring future 
control over Gulf oil reserves, Israelis security, containment of political 
Islam, and regional hegemony were forthcoming. 
The perception of imperial globalization is a matter of interpretation, as 
are its probable effects on the governance of political behaviour in the 
world. The advocates of the new imperialism emphasize its benevolent 
potentialities, with reference to the spread of constitutional democracy and 
human rights, and the provision of peacekeeping capabilities that could act 
far more effectively than what could be achieved by reliance on the United 
Nations.26 The critics make several main arguments. Some are concerned 
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with prospects for a geopolitical backlash in the form of a new strategic 
rivalry, possibly involving a Sino-European alliance. Others stress that this 
commitment to global militarism will lead to the further weakening of 
American republicanism at home and abroad. Given these developments, 
it seems prudent to worry about the emergence of some new oppressive 
political order that might be most accurately described as “global fas-
cism,” a political fix without historical precedent.27 Of course, the propo-
nents of imperial globalization resent the friction produced by civic global-
ization, and despite the claims of support for “democracy” prefer compli-
ant governmental elites and passive citizenries. Bush “rewarded” and 
lavishly praised governments that ignored and overrode the clearly evi-
denced anti-war sentiments of their citizens, especially Britain, but also 
Italy and Spain, while “punishing” those countries that refused to support 
fully recourse to an aggressive and unlawful war against Iraq, including 
France, Turkey, and Germany. To some degree these concerns have abated 
since Barack Obama became president of the United States, although the 
structure of American militarism persists, as does the resolve to deal with 
persistence of threats associated with the September 11 experience by 
military intervention. The Obama presidency has escalated American and 
NATO military operations in Afghanistan and has kept tensions high in 
relation to Iran. 
Apocalyptic Globalization. There is no entirely satisfactory designation 
for the sort of political stance associated with Osama Bin Laden’s vision 
of global governance. It does appear reliant upon extreme forms of politi-
cal violence that challenge the West, especially the U.S., by a “war” with-
out limits. Without normal military capabilities the strongest consolidation 
of state power in all of human history is being challenged. The al Qaeda 
capability to pose such a challenge was vividly demonstrated on Septem-
ber 11, attacking the United States symbolically and substantively more 
severely than throughout the course of its entire history with the possible 
exception of the War of 1812. The Bin Laden vision also embodies very 
far reaching goals that if achieved would restructure world order as it is 
now known: driving the United States out of the Islamic world, replacing 
the state system with an Islamic umma, and converting the residual infidel 
world to Islam, thereby globalizing the umma. It is here characterized as 
“apocalyptic” because of its religious and absolutist embrace of violent 
finality that radically restructures world order on the basis of a specific 
religious vision, as well as its seeming willingness to resolve the historical 
tensions of the present world by engaging in a war of extermination 
against the “crusader” mentality of those designated as enemies, including 
Jews, Christians, and atheists, an avowedly genocidal agenda. Since the 
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United States as the target and opponent of al Qaeda also expresses its 
response in a political language of good and evil, but with the moral iden-
tities inverted, there seem to exist grounds for the term “apocalyptic glob-
alization.”28 This designation also conforms to the concern about nuclear 
weaponry, both as a safeguard for the established order and as a potential 
threat should such weapons of mass destruction fall into the hands of al 
Qaeda or others of similar disposition. 
Perhaps, it confers on al Qaeda an exaggerated prominence by treating 
its vision as sufficiently relevant to warrant a distinct status as a new spe-
cies of globalization that approaches the future with its own formula for 
global governance. At present, the scale of the attacks, as well as the scope 
of the response, seems to validate this prominence, even though it may 
seem highly dubious that such an extremist network has any enduring 
prospect of toppling statism or challenging either corporate and monetary 
globalization or imperial globalization. As far as civic globalization is 
concerned, there exists a quiet antagonism, and an even quieter basis for 
limited collaboration. The antagonism arises because the main support for 
civic globalization comes from primarily from those that regard them-
selves as secularists, or at least as opponents of extremist readings of any 
particular world religion that gives rise to a rationale for unrestricted holy 
war waged against civilian society. The collaboration possibility, if it 
exists at all, is implicit and a result of convergent goals rather than active 
cooperation. This convergence is present because of certain shared goals, 
including justice for the Palestinians and opposition to imperial and corpo-
rate and monetary globalization. 
Regional Globalization. As with apocalyptic globalization, the termi-
nology presents an immediate problem. Does not the postulate of a region-
alist world order contradict trends toward globalization of a planetary 
scope? The language may seem to suggest such a tension, but the intention 
is coherent, to imply the possibility that global governance may in the 
future be partially, or even best, conceived by reference to a world of re-
gions. The basic perspective, longer range than the others, is to view 
European regionalism as an ambitious exploratory venture, which if it is 
maintains and seems vindicated in the eyes of the world, will lead to imita-
tive behaviour in other principal regions of the world. What would consti-
tute success for the EU is not entirely clear, and is impossible to specify at 
this time. It would undoubtedly include economic progress, social democ-
racy, conflict resolution in relation to ethnic and territorial disputes, resis-
tance to, or at least the moderating of, imperial, apocalyptic, and corporate 
and monetary manifestations of globalization. Such regionalizing pros-
pects are highly speculative at this stage, but still worth entertaining, given 
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the dramatic transformations experienced by Europe during the past fifty 
years, and the difficulties associated with establishing beneficial world 
order alternatives.29 
Regionalism is conceptually and ideologically appealing as a feasible 
synthesis of functional pressures to form enlarged political communities 
and the rise of identity politics associated with civilizational and religious 
orientations. Regionalism is geopolitically appealing as augmenting the 
capabilities of the sovereign state without abandoning its centrality in 
political life at the national level, especially to allow non-American cen-
tres of action to compete economically and to build bulwarks of political 
resistance to the threats posed by imperial and apocalyptic globalization. 
It is also well to acknowledge grounds for scepticism with respect to 
regional globalization. The United States, as well possibly as China, Rus-
sia, Japan, Brazil, and India, seem likely either to oppose or to try their 
best to dominate any strong regionalizing moves outside of Europe. The 
disparities and rivalries among countries in the non-Western regions are so 
great as to make ambitious experiments in regionalism seem rather utopian 
for the foreseeable future. Also, regional frameworks are not entirely con-
gruent with the supposed recognition of civilizational and religious identi-
ties. Even in Europe there are large non-Western, non-Judeo-Christian 
minorities, and in Asia and Africa, the civilizational and religious identi-
ties cannot be homogeneously categorized without neglecting the realities 
of their basic condition of heterogeneity. 
Ecological globalization. The advent of growing concerns about the 
adverse effects of climate change present a statist world order with a series 
of difficult problems that can be effectively addressed through inter-
governmental cooperation on an unprecedented scale and scope. The Co-
penhagen Climate Conference at the end of 2009 showed both the realiza-
tion that some portions of the world are exceedingly worried about the 
harmful effects of global warming in the coming decade. This seems espe-
cially true for low lying island communities facing the prospects of rising 
ocean levels due to the melting of polar ice and parts of sub-Saharan Af-
rica that are threatened with higher temperatures and catastrophic drought 
in conditions where the human struggle for survival is already exceedingly 
difficult. There are related issues concerning the discouragement of defor-
estation, the danger that marine life will be devastated by acidification of 
the oceans, reduced biodiversity, a rising incidence of extreme weather, 
and a variety of harms associated with growing scarcities of fresh water. 
Normative globalization. By normative globalization is meant the im-
pact of international law, the United Nations, human rights, and religious 
and secular forms of humanism upon transnational behaviour and policy 
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agendas. It represents a recognition of the role of values and rights both in 
public consciousness and in political behaviour. By considering these 
influences within a framework of globalization, there is also a recognition 
that national identity frameworks are being superseded to varying degrees 
by universalistic and civilizational identities. Civic globalization is also 
often the bearer of undertakings that reflect commitments to the human 
interest and to human security rather than to more exclusive perspectives 
centring on nation, religion, ethnicity. The rise of human rights and hu-
manitarian intervention are expressive of this tendency, but also may oper-
ate in a contradictory manner as disguised carriers of imperial or apocalyp-
tic globalization, and even of corporate and monetary globalization.30 
VI. A Concluding Observation 
The basic argument made here is that it remains useful to retain the de-
scriptive terminology of globalization in addressing the challenge of 
global governance, but that its provenance should be enlarged to take 
account of globalizing tendencies other than those associated with the 
world economy and the anti-globalization movement that formed in reac-
tion. The discourse on globalization to remain useful needs to extend its 
coverage to the antagonism produced by the encounter between the United 
States and al Qaeda, acknowledging its borderless character and the degree 
to which both antagonists sponsor a visionary solution to the problem of 
global governance, neither of which seems consistent with the values as-
sociated with human rights and global democracy. As well, the European 
experiment in organizing many aspects of political community on a re-
gional basis suggests what many find to be an attractive alternative to 
reliance on statism, (which had been unquestioned at the time the United 
Nations was established) as well as a potential source of resistance to both 
imperial and apocalyptic menaces.31 Ecological stresses, especially associ-
ated with climate change and global warning, also seem to require such 
high levels of cooperation among sovereign states that perceive their inter-
ests very unevenly as to generate a variety of disturbing effects on the 
collective life of the planet. 
Such an appreciation of various globalizations is not intended as a fu-
neral rite for the state system that has shaped world order since the mid-
seventeenth century or to deride the achievements of territorial sovereignty 
in promoting tolerance, reason, plural space for self-determination, and a 
liberal conception of state/society relations. The state may yet stage a 
comeback, including a normative comeback, providing most of the peo-
ples of the world with their best hope for blunting the sharp and often cruel 
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edges of corporate, imperial, apocalyptic, ecological, and even regional 
dimensions of globalization. This possibility is explored in Falk 
(1997:123-136). The recovery of a positive world order role for the state 
may be further facilitated by collaborative endeavours joining moderate 
states with the transnational social energies of civic globalization, and 
possibly environmental activism. Such a possibility has already been 
manifested in impressive moves to support the Kyoto Protocol on climate 
change, the outlawry of anti-personnel landmines, and especially by the 
successful movement that led to the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court in 2002. 
The whole project of global governance has been eclipsed by the 
events of recent years, especially by the advent of unilateralist American 
government as of the 2000 presidential elections, followed in 2001 by the 
unleashing of the borderless war and the deliberate Washington effort to 
sideline the United Nations and disregard international law to the extent 
that such sources of authority clash with the policies of imperial globaliza-
tion by withholding a legitimating seal of certification. Part of the rationale 
for reimagining globalization is to encourage a more relevant debate on 
the needs and possibilities for global governance, that is, suggesting that 
the world situation is not altogether subject to this vivid clash of dark 
forces, that constructive possibilities exist to move forward, and deserve 
the engagement of citizens and their leaders throughout the world. Of 
course, it will be maintained by some commentators that such an undertak-
ing is merely rescuing globalization from circumstances that have ren-
dered the discussions of the 1990s irrelevant to present concerns, including 
how to re-stabilize the world economy and provide a regulatory frame-
work protective of human security. 
Returning to the observations made at the outset, the postulate of a de-
centralized political order composed of many dispersed actors continues to 
support a pluralist view of world society, but not one that is elegantly 
simplified by limiting the class of political actors to sovereign states. Be-
yond this, the integrative characteristics of the world economy, environ-
mental protection, and global civil society, as well as the American drive 
for global empire, give unprecedented weight to more solidarist construc-
tions of the global reality. Indeed, the most responsive rendering of world 
order prospects would seem to rest upon the emergence of a creative ten-
sion between the two poles of assessment, pluralist and solidarist as con-
ceptualized in an earlier global setting by the English School. We do not 
yet have a convincing political language with which to express this new 
dynamic reality, and so during what might be a long waiting period, the 
best solution seems to describe the world situation as one of “complex 
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globalization,” a multi-dimensional viewpoint that is sensitive to the cur-
rently anguished, messy, and controversial interplay of the main contend-
ing agents of history. Whether a new coherence will emerge from complex 
globalization is radically uncertain, although it is plausible to highlight 
two solidarist candidates for the shaping of the future of world society: the 
first, associated with the American dominance project, the second associ-
ated with the vision of a global democracy that informs the activities of 
global civil society.32 An imperial solution for world order would create a 
negative form of solidarism while a democratic solution, as abetted by 
environmental activism, would embody a positive form. In either case the 
pluralist hypothesis is likely to be refuted by the middle of this century. As 
mentioned in the discussion of a world of regions, that is, regional global-
ization, it is at least conceivable that a triumphal regionalism will produce 
a new pluralism rather than lead to political unification in some form, that 
is, the realization of a partial variant of solidarism as a sequel to the West-
phalian Era. 
The future of world society, it has been argued, is being forged on this 
anvil of complex globalization. It is most likely to produce a world order 
that exhibits a high degree of structural hybridity, combining aspects of 
pluralist and solidarist organizational ideas. Whether it will make benefi-
cial contributions to human security will depend, above all, on neutralizing 
apocalyptic and imperial forms of globalization, as well as democratizing 
corporate and monetary, civic, regional, and even normative and ecologi-
cal globalization. It is an ongoing historical cosmodrama that is likely to 
swerve to and from before arriving as some outcome that is sufficient 
stable to give rise to a new generalized account of world society. 
Notes 
1. President Barack Obama did deliver a speech in Prague that committed the 
United States to a vision of a world without nuclear weaponry, but there seems to 
be little evidence of an intention to follow up on such an initiative, except in 
managerial arms control/non-proliferation modes as in the New START Treaty or 
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. “Remarks of President Barack Obama,” Hrad-
cany Square, Prague, April 6, 2009; for more general assessment, see Falk 
(2010:131-149). 
2. This issue is well depicted by Anthony Giddens, presented as the “Gidden’s 
Paradox” (Giddens, 2009). 
3. The contours of the English School have been set forth most definitively by 
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. See especially Bull (1977); Butterfield & Wight 
(1966). For a sympathetic presentation of the English School see Dunne (1998) 
and more recently Linklater and Suganami (2008). 
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4. The effort was to show that both prudent power management respectful of inter-
national law and the benefits of inter-state cooperation across a wide spectrum of 
issues were characteristic of the workings of the state system. For a far more scep-
tical reading of the Westphalian image of world order either historically or empiri-
cally see various essays in Orford (2006). 
5. A viewpoint most influentially expressed by Bull in his influential essay, “The 
Grotian Conception of International Society” (1966: 51-73n2). 
6. My attempt to treat these concerns is to be found in Falk (2004). 
7. See a graphic depiction of this global reach in Johnson (2004), but the designa-
tion of “empire” needs elaboration as the American embodiment of the global state 
makes no formal claim to override the sovereignty of subordinated states, but its 
disregard of the sovereignty of others is blatant and constitutive of a new 21st 
century framing of world order. 
8. An intelligent expression of this perspective can be found in Brooks & Wohl-
forth (2009:49-63); especially in the period after September 11, this primacy was 
articulated as an ideological mission that amounted to a global domination project. 
9. For differing approaches to the changing geopolitical landscape see Kagan 
(2008); Moravcsik (2010:91-98). 
10. Most influentially by Manuel Castels in his magisterial three volume work 
bearing the overall title The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture 
(1996, 1997, 1998). 
11. My own misguided early endorsement of the Afghanistan War represented a 
misplaced view that the threat that produced the attacks was both attributable in 
part to a government in power and could be significantly reduced, if not elimi-
nated, by recourse to war and regime change. See Falk (2003). 
12. Ignored here, but not to be dismissed, are continuing calls for a redescription 
and reappraisal of what actually took place on September 11, giving rise to a grow-
ing ethos of suspicion with respect to truth and governance. See Griffin (2008); for 
an inquiry into deeper roots see Scott (2007). 
13. Perhaps most comprehensively and intelligently defended in Glennon (2001); 
for a more nuanced endorsement of the Kosovo intervention that seeks to revise 
international law to take wider account of humanitarian pressures to erode sover-
eign rights see The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons 
Learned (2000). 
14. For analysis of these issues, including an assessment on the future viability of 
the Charter constrains on the use of international force see Falk (2008:69-82). 
15. For mainstream assessment, and accompanying official texts appearing as 
appendixes, see Korb (2003); for early criticism see Falk (2002). For useful con-
sideration of deeper and complex issues see Doyle (2008). 
16. For one interpretation of this new framework of global conflict see Falk 
(2003). 
17. For extended discussion Falk (2002:311-352). 
18. For a widely read extravagantly positive account of the benefits of globaliza-
tion see Friedman (1999). 
19. The Economist  in its treatment of the anti-globalization movement that was 
initiated at Seattle in late 1999 demonstrations against the World Trade Organiza-
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tion argued that the poor were much more helped by market-oriented constitution-
alism than by more social democratic or welfare oriented approaches to economic 
development. 
20. For text of the most authoritative statement see the opening sentences of the 
covering letter signed by George W. Bush as president, White House, “The Na-
tional Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Washington, D. C., 
2002. 
21. An insightful critical response to the failures of economic globalization and 
possible transformative responses is found in Gill (2008). 
22. The dominant tendencies within civic globalization favour democracy as the 
basis for political life, but are sceptical about procedural forms of democracy that 
is centred upon periodic and free elections. Instead, what is proposed by those 
associated with various forms of globalization-from-below is substantive democ-
racy in which the governing process is dedicated to equitable economic, social, and 
political development, with a bias toward ensuring the wellbeing of the impover-
ished. 
23. For two very different approaches to the emergence of imperial globalization 
see Hardt and Negri (2000) and Bacevich (2002). 
24. The ending of the Bacevich (2002:244n22) asserts this challenge: “The ques-
tion that urgently demands attention—the question that Americans can no longer 
afford to dodge—is not whether the United States has become an empire. The 
question is what sort of empire they intend theirs to be.” Whether this question 
retains its same saliency in 2010 in the aftermath of the world economic recession 
and the frustrations faced by American military interventions in Iraq and Afghani-
stan is questionable. In any event, both the American public and its leaders have 
difficulty discussing this imperial identity or project because the guiding national 
political myth remains anti-imperial, a legacy of the country’s revolutionary origins. 
25. Bush writes as follows in very first sentence of his cover letter attached to the 
2002 National Security Strategy document cited in Note 20: “The great struggles 
of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive 
victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model of national 
success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” 
26. For influential statements of this pro-imperial outlook see Kagan (1998:24-35); 
Ignatieff (2003:22-27;50-53). 
27. For two rather different lines of argument along these lines see “Will the Em-
pire be Fascist?” in Falk (2004: 241-252n5); Wolin (2008). 
28. My use of the word “apocalyptic” here is based on conversations with Robert 
Jay Lifton. 
29. See useful conceptualization and advocacy by Paupp (2009); also Falk 
(2004:45-65n5). 
30. For several explorations see Orford and Kennedy chapters in Orford 
(2006:131-196n3). 
31. Although this Westphalian consensus that existed at the birth of the United 
Nations was distinctly West centric, and had no trouble reconciling this conceptual 
statism with an acceptance of European colonial empires as valid political ar-
rangements. 
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32. Important to distinguish the spread of democracy within states from the democ-
ratization of the world order system. The latter includes the procedures of such 
entities as the IMF and World Bank, and the operations of the UN principal organs, 
General Assembly and Security Council. For incisive overview of the interdepend-
ent nature and significance of national and global democracy see Archibugi (2008). 
Bibliography 
Archibugi, D. 2008, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward 
Cosmopolitan Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Bacevich, A. J. 2002, American Empire: The realities and consequences of 
U.S. diplomacy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Brooks, S. and Wohlforth, W. 2009, “Spearheading Reform of the World 
Order,” Foreign Affairs 88(2) 
Bull, H. 1977, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 
New York: Columbia University Press 
—. 1966, “The Grotian Conception of International Society,” in H. 
Butterfield and M. Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in 
the Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 
Butterfield H. and Wight, M. eds., 1966, Diplomatic Investigations: Es-
says in the Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press 
Castels, M. 1996; 1997; 1998, The Information Age: Economy, Society 
and Culture, 3 vols., Malden: Blackwell 
Doyle, M. W. 2008, Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in Interna-
tional Conflict, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Dunne, T. 1998, Inventing International Society: A History of the English 
School, Basengstoke, UK: Macmillan 
Falk, R. 2002, “The New Bush Doctrine,” The Nation, vol. 275(3), July 15 
—. 2002, “Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia,” Journal 
of Ethics 6 
—. 2003, The Great Terror War, Northampton: Olive Branch Press 
—. 2004, The Declining World Order: America’s Imperial Geopolitics, 
New York: Routledge 
—. 2008, The Costs of War: International Law, the UN, and World Order 
after Iraq, New York: Routledge 
—. 2010, “A Radical World Challenge: Addressing Global Climate 
Change and the Threat of Nuclear Weapons,” Globalizations VII(1) 
—. 1997, “State of Siege: will globalization win out?” International Af-
fairs, Vol. 75(1), January 
Richard Falk 46 
Friedman, Th. 1999, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Glob-
alization, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux 
Giddens, A. 2009, The Politics of Climate Change, Cambridge: Polity 
Gill, S. 2008, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, 2nd edition, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Glennon, M. J. 2001, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Intervention-
ism After Kosovo, New York: Palgrave 
Griffin, D. R. 2008, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited: 9/11, the Cover-up, 
and the Exposé, Northampton: Olive Branch Press 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. 2000, Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 
Ignatieff, M. 2003, “The Burden: With a military of unrivaled might, the 
United States rule a new kind of empire. Will this cost America its 
soul—or save it?” New York Times Magazine, January 1 
Johnson, Ch. 2004, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the 
End of the Republic, New York: Metropolitan Books 
Kagan, R. 1998, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy, Summer 
—. 2008, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, New York: 
Knopf 
The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, 
2000, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Korb, L. ed., 2003, A New National Security Strategy in an age of terror-
ists, tyrants, and weapons of mass destruction, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations 
Linklater A. and Suganami, H. 2008, The English School of International 
Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Moravcsik, A. 2010, “Europe, the Second Superpower,” Current History 
109, March 
Orford, A. ed., 2006, International Law and its Others, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 
Paupp, T. E. 2009, The Future of Global Relations: Crumbling Walls, 
Rising Regions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Scott, P. D. 2007, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of 
America, Berkeley: University of California Press 
Talib, N. N. 2007, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 
New York: Random House 
Taylor, Ch. 2004, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press 
Wolin, Sh. 2008, Democracy Inc.: Managed Democracy and the Specter 
of Inverted Totalitarianism, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
GOVERNING THE GLOBE: 





Imagine the possible political arrangements of international society as 
if they were laid out along a continuum marked off according to the degree 
of centralization. Obviously, there are alternative markings; the recogni-
tion and enforcement of human rights could also be measured along a 
continuum, as could democratization, welfare provision, pluralism, and so 
on. But focusing on centralization is the quickest way to reach the key 
political and moral questions, above all the classical question: what is the 
best or the best possible regime? What constitutional goals should we set 
ourselves in an age of globalization? 
My plan is to present seven possible regimes or constitutions or politi-
cal arrangements. I will do this discursively, without providing a list in 
advance, but I do want to list the criteria against which the seven arrange-
ments have to be evaluated: these are their capacity to promote peace, 
distributive justice, cultural pluralism, and individual freedom. Within the 
scope of this essay, I will have to deal summarily with some of the ar-
rangements and some of the criteria. Because the criteria turn out to be 
inconsistent with—or at least in tension with—one another, my argument 
will be complicated, but it could be, and no doubt should be, much more 
so. 
It’s best to begin with the two ends of the continuum, so that its dimen-
sions are immediately visible. On one side, let’s say the left side (though I 
will raise some doubts about that designation later on), there is a unified 
global state, something like Immanuel Kant’s “world republic,” with a 
single set of citizens, identical with the set of adult human beings, all of 
them possessed of the same rights and obligations. This is the form that 
maximum centralization would take: each individual, every person in the 
world, would be connected directly to the centre. A global empire, in 
which one nation ruled over all the others, would also operate from a sin-
gle centre, but insofar as its rulers differentiated between the dominant 
nation and all the others, and perhaps among the others too, this would 
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represent a qualification on its centralized character. The centralization of 
the global state, by contrast, is unqualified. Following Thomas Hobbes’s 
argument in Leviathan, I want to say that such a state could be a monar-
chy, oligarchy, or democracy; its unity is not affected by its political char-
acter. By contrast, unity is certainly affected by any racial, religious, or 
ethnic divisions, whether these are hierarchical in nature, as in the imperial 
case, establishing significant inequalities among the groups, or merely 
functional or regional. Any political realization of difference moves us 
rightward on the continuum as I am imagining it. 
At the far right is the regime or the absence-of-regime that political 
theorists call “international anarchy.” This phrase describes what is in fact 
a highly organized world, but one that is radically decentreed. The organi-
zations are individual sovereign states, and there is no effective law bind-
ing on all of them. There is no global authority or procedure for policy 
determination and no encompassing legal jurisdiction for either sovereigns 
or citizens. More than this (since I mean to describe an extreme condition), 
there are no smaller groups of states that have accepted a common law and 
submitted to its enforcement by international agencies; there are no stable 
organizations of states working to generate common policies with regard, 
say, to environmental questions, arms control, labour standards, the 
movement of capital, or any other issue of general concern. Sovereign 
states negotiate with each other on the basis of their “national interests,” 
reach agreements, and sign treaties, but the treaties are not enforceable by 
any third party. State leaders watch each other nervously and respond to 
each other’s policies, but in every other sense, the centres of political deci-
sion making are independent; every state acts alone. This is not an account 
of our own situation; I am not describing the world as it is in 2000. But we 
are obviously closer to the right than to the left side of the continuum. 
The strategy of this essay will be to move in from the two sides. I will 
be moving toward the centre, but from opposite directions, so as to make 
clear that I am not describing a developmental or progressive history. The 
different regimes or arrangements are ideal types, not historical examples. 
And I don’t assume in advance that the best regime lies at the centre only 
that it doesn’t lie at the extremes. Even that assumption needs to be justi-
fied; so I had better turn immediately to the twin questions: What’s wrong 
with radical centralization? What’s wrong with anarchy? The second of 
these is the easier, because it is closer to our own experience. Anarchy 
leads regularly to war—and war to conquest, conquest to empire, empire 
to oppression, oppression to rebellion and secession, and secession leads 
back to anarchy and war again. The viciousness of the circle is continually 
reinforced by inequalities of wealth and power among the involved states 
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and by the shifting character of these inequalities (which depend on trade 
patterns, technological development, military alliances, and so on). All this 
makes for insecurity and fear not only among the rulers of states but also 
among their ordinary inhabitants, and insecurity and fear are, as Hobbes 
argued, the chief cause of war. 
But would an international society, however anarchic, all of whose 
constituent states were republics, be drawn into the same circle? Kant 
argued that republican citizens would be far less willing to accept the risks 
of war than kings were to impose those risks on their subjects—and so 
would be less threatening to their neighbours (Perpetual Peace, First De-
finitive Article). We certainly see evidence of that unwillingness in con-
temporary democracies, though it has not always been as strong as it is 
today. At the same time, it is qualified today by the willing use of the most 
advanced military technologies—which don’t, indeed, put their users at 
risk though they impose very high costs on their targets. So it may be the 
case, as the Kosovo war suggests, that modern democracies won’t live up 
to Kant’s pacific expectations: they will fight, only not on the ground. 
A rather different argument has been made by some contemporary po-
litical scientists: at least in modern times, democratic republics don’t fight 
with one another. But if this is so, it is in part because they have had 
common enemies and have established multilateral forms of cooperation 
and coordination, alliances for mutual security, that mitigate the anarchy 
of their relations. They have moved, so to speak, to the left along the con-
tinuum. 
But I don’t want to dismiss international anarchy without saying some-
thing about its advantages. Despite the hazards of inequality and war, 
sovereign statehood is a way of protecting distinct historical cultures, 
sometimes national, sometimes ethnic/religious in character. The passion 
with which stateless nations pursue statehood and the driven character of 
national liberation movements reflect the sombre realities of the twentieth 
century, from which it is necessary to draw moral and political conclusions 
for the twenty-first. Sovereign power is a means of self-protection, and it 
is very dangerous to be deprived of this means. So, the morally maximal 
form of decentralization would be a global society in which every national 
or ethnic/religious group that needed protection actually possessed sover-
eign power. But for reasons we all know, which have to do with the neces-
sary territorial extension of sovereignty, the mix of populations on the 
ground, and the uneven distribution of natural resources above and below 
the ground, dividing up the world in this way would be (has been) a 
bloody business. And once the wars start, the divisions that result are 
unlikely to be either just or stable. 
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The problems at the other end of the continuum are of a different kind. 
Conventional warfare would be impossible in a radically centralized 
global state, for its agents would have disappeared, and none of the mo-
tives for going to war would any longer operate: ethnic and religious dif-
ferences and divergent national interests, indeed, every kind of sectional 
interest, would lose their political relevance. Diversity would be radically 
privatized. In principle, at least, the global state would be constituted 
solely and entirely by autonomous individuals, free, within the limits of 
the criminal law, to choose their own life plans. 
In practice, however, this constituting principle is radically unlikely to 
prevail, and ideal types should not be fictional types; they have to fit an 
imaginable reality. It isn’t plausible that the citizens of a global state 
would be, except for the free choices they make, exactly like one another, 
all the collective and inherited differences that make for rivalry and dis-
trust today having disappeared in the course of the state’s formation. 
Surely different understandings of how we ought to live would persist; and 
these would continue to be embodied in ways of life, historical cultures, 
and religions, commanding strong loyalties and seeking public expression. 
So let me redescribe the global state. Groups of many different sorts would 
continue to shape the lives of their members in significant ways, but their 
existence would be largely ignored by the central authorities; particularis-
tic interests would be overridden; demands for the public expression of 
cultural divergence would be rejected. 
The reason for the rejection is easily explained: the global state would 
be much like states today, only on a vastly greater scale. If it were to sus-
tain itself over time, it too would have to command the loyalty of its citi-
zens and give expression to a political culture distinctly its own. It would 
have to look legitimate to everyone in the world. Given this necessity, I 
don’t see how it could accommodate anything like the range of cultural 
and religious difference that we see around us today. Even a global state 
committed to toleration would be limited in its powers of accommodation 
by its prior commitment to what I will call “globalism,” that is, centralized 
rule over the whole world. For some cultures and most orthodox religions 
can only survive if they are permitted degrees of separation that are in-
compatible with globalism. And so the survival of these groups would be 
at risk; under the rules of the global state, they would not be able to sustain 
and pass on their way of life. This is the meaning I would give to Kant’s 
warning that a cosmopolitan constitution could lead to “terrifying despot-
ism” (Theory and Practice, Part III)—the danger is less to individuals than 
to groups. A more genuine regime of global toleration would have to make 
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room for cultural and religious autonomy, but that would involve a move 
rightward on the continuum. 
Once again, however, I want to acknowledge the advantages that lie on 
the continuum’s far left side, though in this case they are more hypotheti-
cal than actual, since we have less experience of centralization than of 
anarchy. But we can generalize from the history of centralized states and 
suggest that global distributive justice might be better served by a strong 
government able to establish universal standards of labour and welfare and 
to shift resources from richer to poorer countries. Of course, the will to 
undertake egalitarian reforms might well be absent in the world republic—
just as it is in most sovereign states today. But at least the capacity would 
exist; the European Community (EC) provides some modest but not insig-
nificant examples of the redistribution that centralized power makes possi-
ble. At the same time, however, the strength of the single centre carries 
with it the threat of tyranny. 
Now let’s move one step in from the left side of the continuum, which 
brings us to a global regime that has the form of a Pax Romana. It is cen-
tralized through the hegemony of a single great power over all the lesser 
powers of international society. This hegemony sustains world peace, even 
if there are intermittent rebellions, and it does this while still permitting 
some degree of cultural independence—perhaps in a form like that of the 
Ottoman millet system, under which different religious groups were 
granted partial legal autonomy. The autonomy is not secure, because the 
centre is always capable of cancelling it; nor will it necessarily take the 
form most desired by a particular group. It isn’t negotiated between equals 
but granted by the powerful to the weak. Nonetheless, arrangements of this 
sort represent the most stable regime of toleration known in world history. 
The rulers of the empire recognize the value (at least, the prudential value) 
of group autonomy, and this recognition has worked very effectively for 
group survival. But the rulers obviously don’t recognize individual citizens 
as participants in the government of the empire, they don’t protect indi-
viduals against their own groups, and they don’t aim at an equitable distri-
bution of resources among either groups or individuals. Imperial hegem-
ony is a form of political inequality that commonly makes for further ine-
qualities in the economy and in social life generally.  
I have to be careful in writing about imperial rule, because I am a citi-
zen of the only state in the contemporary world capable of aspiring to it. 
That’s not my own aspiration for my country, nor do I really think that it’s 
possible, but I won’t pretend to believe that a Pax Americana, however 
undesirable, is the worst thing that could happen to the world today (it may 
be the worst thing that could happen to America), and I have been an ad-
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vocate of a more activist American political/military role in places like 
Rwanda and Kosovo. But a role of that sort is still far from imperial he-
gemony, which, though we might value it for the peace it brought (or just 
for an end to the massacres), is clearly not one of the preferred regimes. It 
would reduce some of the risks of a global state, but not in a stable way, 
because imperial power is often arbitrary and capricious. And even if a 
particular empire did protect communal autonomy, it would be of no use 
to individuals trapped in oppressive communities. 
Now let’s move in from the right side of the continuum: one step from 
anarchy brings us to something like the current arrangement of interna-
tional society (hence this is the least idealized of my ideal types). We see 
in the world today a series of global organizations of a political, economic, 
and judicial sort—the United Nations, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World 
Court, and so on—that serve to modify state sovereignty. No state pos-
sesses the absolute sovereignty described by early modern political theo-
rists, which makes for anarchy in its strongest sense. On the other hand, 
the global organizations are weak; their decision mechanisms are uncertain 
and slow; their powers of enforcement are difficult to bring to bear and, at 
best, only partially effective. Warfare between or among states has been 
reduced, but overall violence has not been reduced. There are many weak, 
divided, and unstable states in the world today, and the global regime has 
not been successful in preventing civil wars, military interventions, savage 
repression of political enemies, massacres, and “ethnic cleansing” aimed at 
minority populations. Nor has global inequality been reduced, even though 
the flow of capital across borders (labour mobility too, I think) is easier 
than it has ever been—and, according to theorists of the free market, this 
ought to have egalitarian effects. All in all, we cannot be happy with the 
current state of the world; indeed, the combination of (many) weak states 
with weak global organizations brings disadvantages from both directions: 
the protection of ethnic and religious difference is inadequate and so is the 
protection of individual rights and the promotion of equality. 
So we need to move further toward centralization. The next step 
doesn’t bring us to, say, a United Nations with its own army and police 
force or a World Bank with a single currency. In terms of intellectual 
strategy, we would do better to reach arrangements of that kind from the 
other side. Consider instead the same “constitutional” arrangements that 
we currently have, reinforced by a much stronger international civil soci-
ety. Contemporary political theorists argue that civil society has often 
served to strengthen the democratic state. Certainly, associations that en-
gage, train, and empower ordinary men and women serve democracy more 
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effectively than other regimes, but they probably strengthen any state that 
encourages rather than suppresses associational life. Would they also 
strengthen the semi-governmental international organizations that now 
exist? I am inclined to think that they already do this in modest ways and 
could do so much more extensively. 
Imagine a wide range of civic associations—for mutual aid, human 
rights advocacy, the protection of minorities, the achievement of gender 
equality, the defence of the environment, the advancement of labour—
organized on a much larger scale than at present. All these groups would 
have centres distinct from the centres of particular states; they would oper-
ate across state borders and recruit activists and supporters without refer-
ence to nationality. And all of them would be engaged in activities of the 
sort that governments also ought to be engaged in—and where govern-
mental engagement is more effective when it is seconded (or even initi-
ated) by citizen-volunteers. Once the volunteers were numerous enough, 
they would bring pressure to bear on particular states to cooperate with 
each other and with global agencies; and their own work would enhance 
the effectiveness of the cooperation. 
But these associations of volunteers co-exist in international civil soci-
ety with multinational corporations that command armies of well-paid 
professional and managerial employees and threaten to overwhelm all 
other global actors. This is still a threat, not an achievement—the corpora-
tions haven’t entirely escaped the control of the nation-state—but the 
threat isn’t imaginary. And I can describe only an imaginary set of balanc-
ing forces in an expanded civil society: multinational labour unions, for 
example, and political parties operating across national frontiers. Of 
course, in a global state or a world empire, multinational corporations 
would be instantly domesticated, since there would be no place for their 
multiplication, no borders for them to cross. But that isn’t an automatic 
solution to the problems they create; in domestic society, exactly as in 
international society, they challenge the regulative and redistributive 
power of the political authorities. They require a practical, political re-
sponse, and international civil society provides the best available space for 
the development of this politics. 
Best available, but not necessarily sufficient for the task: it is a feature 
of the associations of civil society that they run after problems; they react 
to crises; their ability to anticipate, plan, and prevent lags far behind that 
of the state. Their activists are more likely to minister heroically to the 
victims of a plague than to enforce public health measures in advance. 
They arrive in the battle zone only in time to assist the wounded and shel-
ter the refugees. They struggle to organize a strike against low wages and 
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brutal working conditions, but are unable to shape the economy. They 
protest environmental disasters that are already disastrous. Even when they 
predict coming troubles, they have too little institutional power to act 
effectively; they are not responsible for the state as a whole, and their 
warnings are often disregarded precisely because they are seen as irre-
sponsible. As for the underlying, long-term problems of international soci-
ety—insecurity and inequality above all—civil associations are at best 
mitigating factors: their activists can do many good things, but they can’t 
make peace in a country torn by civil war or redistribute resources on a 
significant scale. 
I want to take another step in from the left side of the continuum, but 
will first summarize the steps so far. Because this next one, and the one 
after that, will bring us to what seem to me the most attractive possibili-
ties, I need to characterize, perhaps try to name, the less attractive ones 
already canvassed. Note first that the right side of the continuum is a realm 
of pluralism and the left side a realm of unity. I am not happy with that 
description of right and left; there have always been pluralist tendencies on 
the left, and those are the tendencies that I identify with. Still, it is proba-
bly true that unity has been the dominant ambition of leftist parties and 
movements, so it doesn’t make much sense, on this occasion anyway, to 
fiddle with the rightness and leftness of the continuum. 
Starting from the right, then, I have marked off three arrangements, 
moving in the direction of greater centralization but doing this, paradoxi-
cally, by adding to the pluralism of agents. First, there is the anarchy of 
states, where there are no effective agents except the governments that act 
in the name of state sovereignty. Next, we add to these governments a 
plurality of international political and financial organizations, with a kind 
of authority that limits but doesn’t abolish sovereignty. And after that, we 
add a plurality of international associations that operate across borders and 
serve to strengthen the constraints on state action. So we have international 
anarchy and then two degrees of global pluralism. 
On the left, I have so far marked off only two arrangements, moving in 
the direction of greater division but maintaining the idea of a single centre. 
The first is the global state, the least divided of imaginable regimes, whose 
members are individual men and women. The second is the global empire, 
whose members are the subject nations. The hegemony of the imperial 
nation divides it from the others, without abolishing the others.  
The next step in from the left brings with it the end of subjection: the 
new arrangement is a federation of nation-states, a United States of the 
World. The strength of the centre, of the federal government, will depend 
on the rights freely ceded to it by the member states and on the direct or 
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indirect character of its jurisdiction over individual citizens. Defenders of 
what Americans call “states’ rights” will argue for a mediated jurisdiction, 
with fewer rights ceded to the centre. Obviously, the greater the mediating 
role of the member states, the more this arrangement moves rightward on 
the continuum; if the mediation disappears entirely, we are back at the left 
end, in the global state. To find a place for this federal regime, we need to 
imagine a surrender of sovereignty by the member states and then a consti-
tutionally guaranteed functional division of power, such that the states are 
left with significant responsibilities and the means to fulfil them—a ver-
sion, then, of the American system, projected internationally. A greatly 
strengthened United Nations, incorporating the World Bank and the World 
Court, might approximate this model, so long as it had the power to coerce 
member states that refused to abide by its resolutions and verdicts. If the 
UN retained its current structure, with the Security Council as it is now 
constituted, the global federation would be an oligarchy or perhaps, be-
cause the General Assembly represents a kind of democracy, a mixed 
regime. It isn’t easy to imagine any other sort of federation, given the 
current inequalities of wealth and power among states. The oligarchs 
won’t yield their positions, and any effective federal regime would have to 
accommodate them (though it might also drain their strength over the long 
run). 
These inequalities are probably harder to deal with than any political 
differences among the states. Even if all the states were republics, as Kant 
hoped they would be, the federation would still be wholly or partly oligar-
chic, so long as the existing distribution of resources was unchanged. And 
oligarchy here represents division; it drastically qualifies the powers of the 
centre. By contrast, the political character of the member states would tend 
to become more and more similar; here the move would be toward unity 
or, at least, uniformity. For all the states would be incorporated into the 
same constitutional structure, bound, for example, by the same codes of 
social and political rights and far less able than they are today to ignore 
those rights. Citizens who think themselves oppressed would appeal to the 
federal courts and presumably find quick redress. Even if the member 
states were not democracies to start with, they would become uniformly 
democratic over time. 
As a democrat I ought to find this outcome more attractive than I do; 
the problem is that it’s more likely to be reached by pressure from the 
centre than by democratic activism at (to shift my metaphor) the grass-
roots. Some combination of the two might work fairly well. But I want to 
stress that my own preference for democracy doesn’t extend to a belief 
that this preference should be uniformly enforced on every political com-
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munity. Democracy has to be reached through a political process that, in 
its nature, can also produce different results. Whenever these results 
threaten life and liberty, some kind of intervention is necessary, but they 
don’t always do that, and when they don’t the different political forma-
tions that emerge must be given room to develop (and change). But could 
a global federation make its peace with political pluralism? 
It is far more likely to make its peace with material inequality. A fed-
eral regime would probably redistribute resources, but only within limits 
set by its oligarchs (once again, the European Community provides exam-
ples). The greater the power acquired by the central government, the more 
redistribution there is likely to be. But this kind of power would be dan-
gerous to all the member states, not only to the wealthiest among them. It 
isn’t clear how to strike the balance; presumably that would be one of the 
central issues in the internal politics of the federation (but there wouldn’t 
be any other politics since, by definition, nothing lies outside the federa-
tion). 
Constitutional guarantees would serve to protect national and eth-
nic/religious groups. This seems to be Kant’s assumption: “In such a 
league, every nation, even the smallest, can expect to have security and 
rights...” (Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, Sev-
enth Thesis). In fact, however, only those groups that achieved sovereignty 
before the federation was formed would have a sure place within it. So 
there would have to be some procedure for recognizing and securing the 
rights of new groups, as well as a code of rights for individuals without 
regard to their memberships. Conceivably, the federal regime would turn 
out to be a guardian of both eccentric groups and individuals—as in the 
United States, for example, where embattled minorities and idiosyncratic 
citizens commonly appeal to the central government when they are mis-
treated by local authorities. When such an appeal doesn’t work, however, 
Americans have options that would not be available to the citizens of a 
global union: they can carry their appeal to the UN or the World Court or 
they can move to another country. There is still something to be said for 
division and pluralism. 
Now let’s take another step in from the right side and try to imagine a 
coherent form of division. I have in mind the familiar anarchy of states 
mitigated and controlled by a threefold set of non-state agents: organiza-
tions like the UN, the associations of international civil society, and re-
gional unions like the EC. This is the third degree of global pluralism, and 
in its fully developed (ideal) version, it offers the largest number of oppor-
tunities for political action on behalf of peace, justice, cultural difference, 
and individual rights; and it poses, at the same time, the smallest risk of 
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global tyranny. Of course, opportunities for action are no more than that; 
they bring no guarantees; and conflicts are sure to arise among men and 
women pursuing these different values. I imagine this last regime as pro-
viding a context for politics in its fullest sense and for the widest engage-
ment of ordinary citizens. 
Consider again the troubling features of the first five, possibly the first 
six regimes: in some of them it is the decentred world and the self-centred 
states inhabiting it (whether the states are strong or weak) that threaten our 
values; in others it is the tyrannical potential of the newly constituted cen-
tre that poses the danger. So the problem is to overcome the radical decen-
tralization of sovereign states without creating a single all-powerful central 
regime. And the solution that I want to defend, the third degree of global 
pluralism, goes roughly like this: create a set of alternative centres and an 
increasingly dense web of social ties that cross state boundaries. The solu-
tion is to build on the institutional structures that now exist, or are slowly 
coming into existence, and to strengthen all of them, even if they are com-
petitive with one another. 
So the third degree of global pluralism requires a UN with a military 
force of its own capable of humanitarian interventions and a strong version 
of peacekeeping—but still a force that can only be used with the approval 
of the Security Council or a very large majority of the General Assembly. 
Then it requires a World Bank and IMF strong enough to regulate the flow 
of capital and the forms of international investment and a WTO able to 
enforce labour and environmental standards as well as trade agreements—
all these, however, must be independently governed, not tightly coordi-
nated with the UN. It requires a World Court with power to make arrests 
on its own, but needing to seek UN support in the face of opposition from 
any of the (semi-sovereign) states of international society. Add to these 
organizations a very large number of civic associations operating interna-
tionally, including political parties that run candidates in different coun-
tries’ elections and labour unions that realize their longstanding goal of 
international solidarity, as well as single-issue movements of a more fa-
miliar kind. The larger the membership of these associations and the wider 
their extension across state boundaries, the more they would knit together 
the politics of the global society. But they would never constitute a single 
centre; they would always represent multiple sources of political energy; 
they would always be diversely focused. 
Now add a new layer of governmental organization—the regional fed-
eration, of which the EC is only one possible model. It is necessary to 
imagine both tighter and looser structures, distributed across the globe, 
perhaps even with overlapping memberships: differently constituted fed-
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eral unions in different parts of the world. This would bring many of the 
advantages of a global federation but with greatly reduced risks of tyranny 
from the centre. For it is a crucial feature of regionalism that there will be 
many centres. 
To appreciate the beauty of this pluralist arrangement, one must attach 
a greater value to political possibility, and the activism it breeds, than to 
the certainty of political success. To my mind, certainty is always a fan-
tasy, but I don’t want to deny that something is lost when one gives up the 
more unitary versions of globalism. What is lost is the hope of creating a 
more egalitarian world with a stroke of the pen—a single legislative act 
enforced from a single centre. And the hope of achieving perpetual peace, 
the end of conflict and violence, everywhere and forever. And the hope of 
a singular citizenship and a singular identity for all human individuals—so 
that they would be autonomous men and women, and nothing else. 
I must hurry to deny what the argument so far may suggest to many 
readers: I don’t mean to sacrifice all these hopes solely for the sake of 
“communitarianism”—that is, for the sake of cultural and religious differ-
ence. That last is an important value, and it is no doubt well served by the 
third degree of pluralism (indeed, the different levels of government allow 
new opportunities for self-expression and autonomy to minority groups 
hitherto subordinated within the nation-state). But difference as a value 
exists alongside peace, equality, and autonomy; it doesn’t supersede them. 
My argument is that all these are best pursued politically in circumstances 
where there are many avenues of pursuit, many agents in pursuit. The 
dream of a single agent—the enlightened despot, the civilizing imperium, 
the communist vanguard, the global state—is a delusion. We need many 
agents, many arenas of activity and decision. Political values have to be 
defended in different places so that failure here can be a spur to action 
there, and success there a model for imitation here. 
But there will be failures as well as successes, and before concluding, I 
need to worry about three possible failures—so as to stress that all the 
arrangements, including the one I prefer, have their dangers and disadvan-
tages. The first is the possible failure of peacekeeping, which is also, to-
day, a failure to protect ethnic or religious minorities. Wars between and 
among states will be rare in a densely webbed international society. But 
the very success of the politics of difference makes for internal conflicts 
that sometimes reach to “ethnic cleansing” and even genocidal civil war. 
The claim of all the strongly centred regimes is that this sort of thing will 
be stopped, but the possible price of doing this, and of maintaining the 
capacity to do it, is a tyranny without borders, a more “total” regime than 
the theory of totalitarianism ever envisaged. The danger of all the decen-
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tred and multicentered regimes is that no one will stop the awfulness. The 
third degree of pluralism maximizes the number of agents who might stop 
it or at least mitigate its effects: individual states acting unilaterally (like 
the Vietnamese when they shut down the killing fields of Cambodia), 
alliances and unions of states (like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
in the Kosovo war), global organizations (like the UN), and the volunteers 
of international civil society (like Doctors Without Borders). But there is 
no assigned agent, no singular responsibility; everything waits for political 
debate and decision—and may wait too long. 
The second possible failure is in the promotion of equality. Here too, 
the third degree of pluralism provides many opportunities for egalitarian 
reform, and there will surely be many experiments in different societies or 
at different levels of government (like the Israeli kibbutz or the Scandina-
vian welfare state or the EC’s redistributive efforts or the proposed “Tobin 
tax” on international financial transactions). But the forces that oppose 
equality will never have to face the massed power of the globally dispos-
sessed, for there won’t be one global arena where this power can be 
massed. Instead, many organizations will seek to mobilize the dispos-
sessed and express their aspirations, sometimes cooperating, sometimes 
competing with one another. 
The third possible failure is in the defence of individual liberty. Once 
again, the pluralism of states, cultures, and religions—even if full sover-
eignty no longer exists anywhere—means that individuals in different 
settings will be differently entitled and protected. We can (and should) 
defend some minimal understanding of human rights and seek its universal 
enforcement, but enforcement in the third degree of pluralism would nec-
essarily involve many agents, hence many arguments and decisions, and 
the results are bound to be uneven. 
Can a regime open to such failures possibly be the most just regime? I 
only want to argue that it is the political arrangement that most facilitates 
the everyday pursuit of justice under conditions least dangerous to the 
overall cause of justice. All the other regimes are worse, including the one 
on the far left of the continuum for which the highest hopes have been held 
out. For it is a mistake to imagine Reason in power in a global state—as 
great a mistake (and a mistake of the same kind) as to imagine the future 
world order as a millennial kingdom where God is the king. The rulers 
required by regimes of this kind don’t exist or, at least, don’t manifest 
themselves politically. By contrast, the move toward pluralism suits peo-
ple like us, all-too-real and no more than intermittently reasonable, for 
whom politics is a “natural” activity. 
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Finally, the move to the third degree of pluralism really is a move. We 
are not there yet; we have “many miles to go before we sleep.” The kinds 
of governmental agencies that are needed in an age of globalization ha-
ven’t yet been developed; the level of participation in international civil 
society is much too low; regional federations are still in their beginning 
stages. Reforms in these institutional areas, however, are rarely sought for 
their own sake. Few people are sufficiently interested. We will strengthen 
global pluralism only by using it, by seizing the opportunities it offers. 
There won’t be an advance at any institutional level except in the context 
of a campaign or, better, a series of campaigns for greater security and 
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Ever since the rise of nation-states in the modern period, diplomats and 
political theorists have struggled to devise international institutions that 
might more effectively secure peace and some measure of justice among 
nations. The very complexity of the current international scene makes a 
fair and effective system of world governance more necessary than ever—
but it also makes it unlikely. In these circumstances, it may be useful to 
sketch briefly a scheme for world governance that is an improvement over 
present circumstances, without being hopelessly utopian. That means that 
any such scheme must be appropriate for international politics as it actu-
ally exists. 
The most salient feature of international politics has long been its anar-
chic character. Ever since the rise of sovereign nation-states, there has 
been no sovereign power above them. The absence of a super-Leviathan, 
combined with the absence of a broad consensus on values or on proce-
dures of conflict resolution, means that international politics has long 
been, in Rousseau’s terms, a “state of war,” real or potential. There have 
been truces, temporary remissions, and zones of peace—but so long as 
anarchy prevails, there can be no end to the possibility of war. 
In the nineteenth century, the main European powers constituted a 
“concert” to try to preserve the post-Napoleonic peace settlements. But 
this was primarily a mechanism of consultation, and the concert eventually 
fell apart over the issue of intervention in domestic affairs. 
After World War I, statesmen and citizens began to think of going be-
yond the sovereign nation-state. The League of Nations seemed like a big 
step forward, because of its provisions against aggressive wars and its 
procedures for peaceful change. But it was a strictly inter-national organi-
zation: its coercive powers depended on the willingness of the major states 
to put them into effect. Even worse, the League’s strong connections with 
the territorial status quo established by the post-1918 treaties thwarted the 
application of its provisions for peaceful change. 
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When the United Nations was founded in 1945, it was designed to pre-
vent a fiasco like the League of Nations, rather than to cope with the mess 
left by World War II. The Security Council of the UN had much more 
power than the Council of the League. But within two years, the Cold War 
showed that this power was meaningless in practice unless the major states 
were able to serve as a kind of directorate—which, during the Cold War, 
they were not. 
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, hopes for 
a new global regime flourished again. But these hopes were dashed, even 
though a fundamental cause of the Security Council’s paralysis had been 
eliminated. In a unipolar world dominated by one sovereign nation-state—
since 1990, the United States—the UN could function effectively only 
when it followed the lead of the United States. 
The UN in the past half century has faced a further difficulty, caused 
by the collapse of the traditional distinction between international and civil 
conflicts. During the Cold War, one of the chief conflicts between the 
United States and the USSR concerned the nature and composition of 
domestic regimes. In the years since the Cold War ended, a number of 
states, especially in former colonized areas, have disintegrated, and their 
fragmentation has incited outside interventions, further blurring the dis-
tinction between wars waged between states and those within a state. 
At the same time, an emergent concern for human rights, a secondary 
issue when the UN Charter was established, has also helped to erode the 
barrier between interstate and domestic affairs, as the UN has in recent 
years succeeded in extending its jurisdiction and in inventing new methods 
of peacekeeping. But it still does not have the kind of supranational power 
necessary to enforce human rights consistently. Nor does it have the power 
to force recalcitrant parties to resolve intractable conflicts in the Middle 
East, Kashmir, Cyprus, and Korea, and between the two Chinas. 
As if matters in the traditional domain of world politics—whose pri-
mary actors are sovereign nation-states—had not gotten complex enough, 
a new domain of a very different sort has emerged: a global civil society, 
in which force (except in the form of terrorism) and conquest play little 
role, and in which the main actors are transnational financial organizations 
and multinational corporations. These actors are increasingly free to ignore 
the sovereignty of select nation-states—largely because the dominant 
nation-state, the United States, wills it so. 
In addition, the new global civil society involves millions of private 
investors and speculators, thousands of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and a number of transnational alliances of specialized bureaucra-
cies (for example, the World Health Organization and national health 
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ministries). Innovations in information technology and communications 
are meanwhile driving a steady integration of civil societies around the 
world. 
Thus we live in a world where one crucial sector, involving security 
and survival, remains a zone of fragmentation, while another sector, in-
volving prosperity and growth, is a zone of growing integration. At the 
same time, the globalization of civil society is gradually depriving some 
nation-states of many of the instruments that were once at their disposal—
especially monetary and industrial policies. 
Undoubtedly, globalization is a new source of conflict: the rich nations 
do not agree on how—or indeed on whether—to help the poor; the poor 
apparently must choose between a more or less gilded dependence and an 
autarkic misery; the experts meanwhile disagree about the best formula for 
assuring global well-being; the champions of free markets often vehe-
mently disagree with the proponents of social justice and human rights; the 
interests of labour clash with the needs of entrepreneurs, as environmental 
interests clash with demands for modernization. 
And then there is the phenomenon of the new transnational forms of 
terrorism exemplified by the attacks of September 11. The terrorists re-
sponsible for these attacks were able to exploit the open borders of the 
new world economy, as well as the global reach of new communication 
media like the Internet. They demonstrated that violence on a vast scale is 
no longer a monopoly of nation-states or aspiring leaders of nation-states. 
To make matters worse, the costs of waging the current war on terrorism 
are liable to make aid for international development even more scarce—
thus aggravating the troubles of an already troubled world economy. 
In recent years, a number of steps have been taken in order to render 
international affairs less chaotic. But each of these steps has been flawed 
in ways that have frustrated the hopes of reformers. 
In the society of states, two sets of advances have been noticeable—
and controversial. There have been a number of humanitarian interven-
tions aimed at preventing mass killings for ethnic reasons, and the creation 
of new forms of international criminal justice has accompanied these ef-
forts. But defenders of national sovereignty have resisted both the interna-
tionalization of human rights and the assimilation of internal to interna-
tional conflict. On each of these two paths, defeats have been as conspicu-
ous as successes: think of Rwanda, and of America’s hostility to the Inter-
national Criminal Court. 
Indeed, the means of peacekeeping and peacemaking at the disposal of 
the UN and of regional organizations (both for internal and interstate con-
flicts) remain pitifully insufficient, in financial and military terms. And 
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efforts to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction have thus far 
been sporadic and generally ineffective. 
In the global civil society that has emerged in recent decades, govern-
ance is similarly patchy and ineffective. A variety of transnational agen-
cies that are specialized and often contradictory in their policies have been 
allocated varying degrees of authority and power. Existing global institu-
tions meant to regulate such matters as the environment, population 
growth, and the condition of women are little more than talk shows. Gov-
ernance of the global economy has been weak because of the strong oppo-
sition of interest groups and some powerful states to anything that could 
encumber a free market; thus, it has been all but impossible to regulate 
foreign investments or short-term capital flows—and there is still no inter-
national bankruptcy code. Many states and the domestic interest groups 
influential in them prefer to have their own national institutions provide 
economic and financial stability, rather than entrusting these aspects of 
domestic policy to multinational agencies. The United States has been 
especially reluctant to accept multinational constraints on trade and on the 
free circulation of currencies. 
All of these limitations in the current system have produced a growing 
dissatisfaction with current forms of world governance. Critics deplore the 
restrictions imposed on the UN and regional organizations by the most 
powerful states—especially those on the UN Security Council endowed 
with veto power. The provisions of the UN Charter aimed at giving mili-
tary capabilities to the Security Council have never been substantiated; a 
code defining the conditions in which humanitarian intervention could and 
should be undertaken has not been drafted. There is still disagreement, for 
example, on what constitutes genocide. And then there are the special 
problems created by the overwhelming power of the United States; it 
claims vociferously the right to act without UN endorsement when its 
security is at stake, and has often resorted to unilateral sanctions without 
seeking external support. More recently, the United States has pushed 
aside UN arms control efforts. 
At the same time, critics protest that current forms of economic gov-
ernance are both incomplete and unjust. Under current circumstances, 
states must conform to the ideology of free trade and obey the dictates of 
the International Monetary Fund, even if this means undermining domestic 
support and democratic legitimacy. Many international agencies are de-
nounced for being pawns of U.S. interests, for exploiting the weakness of 
poorer countries and countries in crisis, for disregarding environmental 
and human rights standards, for acting in secret, etc. Multinational corpo-
rations are attacked for usurping powers of the state: they are increasingly 
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global in their control of resources, products, banking, and insurance; their 
private connections with politicians make them increasingly influential (in 
trade negotiations, for instance); and their ability to shift their activities 
toward low-wage countries fosters a race to the bottom. Thanks to the 
absence of international oversight, corporations are able to exploit rela-
tively weak states with impunity. 
Such is the unsatisfactory state of world governance today. But what is 
to be done? 
If we are to improve on the present situation without being utopian, we 
shall have to imagine a set of institutions appropriate for the world of 
international politics as it presently exits. 
This means that I must reject a number of familiar proposals for re-
form. The first—chronologically—is Kant’s formulation of a confedera-
tion of representative republics. On the one hand, its provisions for the 
abolition of war do not deal with such pressing contemporary issues as 
terrorism or humanitarian interventions (Kant is, fundamentally, a nonin-
terventionist liberal). On the other hand, Kant foresees no significant regu-
lation of civil society on a global scale, apart from protecting freedom of 
trade and the right of individuals to hospitality abroad. This is too sketchy 
for a world in which liberal regimes are relatively few, standing armies 
prosper, armaments are ever more sophisticated, and the world economy is 
ever more inegalitarian. 
Another scheme, which had many proponents just after the end of 
World War II, is the creation of a world-state, usually advocated in the 
form of a global federation not unlike the United States of America. This 
proposal for reform acknowledges a world of nation-states, but has little to 
say about the global society in which both states and a free market of indi-
vidual actors and private groups and organizations operate. Furthermore, 
its demand that the states give up their formal sovereignty is still “a bridge 
too far.” Kant’s critique of such a world-state remains valid: such a state 
world have to be imposed by force, or else it would be too weak to survive 
the daily crises and challenges of world and internal affairs. 
Nor do I find John Rawls’s scheme in The Law of Peoples convincing. 
He has little to say about governance, even though he realizes that in the 
world as it is—the world of “non-ideal theory”—the states would have a 
formidable task dealing with rogue and aggressive actors and with the 
“burdened societies” that need economic assistance. Paradoxically, in 
Rawls’s ideal theory, his concern with the need for a consensus broader 
than that of liberal regimes leads him to a restricted conception of human 
rights, one that would have to be acceptable to what he calls “decent hier-
archical” regimes. The priority he gives to “the justice of societies” over 
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the “welfare of individuals” finally raises important questions about the 
fate of the increasingly large number of individuals—migrants, refugees, 
and other stateless people—who do not fall under the protection of any 
specific society. 
I will therefore leave (with some regret) the realm of utopia and de-
scribe briefly the kind of governance that would constitute a great im-
provement, from the viewpoint of a rather traditional liberal with social-
democratic leanings. 
In the global society of sovereign nation-states, two issues are central. 
The first is the protection of human rights. There are, in some parts of the 
world, such as Europe, strong agencies that protect such rights; it is rela-
tively easy for European citizens to lodge complaints against state viola-
tions. But these institutions do not cover the globe, and the relevant UN 
agencies remain weak, politicized, and state-centred. 
That is why we need a world commission and a world court on human 
rights, on the European model, as well as the right of monitors and inspec-
tors to operate at the service of such a commission. The latter would have 
the duty to report to, if necessary to ask for action from, the secretary-
general and the political organs of the UN under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter, if necessary. States, being the most frequent violators of human rights, 
should not be left in charge of initiating the enforcement of covenants they 
have either refrained from signing or, more usually, signed but disre-
garded. Although there has been a gradual shift away from invariably 
preferring a claim of national sovereignty to a claim of human rights, the 
conflict between these two principles remains intense. 
The second issue is that of the use of force. There has been a similar 
shift away from the nineteenth-century claim by states of a right to wage 
war--with limitations only on the means--toward a modern version of the 
old doctrine of jus ad bellum, which bans aggression and recognizes as 
legal only wars of self-defence and of solidarity with the victims of ag-
gression. But here, too, two contradictory principles uneasily coexist, with 
uncertain implications for the practice of war. 
A more consistent application of emergent principles of world govern-
ance would require an enormous reinforcement of the powers of the UN. 
The secretary-general should be not merely allowed to bring dangerous 
cases to the Security Council: he should be obliged to activate the Council 
and the General Assembly when the legal limitations on the use of force 
among states risk being violated, or when grave violations of human rights 
risk being committed internally. There needs to be a legal code that clearly 
defines when humanitarian interventions are justified. States that want to 
use force in (or by claiming) self-defence, individual or collective, should 
World Governance: Beyond Utopia 67 
need the authorization of the Security Council, or, if the Council is para-
lyzed, of the General Assembly—and when the General Assembly itself 
cannot agree on the proper course of action, the use of force as a last resort 
should have to be fully reported to the UN’s bodies. 
Above all, the Security Council should be provided with a standing 
force, recruited from the member states but placed under a UN military 
command that would have a supranational character. This command could 
be put in charge of preventive or reactive operations licensed by the Secu-
rity Council, and a civilian board, composed of UN officials who would 
monitor all UN military actions, could supervise it. These bodies could 
also have a right to inspect countries suspected of acquiring weapons of 
mass destruction, and to call for sanctions by the Security Council if such 
weapons are indeed being acquired. The secretary-general should have the 
duty to be the chief negotiator for the UN in grave conflicts that threaten 
global or regional peace-either along with state efforts at good offices, or 
instead of such efforts if they are blocked by states or if state efforts have 
failed. A permanent supranational arms control negotiating body would 
put pressure on states in dangerous zones to reduce their arsenals and to 
open their borders to inspections. 
In the case of humanitarian interventions—future Yugoslavia’s or 
Rwanda’s—the powers of the UN should go beyond restoring peace, and 
extend to the kind of nation-building or rebuilding that would be indispen-
sable. Obviously, this would entail a vast increase of the UN’s budget, and 
a substantial increase in the number of international civil servants working 
for the UN secretariat. 
In order to curb terrorism, a UN agency should be created to insure the 
cooperation and coordinate the responses of state forces. Such an agency 
could also issue periodic reports to the relevant political and military 
agencies of the UN. As in cases of inter- and intra-state wars, wars against 
terrorism and wars against states that foment or shelter terrorism should be 
authorized by the Security Council and proceed under the supervision of 
the UN’s military command. 
In imagining how to improve the governance of civil society on a 
global scale, a traditional liberal with social-democratic leanings will pro-
ceed with caution. Global dirigisme is neither possible nor probably desir-
able. But a few important problems need to be addressed. Just as nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century capitalism gradually came to accept a modi-
cum of national and international regulation—to protect workers and con-
sumers, to preserve price stability, to prevent monetary disasters, etc.—
twenty-first-century global capitalism needs a regulatory framework that is 
less fragmented than what exists today. I am thinking of the flaws, demon-
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strated by the Asian crisis of a few years ago, in the supervision of coun-
tries and of banks by the IMF, and in the IMF’s frequent indifference to 
the domestic effects of the deflationary policies it imposes, the disastrous 
effects of the volatility of private capital flows, the risks created by exces-
sively rigid exchange rates, the need to oblige foreign investors to take 
into account human rights and labour conditions, health standards, and 
environmental protection. 
I have neither the competence nor the space to redesign the institu-
tional architecture, but the need for fresh political initiatives in four areas 
seems to me essential. 
First, there ought to be one embryonic economic government that 
oversees and tries to guide the evolution of the world economy. Here the 
model could be the European Union, whose supranational commission 
functions as an economic executive, and whose Council of Ministers sets 
the rules. (For the global economy, a new economic and social council 
comparable to the Security Council would be needed.) Harmonizing the 
activities of the World Trade Organization with those of the International 
Labour Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF would be within the 
jurisdiction of this economic government, and a functional equivalent of 
the EU’s commission could act as its executive agent. Divergences over 
economic philosophies and goals would persist, but these bodies could 
focus on setting common norms, in the form of codes of good practices, 
and on reducing the bad effects of capitalist competition—the rash of 
alliances and mergers, which creates a need for a global antitrust mecha-
nism. 
Second, the responsibility for giving aid to developing nations ought to 
be more centralized, the goals being an increase of development assistance 
and a reduction of the inequality between the rich and the poor countries’ 
influence in world governance: this would entail giving the UN the power 
to tax its member states in order to promote more equitable patterns of 
global development, and to inspect, report on, and recommend changes in 
the policies of countries receiving such UN aid. 
Third, a world environmental agency must be created. It would be in 
charge of negotiating global protocols and be provided with the expertise 
necessary to supervise their enforcement and to recommend sanctions 
against noncompliance. 
Fourth, UNESCO would have to be revamped; from the (valuable) 
concern for elite cultures and endangered local ones, UNESCO’s activities 
should partly switch to a global effort against fanaticism, parochialism, 
and intolerance. This would require major funds to influence and activate 
governments, churches, and school systems. Once again, an agency com-
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parable to the EU commission would serve as this new UNESCO’s execu-
tive. 
A final point of principle must be stressed: The improvement of global 
governance requires not only more powers and resources for global institu-
tions, but also far greater democratization. The UN General Assembly, 
which represents the governments of states, needs to be complemented by 
a UN Assembly of Peoples’ Representatives that, in the beginning, might 
have only powers of general recommendation. Even so, such a UN Popu-
lar Assembly would introduce unofficial voices into the global debates. 
The General Assembly might also be augmented by an additional consul-
tative assembly, composed of representatives of NGOs and of important 
multinational corporations (an official and public supplement to, if not a 
substitute for, the Davos Conference). As I have suggested before (Hoff-
mann, 1998:185, chap. 12), mandating a routine review of the resolutions 
adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the new Eco-
nomic and Social Council could be entrusted to the World Court, in order 
to increase the authority and legitimacy of these resolutions, just as su-
preme courts in many democratic states currently enhance the authority 
and legitimacy of the laws passed by their elected representatives. 
Short of being mobilized by a world catastrophe—a nuclear, biologi-
cal, or chemical war that kills millions, an economic recession next to 
which that of 1929 would appear insignificant, a meteorite colliding with 
the earth, a series of global epidemics that nobody would know how to 
stop, global warming turning into a boil (we now understand that Holly-
wood science fiction can anticipate real events)—the many tribes of the 
human race are unlikely to launch a world constitutional convention that 
would do away with the sturdy residues of the Westphalian order, to abol-
ish existing states and the creaky international institutions that serve them, 
and to proclaim a world state. If they occur at all, institutional reforms are 
likely to be gradual, and to grow out of responses to crises. 
Indeed, if one recalls how difficult it has been to complete the trans-
formation of the European Union from a complex mechanism of inter-state 
cooperation into what Jacques Delors likes to call, cryptically, a federation 
of nation-states, then one has to concede that the transnational regime I 
have described is, at best, a very remote possibility. The obstacles are too 
many to examine in detail here, but the main ones need to be faced 
frankly. 
First, the nation-state is not yet obsolete. Despite the erosion of their 
legal and operational sovereignty by global markets and the claims to 
universal jurisdiction made on behalf of the new global institutions that 
have been set up to reduce violence and protect human rights, nation-states 
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remain the ultimate locus of authoritative decision-making regarding most 
facets of public and private life. The enduring power of nation-states 
means, of course, that conflicts between states will not disappear—indeed, 
such conflicts may grow even sharper as states become more fearful of 
losing what power they still have. Although the number of ostensibly 
sovereign states has multiplied in recent decades, most of them lack any 
real clout. The fact that power is so unevenly distributed today makes an 
agreement on the respective weight of different states in the institutions of 
global governance very dubious. Military and economic giants will not be 
outvoted or pushed around by hordes of pygmies. They are also unlikely to 
embrace abstract obligations that clash with concrete calculations of na-
tional interest. (This is why the United States can deplore nuclear prolif-
eration when it involves “rogue” states such as Iraq and North Korea, 
while tolerating it in an ally like Israel.) 
A second obstacle involves the sheer variety of cultures represented by 
the growing number of nation-states. Despite the partial globalization of 
mass culture, and the existence of pressing ecological problems that can 
only be solved through global cooperation, recent decades have also seen 
ongoing movements of nationalist secession, the rise of new religio-
political movements, especially in Muslim states, and a reassertion of 
indigenous cultural practices in many countries around the world. In a 
world driven by economic and technological forces, where the political 
ideologies of the past two centuries have tended to exhaust themselves—
through horrible excesses or humbling irrelevance—there remains an 
unbridgeable gulf between globalizers, whose hopes lie with capitalism, 
and cultural particularists, many of whom distrust the inhuman scale of 
global capitalism. All this has made Rousseau’s dictum about the absence 
of any unity of humankind truer than ever before. 
A third obstacle to reform is the cleavage between liberal democratic 
regimes that respect human rights and the right of people to self-
determination, and authoritarian or totalitarian regimes that do not. The 
“decent” authoritarians of Rawls are a fiction of his ideal theory. The 
many tyrants of this world have no incentive to grant to other countries, or 
to a global criminal court, jurisdiction over those of their subjects who 
have committed crimes against humanity or genocide. States whose re-
gimes erect political walls even if they open up their economies will not 
welcome the democratization that I propose. A UN Assembly of Peoples’ 
Representatives half elected by popular vote and half appointed by dicta-
tors would be a joke. Without the Kantian prerequisite—a world of liberal 
democracies—the institutions of world governance will remain battle-
grounds. 
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The final obstacle that needs to be confronted lies closer to home: it is 
the United States, the very superpower that sees itself as the upholder of 
world order and the champion of liberal democracy. My scheme of world 
order needs not just new international institutions, but also the good will of 
the world’s most powerful sovereign nation-state. Without moral and 
financial support from the United States and the other major powers, it is 
impossible to imagine how a new regime of global governance could en-
force the principles and procedures I have sketched. 
In recent years, unfortunately, a sizable section of the American estab-
lishment has expressed scepticism about the value of U.S. support for 
existing global institutions—never mind creating new ones. Under Presi-
dent George W. Bush, furthermore, a growing number of international 
protocols and treaties have been abandoned or repudiated. 
The underlying message of this boastful unilateralism is clear: the 
United States is a self-sufficient guarantor of global order, and the inter-
preter of last resort of what global order requires. 
This is not exactly conducive to a consensual scheme. Other states do 
not want America to rule the world by itself. And without a thorough re-
jection of this new doctrine, and a return to a policy of American leader-
ship without dictation, the prospects for creating a new and more democ-
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Any political philosophy which is truly political addresses contempo-
rary challenges. Today, this especially means coming to terms with global-
ization. But the word itself has become so amorphous through overuse that 
it calls for a new formulation. To this end, I would like to suggest three 
observations from which this reformulation might begin. 
 (Observation #1) Plural Globalization 
It is common to hear the word globalization in the singular, used as a 
term that refers only to economic changes in the contemporary world. If 
this picture were accurate, economic sciences are certainly of primary 
relevance to any account of globalization, and so too are the law of peo-
ples, the theory of international relations and sociology. But for at least 
two reasons, philosophy is also suited to assist in an assessment of global-
ization. First, philosophy concerns itself generally with the very conditions 
under which globalization is possible: the capabilities of language and 
reason shared by all human beings. Second, philosophy, being exlusively 
concerned with these very capabilities, is itself a global success story of 
sorts. After beginning in Asia Minor and then flourishing in classical Ath-
ens, philosophy spread itself across the Mediterranean and from there over 
the whole globe. Consequently, the masterpieces of philosophy—those of 
Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes and Descartes, Kant and Hegel—were read 
worldwide long before financial and economic globalization were them-
selves the subjects of study. Indeed, long before computers came into the 
houses of educated people, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein were 
already there. 
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The conception of globalization as a one-dimensional process, this re-
duction of globalization into narrow economic terms manages to recon-
cile—at least on this one point—two otherwise bitterly opposing groups: 
orthodox Marxists and orthodox Liberals. Both believe that the primary 
powers at work in the world are economic. In truth, however, economic 
changes have more than just economic causes. They are based also on 
political decisions—consider, for example, the deeply political roots of 
Bretton Woods, GATT and the OECD—as well as on technological inno-
vations, whether military or non-military. In addition, globalization is not 
confined to a world-wide network consisting only of markets and labour. 
Rather, its domain is the whole of the free world, including even such 
things as global tourism. Hence it includes a great wealth of phenomena, 
which are only partially or not at all economic. The totality of globaliza-
tion, including its economic components, can be grouped according to its 
three dimensions. 
The first dimension consists of a multifaceted “society of violence.” 
This society operates (a) in war, which threatens to assume global scale 
through new weapons, (b) in international crime (drug trafficking, slavery, 
terrorism), and (c) in the exploitation of the environment, which certainly 
observes no national borders. This society of violence has left a trail of 
bloodshed through history. This trail is picked up by what might be called 
a “critical world-memory” which follows the society of violence and keeps 
its misdeeds in common memory. And if this world-memory preserves, 
unlike up to now, a non-selective memory of the atrocities, it will help us 
to prevent future terrors from this society. 
Thankfully this wide-spread society of violence is complemented by a 
still wider-spread “society of cooperation,” the second dimension of glob-
alization. Here economics and finance play an important role, along with 
the institutions of communication, transportation and the labour market. 
As previously, though, economics is not the only force at work. Philoso-
phy itself, along with its sibling academic disciplines and the other impor-
tant areas of culture and education, take part in this process of globaliza-
tion. Further, liberal democracy itself is part of this society of cooperation 
and drives the tendency of the “cooperation” toward globalization, partly 
through its promotion of “world-memory.” An indication of this is that, 
even though not all human rights abuses are punished worldwide, they 
lead at least to a worldwide protest. A common public sphere, indeed a 
global one, is growing and endorsing a critical “world-memory.” This 
global public sphere is indeed becoming stronger through the expansion of 
international law and the growing number of globally active governmental 
and non-governmental organizations. In addition to these newcomers, such 
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as the World Bank and Amnesty International, older examples should not 
be forgotten, such as international sporting organizations and the even 
much older churches. 
One should not confuse this society of cooperation with love and 
friendship. On the contrary, in all areas of the society of cooperation com-
petition is still an essential component. But competition has two sides: one 
which motivates the effort, risk, and creativity that fosters the growth of a 
collective human wealth, and another which involves costs. These costs, 
which are sometimes economically internal, e.g. unemployment, and 
sometimes external, e.g., damage to the environment, bring forth the third 
dimension of globalization, the “society of shared destiny,” the community 
of neediness and suffering. This includes a broad spectrum, the movement 
of refugees with its concomitant religious, political and economic back-
ground, civil wars, which are often the later consequences of colonization 
and decolonization, but also often the eruptive answer to corruption and 
mismanagement. Natural catastrophes, famine, poverty, and economic as 
well as cultural and political underdevelopment also belong to this dimen-
sion. 
All three dimensions—my first of the three promised observations 
about globalization—call for a global reaction to their global implications. 
And this puts into perspective the dominant paradigm of political philoso-
phy from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes and Hegel: the self-contained, 
national state. 
(Observation #2) Two Qualifications 
It has been pointed out that globalization is not the exclusive move-
ment of contemporary history. Indeed, as if to qualify the expression of 
globalization, there are some pronounced oppositions to it. These include 
the growing self-confidence of certain regions and the formation of re-
gional authorities, as well as the fragmentation of many mega-cities into 
separate ethnic and cultural groups and even the strengthening of national 
sentiment in young democracies. There is, in any case a variety of lan-
guages, customs, morals, and religions. If indeed humanity develops into a 
global society of shared destiny, fate itself will be more immediate at the 
regional, local and individual level. For this reason, the notion of a world 
village is highly simplistic, but, in the same time, the often conjured dan-
ger of a standardization of our lives is avoidable. 
By way of a second qualification, we do well not to forget that global-
ization has historical antecedents. International trade routes such as the 
Silk Road were developed long before the modern era. In Hellenistic times 
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there emerged something of a smaller-scale international trade area with 
market pricing and even trading centres of international scale, such as 
Alexandria and the Mesopotamian city of Seleucia. Further, certain relig-
ions—such as Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—spread them-
selves; they are therefore called world religions. These faiths also promote 
international pilgrimages to their holy cities, such as those to Jerusalem, 
Mecca and Santiago de Compostela. In addition to religious pilgrimages 
there are also “epic” pilgrimages, such as the fables and tales of the sort 
depicted in Boccacio’s Decameron, which are in fact comprised of mate-
rial from a variety of cultures and geographies from around the globe. 
Indeed, much that appears again later in the art of almost all European 
countries can be traced back over Persia and then to India. And, in addi-
tion to these examples from cultural history, let us not forget that the natu-
ral sciences have “globalized” themselves through the development of 
philosophy: science, medicine, and technology. 
Following this cultural phase of globalization, inventions from the era 
of intellectual rediscovery and enlightenment—such as the compass, tele-
scope, gunpowder, and printing press—led the way to a second phase of 
globalization which took place in the early and middle stages of moder-
nity. This is the age, of course, not only of discovery, but also of the colo-
nialism which corresponds to it disturbingly. 
The third historical phase of globalization, the one in which we pres-
ently live, is similar in this respect. Both commercial inventions (radio 
technology, electronic media, etc.) and military inventions (first the long 
range bomber, then the InterContinental-Ballistic-Missile) play a roll. 
Political decisions come into play with respect both to the opening of 
financial and trade markets and to international organizations such as the 
United Nations or the World Bank. These practical and historical qualifi-
cations comprise the second of the three observations about globalization 
which were promised at the outset. In so doing, we see once again that 
globalization is a concept which is both overrated and oversimplified. 
(Observation #3) Two Pinches of Scepticism 
Before attempting to respond to the realities of globalization, it will be 
helpful to observe a couple of the common mischaracterizations of global-
ization. I want to add two pinches of scepticism to contemporary discus-
sions. The first follows from the insight that contemporary globalization is 
not really very contemporary after all. In considering the challenges and 
potential of the modern era, we must recognize one of the illusions that 
modernity seems glad to indulge in: namely, that every generation sur-
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passes the preceding one. For example, the present moment in history may 
seem impressive for the internationalization of finance and currency mar-
kets, but any historian is sensitive to the manner in which it seems to re-
peat historical precedents. At the time of the monetary gold standard (circa 
1887-1914), the trade among the developed countries was on a similar 
level to the one we know today. In this respect, we are returning only 
today to the status quo of that era which was interrupted by World War 1, 
the financial crises of the 1930s, and World War 2. Whether information is 
transmitted over deep see cable or electronically is not trivial in itself, but 
the overall impact on global trade is not greatly significant. And with re-
spect to peace politics, its impact is hardly discernible. Take, for example, 
the peace treaty which in 1648 ended the Thirty Years’ War, a great terror 
in Germany. Because the post took one month to get a letter to Madrid, 
one had to wait a total of about a quarter of a year for news instructions 
from Spain. Peace only came after four years of negotiations. But neither 
air planes nor electronic message transfer have been able to speed up the 
peace process on the front lines of Asia or in the former Yugoslavia. 
The second pinch of scepticism is a result of the recognition that the 
economic globalization that occurs of today occurs only on a moderate and 
limited scale. In terms of real numbers, global trade happens almost exclu-
sively between the U.S., Japan, and the European Community. And these 
three hardly allot an excessively high share to exports. Exchange is proba-
bly greater in other areas: once again the globalization of science and 
culture is at least equal to that in the economic sphere. 
Two Visions how should the human race best respond to the chal-
lenges posed by globalization? In general, there are two fundamental mod-
els of social organization. Both have a visionary power one might also 
speak of a utopia. On the one hand, civil rights and public powers remove 
despotism and privately held power, the rule of law and justice take the 
place of naked power. And public powers achieve this goal through de-
mocratic organization. We therefore might speak of a universal vision of a 
well-ordered legal and political society and an equally universal vision of 
democracy. Liberal democracy, in particular, gives space to the free play 
of human capacities, and expects from this—indeed from the hard compe-
tition this entails—a great return of goods and services, including those 
from science, medicine, and technology, as well as those from music, 
literature, and art. This second vision of a multidimensional prosperity 
complements the vision of peace, justice and democracy. The final aim is 
to realize an ancient dream of humanity not unlike the political situation 
described by the Hebrew prophet Isaiah: “They shall beat their swords into 
plowshares / and their spears into pruning hooks” (Isaiah 2:4 RSV). Lib-
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eral democrats have long dreamed of putting the physical strength often 
used for war to the service of economic and cultural ends. And when peace 
predominates, it is thought, in addition a prosperity that is not merely 
material should be realized. Here is the fundamental question: can what 
holds true within a community also be valid on a global scale? Can there 
first be an ordered system of peace and law, such that as it is—by means 
of economic, scientific, and cultural competition—broadly integrated 
society in which, above all, the individuals will flourish? And in fact: no 
envisioned society is an end in itself: What counts is the individual in 
relation to all other individuals, rather than just one or a select few. Legal 
and political philosophy accepts and endorses the second vision, but op-
poses its being made absolute by the suppression of the political through 
the market. No longer, one often hears, are decisions made by democrati-
cally responsible officeholders, but rather by international corporations 
and entrepreneurs. In many corners, an economic fatalism rules, which 
says that “the economy decides both means and ends.” The goal of the 
economic power brokers is to marginalize politics—instead of actively 
forming anything, politics is required passively to conform. In truth, of 
course, there are no anonymous forces at work. Globalization is promoted 
by publicly-named and publicly-recognized people, organizations, and 
movements—just as the previously referred to agreements on the liberali-
zation of world markets. And as the domestic market is forced to conform 
to more general to certain rules, to an internal setting, an analogous setting 
of the global market is not excluded a priori. It is politics itself—hardly 
national, indeed truly international—which either subjugates to the powers 
of the market, or forces them into a fair setting through a code of competi-
tion as well as through social factors and ecological minimum criteria. The 
world community should and must leave many things to work on their 
own: the creativity of individuals and groups, free competition, and the 
chance distribution of natural talents and potential. But in many instances 
the power and responsibility that shapes social and political events is re-
quired. Therefore we have to ask the question: If law and justice instead of 
private power are to rule, if law and justice are to be organized democrati-
cally within a state, should not the same hold true at all levels, both in and 
between states? Is there not, then, a need for a global legal system respon-
sible for the promotion of law and justice, grounded in a democratic or-
ganization? Does the best political response to the age of globalization lie 
in the extension of democracy on the level of the single state to a world 
democracy—one might also choose to call it a “world republic?” Given 
the three dimensions of globalization outlined above, any such world re-
public should be judged according to three positions corresponding to the 
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three dimensions: (1) if it appropriately challenges the “society of vio-
lence,” (2) if it successfully fosters the global “society of cooperation,” 
and (3) if it makes allowances for the neediness and suffering that must be 
addressed by the “society of shared destiny.” 
Five Objections 
I hope that these observations and responses to the age of globalization 
appear compelling. Given that they entail a radical break with contempo-
rary political reality, I would like to anticipate and address certain objec-
tions. I will treat five of these which seem especially significant. The very 
first objection was presented by no less a man than Kant. A world repub-
lic—Kant suggested—is a monster which cannot be governed well due to 
its bulkiness and intangibility. Is this a reasonable criticism? For citizens 
of Lichtenstein with its 28,500 inhabitants, Switzerland with its 6.5 million 
is gigantic and the USA with 265 million is truly a monster, to say nothing 
of the 850 million in India and the 1.1 billion in China. When a commu-
nity the size of the USA—almost 10,000 times the size of Lichtenstein and 
about 40 times that of Switzerland—may be governed well, the first criti-
cism has a certain claim. But in itself it hardly amounts to a devastating 
argument against the idea of a world republic. Indeed the criticism can be 
seen as constructive given what it recommends. The world republic is 
permissible, even morally required, under the condition that it is able to 
prevent its own unmanageability as well as the potential overcompensation 
of this unmanageability: too much bureaucracy or even a police state. Here 
we should be content with a constructive point. A world republic must not 
follow the pattern of the United Nations and blindly fuse mega countries 
like India or China together with tiny countries like Lichtenstein. One 
should first bring together political unities on the continental or sub-
continental level. And these new unities could—in this respect, the model 
of the EU is of great value—establish the practice of dealing with most 
problems in their own back yard, leaving only a few things for the global 
government. Let us establish a principle of large intermediary regional 
unities. 
The Principle of Subsidiarity 
According to a second objection, a world republic puts at risk the great 
accomplishments of civilization: human and civil rights. According to this 
criticism, only the single state has been successful in guaranteeing rights 
throughout history. This line of reasoning is correct insofar as (a) it makes 
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a normative claim as to the responsibility to promote and protect human 
and civil rights, and (b) it points at the empirical observation that individ-
ual states have succeeded in protecting rights. There is indeed no doubt 
that, in the West, human and civil rights are protected by the state first and 
foremost. (In Europe, of course, the Human Rights Convention also has 
considerable influence.) At any rate, citizens who presently rely for this 
protection only on international organizations, fare quite badly. 
Nevertheless, to argue that (a) and (b) prove that only the nation-state 
can protect rights overlooks two things. First, Western governments were 
the first to put these precious rights into danger: France persecuted the 
Huguenots, the USA—founded to a great extent as a response to the reli-
gious intolerance of England—allowed slavery far into the middle of the 
19th century. So individual states have violated as well as fostered their 
share of rights. Second, a good place for a world republic is just where 
human and civil rights already enjoy a history of some form of protection. 
Where human and civil rights already have some historically established 
defence—partly through the state and partly according to the regional 
conventions of human rights (set by example in Europe)—the world re-
public might hold back from intervention. But when there are enormous 
violations of human rights, the world republic should only hold back when 
a humanitarian intervention would cause even greater damage. In princi-
ple, though, just to stand by and do nothing is not justifiable. 
Like the first objection to a world republic, the second hardly amounts 
to a refutation of the proposed responses to globalization. Once again, 
rather, it comes to support our argument through constructive criticism. 
Here we agree with the part of the criticism that suggests that sovereign 
nations should remain accountable for the protection of basic rights in the 
first place. Only the nation-state has the rank of a first-order government, 
while the world republic remains only a second-order government, even a 
third-order in the case of large regionally governed regions. Let us take 
this as the basic aspect of the “subsidiary” world republic. Being “subsidi-
ary” means two things. First, the republic should not decree things from on 
high, but rather democratically, built, as it is, from citizens and individual 
countries. It is not a centralized world government, but rather a world 
government comprised of member states: a federal world republic. Sec-
ond, the scope of its tasks is limited to those issues which cannot be dealt 
with on the national level. The “federal” is, in the same time, a comple-
mentary world republic: one that includes rather than excludes the first-
order governments. The questions of civil and criminal law, of labour and 
social law, of law governing the freedom of speech, religion and culture—
these and other tasks remain in the jurisdiction of the primary government 
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of the individual states. But because of diverse globalization, the primary 
states will have to work with their fellow primary states. Then, it will be 
more efficient to give certain responsibilities to a higher, more global 
authority, such as the coordination of combating crime that does not ob-
serve national borders and the determination of the fair rules which govern 
international markets. 
The world republic has not merely subsidiary, but original responsibil-
ity for peace between nations and its precondition of disarmament. The 
first of these tasks on the practical level is the successful abolition of 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons (ABC). 
A subsidiary world republic must be vigilant in preventing any com-
promise in the basic standards of liberal democracy, which is already 
achieved by the single states and their larger regional units. Beyond sub-
sidiarity, the world republic must develop gradually, so that one can try 
new possibilities, collect experience, and—first and foremost—develop an 
important precondition: a global public sphere. Difficulties in establishing 
a public sphere already exist in Europe, and even more challenges await it 
on a global level. To achieve such a world-wide public sphere, it is not 
enough that we become outraged about far away rights violations. We 
must also—as already happens too infrequently in the case of European 
legislation—lead the type of debate common within states, to prepare, 
accompany, and later, comment on parliamentary discussion and legisla-
tion, and—should it be necessary—to suggest new laws. The sphere of 
publicity on a global scale is inseparable from a competent world republic: 
So long as there is no global public sphere, the establishment of a com-
plementary and federal world republic would be unreasonable. It is indeed 
un-permissible that a lasting global legal system is created through a sur-
prise coup or with the wool over the eyes of the people. 
During the period of transition involving a provisional world legal sys-
tem, in addition to the law of peoples international organizations will have 
certain tasks to assume. International organizations will realize a certain 
structure and permanency of international cooperation and they then could 
realize a global order with rudimentary elements of statehood. The result-
ing provisional system would call together the entire international coop-
eration structure to determine the time frame needed to manage a world 
government with rudimentary formations of statehood. 
There is a theory of international relations called realism which sees in-
ternational institutions only as instruments of governmental diplomacy. 
Individual states jump into a foray with and against each other in pursuit 
of influence and resources. In fact, these international institutions are not 
only an arena for a struggle of power among the individual states, but also 
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a forum for political interaction between states. Moreover, international 
organizations themselves have some power to set agendas. They are thus 
able to motivate some reluctant states to participate in negotiations. In the 
best cases, they even become an authority of arbitration. Individual states 
will use them when the relative costs of a military solution of conflicts 
seem too high. In the same direction points their relevance as a point of 
interstate coordination, they are in fact to be seen as a precursor of a world 
republic. They help member states to articulate and—within reason—
realize their interests. 
Impartiality—the central responsibility of public authorities—may be 
attributed to international organizations only to a highly limited extent. 
The standard business of the day involves individual states attempting to 
exploit international organizations for their own interests: superpowers try 
to use their weight to push through their objectives while smaller states 
attempt to outnumber their larger rivals. For this reason alone international 
institutions their organizations and rules, may only help to prepare a world 
republic. They cannot substitute a world republic permanently. 
Are democracies inclined toward peace? 
According to a third objection, there is a much simpler means to pro-
tect human rights than a world republic: namely, the democratization of 
each individual state. In accordance with the thesis that global peace will 
be achieved through a global democratization, we have to take account of 
the contention that a world-wide peace politics may be pursued by the 
means of a world-wide politics endorsing democracy. Thus, a world re-
public becomes superfluous. And it is true, liberal democracy already 
protects human rights within states. And certainly, democracy has more 
reasons on its side. As the European Convention of Human Rights already 
assesses the protection of human rights within single states, one has to 
endorse the establishment of a global commission of human rights which 
surveys those authorities of larger regions. (The United States, for exam-
ple, would not pass muster even within times of peace because of its death 
penalty.) And in particular, individual states are to be protected: their terri-
torial integrity and their political self-determination. 
As far as the danger of aggressions is concerned, contemporary politi-
cal science has married itself to the famous theory of Kant that liberal 
democracies—or republics, as Kant called them then—have very little 
proclivity to invade other countries. Kant was assuming not that the citi-
zens of a democracy have a genuine propensity to peace, but he rather 
assumes that enlightened self-interest would bring about a tendency to-
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ward peace. In a democracy “the vote of the citizens should be required” 
to go to war. Further, “because they would have to decide to bring all of 
the hardships of war upon themselves (they themselves must do the sword 
fighting, pay the costs of war from their own possessions, to try to rebuild 
the wretched devastation which is left behind...)” they would hardly ever 
begin “such a bad” game. 
Nevertheless, history calls for scepticism. The new French republic 
overran Europe with war and pursued its own imperial interests through-
out. A still older republic, the United States of America, spread itself 
westward, acting ruthlessly toward the native peoples. Moreover, the USA 
first annexed Texas, and then went to war with Mexico to pursue manifest 
destiny further, resulting in the acquisition of the states of Arizona, Utah, 
New Mexico, California, and Nevada. At the same moment in history, 
Great Britain did not hold back from developing plans to become a world 
power and to spread out its Commonwealth, all while developing inter-
nally as a democracy. For this reason political scientists had to weaken 
their claims: democracies are not peaceful in principle. At best the claim is 
true, on the one hand, for democracies which fulfil certain very high stan-
dards, and, on the other, for the relation between democracies exclusively. 
Toward other democracies only democracies exhibit a tendency toward 
peaceful relations, but certainly not toward non-democratic states. 
But even against this moderate claim some reservations might be 
raised. On the one hand, very important elements—such as equality of 
women and of the working class, and a higher level of education for the 
whole population—were absent from early democracy as well as parlia-
mentary decisions about entry into war and anticipated public debates. But 
entry into war often enjoyed such a broad support among the people that 
“more democratic democracies” would have hardly decided the matter 
otherwise. And on the other hand, enlightened self-interest does not al-
ways speak against war. In wars which take place far away the people at 
home feel fewer hardships and they feel even fewer hardships when the 
enemy is clearly weaker. War away from home can distract from political 
strife at home, in addition there is mass hysteria. Further, foreign wars can 
be profitable. In the end, the preparedness for peace could be weakened as 
soon as most states become democracies. A potential for conflict already 
has arisen today relating to commercial policy and ecological questions, 
which could broaden under the influence of grave economic conditions 
and social problems. There is also a wealth of legal problems below the 
level of war. 
Consequently, the universal duty to establish a legal and governmental 
order remains relevant, again in the form of a constructive criticism. The 
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protection of rights and peace, which already is achieved by a world-wide 
democratization, may be recognized. Individual states have a claim—just 
as individuals do—that possible conflicts be resolved through other means 
than power. They should be resolved through law, so that in fact a world 
legal establishment and ultimately a world republic, is needed. 
In accordance with the fourth criticism there can only be a world legal 
system if a precondition were fulfilled which is actually unfulfilled: a 
sense of justice common to all human beings, a world-wide consciousness 
converging on moral standards of right and wrong. We know that such a 
common sense of justice is lacking already in the West. We should be 
content with a small example: whoever reads about US legal compensa-
tions, multi-million dollar pay outs in certain cases in which German 
courts at best would give 10,000 German Marks, wonders if we live on 
different legal planets. Stronger differences show themselves in the atti-
tude toward the death penalty, even stronger toward corporal punishment 
in some Islamic states or in dealings with dissidents in China, Cuba, and 
North Korea. On the other hand, there are important commonalities: the 
laws of equality and impartiality are recognized in the application of law, 
as well as laws of procedure of the sort audiatur et altera pars (the other 
side is also to be heard) or the presumption of innocence. Further, nearly 
all legal orders recognize the same basic goods of subjects of rights: body, 
life, property, and honour. And the human rights conventions of the United 
Nations provide further evidence of commonalities. The only thing lacking 
is preparedness to enforce those standards in an unbiased and effective 
way. For this reason, the constructive criticism which comes to us through 
the consideration of the fourth criticism seems almost obvious: More time 
is needed for a world-wide sense of justice to unfold. But the already 
emerging common ground is remarkable indeed. It has, in itself, already 
made world courts possible, including The International Court, the Mari-
time Court, and most recently, even when not yet ratified, the International 
Court of Justice. 
A Right to Difference 
According to a fifth and final criticism that we will consider, we are 
threatened by a levelling off of cultural particularities in the age of global-
ization. To respond to this, it is said, we must respect the peculiarities on 
which the social and cultural wealth of the world depends, especially in 
the identity of individual human beings as bound to their particular tradi-
tion. These criticisms are presented by the recently prominent Communi-
tarians, who plead for “good fences,” and thus for national separateness 
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instead of global unity. For philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Michael Walzer, for example, the highest social unity—in which moral 
and political concepts such as justice and solidarity have sense and mean-
ing—has to be seen in the individual state. And indeed, many states are 
founded on a common history of their members as they have, each on its 
own, a particular tradition, culture, and language or even a well defined 
plurality of languages, as the case may be. They also follow a common set 
of values; the dissolution of states within a global state therefore would 
limit the wealth of humanity. Over and above this, the identity of the unit 
is being threatened which is, in the end, the very source of values: the 
individual, though not isolated person. It is argued that in spite of all indi-
viduality, often in fact to this very goal, individuals belong to certain 
“communities.” These communities strengthen the source of “solidarity,” 
the very definition of human readiness to help ones neighbour. Above all, 
every community has a right to follow its own ideal of a common good—
provided that it is consistent with the requirements of liberal democracy. 
Such a right to national particularities—let us refer to it as a right to 
“difference”—is favoured already by the lack of a full determination of 
universal principles of right, which suggest that human rights, at first, 
operate only as a secondary level of social regulation. Only their “applica-
tion” to particular issues and types of situations leads to the common rules 
covering concrete action. But neither the particular issues nor the types of 
situations admit of only one interpretation. History, culture, and tradition 
have their right too. 
Let us think, in a thought experiment, of an ideal lawgiver, a Solon of 
sorts, or even—as the discourse theorists prefer—an ideal parliament, and 
let us instruct him or it to draw up laws which are equally valid for all 
cultures. In contrast to an empirically existing lawmaker, our ideal law-
maker has all relevant knowledge at his disposition; he is omniscient. 
Untainted by particular interests and passions, our lawmaker orients him-
self exclusively toward the principles of justice, especially those relating 
to human rights: our lawmaker is perfectly just. Such a magical lawgiver 
can establish the framework for just laws. He finds, however, hardly a 
single solution from the standpoint of justice. Even less as one can design 
a chair from criteria such as comfort and durability, can he find a well-
defined norm of law which can be derived from the principles of justice? 
Cultural particularities stemming from history and tradition belong to the 
wealth of elements which must be included, among them different prefer-
ences and minor settings and other purely conventional things. Economic 
and other matters play a roll too. 
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Thanks to his omniscience, the ideal Solon knows about the particu-
larities. Thanks to his justice and impartiality, he wants to let justice pre-
vail over these competing particularities. Hence he acknowledges them 
equally. The result looks paradoxical only on first glimpse: The inter-
culturally groundable principles of justice are open for different cultures 
and universal principles might be expressed in a particular form. Here, in a 
moral universalism which is culturally open, both—our ideal Solon and 
the ideal parliament—find their limits. And because of these limits a par-
ticipatory democracy is called for. In mathematics it should be different: 
an ideal Pythagoras does not have the limitations of the ideal Solon. When 
democratic discourse seeks more than the establishment of universally true 
human rights, when it recognizes the requirements of historical contexts 
and political decisions, then it also recognizes a “right to difference.” And 
the two are indeed inseparable: the more rights we want to award to par-
ticipatory democracy, the more we have to recognize the lack of a full 
determination of universal principles and the more we have to grant to the 
right of difference. Otherwise democracy degenerates into the organ of 
enforcement for an ideal law giver. 
Let us take the freedom of religion as an example. As one of the prin-
ciples of human rights, it demands a religious tolerance concerning the 
practice of religion which refuses to any community, to deny the right to 
participate in religion, to “freethinking” and atheism, or even the with-
drawal from religious society altogether. (A religion, which declares apos-
tasy to be a crime, or even a capital crime, makes a major violation of 
human rights.) Above this minimum, the individual right to a negative 
freedom of religion, a minimum of a positive freedom of religion is proba-
bly required, namely the right to develop oneself religiously and to build a 
religious community for this end. This two part requirement, as Article 18 
already a part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, allows a 
wealth of open points. Freedom of religion does not exclude, for example, 
that a community understands itself as Christian, Jewish, Islamic or 
Shinto. A strongly anti-religious or atheistic arrangement of a legal and 
constitutional order is not required for human rights. Consequently, differ-
ent formations are justifiable, such as the laicism of France, which over-
came the flaring up of Huguenot persecution (that occurred despite edicts 
of tolerance) through the strong break between church and state—and in 
Alsace-Lothringen differs there from. Founded as a place of refuge for the 
persecuted religious communities, the USA nursed against the practice of 
“well-meaning neutrality.” Germany on the other hand, like Austria and 
part of Switzerland, allowed an institutional connection between church 
and state, but firmly not in the inner circle of the law of the constitution or 
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in the political nucleus. Defined by the reformed national church, Scandi-
navian countries, and in another respect Great Britain, have a church of 
national character. Israel on the other hand ensures Christians, Druses, and 
Muslims full religious freedom, even their own jurisdiction for personal, 
marriage, and family law and nevertheless grants far reaching privileges to 
its own people. For example, the costs of religion are born one-third by the 
state and two-thirds by the Communes. And in a multicultural state like 
Malaysia three fundamentally different legal systems are in to be seen in a 
complicated coexistence: an “autochthonous” law of customs, the Islamic 
Sharia, and the British Common Law. 
In addition to these fine details comes the task of weighing up rights, 
which, once again—because of the corresponding “under-determination”—
can be taken differently by different communities. Consideration of the 
freedom of the press is relevant to this example: Is one—in the name of 
protecting rights—allowed to film (for television broadcast) rights viola-
tions such as property damage, kidnapping, and perhaps even genocide, 
instead of stepping in against them? Another example: Is one allowed with 
so-called public figures to diminish the necessary right to privacy, perhaps 
even violate it? A choice between conflicting rights is also necessary when 
the question is posed as to which evidence in a criminal proceeding should 
be admissible. Here the defence of the private sphere necessary for human 
rights is to be weighed against the combating of crime which is also neces-
sary to preserve human rights. Further, within the sphere of positive rights 
to freedom, the realization of which being restricted by scarcity, another 
question must be considered: how much of the resources should the health 
service or education receive? And, finally, perhaps one must weigh up the 
benefits of the welfare state against the incentive to personal responsibility 
and personal initiative. 
Obviously the under determination of universal principles has far-
reaching consequences. It is by itself the foundation of the right to differ-
ence, namely a universal authorization to particularity, in some way com-
parable with the right to individuality, which not in spite of but because of 
universal morality is due to human beings. Because of this right to differ-
ence there can be no world republic which stubbornly opposes the nation-
state of the Communitarians. According to the view of political theorists 
like Charles Beitz the global political order should be set up as a homoge-
nous world republic similar to a single state. In his conception, possible 
subdivisions only result secondarily from top to bottom, whereas the na-
tion-states themselves, as an expression of particularity, lose their right. 
But the right to difference opposes this. 
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Our constructive criticism of Communitarianism says that their posi-
tion has value, but what is valuable about it only goes a third of the way. 
Human beings indeed have the right to characteristics: their history, tradi-
tion and religion, as well as language, culture and shared idea of the good 
community. And because the diversity of these characteristics augments 
the social and cultural wealth of humanity, it is important that the right to 
difference will be observed. The second third of the way, however, which 
the Communitarians fail to go, indicates that the resulting nation-states are 
not an end in themselves that earns an uncompromising protection. As 
unities which exist for the sake of human beings, they can change them-
selves by them and for their sake. They can dissolve themselves, reform 
themselves, and thereby achieve both lesser and greater unity. 
And the last third of the way, the final stretch unrealized by the com-
munitarians insists that neither states nor foreign citizens are relieved of 
the universal law of a legal and political order. The relevant principle is 
called “federalism.” Only a federal unity can be a morally legitimate world 
republic. 
For the world republic there are three strategies of democratic legitima-
tion which should be considered. According to the one which bases its 
legitimation exclusively on the people, the world state will emerge from 
the will of the entire world population—comprising the complete citizen-
ship of the world republic. Because individuals have the last word on le-
gitimacy, one could consider this strategy appropriate. As the interests of 
states are legitimized through their citizens, one could eliminate the indi-
vidual states as additional authority of legitimation. But the right of state-
hood speaks against this. So too does the fact that the interests of collec-
tives cannot be reduced to the sum of the interests of their members. For 
this reason a second strategy of democratic legitimation suggests itself. 
Because the single states represent both the distributive interests of the 
single citizens and the collective interests of the population, one could 
want to eliminate the first legitimation and defend the exclusive legitima-
tion of the individual states, with the result that the collective will of the 
single-states would decide. But this trammels the membership which 
should be enjoyed by the individual, which is ultimately the deciding au-
thority of legitimation, and which should be allowed to freely extend be-
yond national borders. These memberships includes religion, language and 
occupation, demanding hobbies or every political interest such as that 
represented by organizations such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, 
or Doctors Without Borders, and further the cultural membership of dis-
persed peoples, such as Irish, Jews, and Kurds. 
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Already because of the “membership across state lines” the exclusive 
legitimation of states is ruled out, so that only the third strategy remains—
the combined legitimation. Its democratic legitimation the world republic 
wins through a connection of citizen legitimation and nation-state legiti-
mation. In consequence, all power of the world state comes from this dou-
ble constituency: the community of all human beings and of all states. And 
this doubled legitimation must find expression in the organization of the 
world state. The parliament, its most important organ, must consist of two 
chambers, an upper chamber of the citizens and a lower chamber of the 
states. Of the specific constitution of these assemblies one need not, at this 
moment, think further. That Lichtenstein will not have the same weight as 
India or China is understood. Which weight exactly, it will be decided 
politically. Anyway, the large regional intermediary organizations could 
change the situation. 
A Final Balance: Graded Cosmopolitanism 
The world government, which should exist according to the universal 
obligation to establish a legal and democratic order, would entail a sub-
sidiary and, further, a federal world republic. In it we are citizens, but not 
in an exclusive, but rather in a complementary understanding of citizen-
ship. The exclusive conception of citizenship corresponds to that brand of 
cosmopolitanism which defines itself—along with Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right (§209, Note)—“in contrast to the political life in a concrete sense.” 
The exclusive cosmopolitan, not without an air of superiority, says: “I am 
neither German, French nor Swiss, but rather I am a free citizen of the 
world.” Here world government substitutes the single state, and interna-
tional civil rights replaces nationally based civil rights. Under world gov-
ernment one is a world citizen rather than the citizen of a particular nation-
state. The federal world republic, however, is beyond the simplistic alter-
natives “national or global” and “nation-state or cosmopolitan.” Interna-
tional civil rights do not take the place of national civil rights, but rather 
the first complements the second. To a certain extent, it realizes a global 
variation of de Gaulle: a world of separate “Vaterländer” and large re-
gional polities, but, quite apart from de Gaulle, it is one with a special and 
(up until now unknown) multiple body of citizens. Whether one is primar-
ily German, French, or Italian and a citizen of Europe only secondarily, 
the democracies of Europe will have to decide in the coming years. In the 
end, it doesn’t matter whether one is citizen of a nation-state first and 
European citizen second or vice versa. In a graded sense, one will be both 
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at the same time, and on the third level one will be a citizen of the world: a 




∗ This text is based in part on my book Höffe (2007). 
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THE RESURGENT IDEA  





The idea of world government is returning to the mainstream of schol-
arly thinking about international relations. Universities in North America 
and Europe now routinely advertise for positions in “global governance,” a 
term that few would have heard of a decade ago. Chapters on cosmopol-
itanism and governance appear in many current international relations (IR) 
textbooks. Leading scholars are wrestling with the topic, including Alex-
ander Wendt, perhaps now America’s most influential IR theorist, who has 
recently suggested that a world government is simply “inevitable.”1 While 
some scholars envision a more formal world state, and others argue for a 
much looser system of “global governance,” it is probably safe to say that 
the growing number of works on this topic can be grouped together into 
the broader category of “world government”—a school of thought that 
supports the creation of international authority (or authorities) that can 
tackle the global problems that nation-states currently cannot. 
It is not, of course, a new idea. Dreaming of a world without war, or of 
government without tyranny, idealists have advocated some kind of world 
or universal state since the classical period. The Italian poet Dante viewed 
world government as a kind of utopia. The Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius, 
often regarded as the founder of international law, believed in the eventual 
formation of a world government to enforce it. The notion interested many 
visionary thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in-
cluding H. G. Wells and Aldous Huxley. In 1942 the one-time Republican 
presidential candidate Wendell Willkie published a famous book on the 
topic, One World. And after the Second World War, the spectre of atomic 
war moved many prominent American scholars and activists, including 
Albert Einstein, the University of Chicago president Robert Hutchins, and 
the columnist Dorothy Thompson, to advocate an immediate world state—
not so much out of idealistic dreams but because only such a state, they 
believed, could prevent a third world war fought with the weapons that 
had just obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The campaign continued 
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until as late as 1950, when the popular magazine Reader’s Digest serial-
ized a book by the world-government advocate Emery Reves, while at the 
same time the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations was considering 
several motions to urge the Truman administration to adopt a policy of 
world federalism (see Boyer, 1985; Cabrera, forthcoming). In fact, to this 
day the World Federalist Movement—an international NGO founded in 
1947 and recognized by the United Nations—boasts a membership of 
30,000 to 50,000 worldwide. 
By the 1950s, however, serious talk of world government had largely 
disappeared. The failure of the Baruch Plan to establish international con-
trol over atomic weaponry in late 1946 signalled its demise, for it cleared 
the way (as the plan’s authors quietly intended) for the United States and 
the Soviet Union to continue apace with their respective atomic projects. 
What state would place its trust in a world government when there were 
sovereign nations that possessed, or could soon possess, atomic bombs? 
(Craig and Radchenko, 2008) 
Certainly, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to 
do so, and once the two states committed themselves to the international 
rivalry that became known as the Cold War, the impossibility of true 
global government became obvious and the campaign in favour of it di-
minished. Even after the invention of thermonuclear weaponry and inter-
continental missiles in the late 1950s, a technological development that 
threatened to destroy all of humanity, few voices in the West (it was never 
an issue in the Soviet bloc, at least until Gorbachev) were raised to de-
mand a new kind of government that could somehow eliminate this dan-
ger. There were some exceptions: a surprising one was the common con-
clusion reached by the two American realists Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans 
Morgenthau, who deduced around 1960 that the “nuclear revolution” had 
made a world state logically necessary. But how to achieve one when the 
United States and the Soviet Union would never agree to it? Niebuhr and 
Morgenthau had no answer to this question. The British philosopher Ber-
trand Russell, however, did: the antinuclear activist once argued that, since 
his preferred solution of total disarmament was not going to occur, the 
nuclear revolution had made global government immediately necessary 
and, thus, the only way to achieve it was to wage war on the USSR. There 
was a perverse logic to this, but we can be thankful that his demands were 
not heeded. 
The end of the Cold War, together with the emergence of various in-
tractable global problems, has spurred the resurgence of writing about 
world government. In this essay I will introduce three themes that appear 
frequently in this writing: how the “collective action problem” lies behind 
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many of the current global crises; the debate between those who support a 
softer form of “governance” and those who look toward a full-fledged 
world state; and the fundamental question of whether world government is 
possible, and whether it is even desirable. 
The Intensifying Dangers of International Anarchy 
Certainly, one of the most evident failures of the nation-state system in 
recent years has been its inability to deal successfully with problems that 
endanger much or most of the world’s population. As the world has be-
come more globalized—economically integrated and culturally intercon-
nected—individual countries have become increasingly averse to dealing 
with international problems that are not caused by any single state and 
cannot be fixed even by the focused efforts of individual governments. 
Political scientists refer to this quandary as the “collective action prob-
lem,” by which they mean the dilemma that emerges when several actors 
have an interest in eradicating a problem that harms all of them, but when 
each would prefer that someone else do the dirty work of solving it. If 
everyone benefits more or less equally from the problem’s solution, but 
only the actor that addresses it pays the costs, then all are likely to want to 
“free ride” on the other’s efforts. The result is that no one tackles the prob-
lem, and everyone suffers. 
Several such collective action problems dominate much of interna-
tional politics today, and scholars of course debate their importance and 
relevance to world government. Nevertheless, a few obvious ones stand 
out, notably the imminent danger of climate change, the difficulty of ad-
dressing terrorism, and the complex task of humanitarian intervention. All 
of these are commonly (though not universally) regarded as serious prob-
lems in need of urgent solutions, and in each case powerful states have 
repeatedly demonstrated that they would prefer that somebody else solve 
them. 
The solution to the collective action problem has long been known: it 
requires the establishment of some kind of authoritative regime that can 
organize common solutions to common problems and spread out the costs 
fairly. This is why many scholars and activists concerned with acute global 
problems support some form of world government. These advocates are 
not so naïve as to believe that such a system would put an effortless end to 
global warming, terrorism, or human rights atrocities, just as even the most 
effective national governments have not eradicated pollution or crime. The 
central argument in favour of a world-government approach to the prob-
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lems of globalization is not that it would easily solve these problems, but 
that it is the only entity that can solve them. 
A less newsworthy issue, but one more central to many advocates of 
world government, is the persistent possibility of a third world war in 
which the use of megaton thermonuclear weaponry could destroy most of 
the human race. During the Cold War, nuclear conflict was averted by the 
spectre of mutual assured destruction (MAD)—the recognition by the 
United States and the Soviet Union that a war between them would destroy 
them both. To be sure, this grim form of deterrence could well obtain in 
future international orders, but it is unwise to regard the Cold War as a 
promising model for future international politics. It is not at all certain that 
international politics is destined to return to a stable bipolar order, such as 
prevailed during the second half of the Cold War, but even if this does 
happen, there is no guarantee that nuclear deterrence would work as well 
as it did during the second half of the twentieth century. It is well to re-
member that the two sides came close to nuclear blows during the Cuban 
crisis, and this was over a relatively small issue that did not bear upon the 
basic security of either state. As Martin Amis has written, the problem 
with nuclear deterrence is that “it can’t last out the necessary time-span, 
which is roughly between now and the death of the sun” (Amis, 1987:16-
17). As long as interstate politics continue, we cannot rule out that in some 
future conflict a warning system will fail, a leader will panic, governments 
will refuse to back down, a third party will provoke a response—indeed, 
there are any number of scenarios under which deterrence could fail and 
thermonuclear war could occur. 
It is possible that the United States, if not other nations, can fight 
against the thermonuclear dilemma with technology. By constructing an 
anti–ballistic missile (ABM) system, America could perhaps defend itself 
from a nuclear attack. Also, and more ominously, the United States may 
be on the verge of deploying an offensive nuclear capability so advanced 
that it could launch a first strike against a nuclear adversary and disarm it 
completely.2 But these are weak reeds. As things currently stand, an ABM 
system remains acutely vulnerable to inexpensive decoy tactics, jamming, 
and the simple response of building more missiles. The first-strike option 
is even more questionable: an aggressive or terrified United States could 
launch a nuclear war against a major adversary, but no American leader 
could be sure that every enemy weapon would be destroyed, making the 
acute risks of initiating such a war (unless a full-scale enemy thermonu-
clear attack was imminent and certain) likely to outweigh the benefits. 
Technology is unlikely to solve the nuclear dilemma. 
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Theorists considering world government regard the thermonuclear di-
lemma as particularly salient because it epitomizes the dangers of the 
continuation of the interstate system. As long as sovereign nations con-
tinue to possess nuclear arsenals, nuclear war is possible, and the only 
apparent way to put a permanent end to this possibility is to develop some 
kind of world government, an entity with sufficient power to stop states—
not to mention subnational groups—from acquiring nuclear arsenals and 
waging war with them. 
Global Governance versus a World State 
Scholars nevertheless disagree whether an informal, loose form of 
governance is sufficient, or whether a more formal world state is neces-
sary. Supporters of global governance argue that the unique dangers cre-
ated by globalization can be solved by a gradual strengthening of existing 
international institutions and organizations, making the imposition of a 
full-blown world state unnecessary. Anthony McGrew, a leading scholar 
of globalization in the British academy, where support for global govern-
ance is particularly pronounced, suggests that global problems can be 
effectively dealt with by liberal international agencies, such as the World 
Trade Organization; nongovernmental organizations, such as Greenpeace 
and Doctors Without Borders; and security bodies, such as the U.N. Secu-
rity Council. McGrew argues that the key is to grant increased and more 
formal powers to such institutions and organizations, ultimately giving 
them greater effectiveness and influence on the international stage than 
nation-states. Another British scholar, David Held, stresses the importance 
of making international institutions accountable to democratic controls. 
Held maintains that the world’s population must have a direct say in the 
composition and policies of increasingly powerful international bodies.3 
Held, along with others who insist on greater democratic oversight of 
global institutions, worries that the current “democratic deficit” afflicting 
existing international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund and 
the U.N. Security Council, could become far worse as they acquire and 
wield greater and greater power. 
The European Union is often offered as a model of what could happen 
at the international level. Gradually, once-hostile European states have 
cooperated to develop forms of transnational governance without subject-
ing themselves to the convulsive and possibly violent task of creating a 
European state. Nations that might refuse to accept the formation of a 
dominant state have nevertheless readily accepted the establishment of 
institutions and bureaucracies that slowly create transnational political 
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bonds and reduce their own sovereignty. True, the process of establishing 
the European Union has been unsure and—for those who want to see a 
stronger political union—remains incomplete, but it has taken place, and 
in a peaceful manner. A similar process at the international level, contend 
advocates of global integration, would constitute a practical way to estab-
lish global government. 
Theorists who believe that a more formal world state is necessary do 
not necessarily disagree with the logic of global governance: it is difficult 
to dispute the claim that the gradual creation of supranational institutions 
is likely to be more feasible and peaceful than the imposition of a true 
world state. The “key problem” for the governance argument, however, as 
Alexander Wendt writes, is “unauthorized violence by rogue Great Pow-
ers” (see Wendt, 2003:506). As long as sovereign states continue to exist 
under a system of governance, in other words, there is nothing to prevent 
them from using violence to disrupt the international peace for their own 
purposes. The European Union has created forms of transnational govern-
ance, but decision-making in the areas of security and defence is still the 
prerogative of its member states. Thus, the EU remains effectively power-
less to stop violence undertaken by one of its own members (such as Brit-
ain’s involvement in the Iraq war), not to mention war waged by other 
nations even in its own backyard (such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Until this problem is solved, world-state advocates argue, any global order 
will be too fragile to endure. Sooner or later a sovereign state will wage 
war, and the inability of a regime of global governance to stop it will de-
prive it of authority and legitimacy. International politics would then re-
vert to the old state system. 
In “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” Wendt argues that a formal 
world state—by which he means a truly new sovereign political entity, 
with constitutional authority over all nations—will naturally evolve as 
peoples and nations come to realize that they cannot obtain true independ-
ence, or what Wendt calls “recognition,” without one. In other words, the 
advent of global technologies and weaponry present weaker societies with 
an emerging choice between subjugation to powerful states and globalized 
forces or participation in an authentic world government; a world state 
would not threaten distinct national cultures, as pluralist scholars have 
argued, but rather it is the only entity that can preserve them. Wendt sees 
this as a teleological phenomenon, by which he means that the logic of 
globalization and the struggle by all cultures and societies for recognition 
are bound to lead to a world state whether it is sought or not. Such a state, 
Wendt argues, would not need to be particularly centralized or hierarchi-
cal; as long as it could prevent sovereign states from waging war, it could 
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permit local cultures, traditions, and politics to continue.4 But a looser 
system of governance would not be enough, because societies that seek 
recognition could not trust it to protect them from powerful states seeking 
domination. 
Daniel Deudney’s recent book, Bounding Power, provides the fullest 
and most creative vision yet of formal world government in our age 
(Deudney, 2006). Deudney argues that the driving force behind world 
government is the fact that international war has become too dangerous. 
Unified by a common interest in avoiding nuclear extermination, states 
have the ability to come together in much the same way as tribes and fief-
doms have in the past when advances in military technology made conflict 
among them suicidal. Unlike Wendt, Deudney does not see this as an 
inevitability: states may well choose to tolerate interstate anarchy, even 
though it will sooner or later result in a nuclear war. But Deudney is also 
optimistic that a world government created for the purpose of avoiding 
such a war can be small, decentralized, and liberal. In Bounding Power, he 
develops an elaborate case for the establishment of a world republic, based 
upon the same premise of restraining and diffusing power that motivated 
the founders of the American republic in the late eighteenth century. 
World-state theorists such as Wendt and Deudney stress the danger 
that advocates of more global governance often downplay: the risk that 
ambitious sovereign states will be unrestrained by international institutions 
and agencies, even unprecedentedly powerful ones, and wage war for 
traditional reasons of power and profit. For Wendt, military conflict of this 
sort will simply push along the inevitable process of world-state forma-
tion, as societies and peoples recognize that a return to interstate anarchy 
will only unleash more such wars, while a world government will put an 
end to them and so guarantee their cultural independence. Deudney is less 
hopeful here. Military conflict in our age can well mean thermonuclear 
war, an event that could put an end to the pursuit of meaningful human 
independence and of the kind of world government that would respect it. 
Is a World Government Possible? 
The initial argument against a world state, and even a coherent system 
of global governance, is the one that anyone can see immediately: it is 
impractical. How could nations of radically different ideologies and cul-
tures agree upon one common political authority? But the “impracticality” 
argument disregards historical experience. The history of state formation 
from the days of city-states to the present era is precisely the history of 
warring groups with different ideologies and cultures coming together 
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under a larger entity. While the European Union is not at all yet a state, 
who would not have been denounced as insane for predicting a political 
and economic union among France, Germany, and other European states 
seventy years ago? For that matter, how “practical” would it have seemed 
forty years ago to foresee the peaceful end of the Cold War? As Deudney 
argues, smaller political units have always merged into larger ones when 
technology has made the violence among them unsustainable. The surpris-
ing thing, he maintains, would be if this did not happen at the planetary 
level. 
The more important objections to world government posit not that it is 
impractical but that it is unnecessary and even undesirable. According to 
one such argument, the world should be governed not by a genuinely in-
ternational authority but rather by the United States: a Pax Americana (for 
example, Ferguson 2004). This school of thought stresses two main points: 
that such authority could more readily come into being without the violent 
convulsions that would likely accompany genuine world-state formation; 
and, as neoconservative writers particularly stress, that a world run by the 
United States would be preferable to a genuinely transnational world gov-
ernment given the superiority of American political, economic, and cul-
tural institutions. 
The case against Pax Americana, however, can be boiled down to one 
word: Iraq. The war in Iraq has shown that military operations undertaken 
by individual nation-states lead, as they have always done, to nationalist 
and tribal reactions against the aggressor that pay no heed to larger claims 
of superior or inferior civilizations. The disaster in Iraq has emboldened 
other revisionist states and groups to defy American will, caused erstwhile 
allies and friends of the United States to question its intentions and compe-
tence, and at the same time soured the American people on future adven-
tures against states that do not overtly threaten them. In conceiving and 
executing its war in Iraq, it would have been difficult for the Bush admini-
stration to undermine the project of Pax Americana more effectively had it 
tried to do so. The United States could choose in future to rally other states 
behind it if it can persuade them of a global threat that must be van-
quished. But, as Wendt implies, to do that successfully is effectively to 
begin the process of world-state formation. 
Another objection to world government was first identified by Imman-
uel Kant. In articulating a plan for perpetual peace, Kant stopped short of 
advocating a world state, for fear that the state could become tyrannical. In 
a world of several nation-states, a tyranny can be removed by other states 
or overthrown from within. At least it could be possible for oppressed 
citizens of that state to flee to less repressive countries. But a sovereign 
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world government could be invulnerable to such measures. It could not be 
defeated by an external political rival; those who would overthrow it from 
within would have nowhere to hide, no one to support them from the out-
side. Kant concluded that these dangers overrode the permanent peace that 
could be had with world government, and he ended up advocating instead 
a confederation of sovereign, commercial states. 
One can raise two points in response to Kant’s deeply important con-
cern. First, he wrote in the eighteenth century, when the spectre of war was 
not omnicidal and the planet did not face such global crises as climate 
change and transnational terrorism. International politics as usual was not 
as dangerous an alternative to his vision of perpetual peace as it potentially 
is today. Second, as Deudney argues, there is one central reason to believe 
that a world government could avoid the temptations of tyranny and actu-
ally exist as a small, federal authority rather than a global leviathan 
(Deudney, 2006, especially chap. 6 and conclusion). This is the indisput-
able fact that—barring extraterrestrial invasion—a world government 
would have no need for a policy of external security. States often become 
increasingly tyrannical as they use external threats to justify internal re-
pression and authoritarian policies. These threats, whether real or imag-
ined, have throughout history and to the present day been used by leaders 
to justify massive taxation, conscription, martial law, and the suppression 
of dissent. But no world government could plausibly make such demands. 
Will the world-government movement become a potent political force, 
or will it fade away as it did in the late 1940s? To a degree the answer to 
this question depends on the near-term future of international politics. If 
the United States alters its foreign policy and moves to manage the unipo-
lar world more magnanimously, or, alternatively, if a new power (such as 
China) arises quickly to balance American power and instigate a new Cold 
War, the movement could fade. So, too, if existing international organiza-
tions somehow succeed in ameliorating climate change, fighting terrorism, 
and preventing humanitarian crises and other global problems. On the 
other hand, if the United States continues to pursue a Pax Americana, or if 
the transnational problems worsen, the movement could become a serious 
international cause. 
These considerations aside, as Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, 
and others discerned during the height of the Cold War, the deepest argu-
ment for world government—the spectre of global nuclear war—will en-
dure as long as sovereign nation-states continue to deploy nuclear weap-
onry. Whatever occurs over the near-term future that is a fact that is not 
going away. The great distinction between the international system pre-
vailing in Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s day and the system in our own time 
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is that the chances of attaining some form of world government have been 
radically enhanced by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a 
unipolar order. This condition, however, will not last forever. 
Notes 
∗ This paper has been previously published in Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 
22(2), Summer 2008. 
1. Wendt (2003:491–542). For a more extensive discussion of new scholarship on 
world government, see especially Lu (2006). 
2. Lieber and Press (2006:7–44). Lieber and Press do not advocate an American 
first strike against a potential aggressor; they simply argue that the United States 
has developed a capability to do so. 
3. For an overview of McGrew’s and Held’s positions, see McGrew and Held 
(2002: chaps. 13 and 15). Also see Hurrell (2007). American scholars in favour of 
global governance include Falk (1995); Slaughter (2005). For an innovative treat-
ment of the problem of global democracy, see Cabrera (2004). 
4. Wendt (2003:507–510;514-516). For the argument that world government 
would threaten cultural pluralism, see Walzer (2004). 
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SECESSION AS A CRIME  





Advocates of the world state rightly point out that an effective world 
state, if it is to be created any time in the future, would introduce the rule 
of law on the whole of our planet. As a result, the world state would be 
empowered to prevent or stop any unlawful use of violence, that is, vio-
lence not properly authorized by a legitimate government. While any 
state—and by implication a world state—would ban unlawful violence, it 
is far from clear what kind of collective action, short of violent ones, a 
future world state would prohibit and prevent. In particular, it is not clear 
whether any detachment, or secession, from the world state would be ex-
plicitly prohibited by the globally enforced law. Any attempt to determine 
which collective action would or should be prohibited is at this stage 
speculative. This kind of speculation, in the present state of our discipli-
nary demarcations, is often the privilege of normative political or ethical 
theorists. This essay explores the speculations and arguments of one very 
influential normative theorist. 
In his “Why the World State is Inevitable” Alexander Wendt (2003: 
491-542)∗ maintains that the disruptions of the world state would consti-
tute not politics but crime. At present disruptions of the world order or 
relations among states—for example, through the creation of new states 
through secession—constitute not a crime but political processes whose 
outcome and legal consequences are often uncertain. In the world state 
which, Wendt hopes, will be established within one hundred years or less, 
disruptions of this kind would no longer be disruptions of the world order 
but of the world state. If so, they fall under the legal regulative of the 
world state. Disruptions detrimental to the world state would no doubt 
constitute a breach of these legal regulations and, thus, a crime. From this 
it follows that secession, as a disruption of the world state, would consti-
tute a crime whose punishment Wendt does not specify. 
Wendt’s article is instructive in two distinct ways. First, it offers a few 
reasons why secession would constitute a crime. Second, it suggests how 
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the world state should “tame” or “domesticate” secessionist tendencies 
based on nationalist narratives. In this way, the article exemplifies the 
standard “carrot and stick” model which world statists employ in their 
approach to the question of secession. The world state should, on the one 
hand, reduce the incentives for secession by satisfying those interests and 
desires that lead, in our anarchic world, to secession; and, on the other, the 
world state should criminalize and punish any actual acts of secession. 
However desirable I think the world state may be, I find this aspect of 
the current projects concerning the world state somewhat worrying. It is 
worrying because of its dogmatic and utilitarian approach to politics. 
Within this approach, any act of politics which may, in some vague sense, 
be detrimental to the world state should be criminalized. The history of the 
twentieth century suggests that attempts to criminalize allegedly undesir-
able political acts are very costly in terms of the loss of human life and 
property, and that the extent of these losses may provide a good utilitarian 
reason to resist criminalization of political actions. For example, Bolshe-
vik and Nazi criminalization of political actions and political beliefs led to 
large-scale conflict and to these states’ systematic maltreatment and exe-
cution of their own citizens. In Wendt’s view, the lessons of history are 
simple: the world state should be made a “good” and not “bad” agency. A 
“good” agency should, presumably, not kill its own citizens because they 
are attempting to establish political organizations of their choice—political 
organizations which are themselves not “bad” agencies. 
Yet if such a “good” political organization—a seceding state—presents, 
in the view of the rulers of the world state, a threat to the happiness and 
security of the whole of humanity, in Wendt’s view, these rulers would be 
justified in deploying lethal force against its supporters. The allegedly 
“good” world state is thus justified in deploying lethal force against—and 
killing—its citizens if their political actions and aspirations, however unin-
tentionally, threaten the security and happiness of the whole of mankind. 
The same kind of reasoning has been used in the past to justify “bad” 
states’ mass murder of potential political opponents who were not even 
aware that they were political opponents of the regime. How does, then, a 
utilitarian justification of killing by a “bad” state differ from the same 
justification by a “good” state? Does the goodness or badness of a state in 
such circumstances depend only on the good that is allegedly being threat-
ened by its opponents? And so killing in order to remove the threat to the 
future (Communist) world of equality is bad, while killing in order to 
remove a possible threat to the (World State) security and happiness of the 
whole of mankind is good? Wendt does not offer any answers to these 
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questions. But he does offer an explanation as to why secession should be 
a crime in the future world-state. Let us now examine his explanation. 
Against anarchy 
The world state, according to Wendt, is inevitable partly because col-
lective actors will rationally decide that the costs of anarchy and the uni-
lateral right to use violence and to wage war are too high. Moreover, the 
world state will be able to recognize all individuals and groups’ subjectiv-
ity equally thus removing the inequality and domination that characterizes 
state and group relations today. The struggle for recognition by groups will 
be domesticated, that is, regulated within the domestic law of the world 
state. The use of violence to achieve recognition will be not only prohib-
ited but also pointless—recognition will be achieved and achievable with-
out the use of violence. This is of course an oversimplification of Wendt’s 
argument—but as I am not examining Wendt’s argument for the inevita-
bility of the world state this oversimplification may be excused. 
Why, then, is secession prohibited? There are two reasons: first, seces-
sion means the return to anarchy, which is characterized by the unilateral 
group right to kill people. In anarchy, states retain the right to kill their 
alleged enemies without being punished for the killing. In the world state, 
no group, except the government of the world state, has the right to kill. If 
a unit of the world state is to secede, it will aim to regain the right to kill 
unilaterally. This is not only dysfunctional—because it brings us back to 
anarchy—but also unjust. 
Second, all demands for equal and mutual recognition by secessionists 
can be met within the world state. Any such demand that cannot be met is, 
necessarily, a demand for unequal and thus unilateral recognition. Seces-
sionists, by demanding a separate sovereign state, are demanding that they 
be recognized not only as different but as superior. They believe that they 
are in some sense superior because their group deserves or needs a sover-
eign state while many or most others do not. But there is no justification 
for the belief that one or more groups require a separate sovereign state 
apart from the existing world state. There is no justification for their belief 
that they are superior in this sense. Such a demand for the recognition of a 
group’s superiority over others is without ground and unjust, an unjust 
demand which should not be met. Although some groups may be recog-
nized as superior in some respect—for example, in so far as they cherish 
specific arts more than others—no superiority requiring a separate sover-
eignty can be recognized. Perhaps Wendt believes that sovereignty is a 
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good that can only be equally shared and, therefore, no group can have 
more sovereignty than any other group. 
Against Wendt’s first argument, one can point out that a secession 
from the world state does not, necessarily, lead to anarchy among states 
characterized by the right of states to kill people unilaterally. The seceding 
state does not, necessarily, aspire to acquire or exercise the right to kill 
unilaterally. States can, and do, accept outside (that is, inter-state) restrains 
on their rights, including their rights to kill non-citizens. In fact, I do not 
think that even today, in our society of states, that states have that right to 
kill people unilaterally. In our society of states, states have the right to kill 
those who are attacking their territory and citizens or those preparing to do 
so. While we have no effective legal and coercive mechanism to enforce 
or regulate this right, this right still significantly restricts the states’ right 
to kill. Our world, then, is not the world of anarchy that Wendt describes 
in his argument against secession. 
If this is the case, why does Wendt describe our world by reference to 
the alleged right of states to kill people unilaterally? In his Leviathan 
Hobbes uses a very similar device to describe the state of nature or anar-
chy among individuals that allegedly occurs in the absence of a sovereign 
or a state. Individuals, in Hobbes’s state of anarchy, have the very same 
right to kill people unilaterally that, in Wendt’s state of anarchy among 
states, is conferred on states. The function of Wendt’s right to kill unilater-
ally is also similar to that of Hobbes’ right: it is to convince his readers of 
the need for a strong state by vividly presenting—and exaggerating—the 
alleged costs of the absence of the world state. As noted by Locke and 
Hume among others, in the absence of modern states, with their monopoly 
on the use of force, individuals do not kill each other unilaterally and they 
are not considered to be holders of the right to do so. Hobbes’ description 
of war of all against all, as a description of a society in which a state with 
its absolute monopoly on the use of force has not been established, is sim-
ply false. Likewise, Wendt’s description of anarchy, as a description of the 
practices in our present society of states, is simply false. Each uses his 
description of the right to kill unilaterally as a rhetorical device whose 
function is to pre-empt any detailed examination of the costs and benefits 
of a strong state with an absolute monopoly on the use of force. 
Against Wendt’s second argument, one can point out that by demand-
ing territorial sovereignty, a group is not, necessarily, demanding the rec-
ognition of its superiority over other groups. A group demanding a sepa-
rate state can base its demand on the ground that its interests are not served 
well enough in the world state: that the state over which they had full 
control would serve their interests better and would not harm anyone 
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else’s interest. Their argument is that their sharing sovereignty over terri-
tory does not serve their interests as well as their own sovereignty over the 
territory. Their interests, they believe, are better served if they can control 
the scope and nature of their own contact with others. This is not because 
they are superior to others but because they have different interests from 
others. Since their interests are, in their view, different from others, their 
demand is to recognize the equal importance of their interests to those of 
the others. If the others’ interests can be served within a world state, and if 
the seceding group’s interests cannot, then the principle of equality re-
quires granting a separate state to the seceding group. The secessionist 
group is not demanding that it exercise sovereignty over its alleged inferi-
ors nor is it disparaging, as inferior, those who prefer a world state to a 
separate state. Therefore, a demand for a separate sovereignty may be a 
demand for the recognition of equality of interests—the secessionists’ 
interests need to be treated as equal to those of the others. If so, that rec-
ognition would include the recognition of a separate sovereign state for the 
seceding group. 
Wendt’s world state is predicted to come about in 100 to 200 years and 
to display competencies and institutions which are perhaps difficult to 
even imagine today. Therefore, our dispute is about an imagined world—
and a world which may even stretch beyond the capacities of our imagina-
tion. Let us then try to imagine a possible scenario for secession in such an 
imagined world which would NOT (a) threaten to return the world to anar-
chy and (b) involve a demand for the recognition of superiority. 
An imagined secession in an imagined world-state 
Let us start with a basic division of cultural practices and beliefs in our 
imagined world. In some units of the world, human life is regarded so 
valuable that any human being is kept alive, whether or not he or she 
wants to be kept alive by all available medical means. In those 
units/countries, there are large medical survival centres, where thousands 
and perhaps millions of human beings are kept alive with the help of a 
great variety of advanced machines. In some units, however, the concep-
tion of a natural span of life is prevalent, and if a person becomes immo-
bile and loses their principal cognitive faculties, he or she is allowed to 
die. People who share this conception often migrate to the natural-span-of-
life units/countries in order to avoid long-term preservation in a vegetative 
state. 
Now one small unit in the natural-span-of-life sphere—with a few mil-
lion people—is dedicated to the competitive game called simply the 
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GAME. It is a complex game involving the use of computing power, 
physical movement and an ability to catch balls. Something like today’s 
cricket with an extensive use of computing and optical equipment predict-
ing and directing the movement of the ball. GAME is played all over the 
planet but our GAME unit/country prides itself on having originated the 
GAME and having the best world players. All enthusiasts of GAME tend 
to migrate to the unit of GAME where they pursue this game with ardour 
and dedication. 
At some point, several GAME players and entrepreneurs proposed that 
the GAME unit/country offer free GAME facilities to each of its inhabi-
tants capable of playing the GAME and introduce compulsory GAME 
playing in all schools together with prizes for all categories of players. The 
costs of this re-direction of budget were so large that the GAME unit au-
thorities requested the Planetary Council that the GAME unit contribution 
to the Planetary budget be reduced. The Planetary Council, after long and 
diligent deliberation, rejected the request pointing out that other units with 
popular sports could follow this example and thus deplete the Planetary 
budget. It would be unjust to burden non-sportive units more than sportive 
units, they argued. 
In response, GAME enthusiasts launched a campaign under the slo-
gan—We stand for life and GAME, not for dying. They argued that the 
Planetary redistribution of income favours those units which spend a lot of 
resources on keeping its citizens alive artificially. The living and those 
who are full of life are thus subsidizing the dying. In response, the non-
natural-span-of life intellectuals and journalists accused the GAME enthu-
siasts of immorality and of devaluing the value of life. The accusations 
and counteraccusations flew freely—and at some point the GAME enthu-
siasts suggested that their way of life is threatened by the need to continu-
ously argue with their opponents and to defend their values and their way 
of life against continuing attacks and innuendos. Couldn’t they enjoy free-
dom from this pressure of the moralists and their demands to respect the 
dying? 
This is how the idea of secession was born. The idea was simple: the 
GAME unit should become a separate budgetary unit so that it can only 
contribute to those shared Planetary costs that its citizens find necessary. 
The secessionists argued: let us share the costs of the defence and of 
shared police forces and perhaps other necessary functions—but not other 
expenses, in particular, no expenses for medical and other care beyond the 
natural span of life. 
In turn, this proposal rang alarm bells in the Planetary Council—if the 
all the natural-span units were to withdraw their contribution, through this 
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kind of budgetary secession, the life preserving machines for many thou-
sands if not millions of the dying would have to be switched off. Many 
natural-span members of the Planetary Council agreed that this was unac-
ceptable in part because this would appear to withdraw recognition from 
the values of the non-natural-span-of-life adherents. 
In response, the GAME advocates pointed out that they fully recognize 
the importance of life preservation for the non-natural-span adherents but 
that they only demand equal recognition of the importance of GAME for 
them. Neither the GAME nor the non-natural span adherents should fund 
each other’s preferences: to each one’s own, they claimed. 
The Planetary Council warned that the Planetary law does not allow a 
unilateral withdrawal of budgetary contributions. The GAMErs retorted 
that their proposal to withdraw is prompted by considerations of justice—
that their action is just and that the law is in this case unjust and should not 
be upheld. The Planetary Council then proceeded to use force to extract 
the contribution by sending its officials, from all over the planet, under 
armed guard. 
The GAMErs in turn proclaimed the nullification of laws of the Planet 
(the world state) and called for non-violent resistance to the officials. Con-
fronting demonstrators hurling abuse and tomatoes (or their 22nd century 
equivalents), the Plantery forces used the most modern stun technology 
which totally incapacitated several demonstrators (who ended up on life-
preserving machines but were not killed). These became the martyrs for 
the cause and the GAMErs demanded the punishment of the Planetary 
forces and withdrawal of the armed riot units. As the armed intervention 
was rapidly alienating the GAME population and destroying the Planetary 
“WE” identity, many Planetary officials and armed forces officers started 
to doubt the wisdom of the armed intervention and imposition of this law 
by force. 
The Planetary Council faced the dilemma—either to continue to use 
armed force and provoke further violent conflict or to withdraw from the 
GAME unit and allow other natural-span units to withdraw their contribu-
tions to the dying machines. Both alternatives were highly costly and none 
of them prevented secession. 
What is at stake? 
Does the world state have means of preserving itself under the circum-
stances of differing lifestyle priorities—some of which require funding 
from the groups which do not share these priorities? 
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The importance of this story is not only to highlight this question but 
also to point out that the secession is not, necessarily, a demand for the 
right to kill unilaterally nor does it lead to the acquisition of that right. The 
GAMErs wanted a budgetary secession and were willing to remain under 
the security umbrella of the World State. They forfeited their right to arm 
and to use force against non-GAMErs at least until they were exposed to 
the violence of the Planetary forces. They demanded equality of recogni-
tion, not superiority. 
Why should they be punished for that? Why is it criminal to make the 
demands that they did? If the GAMErs revoked the shared security agree-
ments and started to arm—in the absence of any threats—this indeed 
might have been regarded as a breach of law that required preventive 
armed intervention. But preventive armed intervention was carried out 
against a budgetary secession because the latter threatened the beliefs and 
way of life of a group of people. Indeed, these people regarded these be-
liefs as the most important—as the core of their own identity—and their 
identity was based on the way of life that involved the use of life-
preserving machines. Even so, is the threat to these very deeply held be-
liefs (identity-beliefs) a sufficiently good reason for the use of lethal force 
(or its contemporary equivalent) against those who do not want to subsi-
dize those beliefs? 
At best, Wendt’s conception of a “good” world state offers no answer 
to this question. But we can easily see how in a “good” world state, those 
whose identity beliefs are threatened would see this threat to be not to their 
deeply held beliefs, but to the whole order of the state; they would con-
sider this threat—which is really a threat to their beliefs—as the threat to 
the happiness and security of all. After all, for the non-natural span adher-
ents, the whole order on which the Planetary state in our imagined world is 
based is that of the existence and functioning of life-preserving machines: 
if the latter are threatened, so is the order of the whole world. 
Under these conditions, those who extol the values of human life and 
its preservation may be ready to justify the use of lethal force or its equiva-
lent against those who threaten their conception of human life. Their situa-
tion thus becomes similar to the idealistic Bolsheviks who are ready to kill 
those who threaten the future egalitarian society—the belief in which 
shapes the Bolshevik identity. And so the “good” world state of promoters 
of life slips into a “bad” state of those who kill people in order to preserve 
life. 
All in all, Wendt’s imaginary world state neither rules out successfully 
all the causes or motivations for secession nor provides sufficient either 
utilitarian or moral grounds for criminalizing secession. Moreover, the 
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criminalization of secession in the world state may only be a symptom of 
its fundamental moral ambivalence and its potential to become, as many 
previous organizations which attempted to create a world state had be-
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For those of us who have our doubts about government as such, at 
whatever level, the prospect of world government is likely to be looked at 
with something approaching stark horror. Is there good reason for this 
aversion? I think so. World government inherits the problems of govern-
ment generally, but it adds a serious further level of problems. And the 
alternatives are at least better, if not very good. That is the general thesis 
for which I will try to provide some basic support in this essay. 
It is tempting to think of world government as a noble ideal, and very 
easy to succumb to that temptation. Think of all the great things such a 
government could do! —So enthusiasts are likely to say. But those who do 
think that are thinking of government as it ideally might be, in their views. 
Most of us, I daresay, are benevolent despots at heart: if we were in 
charge, things would be terrific! Each such theorist thinks about the sub-
ject through his or her own particular shade of rose-colored glasses. The 
problems begin right there. The various ideal visions of world government 
are mutually incompatible, and how would agreement be achieved among 
them, and at what cost? In any case, however, what matters even more is 
that no such vision is remotely likely to be achieved. We must think, not 
about what conceivably in the best case could be or should be, but rather, 
about what to hope for and expect given what we know about people, their 
states, and their histories. It is in that spirit that the following reflections 
are set forth. 
Obviously all this assumes certain things about the purposes of gov-
ernment. I am one of those who has doubts that governments can actually 
serve any of the good purposes for which they are presumably supported, 
or at least tolerated, by those subject to their powers, but at least it will be 
useful to consider whether a world government could be expected to 
achieve all or any of them even as well as, let alone better than, a collec-
tion of disparate, separate countries with assorted mutual connections and 
World Governance: Can it Happen in a Good Way? Not Likely! 111
relations, bilateral or low-number-multilateral treaties and other agree-
ments. 
Why Government? The Liberal Perspective 
What, then, might we hope governments would do? Of course there 
has been much disagreement about this. However, we can pare down the 
disagreement usefully, and considerably, by making a general distinction 
between what I will presumptively call “liberal” and, to be bland and 
broad, “nonliberal” views. The general distinguishing feature of liberal-
ism, I hold, is that it holds that 
 
(1) Government is justified only if and insofar as it governs for the 
good of the governed, rather than of the governors; and 
 
(2) The “good of the governed” is the good of people as seen by them-
selves rather than according to some purportedly objective, or idealistic 
theory not embraced by the individual concerned. Government, then, is 
concerned with enabling people to get what they want. 
 
All other views of government declare either, in the manner of Thra-
symachus, that the purposes of government simply are the purposes of the 
rulers, whatever the governed may think, or else, in the manner of Aris-
totle, that The Good is such-and-such and government is to promote that, 
like it or not. There are, of course, innumerable variants stemming from 
both views. The first, indeed, can hardly be called a “view” in the relevant 
sense—no sane philosopher is going to hold that we should all be rooting 
for the despot irrespective of his aims. The second, on the other hand, is 
very widely held and, I think, still more widely put into practice, usually 
by persons claiming to be liberals. 
What is clear is that the first kind of view, which I call by the some-
what misleading but accurately enough name “conservatism” has no 
chance of achieving world government. If world government could be 
achieved and then maintained by force, of course, then the vision of the 
successful conqueror could in some measure be instantiated. But it isn’t 
going to happen, nor should it. Conservatism as a unifying force for all is 
hopeless. The following treatment assumes, therefore, the correctness of 
liberalism without further argument.1 Of course liberalism too has had its 
diverse exponents and disciples in the last few centuries and especially in 
the past few decades, and the kind of divergences they have had plays 
some role in the following discussion. But with liberalism, at least the 
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prospect of unity is not a virtual non-starter, as is the case with the as-
sorted conservative views. 
My general, fairly bland generalization about the legitimate purposes 
of government is that the idea is to help make people better off—to live 
better lives. On our liberal view, however, these “better lives” are lives 
that those very people—the to-be governed—must see to be better for 
themselves—not just better according to some pundit or some supposed 
authority. The vision of the good life on the basis of which they are gov-
erned needs to be that of a life that they want to live. But of course, this is 
very indeterminate in its implications for practice. Indeed, some of us, 
sympathizing with Henry David Thoreau in spirit, wonder whether the 
best way for government to contribute to the important general goal of 
everyone’s achieving the best life they reasonably can hope to achieve, 
given the nature of their fellows and of their current environments, is to 
stop governing altogether. But still, the general outlook of liberalism at 
least suggests certain quite general more concretely specifiable purposes 
for governments to pursue. 
 
At any rate, we can conveniently categorize these as follows:2 
(1) Peace, both internal and external: that is, to keep people from mur-
dering and otherwise molesting each other—both fellow citizens (domestic 
peace) and people from other countries (international peace). At the top of 
every list is the control of civil violence. Governments are to provide the 
police who will punish interpersonal assaults, robbery and murder. They 
are also to organize such defence as may be necessary for the special case 
of foreign invasion, of course. But obviously the very agency that enables 
such defence also enables, and has been used since time immemorial for, 
offense. Thus an implied further purpose is to minimize violence against 
citizens by governments themselves. 
 
2) Welfare promotion, specifically in the way of health, education, and 
the production of the necessities and luxuries of life. People have sup-
posed, and expected, that governments would promote our health, educa-
tion, and welfare: at least to keep people from dying of the most prevalent 
curable diseases, to make them literate, and to enable the neediest among 
them to stave off starvation. 
 
3) Large-scale services: infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, and 
what a long-ago student helpfully refers to as “sandbox.” (Aquinas men-
tions “community festivals” and more generally “acting well by the com-
munity.”) In the second of those capacities, people have looked to gov-
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ernment provision of public facilities such as parks and the organization of 
public festivals and the like—the Olympic Games come to mind. 
 
For each of these objectives, it is worth observing that government is 
not literally necessary for achieving any of them. People can refrain from 
injuring their neighbours, they can help them when in need, and they can 
form associations such as businesses or cooperative societies for the crea-
tion of infrastructure, entertainment facilities and areas of all kinds. The 
defender of government needs to show us that governments can be ex-
pected to do these things better than independently acting individuals, 
proceeding only by voluntary means, can manage. There is, of course, no 
intention of attempting to show that here. Rather, the point is to add fur-
ther to the background of our topic here, one world government, for all. 
The question is whether there is any serious hope of improvement from a 
world government relative to what a loose and voluntary association of 
separate states might be likely to do. 
Nations have achieved enormously variable degrees of success in pro-
moting these three general objects. Regarding the first, they have, for 
example, generated an enormous number of wars, small and large, and to 
murder their own citizens in horrendous numbers. Regarding the second, 
they have sometimes managed to bring their people to the brink of starva-
tion, and occasionally over it; their populations have achieved highly vari-
able degrees of literacy, wealth, and health. The best ones do pretty well; 
the worst do miserably. And how you size up the third depends partly on 
matters of taste. Self-glorificational display, for example—if you go in for 
that sort of thing—has certainly been one of the State’s major achieve-
ments over time, from the Pyramids to imposing palaces and the like, as 
well as frequently heavy subsidies to various of the arts. But the achieve-
ments of non-governmental organizations and individuals are at least as 
impressive. Nor should we overlook the tendency for governments to 
crowd out the private sector associations’ attempts in these directions. 
Enter World Government 
When we move to World Government, what difference does that 
make? The Stanford Online Encyclopaedia, in a helpfully typical vein, 
tells us that “Proponents of world government offer distinct reasons for 
why it is an ideal of political organization. Some are motivated negatively 
and see world government as the definitive solution to old and new human 
problems such as war and the development of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, global poverty and inequality, and environmental degradation. More 
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positively, some have advocated world government as a proper reflection 
of the unity of the cosmos, under reason or God.” 
It is interesting that advocates would lump these together, for they are 
extremely different. World peace is the absence of war. Global poverty 
need not lead to war, though it might, neither need global inequality, 
though the perception that the state on the other side of the line offers easy 
pickings for desperate seekers of goods has no doubt contributed to some 
wars. And then, the adoption of equality as a goal can itself easily lead to 
war, and probably often has done so, in one way or another. Environ-
mental degradation is a recent addition, and rather an odd bedfellow in this 
group, but nevertheless one that can readily be plumped for by enthusiasts, 
who might see world government as the way to handle global environ-
mental issues, such as “global warming,” which currently leads the pack 
by a considerable margin. 
As to global unity, it is, to put it mildly, not clear that the right way to 
reflect any “unity” that the cosmos may have is to establish a world gov-
ernment. For one thing, if we really had unity, then surely we would be 
united without world government. But if, as is far more plausible, we are 
in fact diverse and disunited, then we should arguably forget about the 
“unity of the cosmos” and go our different ways. Anyway, the plausible 
view is that we are disunited in fact, and indeed, that the sort of problems 
inducing us to set up a world government stem precisely from that fact. 
I submit that there is little reason to hope for anything helpful on the 
second or third fronts from a world government—though I will expand on 
that point below. In any case, we already have the Olympic Games, with-
out a world government, and innumerable other international or global 
organizations and recognized festivals and so on. The focus falls all but 
entirely, then, on the first. World government, above all, is supposed to 
keep the peace. If it is neither necessary nor sufficient for greatly improv-
ing our expectation of peace, then there is not much reason to pin our 
hopes on any of the others. 
From the point of view of a world government, keeping what is cur-
rently international peace would be a matter of keeping world-domestic 
peace, as it were. The question is whether there is any really decent reason 
for believing (1) that it would accomplish such an objective, and (2) that it 
would confine itself to that function. I shall pursue both points—briefly 
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World Government=World Federation 
As things stand, World Government is necessarily going to be a sort of 
Federation, a la Kant. One reason for this is that if the world were made 
into one huge state, with democracy in place, countries like the United 
Stated would become small minorities, while my own country, Canada, 
would be a barely discernible speck on the political horizon. It is essen-
tially inconceivable that any State, even the very large ones, would go 
along with an indissoluble union of the world that subjected its govern-
ment and citizens to the uncertainties of world-wide majority voting. 
This is hardly unique. Canada and the United States are federal. A 
dozen states preceded the United States; a couple of Provinces preceded 
Canada, with more assembling in the lobby all ready to be added. In both 
cases, powers are divided between these smaller political entities and the 
larger ones. But that doesn’t keep both of these countries’ federal govern-
ments from doing a whole lot of the sort of thing that inspires critics of 
government with alarm. Are Ontario and British Columbia doing better 
because they are subordinate to the federal state of Canada? Quebec and 
Newfoundland may think they are: the Federal Government imposes taxes 
to “equalize” the situations of those two relative have-less provinces with 
the have-mores. Arguably, all would do better with sheer free trade among 
themselves. Once political democracy sets in, however, that’s unlikely to 
get wide recognition by the people who count—namely, The People. 
Think now of the 200 or so governments in today’s world, in relation to 
World Government and its prospects for elaborate programs of “equaliza-
tion” among them, as compared with its prospects for promoting real free 
trade among them. 
A world government’s components would be national units all of 
whom have been accustomed, and supposedly entitled, to be regarded as 
“sovereign” states. That is a notion difficult to define and the status of a 
state as “sovereign” is one that is very hard to sustain in the modern world, 
even if we can make sense of it. But in whatever workable meaning it may 
have, it is obviously going to be a major obstacle in the path of any higher 
level of what claims to be government. If your subordinates claim to rank 
equally with you, your authority over them is questionable. But if they 
clearly are subordinate, their enthusiasm to join the institution is likely to 
be modest at best. 
In a recent press opinion column in Canada, a columnist addressed the 
question of what we can do about the government of Burma’s refusal even 
to permit foreign aid workers to help out the numerous victims of a major 
typhoon in the Irrawaddy delta. His answer was discouraging, but surely 
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correct: nothing. “There is much talk at the world’s jaw-jaw organizations 
such as the UN and the Commonwealth about “responsibility to protect” 
and “soft power,” but for all this high-minded sentiment and flowery 
rhetoric, nothing short of hard power is going to save most victims of 
humanitarian crises. And the West, quite rightly, is reluctant to go around 
invading sovereign nations each time some generalissimo or president-for-
life decides to use a cyclone, drought, tsunami or social unrest to keep his 
people down and weaken his opposition” (Gunter, 2008). Robert Mugabi, 
the government of Sudan, Fidel Castro—not to mention Mao Zedong and 
Stalin—all of these stunningly evil people remained immune from the 
world’s more decent regimes for whole lives or at least for many decades, 
despite the U.N., despite immense power, economic and military. Why so? 
It’s hard to resist the conclusion that nations accustomed to thinking that 
they have sovereign power will refuse to give up that power short of any-
thing but war, and meanwhile, the nations that possibly could make war on 
them in the interest of the rights of their inhabitants will be difficult to 
budge in the direction of doing that very expensive and risky thing. And it 
is easy to believe that rather than run the risk of losing sovereign power at 
the hands of a strong overarching government, they’ll prefer not to accept 
the latter in the first place. 
It might be thought that world government could make a difference 
here. But that is, I fear wishful thinking. Every war in a world with a world 
government would be a civil war, and civil wars have a way of being 
worse than the international wars with which the world has been amply 
plagued. The thought, perhaps, is this: that in an official world federation, 
there would be an overall nanny who could keep her unruly charges in 
line. But this is an analogy that runs out of plausibility fairly soon. Nan-
nies are usually large in relation to their charges, but would world gov-
ernments be? On paper, yes. But would they be willing to risk their mem-
bers’ resources for these purposes if, as I think inevitable, they “ruled” 
with little behind them but such force as moral suasion can muster? 
A world government would not, in anything like current circum-
stances, come about in the usual way, viz. by conquest. Alexander the 
Great, Caesar, and Genghis Khan are not where it’s at any more (if they 
ever really were, for that matter.) Instead, world government would origi-
nate in some sort of constitutional convention, rather as the United Nations 
did. Now, with such an entity, we have a chain that is about as strong as its 
weakest link. If every member is such by agreement, then the terms of 
association will be extremely weak, else the ones we really want to get at 
will not join, or will do so only on meaningless terms—as when, in the 
U.N., Libya ends up in charge of Human Rights, for example. And if the 
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“rogue” states do join, the terms will be weak enough so that we can’t get 
at them. Indeed, it will make matters worse. In the world as it has been, 
NATO forces could make war against Serbia on behalf of Kosovo, for 
example. The UN wouldn’t have done such a thing—the opposition of 
Russia by itself is enough to guarantee that. 
So the question is whether world government might indeed enable a 
“definitive solution to... problems such as war...” to say nothing of world 
poverty or inequality. And on this, it seems to me, the plausible view has 
to be resoundingly in the negative. The reason for this is familiar: either 
the problem of war is such as to make effective world government impos-
sible, or else, if soluble at all, it makes it unnecessary. Both horns of the 
dilemma deserve some further comment. 
How would a world government prevent war? Will the member states 
be happy to contribute troops (for example) to a military expedition on the 
basis of a majority vote of the members? Not likely. If they will only be 
asked to approve the sending of them by somebody else, then what about 
the member against whom the expedition would be directed? Would it 
have a veto, or not? If it would, that’s the end of our police action. If it 
wouldn’t, what nation would join an organization with such powers? 
On the other hand, let’s suppose that the various nations are ready to 
seek peace with others, to engage in trade, and to respect negotiated 
agreements. In that case, though, what need is there of a world govern-
ment? To be sure, some might say: to enforce those agreements. I reject 
this argument altogether, though discussing it at length is beyond the pur-
view of this discussion. A shorter way with it is to observe that those who 
make agreements and then disregard them pose a problem that can amount 
to a declaration of war, and if that is a serious problem, then the condition 
I’m envisaging here simply isn’t met. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia cites Kai Nielsen thus: 
“when the winning conditions exist for establishing a desirable form of 
world government or global governance—one that will guarantee human 
security with individual liberty, protect the environment, and advance 
global social justice—it will no longer be necessary” (Nielsen, 1988:276). 
Of course, on Nielsen’s view, on which an appropriate object for pursuit 
by world government is, say, “environmental protection” and what he 
claims to be “social justice,” the “desirable form of world government” is 
one for which “winning conditions” will never exist, leaving the question 
whether he would favour world government beforehand. He there echoes 
Marx’s distinction between pre-ideal socialism, which would call for 
enormously heavy government, and “ideal” communism, which he sup-
posed would be anarchic. Discussion of the latter option is academic: 
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given the way people have always been, communist goals will not be 
achieved in anarchic conditions, period. Capitalist goals, on the other 
hand, apparently could be, so far as I can see. Mutually beneficial ex-
change among voluntarily acting individuals does not require the sort of 
compulsory “distribution” that communism does. But what will happen at 
the international level? 
It is at such a level that, it seems to me, the problems facing global an-
archy are far less severe, as compared with world government. That the 
states of the world might cooperate to the extent of not making war on 
each other is far from inconceivable, and indeed for the most part hap-
pens—among most of them—most of the time. World government is un-
necessary among those ready to respect agreements, and ready to make 
those agreements with like-minded others. So insofar as the world is like 
that, no world government is needed to achieve that desirable state of 
affairs. But insofar as it is not like that, the prospects for forming a world 
government via effective federation are roughly nil. 
There is also the question whether world peace would actually be pro-
moted by world government. The tendency of government is to gang up on 
the relatively weak. Knowing that the relatively weak have an incentive 
for becoming relatively strong thus inhibiting the bullying tendencies of 
the world government. Of course, at the same time this relative strength is 
going to encourage the very behaviour that it was the point of world gov-
ernment to inhibit. Not good! 
From the behaviour of member states in the United Nations, we may 
also safely infer that a world federation any more robust than that rela-
tively toothless organization would be characterized by squabbling among 
its members. If, as with the Security Council, some states have an effective 
veto, this will, as it has done so far, inhibit effective action to secure peace. 
Everybody wants peace, of course—so long as it’s on their terms. But they 
disagree hugely over terms. And then what? 
Democracy 
A further important aspect of the problem of international peace is the 
argument, due to Immanuel Kant in (so far as I know) the first instance, 
that if the world’s nations were all what he called “republics”—
contemporary democracy being a tolerably good approximation—then war 
would, in all likelihood, not happen. Where the populace elects the gov-
ernment, Kant reasoned, people wouldn’t stand for expending their money 
and children on foreign adventures. They would instead confine them-
selves to defence. If all significant players on the international scene rea-
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son similarly, then there would be no aggression; but without aggression, 
there is no need of defence, and so Kant’s further desideratum, the absence 
of large standing armies, would probably also obtain. 
Democracy is the political system of choice in the contemporary world, 
and while it might be overly optimistic to suppose that all the world’s 
nations are destined sometime soon to become genuinely democratic, that 
possibility is at least not to be dismissed out of hand. Again, the point is 
that world government would be unnecessary to achieve general peace in a 
world of democracies. 
The Tendency to World Nanny-Statism 
This brings us to a problem that is, I think, very much more ominous. 
For a tendency to erect government is evident, in social groups almost 
everywhere, and an aspiration will surely arise of forming a world gov-
ernment despite the lack of the most urgent reason for having one. We 
may expect that world government certainly can and certainly would take 
to its bosom all sorts of popular political goals—world health, welfare and 
“equality” especially. And it would certainly do so in even more ineffi-
cient and counterproductive ways than the several separate governments in 
the world do at present. It will decree that all sausages should be precisely 
23 mm in length, that all children will be vaccinated against diseases that 
have never existed in the area, and innumerable other things of that kind, 
all the while staffing departments and committees with secretaries, under-
secretaries, under-undersecretaries, and so on indefinitely. We can expect 
world government to have at least all of the vices of actual governments 
everywhere, and very likely have them in much higher degree. Who, as 
young folks say, needs it? 
Kant, anticipating the above, says that what he calls a “pacific federa-
tion … does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to 
preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of 
the other confederated states” (Kant, 1983:104). Experience suggests that 
we should not be too optimistic about this. States always seek to acquire 
power, and organizations with quasi-statelike powers want to grab their 
share when they can. The example of the United Nations does not encour-
age us in this regard. Despite the decidedly non-pacific nature of various 
of its members, the UN, with all its many internal committees and associa-
tions, certainly tries to do considerably more than what Kant suggests. 
And it in general does not do it well, and does what it does do at enormous 
extra expense. Even if we only look at lesser super-national organizations, 
such as the European Union, the situation borders on the ridiculous. We 
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look to the EU for spectacular examples of bureaucracy gone berserk, with 
an incredible welter of highly arbitrary regulations about nearly all aspects 
of life. 
Governments are touted for instantiating and promoting the “rule of 
law.” Yes, indeed, but here we need a distinction: between the rule of the 
idea of Law, and the rule of laws, that is, the statutes and ordinances and 
operating procedures of the innumerable agencies of governments. The 
Rule of Law properly speaking would be the rule of the basic laws of 
society, above all that of mutual noninterference. But governments are not 
in fact very good at confining themselves to that. While they devote some 
time to dealing with robbery and murder, they devote a lot more of it to 
controlling the drug traffic, enforcing speed laws, building monuments to 
various parts of itself, and other such things—not to mention fairly freely 
breaking their own laws in various ways. 
The true view of the Rule of Law is that the actions of people are to be 
brought under a common rule that is in the common interest. Given the 
diversity of people, that common rule is going to be the general rule of 
liberty, that is, of non-harm. That people are not to assault, rob, or murder 
each other is the bottom line for the rule of law. And this basic level of law 
does not obviously require government for its administration, though it 
does require some kind of enforcement mechanism. Indeed, we all admin-
ister this rule, to greater or lesser extent, and in any case much of the ad-
ministering is really judicial in nature. People engaged in ongoing rela-
tions will in general see the wisdom of this general rule, and generally 
abide by it. 
For a recent interesting example of how things can work even at the in-
ternational level without world government, consider a recent article by 
Leif Wenar on international state robbery and what to do about it (Wenar, 
2008). Wenar observes that on almost anybody’s view, many contempo-
rary resource transactions are in principle invalid. They involve stealing 
from the people of countries that happen to have sizable amounts of valued 
resources, such as oil or diamonds. Merchants and governments trading 
with the rogue regimes that engage in this activity should desist from do-
ing so. But they won’t, very likely, and so, what to do? His proposal is that 
any regime that does trade with the rogue state should in turn be subject to 
a tariff of suitable size, the proceeds from which would go into a fund that 
ultimately will be used to enhance the situations of the defrauded people in 
the original countries. This is an interesting idea, and in the case of a very 
large, very wealthy, and moderately liberal state—the U.S. in this in-
stance—it could even, conceivably if not likely, work, and work without 
resort to world government. But if we had world government, we can be 
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sure that nothing at all would be done. Since most governments participate 
in the kind of robbery that Wenar deplores in his article, we may also have 
our doubts that they would even try to engage in a program of the kind he 
describes. But without world government, it’s possibly feasible; organized 
economic boycotts have had some effect in recent years, for example. All 
such, however, require independent decision-making, not top-down rules. 
A final note should be added concerning the “loftier” goals set for the 
United Nations and about which most proponents of world government are 
enthusiastic—the promotion, especially, of health, education, and welfare. 
I would argue that government in general is not competent to manage any 
of these things, as compared with private provision. There is a comparable 
case against provision by world government as compared with provisions 
by many separate states. Romania will do better trying to take care of 
Romanians than a world government centred in Brussels (or maybe New 
Delhi or Shanghai, in a not entirely unlikely future.) Individual states may 
suggest that they do not know much, but they generally at least know their 
own people better than foreign states with different languages and cul-
tures. Diseconomies of scale are the expected order here, and a world 
government would show the greatest diseconomy of all. 
Conclusion 
World government is a terribly mistaken idea. The way that real-world 
states are and have been for a long time suggests that achieving world 
government by a unanimous federation is all but impossible, and that if 
any such thing really were possible, by virtue of the relative reasonable-
ness of the constituent states, then it would also be entirely unnecessary 
since peace would be in everyone’s interest and would be maintained as 
such. But such an institution as could possibly happen would inherit all the 
worst features of government, while proving unnecessary for the primary 
purpose of government—to maintain peace. On the other hand, a world 
government would certainly attempt to impose a welter of wrongheaded 
laws about any number of things, ineffectually but expensively enforcing 
them, dampening the world commerce that is its main contributor to gen-
eral prosperity, and in general making life more difficult for everyone. 
Those who think world government a shining ideal need, I believe, to 
think again. 
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Notes 
1. My recent book, You and The State (2008), explores politics generally on the 
basis of this general division of theories. 
2. I here help myself to the classification made by St. Thomas Aquinas in his inter-
esting little treatise, On Kingship, (1982:§15). 
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KANT’S VISION AND HIS CONCERNS 
 
APPROACHING PERPETUAL PEACE:  
KANT’S DEFENCE OF A LEAGUE OF STATES 





The standard view of Kant’s position on international relations is that 
he advocates a voluntary league of states and rejects the ideal of a world 
federation of states as dangerous, unrealistic, and conceptually incoherent. 
This standard view reigns in both the Kant literature and the debates 
among Kantian political theorists. However much John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas, for example, may disagree over whether Kant is right to defend 
a voluntary association of states, their dispute is premised on the standard 
interpretation of Kant’s position. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls’s appeal to 
Kant’s purported reasons for rejecting the ideal of a world government 
serves as a theoretical short-cut, relieving him of the task of discussing the 
desirability of a world federation of states.1 In Habermas’s 1995 essay on 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace, the case for transforming the United Nations into 
a cosmopolitan democracy with strengthened coercive powers is preceded 
by a lengthy argument showing that Kant’s position in Perpetual Peace is 
riddled with contradictions and that Kant’s own principles should have led 
him to argue for a federative state of states with coercive powers.2 
In this essay I argue that the standard view of Kant’s position is mis-
taken and that he in fact holds a third position that combines the defence of 
a voluntary league with an argument for the ideal of a world federation 
with coercive powers. I do so via an examination of the three main criti-
cisms that are usually levelled against Kant. These criticisms can be found 
throughout the Kant literature and in the writings of Kant’s opponents, but 
they are particularly central to recent attempts to use Kant against Kant to 
advocate the establishment of a world government. First, he is criticized 
for scaling back, on empirical grounds, the ideal of a state of states to that 
of a voluntary non-coercive league of states, while still maintaining that 
pure practical reason demands a state of states. Critics charge that consis-
tency requires that he advocate a federative state of states with coercive 
powers, and that Kant’s appeal to the fact that states do not want to join 
such an institution makes for a decidedly un-Kantian line of argument.3 
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Second, critics object that a state of states is not a contradiction in terms 
and hence that Kant should not have rejected it on grounds of conceptual 
incoherence (Carson, 1988:177, 202; Guyer, 2000:416; Kersting, 1996). 
Third, critics regularly object that a mere league would not help bring 
about peace because there is no practical difference between a voluntary 
non-coercive league and no league at all.4 
I here defend Kant against all three of these charges and argue that they 
rest on misunderstanding of Kant’s argument for the league of states, in 
particular a misunderstanding of the relationship between his defence of 
the league of states and his claim that reason demands a state of states. 
Kant does advocate the establishment of a non-coercive league of states,5 
at least in his mature political writings (such as Perpetual Peace and the 
Metaphysics of Morals), but he does so for reasons that both make good 
sense within the framework of his political theory and are compatible with 
the stronger ideal of a state of states. 
Even though the argument presented here concerns the interpretation of 
Kant’s theory of peace, it has implications for both lines of Kantian politi-
cal theorists mentioned above. Against those who claim that their plea for 
a federative state of states with coercive powers is merely a Kantian im-
provement of Kant’s own argument, I show that Kant’s reasons for advo-
cating a voluntary league instead of a state of states are not inconsistent 
and deserve to be taken seriously. Against those who use Kant, as for 
example Rawls does, to justify sidestepping a discussion of the ideal of a 
federal world government, I show that it is in fact inappropriate to do so. 
In the first section I show why exactly Kant holds that states in the 
state of nature do not have a right to coerce other states into a state of 
states against their will, even though the analogy with the state of nature 
among individuals might seem to require such a right. In the second sec-
tion I argue that Kant does not regard the state of states as conceptually 
contradictory and that his own defence of the ideal of a state of states is 
compatible with his view of state sovereignty. In the third and fourth sec-
tions I explain how, according to Kant, the voluntary league of states 
serves to bring a state of states nearer to realization, despite the league’s 
lack of coercive authority. I end by indicating how Kant’s revised view 
can be made productive for present-day philosophical purposes, suggest-
ing several amendments to current Kantian political theories. 
Before starting, I should make a terminological comment about the use 
of “states” and “peoples.” It is clear and uncontroversial that Kant is dis-
cussing the relations among states, not nations or peoples in an ethnic, 
cultural, or nationalist sense. The term Völkerstaat refers to a state of 
states, despite the fact that Volk is generally best translated as “people.” 
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Nowhere does Kant advocate the dissolution of existing states in favour of 
the formation of a single world state under which individuals would be 
directly subsumed. In the present case, Kant uses the term “people” in the 
political sense of a group of individuals who are united under common 
laws, hence who form a state (cp. PP VIII:344). Accordingly, Kant indi-
cates at the beginning of his discussion of international right6 in Perpetual 
Peace that he is discussing “peoples as states” (Völker als Staaten) (354), 
and in the subsequent discussion he refers to a league “of states” and a 
league “of peoples” interchangeably. Elsewhere, Kant notes that “right of 
peoples” (Völkerrecht, international law) is a misnomer and that the ap-
propriate term would be “right of states” (Staatenrecht, MM VI:343; a 
people with alleged common ancestry he calls a Stammvolk, MM VI:311). 
To keep the discussion below focused on the relationships among “peoples 
as states” and to avoid nationalist misunderstandings, I use “state of peo-
ples” as synonymous with “state of states.” This should not in turn lead to 
a statist misunderstanding. One should keep in mind that Kant conceives 
of the state as the political self-organization of a group of individuals and 
that he does not regard the rights granted to the state as independent from 
the rights of these individuals. 
I. The Potential Despotism of a Coercively Established 
State of States 
One of the most infamous passages in which Kant defends the estab-
lishment of a league instead of a state of states is the following: 
 
As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can 
be no other way for them to emerge from the lawless condition, which con-
tains only war, than for them to relinquish, just as do individual human be-
ings, their wild (lawless) freedom, and to accustom themselves to public, 
binding laws, and to thereby form a (continually expanding) state of peo-
ples (civitas gentium), which would ultimately comprise all of the peoples 
on earth. But they do not want this at all, according to their conception of 
the right of peoples (thus rejecting in hypothesi what is right in thesi);7 
therefore, instead of the positive idea of a world republic (if not everything 
is to be lost) only the negative surrogate of a lasting and continually ex-
panding league [Bund] that averts war can halt the stream of law-shunning 
and hostile inclination, but with a constant threat of its breaking out... (PP 
VIII:357) 
 
Kant here mentions the state of states (“state of peoples”) as an idea of 
reason. Central to Kant’s political theory is the view that the state of nature 
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among individuals can be overcome only by their subjecting themselves to 
common public laws in a state. In the quoted passage, he claims that rea-
son demands that states do the same and leave the international state of 
nature by giving up their external sovereignty, subjecting themselves to 
the public laws of a state of states (also called a “world republic”). To the 
consternation of his readers, however, Kant nevertheless goes on to advo-
cate the establishment of a voluntary league of states without coercive law 
enforcement. 
The passage is generally regarded as inconsistent, and its standard in-
terpretation leads directly to the first objection against Kant’s advocacy of 
the league of states. Some commentators criticize Kant, others commend 
him for scaling back what reason demands on the basis of the empirical 
consideration that states do not want to join a state of states. But all agree 
that this argument is a decidedly unKantian move.8 Kant is seen as arguing 
that the idea of a state of states is a good one in theory but unrealistic in 
practice, and this is exactly the kind of argument that he himself repeat-
edly repudiates, most notably in “On the Common Saying: This May Be 
True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice.” 
I would like to propose that the importance of the states’ wanting to 
join a federative state of states can and should be interpreted differently, 
and that their not wanting to join is a good reason for Kant, given his other 
theoretical commitments, to advocate the establishment of a voluntary 
league. Let me point out first that Kant is not saying (as he is often thought 
to be) that one should reject the idea of the state of states. Nor does he 
claim that states will never want to join such a body. What he does say is 
that because states do not want to join a state of states and (mis)interpret 
international law as a right to remain in the state of nature, such a body is 
not able to “halt the stream of law-shunning and hostile inclination” that is 
characteristic of the state of nature, and that the only thing that can halt it 
is a continually expanding league. Therefore, he claims, a league, not a 
state of states, is necessary for the purpose of leaving the state of nature (in 
order to “halt the stream...” of bellicosity). Kant presents us with a view as 
to how to start leaving the international state of nature; he does not say that 
we should reject the idea of a world republic as such. 
In fact, Kant defends the state of states as ideal not only in the quote 
discussed here, but also in other, often-overlooked passages. In Perpetual 
Peace he expresses the hope that “distant parts of the world can peaceably 
enter into relations with each other, relations which can ultimately become 
publicly lawful and so bring humanity finally ever closer to a cosmopoli-
tan constitution” (PP VIII:358).9 He writes that justice requires “an inter-
nal constitution of the state in accordance with pure principles of right, and 
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then further, however, the union of this state with other neighbouring or 
also distant states for the purpose of a lawful settlement of their conflicts” 
(PP VIII:379). Similarly, he writes in the Metaphysics of Morals that be-
fore states leave the state of nature all international right is merely “provi-
sional,” and that international right can come to hold definitively and es-
tablish a true Perpetual Peace only “in a universal union of states 
[Staatenverein] (analogous to that by which a people becomes a state),” a 
body which Kant here also calls a “state of peoples” (Völkerstaat, MM 
VI:350). 
Turning now to the question of how to square Kant’s advocacy of a 
league of states with his defence of the state of states as an ideal, I start 
with a few words about the analogy between the state of nature among 
individuals and that among states. Many commentators claim that because 
Kant holds that the state of nature among individuals can be overcome 
only by establishing a state with common laws and law enforcement, he 
should also use the state as the model for overcoming the international 
state of nature.10 Hence, he should have advocated a federation of states 
with coercive public laws and granted states the authority to force each 
other to join such a federal state of states. 
Interestingly, in the texts from the 1780’s (such as the “Idea for a Uni-
versal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”), Kant himself de-
fended this strong interpretation of the analogy between the two states of 
nature (cp. VIII:24–5). But he later came to realize that the analogy fails in 
an important respect. As a result, he gave up this earlier view, explicitly 
denying that the analogy runs deep enough to yield a defence of a state of 
states as a matter of international right (right of peoples). 
The disanalogy, he writes in Perpetual Peace, is that “states already 
have an internal legal constitution, and thus they have outgrown the coer-
cion of others to subject them to a broader legal constitution according to 
their [viz., others’] conceptions of right” (PP VIII: 355–6). This passage is 
cryptic, and Kant’s growth metaphor is not helpful. One might be tempted 
to invoke the second and fifth Preliminary Articles in Perpetual Peace, 
which formulate versions of the principle of non-interference. But an ap-
peal to this principle does not yet explain why Kant regards it as wrong to 
coerce states to join a state of states, especially given that he also believes 
that a state of states is mandated by practical reason. 
There is, however, a way of understanding the importance of states 
wanting to join that makes good sense of the problematic passages and 
explains in what sense states have “outgrown” the coercion by others. This 
reading is more plausible than the standard view because it does not re-
quire us to regard Kant as blatantly contradicting himself in one and the 
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same paragraph and instead enables us to find a coherent line of argument 
that fits well with other major tenets of Kant’s theory. 
When individuals exit the state of nature, the state they form may not 
be perfect. Kant believes that it is always better than the state of nature 
that they left behind—since, on his view, any juridical condition, even one 
that is only partially in accordance with principles of right, is better than 
none at all (PP VIII: 373n)—even though it may (and is likely to) be the 
case that the most powerful individuals or groups are legislating and ruling 
in a despotic way. (Kant also holds, however, that such a despotic state can 
transform itself into a republican one, and that this improvement is pro-
pelled by the self-interest of peoples and their rulers, if not by their good 
will.)11 
At the international level, however, the situation is quite different. 
When states exit the state of nature, a state of states with coercive powers 
is not necessarily better, in terms of right, than the international state of 
nature. There is an important disanalogy that explains why Kant advocates 
a voluntary and noncoercive league instead of a coercive state of states. 
The disanalogy comes to light when one realizes that granting states a 
right to force other states into a federation with coercive powers, analo-
gous to the right of individuals to force others into a state would mean, by 
analogy, that the strongest state (or group of states) would end up setting 
the terms, subjecting other states to its laws and interests. Kant believes 
that in the case of individuals leaving the state of nature, there is progress 
even if the newly formed state is despotic. In the case of states leaving the 
state of nature, by contrast, a despotic state of states might quash any al-
ready existing rights that are secured internally by the subjected states, and 
hence a despotic state of states can severely violate lawful freedom. After 
all, there is no reason to assume that the strongest state (or group of states) 
acts in accordance with the requirements of right (or that it acts more so 
than the dominated ones). The states with less power may be the ones that 
are the most in accord with justice. The state of states may be governed by 
laws that are inconsistent with the freedom (autonomy) of the member 
states, and a despotic federal state of states could, for example, destroy the 
“republican” institutions through which the citizens of a particular member 
state give laws to themselves. (This is suggested by Geismann, 1983:367). 
Yet it does not seem that the risk of bad consequences is itself the rea-
son why Kant objects to coercing unwilling states into a federation. Kant 
does not say that it is, and indeed if it were, this would open him up to the 
objection that this consequentialist line of argument would commit him to 
endorsing cases in which a group of powerful “republican” and rights-
respecting states coercively forces unwilling despotic states into the fed-
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eration. After all, such coercion would expand the external freedom of the 
population of such despotic states and it would seem that if the risk to 
freedom is a reason not to coerce just states into a federation, the chance to 
expand freedom would be a reason to coerce unjust states. But this is a 
strategy which Kant clearly does not endorse. 
What does explain the importance of states wanting to join, and what 
does find support in the texts, is Kant’s view of the ideal state as the union 
of individuals for the purpose of being under common, self-given laws, 
along with his conviction that forcing states to join a state of states against 
their will would violate the autonomy of these individuals as well as the 
autonomy of the people they compose collectively. Kant regards states 
primarily as unions of individuals, and ideally as republican unions of 
politically autonomous (i.e., self-legislating) individuals. Forcing them 
into a state of states would run counter to the basic idea of the polity as a 
self-determining and self-legislating unity. 
This is most clearly illustrated by cases in which a despotic state of 
states would destroy rights and freedoms secured within relatively just 
states. But it holds true even in cases in which the coercion is intended to 
be for the sake of the population’s own good. For even if it seems that 
citizens of brutally oppressive states would prefer to live under a republi-
can federation rather than their oppressive rulers, and hence that their 
autonomy might be served by coercing their state into a federation, it may 
in fact be that what they really want is to be in a position to decide for 
themselves in this matter. The people may well want to get rid of their 
despot, but it does not follow that they will want to join a particular state 
of states with its particular conception of justice. Thus, coercive inclusion 
of a state for the good of the population comes down to an essentially 
paternalistic line of reasoning that passes over the political autonomy of 
the people it purports to serve, and Kant’s objections to paternalism are 
well-known. The individuals within despotic states may not want to join 
the coercing state (or group of states) on the latter’s terms. This is also 
illustrated by the various unsuccessful attempts on the part of strong states 
that understand themselves as “republican” or “democratic” to impose 
their version of republicanism or democracy on the populations of hereto-
fore despotic states—this was the experience of, for instance, revolution-
ary France at the end of the eighteenth century, and also of the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. in the twentieth century. 
This seems to be what is meant by the passage, already quoted above, 
in which Kant claims that states have “outgrown the coercion of others to 
subject them to a broader legal constitution according to their [viz., oth-
ers’] conceptions of right” (PP VIII: 355–6). This claim does not mention 
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risks, but rather indicates that the autonomy of the individuals that make 
up states puts normative constraints on the way that states exit the interna-
tional state of nature.12 Thus, there is no parallel at the international level 
to a right that is granted to individuals in the state of nature, namely, the 
right to force other individuals to either enter into a state with them or 
leave them alone (cp. PP VIII: 349n). 
Kant’s point is not that a state of states is more likely to be despotic (or 
likely to be more despotic) than its constituent states. Rather, his point is 
that the starting assumptions in the state of nature among individuals are 
relevantly different from those in the case of the state of nature among 
states. In the first case one starts with a universal state of nature, whereas 
in the second case the state of nature exists only in the external relations 
among states that internally already have a civil condition. Forcing indi-
viduals to leave the state of nature in order to have them subject them-
selves to common civil laws leads only to improvement (in Kant’s norma-
tive terms), because it establishes a civil condition where there was none 
before. Forcing existing states into a state of states with coercive powers, 
by contrast, violates their people’s autonomy (and may also lead to viola-
tions of rights and freedoms they have secured within their state). There-
fore, there is no right to coerce unwilling states into a state of states. As 
Kant puts it in the Vorarbeiten, states are allowed to resist the attempt by 
others to force them to join a federative state of states “because within 
them public law has already been established, whereas in the case of indi-
viduals in the state of nature nothing of the kind takes place” (XXIII: 168). 
Kant’s argument does not depend on any particular assumption about 
the motivation of states to avoid joining the coercive state of states. It is 
valid regardless of whether the reason states do not want to join is the 
conscious attempt to protect the political autonomy of their citizens vis-à-
vis an existing internally despotic state of states, or the states’ stubborn or 
self-interested attachment to their external sovereignty on the basis of a 
mistaken view of international right. Moreover, it applies both to states 
that comply with the principles of right to a small degree and to those that 
are near-perfect republics. Kant’s point in stressing the disanalogy is not to 
defend the isolationism or self-interested policies of imperfect states; 
rather, the point is that there is no general right to coerce unwilling states 
into a state of states. This does not imply that he approves of isolationism 
or of self-interested foreign politics, of course, and one should keep in 
mind that Kant also holds that duty requires that states join a league of 
states with an eye to promoting international peace, so they ought to do so 
even though they should not be forced to do so. 
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It is worth noting here that commentators who criticize Kant for down-
playing the analogy between the state of nature among individuals and that 
among states often themselves fail to take seriously the problems con-
nected with a strict analogy. Most of them (inconsistently) allow for vol-
untary joining and secession. The few authors who do follow the alleged 
analogy to its logical conclusion expose the dangers connected with this 
view. According to Thomas Carson, for example, in an essay entitled 
“Perpetual Peace: What Kant Should Have Said,” neither democracy nor 
consent are required for the creation of a state of states: 
 
[I]f... the creation of a world government would require that all nations 
have democratic or “republican” forms of government, then the prospects 
for the creation of a world government are not good. It may seem unlikely 
that all nations would ever agree to a particular form of a world govern-
ment. But this is not necessary for the creation of a world government. It 
would be enough if all great powers (or all nuclear powers) agreed to the 
idea of a world state. They could then unite and compel other nations to 
join.13 
 
If the state of states is based on the sheer power of a few states with the 
weaponry that can compel all others, it is clear that the political autonomy 
of the citizens of the states that are so compelled has evaporated, and the 
despotic nature of this process is apparent.14 Kant has good reason then, 
given his broader commitments, not to advocate the coercive formation of 
a state of states and advocate a league instead. 
I believe that this reading of Kant’s argument makes good sense of the 
passage quoted at the beginning of this section, but it does so in a way that 
departs from the received view that Kant settled for a league rather than a 
state of states on “realist” grounds. Kant actually never gives up the ideal 
of a federal state of states for reasons of feasibility. Instead, his defence of 
a league of states is inspired by a concern that a state of states that is estab-
lished by coercing unwilling states into it runs counter to the political 
autonomy of the citizens of the member states. True and durable peace 
does indeed require that states form a state of states (by analogy with the 
formation of a state), but Kant denies that the way this goal is achieved 
should be analogous as well. Kant’s positive views as to how this goal 
ought to and can be achieved will become clear in sections III and IV 
below. 
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II. Sovereignty and the Importance of Political  
and Moral Development 
Kant presents a second argument in favour of a league of states (and 
against forcing states into a coercive state of states). It too is generally 
thought to be highly problematic, though I will again argue that the criti-
cism rests on a misinterpretation. 
In an important passage, at the beginning of his discussion of the prin-
ciple of international right, Kant seems to reject the establishment of a 
state of states citing a “contradiction” that would then ensue: 
 
Peoples, as states, can be judged as individual human beings who, 
when in the state of nature (i.e., when they are independent from external 
laws), already harm one another by being near one another; and each of 
whom, for the sake of his own security, can and ought to demand that the 
other enter with him into a constitution, similar to that of a civil one, under 
which each is guaranteed his rights. This would constitute a federa-
tion/league of peoples [Völkerbund], which would not, however, need to 
be a state of peoples.15 Therein would lie a contradiction, because every 
state involves the relation between a superior (who legislates) to an inferior 
(who obeys, namely, the people), whereas many peoples within one state 
would make only one people, which contradicts the presupposition (since 
we have to consider the right of peoples vis-à-vis each other, insofar as 
they make up so many different states and should not fuse together into 
one state) (PP VIII:354). 
 
Interpreters often assume that Kant’s phrase “therein would lie a con-
tradiction” refers to the conceptual incoherence of the very notion of a 
state of states.16 In his widely used translation, H. B. Nisbet reinforces this 
assumption by rendering the clause as follows: “For the idea of an interna-
tional state is contradictory, since...“ (MM:102). According to this reading, 
Kant regards it as part of the concept of a state that it has full sovereignty. 
If states were to join in a state of states they would have to relinquish their 
sovereignty and hence cease to exist as states in the proper sense of the 
term. Abolishing their statehood in the act of joining, the states would 
actually form only one state, and not a state of states, and hence, Kant is 
thought to argue, the very idea of a state of states is contradictory. 
On the basis of this interpretation, critics have complained that Kant 
neglects the possibility that states transfer only part of their sovereignty to 
the federal level of the state of states. They would have to give up only 
their sovereignty in their relations towards each other, and they could 
retain sovereignty in internal affairs. Kant is said to have been under the 
spell of a Hobbesian prejudice about sovereignty, a prejudice which, for-
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tunately, is easily obviated without requiring any structural changes in 
Kant’s political theory. The resulting (and purportedly more consistent) 
Kantian position would then be to advocate a world state (Kersting, 
1996:437–8). 
I would like to argue that the contradiction lies elsewhere. First, it is 
worth pointing out that the second objection sits very uneasily with the 
first one, although many commentators bring up both. If Kant rejects the 
state of states as a contradiction in terms, the argument targeted by the first 
objection would not only be bad but also entirely superfluous. If one can 
show that a square circle is conceptually contradictory, it is not neces-
sary—indeed it is rather odd—also to argue that there are empirical rea-
sons why people will refuse to draw one. 
More importantly, Kant does not actually write that the concept of a 
state of states is contradictory. Rather, he claims that there is a contradic-
tion between the concept of a state of states, on the one hand, and a fun-
damental “presupposition” of international right, on the other. Conceptu-
ally, a state of states constitutes only one state. It is a presupposition of 
international right (right of peoples, right of states), however, that it con-
cerns the interactions of a plurality of states. As international right, then, it 
cannot be grounded in the ideal of a world-wide state of states, because if 
there were such a global political body, there would strictly speaking be 
only one state, and then international right would not be applicable. Simi-
larly, Kant starts off the follow-up discussion later in Perpetual Peace by 
saying “The idea of the right of peoples presupposes the separation of 
many neighboring states that are independent of each other” (VIII:367, see 
also XXIII:168). In short, when one is talking about international right 
one should address the legal regulation of the interactions among a plural-
ity of different states, not the internal laws of a single world state.17 
If this is Kant’s argument, however, one might object that he could 
have gotten rid of the contradiction by replacing the “right of peoples” 
with something like the “right of a state of states.”18 One might then regard 
his very assumption that it is important to establish international right as a 
questionable premise. 
Kant’s answer lies in his at first sight curious remark, in the quote at 
the beginning of this section, that states “should not fuse together” (PP 
VIII:354). This belief motivates his insistence on the establishment of 
international right (“right of states,” as opposed to the establishment of the 
“right of a state of states”). But it is not immediately clear why states 
should not fuse together, especially given Kant’s conviction that the state 
of states is demanded by reason. 
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Kant’s reason for believing that the states should not fuse together is 
not that they should preserve their sovereignty but that the kind of fusion 
he has in mind here is dangerous. He explains his objection to the fusion 
of states by asserting that it would be bad if states formed a so-called “uni-
versal monarchy.” By the latter term he means a global empire that is 
formed when states “fuse together” by being absorbed into a single strong 
hegemonic state (PP VIII:367). This kind of non-federal world govern-
ment, established by one imperialistic state that swallows all others, leads 
to “soulless despotism” and the peace of a graveyard (PP VIII:367).19 
Kant’s objection to the formation of a universal monarchy does not 
imply the rejection of a federal state of states. In the passages under con-
sideration, Kant explains his rejection of the fusion of states in terms of his 
rejection of the formation of a coercive universal monarchy. It does not 
mean that he rejects the ideal of a global federation of states. If he were 
opposed to any transfer of external sovereignty, one would expect him to 
criticize strongly the creation of the United States of America, which he 
does not do (cp. MM VI:350), and of course it would be odd for Kant to 
claim, as he does repeatedly, that the state of states is demanded by reason. 
As Sharon Byrd has pointed out (Byrd, 1995:186–87n58), however, many 
commentators mistakenly read Kant’s arguments against the “universal 
monarchy” as arguments against all forms of world government. 
Thus, Kant can consistently reject the “fusion” of states and yet defend 
the ideal of a global federation. In fact, on his view, the initial separation 
of states, reinforced by differences in language and religion, furthers the 
internal development within states (also called “culture” by Kant), and this 
development will prepare humankind for the future establishment of a 
world federation of the right kind. Kant expects that cultural development 
within states will lead to “greater unanimity on principles” (he presumably 
means moral and juridicalpolitical principles, including the principles of 
international right). According to Kant, this increased consensus on nor-
mative principles will facilitate a nondespotic peace that peoples (as states) 
enter into willingly and autonomously (VIII:367). Once enlightenment has 
progressed far enough and people have learned to see beyond their cultural 
differences and achieved a proper understanding of and respect for the 
universal principles of human rights, republicanism, and international and 
cosmopolitan right, then the time will be ripe for the transition to a global 
juridical condition.20 
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III. Whether the League of States Would Make a Difference 
If we take Kant to endorse the state of states only after a certain level 
of development has been reached, then it becomes crucial to determine 
how he envisions the role of the league in the development toward a more 
secure peace. He clearly sees the league as promoting peace, but it is a 
point of contention in the literature whether it can actually do so. 
The third common objection against Kant’s views on peace (according 
to the standard interpretation) is that the league of states is not able to 
make any practical difference for promoting peace. The charge is that if 
the league is merely voluntary and non-coercive, only those states will join 
it that would not wage war anyway; moreover, if and when these states 
later change their position and do become bellicose, they will simply quit 
the league (as happened with the League of Nations in the 1930’s).21 
Strong states will behave opportunistically, subjecting the interests of 
weaker states to their own, using the league as an instrument of foreign 
policy when this is useful to them, and quitting or simply disregarding the 
league when it is not. Thus, the league does not add anything substantive 
that goes beyond the mere subjective intention of the member states not to 
wage war, and hence it does nothing to promote peace. As Friedrich Gentz 
put it in 1800, “A free treaty among states will be honoured merely as long 
as none of those who signed it possess both the will and the power to 
break it; in other words, as long as peace, which the treaty is supposed to 
establish, would exist also without it” (Gentz 1953: 479). 
Kant nowhere provides a detailed explanation of how the league of 
states is supposed to work. This is quite remarkable given the crucial role 
he accords to it, and it is hard not to agree with Gentz when he complains 
about this lack of detail (Gentz 1953: 478n). However, we do find the 
beginning of an account in the Metaphysics of Morals, and it provides the 
rough outlines of a reply to the third objection. 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant conceives of the league on the 
model of a “congress of states,” where the ministers of courts and repub-
lics present their complaints and reports of hostilities in order to submit 
their conflicts to arbitration (MM VI: 350–51). The league of states would 
create a permanent institutional structure for conflict mediation, opening 
up channels for communication and offering structures for neutral arbitra-
tion and negotiation that would otherwise not exist or would have to be 
arranged on an ad hoc basis. 
There is, then, a practical difference between a world with and one 
without a league of states, however sketchy Kant may be on specifics. The 
league goes beyond a mere treaty not to wage war. Without the league, 
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states with conflicts have to work these out between themselves, and they 
may fail to seek out impartial mediators and resort to violence instead. 
Third party states may offer themselves as mediators, of course, and Kant 
says as much in Perpetual Peace, where he points out that because a war 
may well go against the interests of third party states, these may do their 
best to bring about a settlement (PP VIII:368). To point out that negotia-
tions and mediation may also take place without a league of states, how-
ever, is to underscore rather than refute the potentially helpful role of a 
league. This is not to say that the league will always be successful, as we 
already saw acknowledged in Kant’s hint at the constant threat of hostili-
ties that would exist even with a league (PP VIII:357). But one should not 
flatly dismiss the potential of the league as an institutional framework for 
helping states keep the peace. Furthermore, the League of Nations and the 
United Nations have shown that such a league can encompass a good deal 
more than a mere court of arbitration, including the regulation of trade and 
labour laws; support for economic and political development; educational, 
scientific, and cultural exchange, and more. 
Such considerations shift the burden of proof onto those who imply 
that there is no value at all in creating channels for negotiation and media-
tion (and any other peace-promoting institutions that the league might 
provide for). It is easy, of course, for Gentz and later sceptics, to point to 
the failures of voluntary leagues to stop wars. These failures are clearly 
visible to all. But for the evaluation to be fair, sceptics need to take into 
account instances in which the league’s mediation resolved a conflict that 
would otherwise have resulted in war or in which it shortened the war’s 
duration. The empirical question is not whether voluntary international 
associations will themselves put an end to all international conflict: Kant 
agrees that they will not. Rather, the question is whether mediating institu-
tions (even if voluntary) can prevent, postpone, or mitigate conflicts in a 
way that allows for internal improvement within states, and the gradual 
development toward a more peaceful world. This empirical assessment of 
the efficacy of a league of states is considerably more complicated than 
Kant’s critics admit. 
IV. The Process Toward Peace 
Kant’s well-known view is that peace is in every state’s interest and 
that states will be moved to join a voluntary league out of sheer self-
interest if not out of nobler motives. Underlying this confidence is his 
long-held assumption that the consequences of war will eventually become 
so costly and destructive that states have an interest in avoiding war (368). 
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Even though they initially do not yet want to relinquish their sovereignty 
to a state of states, their self-interest will nevertheless move them to join a 
league. 
In addition to the older theme that peace is in the states’ interest, Per-
petual Peace expresses Kant’s further convictions that self-interest moves 
states internally in the direction of a republican government (see above, n. 
13), and that republics, in contrast to despotic states, are naturally inclined 
to peace. This is so because rulers of despotic states easily declare war, 
and they will simply make their subjects shoulder the burdens. Despotic 
states are therefore more prone to war, but they are also likely to succumb 
from within when these burdens get out of control, as in Kant’s eyes had 
happened to the ancien régime in France. Once they start to crumble, they 
provide opportunities for reform, as Kant also thought had happened in 
France (MM VI:341, cp. TP VIII:311). By contrast, the government of a 
republic, in which the citizens themselves decide whether or not to go to 
war, is more pacific. Kant believes that citizens will realize that offensive 
wars go against their self-interest, and hence that a republic will not start 
such a war. Furthermore, once a republic has been formed, this may con-
stitute a crystallization point or anchor for a pacific league, Kant writes, 
expressing a rosy view of the French conquests during the revolutionary 
wars (PP VIII:351, 365–7). Thus, he believes that there are several factors 
that move humanity in the direction of peaceful republicanism. 
Self-interest alone is not enough to make this peace durable, and Kant 
is the first to admit as much, mentioning the constant threat of the outbreak 
of hostilities that afflicts the league (357). Truly Perpetual Peace is a 
“moral task” and peace is desired “not just as a physical good but also as a 
condition that arises from the recognition of duty” (377), and only then 
can peace be truly perpetual. Kant believes, however, that the league of 
states does make a positive difference, however small perhaps initially, 
and that over time it will lead to more stability.22 
Starting with his first writings on history, Kant’s view was that the less 
war there is among states, the more this will allow for further political and 
moral development within states (cp. IUH VIII:20–31; TP VIII:311–12, 
see also below). As long as states have to use large amounts of their re-
sources for protection against threats by others, they cannot use these 
resources for, say, improving the education of their citizens. Moreover, 
war and the threat of war tend to curtail the external freedom of the citi-
zens and distract efforts to improve the political system within the state. 
The absence of war will free up resources and enable a focus on the inter-
nal development of republican (current Kantians would want to say “de-
mocratic”) political institutions. This development will then reinforce the 
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peace process and make it more secure. The idea behind this conviction is 
that a reduction of warfare is conducive to political and moral progress 
within states and that this progress in turn contributes further towards 
peace among states, and so on.23 Once there is agreement on universalist 
normative principles (such as a republican constitution, human rights, 
etc.), then a voluntarily created state of states can be actively pursued.24 
Thus, when critics claim that Kant’s peace theory is problematic because 
the league of states will not last,25 they overlook the larger framework of 
Kant’s view of history in which the role of the league is embedded. 
As a final step, once legal peace is established, the prospect is opened 
up for ever more moral learning. In a particularly salient passage on the 
relationship between the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue, 
Kant writes that when laws secure freedom externally, inner freedom (mo-
rality) will “liven up” and this, in turn, will enhance obedience to the laws. 
Thus, the legal peace is gradually made more secure because peaceful 
behaviour will no longer be inspired merely by anxious self-interest but be 
backed up by peaceable dispositions: 
 
A firmly established peace, combined with the greater interaction 
among people [Menschen] is the idea through which alone is made possi-
ble the transition from the duties of right to the duties of virtue. Since when 
the laws secure freedom externally, the maxims to also govern oneself in-
ternally in accordance with laws can liven up; and conversely, the latter in 
turn make it easier through their dispositions for lawful coercion to have an 
influence, so that peaceable behavior [friedliches Verhalten] under public 
laws and pacific dispositions [friedfertige Gesinnungen] (to also end the 
inner war between principles and inclinations), i.e., legality and morality 
find in the concept of peace the point of support for the transition from the 
Doctrine of Right to the Doctrine of Virtue. (XXIII:354–5, Vorarbeiten to 
the Metaphysics of Morals). 
 
We find this developmental view in many other texts from the 1780’s 
and 1790’s (e.g., the 1784 essay, “Idea for a Universal History from a 
Cosmopolitan Point of View,”26 the third essay in “On the Common Say-
ing,” 1793). 
Current Kantian theorists do not share all of the particulars of Kant’s 
teleological assumptions regarding the historical development of human-
kind, but significant aspects of the view are still present. For instance, 
Rawls maintains that the more The Law of Peoples is observed, the more 
‘moral learning’ takes place. By this he means a psychological process by 
which peoples will tend to accept The Law of Peoples as an ideal of con-
duct and transform what once was a mere modus vivendi into something 
more stable (Rawls, 1999: 44–45). 
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One might wonder, though, whether Kant’s developmental perspective 
does not indirectly undermine his own argument for a state of states. If 
self-interest leads to the formation of republics, and if republics are natu-
rally peaceful, then it would seem that a league of republics would forever 
do away with war even in the absence of any federal coercive authority. 
Or, put differently, it is unclear why Perpetual Peace would require a state 
of states instead of a mere league of republics. Kant’s claim that republics 
are naturally peaceful is often quoted in contemporary theories of interna-
tional relations, ever since Michael Doyle showed that it is confirmed 
empirically when narrowed to the thesis that democracies do not wage war 
against each other (rather than in the broader version that they do not wage 
war in general) (Doyle, 1983 and 1993). On the basis of this assumption, 
then, one might believe that a global democratization would be enough to 
durably do away with war, as indeed Rawls holds in The Law of Peoples 
(Rawls, 1999:8). 
Kant has several answers to this question. For one thing, truly Perpet-
ual Peace should be backed up by the appropriate normative convictions, 
not just by the fact that it is in everyone’s interest, because a peace that is 
based merely in self-interest is not really secure.27 
Furthermore, the fact that humans are free, coupled with the propensity 
towards evil that is rooted in human nature, means that they in principle 
pose a threat to each other’s external freedom, and this threat needs to be 
countered with a system of public and coercive laws. Kant believes that 
this last point also holds at the level of the interaction of states, as is clear 
from the passage quoted at the beginning of section II above. 
Finally, even a general “moralization”28 of humanity would not make 
the state of states superfluous. This is clear from Kant’s handling of a 
related worry with regard to the state. Kant argues that the state is morally 
necessary even for “goodnatured and justice-loving” individuals (MM 
VI:312).The reason for this is presumably because their unrecognized 
prejudices or one-sided perspectives might be at odds with the demands of 
justice or produce conflicts that need to be settled. Hence, true peace re-
quires not just the absence of hostilities, but also the lawful arbitration of 
conflicts by an authority established over the individuals; the same argu-
ment would hold in the case of states. 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant invokes the problem of size (not 
the problem of states never wanting to join) as grounds for ruling the per-
fect realization of the ideal of a state of states impossible. Echoing a 
widely held view, he writes that if a state of states becomes too large, it 
becomes impossible to govern it and to protect each member; but if there 
were more than one such body this would reintroduce war, and therefore 
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Perpetual Peace is an “unrealizable idea” (MM VI:350). But he does not 
give up the idea, stating that the “continual approximation” is possible and 
a duty (350). Thus, even if one disagrees with Kant’s assessment that a 
global federal state of states is impossible for reasons of size, as some 
recent commentators do,29 one should not accuse him of inconsistently 
having given up the ideal on the basis of its impracticability. 
V. Kant and Kantian Theories of International Relations 
The core of Kant’s argument, then, is that the full realization of Per-
petual Peace does require a federal state of states backed up by the moral 
dispositions of the individuals within the member states, but that this goal 
should be pursued mediately, via the voluntary establishment of a league, 
and not via premature attempts to institutionalize a state of states immedi-
ately. Out of concern with the protection of autonomy, Kant holds that the 
right way to approximate the state of states is to develop a league of states 
first. Citizens and politicians ought to work practically towards the estab-
lishment of a league, but the ultimate goal they should have in mind in 
doing so is a situation in which all states have become republics and their 
citizenry has become enlightened enough to want to submit to the public 
and enforceable laws of a republican state of states. This ideal of a fully 
realized Perpetual Peace may well remain out of reach—indeed Kant 
thinks it will—, yet it remains for him an ideal that one can and ought to 
strive for and that can be approximated. 
Kant’s position as presented here is thus much more consistent and 
more nuanced than is usually thought. He does fail to provide sufficient 
details regarding the preferred structure of the league and the federative 
state of states, however, and regarding the question of how one determines 
whether the time is ripe for moving from a league to a federative state of 
states. At one point Kant expected the process toward the state of states to 
take “thousands of years” (Lectures on Anthropology XXV:696–7), and 
hence he may have viewed the second issue in particular as not pressing. 
Current Kantian theorists have developed accounts to amend this deficit, 
in light of the real achievements and real disasters of the past hundred 
years. The current world is very different from the one Kant had in mind. 
There already is a league of states, comprised of the vast majority of states 
on the globe. The UN certainly has its problems, as Kant expected it 
would, but it can also boast some important successes. Furthermore, in 
significant respects the world is already engaged in a process of transition 
towards more binding structures (as indicated, for example, by institutions 
such as the International Criminal Court and the World Trade Organiza-
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tion, and the fact that states can now be punished for violating human 
rights). Any appropriation of Kant’s theory of peace needs to take these 
changed circumstances into consideration, as most Kantian theorists are 
well aware (see especially Habermas, 1997). If my interpretation is cor-
rect, however, Kant’s own argument is not only compatible with these 
developments but also suggests some interesting amendments to current 
Kantian theories of peace. I will merely give some hints here. I do not 
aspire to defend the Kantian position per se but only to show how Kantian 
theories might be affected if one takes into account Kant’s arguments as 
presented in this essay. 
Those who, like Rawls, reject any type of world government can no 
longer justify their view by an appeal to Kant. Rawls now lacks an argu-
ment for the rejection of the ideal of a world republic of the sort that Kant 
holds up as ideal. The reasons Rawls adduces to motivate his rejection of 
world government in general and that he borrows from Kant are actually, 
for Kant, merely reasons to reject a hegemonic state (i.e., a “universal 
monarchy,” see above). Although this does not of course mean that a 
Rawlsian could not craft an argument for rejecting the Kantian ideal, at the 
least there is a need for more discussion. 
While Rawls’s theory “makes room for various forms of cooperative 
associations and federations among peoples” (Rawls 1999:36), a world 
federation of states is explicitly not part of the ideal, and peoples are to 
remain “free and independent” (Rawls 1999:37). The realist utopia he 
outlines includes what he calls a mere “confederation” of independent 
states (“peoples,” in his terminology), and when Rawls mentions the pos-
sibility and permissibility of states joining together to form federations, he 
always speaks of such federations in the plural (e.g., (Rawls 1999:70). In 
light of Kant’s theory as interpreted above, what is missing here is the 
ideal of a lawful and enforceable global arbitration of conflicts. Rawls 
believes that the lack of enforcement of The Law of Peoples is not a prob-
lem, because in the realist utopia as he envisions it the members of the 
confederation will not have reasons to wage war against each other 
((Rawls 1999:9;19). As we saw above, however, on Kant’s view a “league 
of republics” is not enough, because even law-abiding peoples may find 
themselves in disagreement on important matters and hence in need of a 
lawful and enforceable settlement of their disputes. So Rawls still faces the 
problem that if the confederation he envisions arbitrates in a binding and 
enforceable way, this significantly diminishes the independence of the 
constituent states and makes the confederation assume traits of a federa-
tion after all; if, on the other hand, it does not arbitrate in such a way, there 
is no mechanism to settle disputes among “well-ordered peoples.” 
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Furthermore, the interpretation here proposed also shows that consis-
tent Kantian theorists need not and should not accept the view that states 
should be coerced into a federative world state. In fact, the interpretation 
here proposed outlines a third Kantian answer (Kant’s answer) to the tradi-
tional dilemma of global order, viz. the dilemma that without a world 
government one cannot cure the ills of anarchy but that with it one faces 
the risk of world-wide despotism. This answer, moreover, shows that Kant 
takes the risk of despotism very seriously. 
To those who still defend the ideal of state-like political structures at 
the global level but who steer clear of the view that these should be estab-
lished coercively, Kant’s position suggests an increased focus on the 
proper emergence of these structures and their democratic legitimacy. In 
this connection it is interesting that in his more recent work, Habermas 
distances himself from his 1995 position mentioned at the beginning of 
this essay. His focus is no longer on bringing about state-like political 
structures at the global level. He now believes that doing so is impossible 
because of the lack of a cosmopolitan consciousness on the part of the 
populations of the world’s states. In fact, he now believes that a federative 
world state is never possible, on the grounds that successful political inte-
gration requires a particular kind of collective identity, and no particular 
collective identity could ever be available at the global level. Only univer-
salist morality would be available to motivate people to act as citizens of 
the world, and as a matter of empirical psychological fact, Habermas 
claims, this is not enough. What is left then is the promotion of a “world 
domestic policy without a world government” (Weltinnenpolitik ohne 
Weltregierung). Habermas suggests that a dynamic array of deliberative 
democratic processes and organizations, at the national, international, and 
transnational levels, can greatly increase the level and legitimacy of bind-
ing regulation concerning matters of global concern. Thus, it is possible to 
continue the transformation of international law into a cosmopolitan order 
(a process that Habermas recognizes is already underway) without leading 
to a centralized world government (see Habermas, 2001:110–1). 
Habermas’s shift towards viewing the attitudes of the populations of 
the world as a crucial factor in assessing the feasibility of the federative 
state of states is very much in line with Kant’s argument as presented 
above, especially with Kant’s emphasis on the importance of peoples 
wanting to join. But instead of making this shift on the basis of an appeal 
to empirical psychology and an assessment that a political world organiza-
tion will always and structurally lack sufficient legitimacy for more than a 
very elementary role, Habermas might be advised to draw more closely on 
Kant to revise this into a stronger argument. A stronger version would be 
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something like the view that any expansion of the reach and powers of 
currently existing globally regulating institutions (such as the UN, WTO), 
or the establishment of additional ones, should proceed only via fully 
democratic processes. Indeed, what Kant’s argument as presented in this 
essay suggests is that this is the only way to secure the legitimacy of such 
global political structures. Even if the states of this world may not (or not 
yet) want to sacrifice their external sovereignty by subjecting themselves 
to a global political system, there is still much that can be done to move in 
the direction of a legitimate world government. A fully legitimate world 
government may remain out of reach. The extent to which the necessary 
cosmopolitan will and consciousness on the part of the world’s population 
will actually develop, however, and hence the extent to which a non-
despotic global legal order can be realized, should not be limited in ad-
vance on grounds of empirical psychology but can rather be treated, in 
typical Kantian fashion, as an open question. 
The thoughts expressed in this final section, however, are just a few 
tentative suggestions as to how the re-interpretation of Kant’s theory of 
peace that I advocate in this essay might affect Kantian political theory. In 
the present context, I cannot discuss them in sufficient detail nor do justice 
here to the complexity of current Kantian political theory. Whether or not 
these speculations are plausible, they should not distract from the main 
thesis of this essay: that Kant’s argument for the league of states is differ-
ent and much more consistent than is usually thought. According to Kant 
the creation of a league of states is not itself the ultimate ideal. Rather, it 
constitutes a first important step on the road towards an ever greater trans-
national regulation of the interaction among states, a process that should 
be guided by the ideal of a global federative state of states.30 
Notes 
1. Rawls (1999:36). Strikingly often Rawls writes that he is “following Kant’s 
lead,” endorsing what he sees as Kant’s rejection of world government (1999:36) 
and the argument for the foedus pacificum (e.g., 1999:10;19;21;22;54). 
2. Habermas (1997:114–126). On Habermas’s more recent shift away from this 
position, see section V below. 
3. For example, Allen Wood claims that the argument of Perpetual Peace would 
seem to require a state of states but that the account is riddled with perplexities. 
Thomas Pogge similarly calls Kant’s account “extremely unsettled” and portrays 
Kant as experimenting with one argument after another without developing a 
single one successfully, trying to evade the demand for a world state that his theory 
commits him to (Pogge, 1988:427–433; Wood, 1995:11. See also, Carson, 1988; 
Cavallar, 1999:123; Dodson, 1993; Habermas, 1997; Höffe, 1995 and 1998; Lutz-
Bachmann, 1997). 
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4. This criticism was formulated as early as 1800 (see Gentz, 1953). Cp. also 
Habermas (1997:117–8). 
5. There are a few authors who have (rightly) argued that Kant defends the ideal of 
a state of states; but they go too far in the other direction, saying that the “impres-
sion” that Kant “seems to favour the League of Nations” is “misleading.” In argu-
ing that Kant defends a state of states instead of a league of states these authors 
tend to appeal to what they believe would be consistent for Kant to say, less to 
what he does say. Cp. Byrd (1995:178–9); Axinn (1989:245–9). 
6. I follow common practice and translate Kant’s “Recht” in this context as “right,” 
to indicate that it does not connote a legal claim but a complete condition of exter-
nal lawfulness (“external” lawfulness here in contrast to “inner” moral lawfulness). 
7. In “On the Common Saying,” Kant explains this terminology: “in thesi” means 
“in theory,” “in hypothesi” is equivalent to “in practice,” TP VIII:276. On the 
states’ interpretation of international right as a right to remain in the state of nature, 
see the Vorarbeiten to Perpetual Peace, XXIII:169. 
8. Dodson’s formulation is representative: “This argument, however, explicitly 
accepts the subordination of considerations of justice to empirical judgments of 
what is realistic in the near future... In putting forth this argument, Kant succumbs 
to the very same weakness that he so often warns us against—leaving us with only 
a ‘surrogate’ arrangement so that something can be salvaged” (Dodson, 1993:7). 
9. In the comments to the third Definitive Article, VIII:358. Earlier in the text Kant 
made clear that a league of states would not have public laws, hence this quote 
suggests the ideal of a state of states. 
10. See note 3 above. 
11. See the famous passage in which Kant states that the problem of creating a 
good state can be solved “even for a people of devils (if only they have under-
standing)” (PP VIII:366). 
12. One may want to disagree with the strong non-interventionist conclusions that 
Kant draws from this line of reasoning, but the reasoning itself does not need to be 
read as flagrantly inconsistent. For a critique of Kant’s non-interventionism, see 
Teso´n (1991:67–8). 
13. Carson (1988:211). The world government would have “military forces suffi-
cient to dismantle and defeat any national army in the process of creation” 
(1988:185—note also the “far reaching intelligence network” of the world gov-
ernment, and Carson’s assumption that one can prevent a military take-over just by 
having rules against it (988:203–4). Cp. also Axinn (1989:249): “We may use 
violence to compel membership in an international federation. Things seem quite 
unKantian, yet we have merely put together Kant’s own positions.” 
14. Commentators who criticize Kant’s defence of the league of states on the 
grounds that the league is likely to have many flaws and who argue that only a 
state of states would be able to solve these problems often overlook the fact that 
the state of states itself, if pursued instead of a league, is also likely to be flawed. 
15. This remark indicates that the term Völkerbund itself is neutral as to whether or 
not the institution has the power to enforce its laws (cp. Idee, VIII:24, line 23–28, 
where the term is clearly used to refer to an international federative union with 
public binding laws and the authority to enforce them). This neutrality is hard to 
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preserve in the English translation. “Federation” has the connotations of a strong 
centralized government; “league,” on the other hand, suggests a loose association. I 
have translated Völkerbund as “league of peoples” wherever it is clear that Kant is 
speaking of a voluntary association without coercive powers, but in this particular 
case it seems good to point out the ambiguity in the term. The same ambiguity is 
found in Kant’s use of the latinate versions of the term, e.g., the word “federalism” 
in the second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace. Here too, however, the larger 
context dispels this ambiguity. 
16. See above, note 4. 
17. Kant’s argument here underscores once more that the term “people” should be 
read in the political sense. After all, if the term were used in the nationalist sense 
one could easily conceive of a state comprised of multiple peoples. 
18. See MM VI:311, where Kant himself uses this term (Völkerstaatsrecht). 
19. On the concept of the “universal monarchy” in the eighteenth-century discus-
sion, see Cavallar (1992) and Brosbach (1998). 
20. This developmental view also underlies Kant’s view in the Religion, where he 
warns against “the premature and therefore (since it comes before people have 
become morally better) harmful fusion of states” (Rel VI:123n); cp. “Conjectural 
Beginning of Human History” VIII:121. For a discussion of Kant’s attempt to 
reconcile national differences with global unity, see McCarthy (1999). 
21. See also Habermas (1997:117). Despite the many parallels that do indeed exist 
between the league proposed by Kant and the twentieth-century League of Nations 
one should not forget that the latter failed to follow Kant’s proposal in important 
respects, for example, because its members did not give up their standing armies. 
22. This role of the league is hinted at by Pogge (1988:430) and Cavallar (1999:ch. 
8). 
23. The developmental perspective here also explains why Kant does not discuss 
the worry that the members of a state of states might lapse back into hostility. On 
the foundations and epistemic status of Kant’s belief in progress, see Kleingeld 
(1995). 
24. PP VIII:367. This is also Fichte’s interpretation, in his review of Perpetual 
Peace. Fichte presents Kant’s view as being that the league is merely an intermedi-
ate stage on the way to a state of states. Fichte (1971:433). 
25. This critique too found its classic formulation in Gentz (1953:478). 
26. According to the “Idea for a Universal History,” the development of the use of 
reason, over the course of human history, culminates in the self-transformation of 
society into a moral community. The peace that was initially established out of 
self-interest will eventually be endorsed for moral reasons and thereby made dura-
ble. On the coherence of Kant’s notion of moral development, see Kleingeld 
(1999). 
27. See also Paul Guyer’s explanation of why a republic is not sufficient for peace 
in Guyer (2000:415–420). 
28. This is a term used by Kant, cp. C1, A748/B776; IUH VIII:26. 
29. See Dodson (1993:8) with appeal to technological developments; Axinn 
(1989:248). 
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30. I would like to thank Joel Anderson, Eric Brown, Larry May, Sarah Holtman, 
Thomas Pogge, and Allen Wood for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper. I would also like to thank Philip Rossi for valuable comments on a 
shorter version of this paper, presented at the Central Division meeting of the 
APA, 2003. 
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KANT’S REASONS AGAINST A GLOBAL STATE: 
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AS A PRINCIPLE  





Allow me to begin by mentioning that the main section of this paper 
(II), which focuses on Kant’s reasons against a global state, has been taken 
from an unfinished book manuscript that was written in 1996 and should 
not therefore be understood as a reaction to the current attempt to establish 
global peace by means of unlimited war; but it has indeed acquired an 
unexpected contemporaneity in this context. 
The introductory part of the paper (I) is new and deals in all brevity 
with the connection of the Second Definitive Article of “To Perpetual 
Peace” to arguments from the theory of popular sovereignty in other parts 
of Kant’s text. Here it is to be shown that for Kant state sovereignty is 
simply the exterior aspect of inner-state popular sovereignty and because 
of this latter dimension requires protection at the level of international law. 
The concluding passages (III), which are also new, briefly confront con-
temporary prevailing models of a global state or other global organizations 
of politics with the rationality of Kant’s defence of state sovereignty, a 
rationality that takes its orientation equally from human rights, democracy, 
and peace. The same observations will be applied to the present discrep-
ancy between the UN Charter, which is understood as the positivization of 
Kant’s text on peace in international law, and the practice of military in-
tervention. In the process, reflections in Part II are supplemented by func-
tional determinations of Kant’s “law of permission” (Kant, 1983:111. 
Published translations of Kant’s texts have been modified). 
                                                 
∗
 I thank John Farrel for translation. 
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I 
Kant’s reasons against a global state in the text on peace are prepared 
by arguments for the principle of popular sovereignty in such a manner 
that neither his option solely for the league of nations nor his defence of 
state sovereignty can be understood as a provincialism that contradicts 
cosmopolitan principles. The Preliminary Articles 2 and 5 already make 
clear that state sovereignty is essentially popular sovereignty. According to 
Kant, it is not permissible for a state to be acquired by another one in a 
peaceful manner on the basis of private Right; nor does a state have the 
right to “forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of an-
other.” The reasons in both cases are the same: the state “is” the people, it 
“is a society of human beings” that, in accordance with the “idea of the 
original contract,” has been formed into a nation of citizens. Acquiring a 
state on the basis of private Right does not damage it as such, it damages 
the state in its attribute as a “moral person” (in current usage: as a legal 
person), that is, the state as an association of citizens. These citizens would 
be mistreated in such a transaction as “things” and would lose their self-
determination as citizens—as happened in the sale of Corsica to France by 
Genoa, for example. In the case of forcible interference, the “scandal,” 
which “would render the autonomy of every state insecure,” is located in 
the violation of “the rights of an independent people struggling with its 
internal ills” (Kant, 1983:109, italics added). When Kant applies his re-
publican epigram—“where state and people are two different persons, 
there you will find despotism” (Kant, 1968:193)—to questions of interna-
tional law, it is clear that peace should not be established at the cost of the 
citizens’ freedom. 
The close connection between freedom and peace acquires a stronger 
wording in the First Definitive Article. Here, the republican constitution of 
“lawful freedom” is the precondition for a state to act peacefully toward 
other states; it is in fact “the only [constitution] that can lead to perpetual 
peace.”1 The “lawful freedom” intended here is clearly demarcated by 
Kant from forms of juridical calculability in an authoritarian state. For 
citizens, it means “the privilege to obey only those external laws to which 
I have been able to give my consent” (Kant, 1968:112n). The right of 
equality before the (equal) law mentioned in the same context anticipates 
the later formulation in the Metaphysics of Morals: 
 
Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each 
decides the same thing for all and all for each, that is, only the general 
united will of the people can be legislative (Kant, 1991:125). 
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Realized popular sovereignty within the state is thus the precondition 
for a peaceable state sovereignty vis-à-vis other states. Establishing a 
“perpetual peace” that is based on a “republicanism of all states” and on 
their association as laid down in treaties (Kant, 1991:156-161), can how-
ever be attained only in continual approximation. We turn to the time 
requirements of this project later (Part III). These time requirements are in 
any case indebted to Kant’s central presupposition that popular sover-
eignty is itself an inalienable human right (Kant, 1968:112n), and for this 
reason the autonomous learning process toward a republican constitution 
must not be interrupted or dominated by external forces. 
In this conception, the goal—establishing a republic in all states—and 
the means to this goal—tolerating the interaction between states in various 
stages of their progress toward this goal—are cosmopolitan. Kant’s cos-
mopolitanism does not therefore have to depend on the levelling of bor-
ders between states because he keeps them open for people’s freedom of 
movement, the exchange of ideas, and a global public sphere. His “cosmo-
politan Right” is thus free of contradictions when it provides the rules to 
be observed in cross-border exchanges between the jurisdictions of various 
national legal systems; it thereby actually presupposes the existence of 
borders. 
II 
The fact that Kant’s peace project is not determined by the goal of real-
izing a global republic but develops the supposedly weaker notion of a 
federation of sovereign republics is regarded by recent interpretations 
almost as a scandal of his practical philosophy. From this viewpoint, how-
ever, Kant’s actual option is precisely determined, and that is why it is 
presumed that any recourse to his peace text, for instance for the purposes 
of supporting arguments for reorganizing the UN into a global state, calls 
for a far-reaching reformulation of his theory (Habermas, 1997:113-
153;114-119). At present there is a stronger tendency to see the current 
need for a global state as being already present in Kant’s theory. The spec-
trum of interpretations is broad and includes: (a) the tentative attempt to 
subsume Kant’s federation of states at least under the concept of an “ultra 
minimal global state” that, going beyond Kant, would however have to be 
expanded to the subsidiary order of an “extremely minimal global state” 
(Höffe, 1995:109–132;115n;119n;122); (b) the most prevalent reading, 
namely, that Kant actually defends the idea of a world republic but in 
reverting to a mere federation of states yields to the superiority of the 
facts;2 (c) the interesting thesis that Kant regards the federation of states as 
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just a transition stage in the process of founding a world republic.3 Not 
only occasional fluctuations in the terminology employed but also the 
hypercomplexity of Kant’s argument do of course contribute to this situa-
tion. 
A “confusing passage” in Kant’s text on peace has been correctly iden-
tified as the true challenge for interpreting the principal goal (Cavallar, 
1992:209). It runs: 
 
Reason can provide related nations with no other means for emerging 
from the state of lawlessness, which consists solely of war, than that they 
give up their savage (lawless) freedom, just as individual persons do, and, 
by accommodating themselves to the constrains of statute law, establish a 
nation of peoples (civitas gentium) that (continually growing) will finally 
include all the people of the earth. But as they do not will to do this be-
cause it does not conform to their idea of international law, and conse-
quently they discard in hypothesis what is true in thesis. So (if everything 
is not to be lost) the place of the positive idea of a world republic must be 
taken only by the negative surrogate of an enduring, ever expanding fed-
eration that prevents war… (Kant, 1983:117–18). 
 
At first glance, Kant seems here to favour a world republic as the true 
idea so unequivocally that no further objections to prevailing interpreta-
tions would be permissible—were it not for the fact that this place (in this 
prevailing interpretation) is in blatant contradiction to all of the arguments 
presented in the Second Definitive Article. Thus, the “most important task 
of interpretation” does indeed consist in resolving the (alleged) contradic-
tion that dominates the “heart of the entire text on peace” (Höffe, 
1995:109–110). Here, Kant argues for a “federation of free states,” a 
“league of nations,” “not a state consisting of nations.” In a state consist-
ing of nations Kant sees a contradiction to his own assumption of treating 
the establishment of peace analogously to the founding of a state, whereby 
in the latter individuals do not have to disappear in a collectivity. He speci-
fies this contradiction as follows: 
 
a number of peoples forming one state would constitute a single peo-
ple, and this contradicts our initial assumption, as we are here considering 
the right of peoples in relation to one another insofar as they constitute a 
lot of separate states and are not to be welded together in one state (Kant, 
1983:115 second italics added). 
 
Kant’s strong justification for state sovereignty as popular sovereignty 
asserts itself at this point. It is further supported by other statements in “To 
Perpetual Peace.” He argues no less than that “it is possible to make poli-
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tics commensurable with morality only in a federative union [of states] 
(which is therefore necessary and given a priori in conformity with the 
principles of Right)” and underscores at the same place that “a federative 
organization of nations whose only purpose is to prevent war is the only 
juridical organization compatible with the freedom of these nations” 
(Kant, 1983:138 italics added). 
Kant regards the universal state so unreasonable that, compared to it, 
even the bellicose state of nature is to be preferred: 
 
The idea of international Law presupposes the existence of many sepa-
rate, independent, adjoining nations; and although such a situation is in it-
self a state of war (assuming that federative union among them does not 
prevent the outbreak of hostilities), yet this situation is, according to the 
idea of reason, preferable to their being overrun by a gradually developing 
superior power that melds them into a universal monarchy in which the ef-
fectiveness of the laws decreases and a “soulless despotism” spreads (Kant, 
1983:124–125). 
 
In complete accordance with this, he writes in “On the Proverb: That 
May Be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use” that the duress of 
constant war ultimately brings states either to the point of entering into a 
cosmopolitan constitution, even against their wills. Or, if such a case of 
universal peace is for its part even more dangerous (as in outsized nations 
it has indeed more that once been) to freedom because it leads to the most 
terrifying despotism, this duress must compel nations to a condition in 
which, while there is no cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single head 
of state, there is nonetheless a lawful instance of federation that conforms 
to commonly accepted international law (Kant, 1983:61-92;87-88). 
In The Metaphysics of Morals too, the federation of free states is ex-
plicitly endorsed as an institution “in accordance with the Idea of an origi-
nal social contract... not in order to meddle in one another’s internal dis-
sensions” but to end the state of nature between states (Kant, 1991:151). 
At first glance, there is therefore a remarkable finding. On the one 
hand, the global state with its public coercive laws (Zwangsgesetze) con-
forms to the demands of reason, with the federation of states appearing 
only as negative surrogate; on the other hand, the selfsame reason, the 
principles of Right a priori, and the idea of a social contract call for a fed-
eration of states in which the legislative sovereignty of individual states is 
maintained. The problem cannot be resolved by claiming a mere wavering 
in Kant’s terminology—for instance, Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone speaks of a “league of peoples as a world republic,” of a “league of 
nations” as a “republic of federated free nations” (Kant, 1960:29n;30). In 
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Kant’s reflections on the federation of states and the global state, it seems 
that reason opposes reason. Nor is the often asserted historical develop-
ment of Kant’s thoughts on this matter helpful as an explanation when his 
ostensible wavering between the two conceptions can be found in the same 
writings—a wavering, incidentally, that begins in the “Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Intent” of 1784. More helpful is the view that 
two conflicting notions of the organization of global peace can be found in 
Kant’s work (Cavallar, 1992:73), even though these notions are precipi-
tately assimilated to the assumption of a stage model: from a federation of 
states to a global state. In view of the unresolved enigma there arises the 
question of what Kant in fact means when he says in the “confusing pas-
sage” that the individual states (according to their idea of international 
law) do not accept a global state, and thus “discard in hypothesis what is 
true in thesis,” which is why a federation of states emerges as a surrogate 
for a world republic. 
Kant’s contrasting of “in thesis” and “in hypothesis” is generally iden-
tified in commentaries with the distinction between theory and (empiri-
cally guided) practice (see Williams, 1983:255; Mulholland, 1987:34n.; 
Cavallar, 1992:178–79;210), from which there follows the rash equation 
of the world republic with the idea of peace and the characterization of a 
federation of states as a second-best concept, one merely assimilated to 
empirical conditions (see, for example, Bohman, 1980:180). These ascrip-
tions are however untenable in view of Kant’s arguments in “On the Prov-
erb” concerning the relation between theory and practice in general and 
the project of a global state in particular. The concluding sentence of the 
text runs: “Thus, even on the cosmopolitan level the assertion is upheld: 
What, on account of reason, applies in theory applies also in practice” 
(Kant, 1983:89). If the global state is defended unequivocally here (with 
reference to Abbé de Saint-Pierre) against the empirical arguments of the 
“politically practically minded” (politische Praktiker), then, ironically, just 
a few paragraphs before we find the reflection, which has already been 
cited, that reason calls for “either ... entering into a cosmopolitan constitu-
tion .... Or, if such a case of universal peace is for its part even more dan-
gerous (as in outsized states it has indeed more that once been) to free-
dom,” to bring about a “federation.” This “either/or” indicates that both 
solutions, global state and federation of states, can comply with reason and 
that it is other aspects that decide the matter. 
Thus, even though the global state is correct “in thesis,” that is, com-
plies (like a federation of states) with reason, it is discarded “in hypothe-
sis.” This latter characteristic contains the other aspects. Since Kant de-
rives the categorical obligation to work toward perpetual peace solely from 
Ingeborg Maus 156 
the fact that the impossibility of attaining this goal cannot be proved 
(Kant, 1983:87), all judgments on the means to attainment are necessarily 
“hypothetical.” It is not the narrow-minded refusal of power-obsessed 
politicians that is decisive for these hypothetical considerations; rather, the 
search for the appropriate model of peace is determined exclusively by the 
criterion of the greatest possible approximation to the idea of peace in the 
attempt to realize this idea; it is determined purely normatively. The idea 
of a world republic and the idea of a federation of states are themselves 
only means and models to be scrutinized as to whether they fit the realiza-
tion of the paramount idea of peace, the “final end of the doctrine of 
Right” (Kant, 1991:161) 
As norms for this scrutiny Kant introduces the “principles of politics” 
that, in the matter of establishing republics, already served to determine 
the closest approximation to the respublica noumenon. There the “princi-
ples of politics” as nonempirical principles mediated between the idea and 
the (yet to be actualized) reality of the republic in a way that corresponds 
completely to the function of the “principles” in Kant’s theoretical phi-
losophy. If the “principles of politics” make it possible in the first place to 
apply a priori principles of Right “to cases of experience” (Kant, 
1997:641), they then function like a ”transcendental scheme” that steers 
the procedure of “judgment” (Urteilskraft) the subsumption of an object 
under a pure concept of the understanding (Kant, 1973:169–75;176–87). 
The “principles of politics” had thus—analogous to the (theoretical) sub-
sumption of a plate under the pure concept of a circle—served to distin-
guish (like plates from nonplates) real republics, which have the factual 
legislating authority of the people, from non-republics, where the proce-
dures of popular legislating are merely simulated in the minds of authori-
ties, but at the same time specified the difference between ideal and “at-
tainable” republics, between legislation by all, on the one hand, and legis-
lation by majority rule and (in large states) by representation, on the 
other.4 
If the same operation is examined in Kant’s comprehension of the phi-
losophy of peace, then it quickly becomes evident that with respect to the 
idea of peace it is not the federation of states that is determined as the 
attainable but imperfect ”plate” in relation to a global state. The locus 
classicus for the function of the principles of politics in the philosophy of 
peace runs: 
 
But if such a state made up of nations [Völkerstaat] were to extend too 
far over vast regions, governing it and so too protecting each of its mem-
bers would finally have to become impossible, while several such corpora-
tions would again bring on a state of war. So perpetual peace, the ultimate 
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goal of the whole international law, is indeed an unachievable Idea. Still, 
the political principles directed toward perpetual peace, of entering into 
such alliances of states, which serve for continual approximation to it, are 
not unachievable. Instead, since continual approximation to it is a task 
based on duty and therefore on the Right of men and of states, this can cer-
tainly be achieved (Kant, 1991:156. Original italics omitted, others added). 
 
Here too, one could get the wrong impression that Kant identifies per-
petual peace and the global state even though it is clear that the political 
principles do not aim at a second-best solution since the global state is, 
according to this statement, not in a position to guarantee peace. Kant’s 
synoptic view of “international law” (Völkerrecht), however, makes clear 
that perpetual peace is in itself “a thing” that can neither be proved nor 
disproved (Kant, 1991:160) and is “unachievable” only in the model of a 
global state. The political principles urge us not to surrender the idea of 
peace but to realize the “most suitable” version of peace, which Kant con-
siders here to be “a republicanism of all single states” (Kant, 1991:160). 
He thus investigates—“in hypothesis”—only the suitability of the models 
for realizing global peace, tests the one that had the greatest approval in 
discussions of the time and that was identified with the idea of peace, 
dissolves this identification and rejects the model itself as inappropriate. 
The global state proves to be a four-cornered plate, as it were. 
Equating world peace and a global state dominated the peace project of 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre, which attracted great attention in the extract pre-
pared by Rousseau. Kant’s many references to this project (Kant, 
1983:35;89) do not distinguish between the intention of Abbé de Saint-
Pierre and Rousseau, even though he adopts exactly the same position as 
Rousseau when he defends the peace plan against the ridicule of the “prac-
ticians ” but locates its unresolved problem in its achievability. In his own 
commentary on Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s peace plan, which was published 
(in 1782) more than twenty years after the publication of the extract, 
Rousseau also defends the plan “in thesis” and rejects it “in hypothesis,” 
as it were. What Rousseau wrote in his commentary sounds like a state-
ment from Kant’s “On the Proverb”: 
 
Let us examine at the outset the difficulties of those who on grounds of 
reason judge not according to reason but according to the facts and who 
have nothing to object to this plan other than it has not been realized 
(Rousseau, 1981:393n;395). 
 
This defence “in thesis” is already set up by a remark of Rousseau’s in 
the Extract: “We will leave to windbags those expressions that generated 
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so much ridicule for the originator and his plan in the chambers of minis-
ters, but unlike them we will not scorn his reasons” (Rousseau, 1953: 
343n;360). 
Only for fact fetishists and with irony does Rousseau develop the 
means for realizing the plan—already thematizing the “cunning,” tense 
relation between the interests of historical actors and the realization of the 
idea of peace (Rousseau, 1981:399n). Rousseau’s presentation of the his-
torical failure of the peace protagonists Henry IV and Sully, introduced by 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre, represents an important reason for the rejection of 
the plan “in hypothesis,” which plays a crucial role in Kant’s further arse-
nal of arguments against a global state: its establishment through force, 
that is, war. Before going into the overhasty equating of founding a state 
and establishing peace by an initial act of force as construed by some in-
terpreters of Kant (for instance, Mullholand, 1987:38) it is worth taking 
another brief look at Rousseau. Rousseau’s playful circumscription of the 
thesis-hypothesis relation—“One does not therefore say when his [Abbé 
de Saint-Pierre’s] system has not been implemented that this is because it 
is not good; on the contrary, one says that it was too good to be imple-
mented” (Rousseau, 1981:400)—is based upon an assessment of Abbé de 
Saint-Pierre as being naive in his choice of means for realizing his idea. 
On the basis of the belief that the narrow-minded natural interests of indi-
vidual states and actors have greater force than the general interest in a 
very artificially generated peace (Rousseau, 1981:399;404), Rousseau 
considers preparing for war in order to establish a hegemonic global state 
to be the most probable way to realize the peace project. In this context we 
find the interesting epigram referring to Henry IV’s politics, an epigram 
that is gladly put forward by Carl Schmitt and his adherents to denounce 
every form of pacifism: “A war that was to be the last one made way for 
perpetual peace” (Rousseau, 1981:403). In contrast, it is precisely this 
perspective that leads Rousseau in summation to accept the abbot’s peace 
plan “in thesis” but reject it “in hypothesis”: “let us admire instead such a 
beautiful plan, yet console ourselves that we will not see its implementa-
tion; for it can be implemented only by violent means that are terrible for 
humanity.”5 In view of the current production of suggestions for the peace-
ful establishment of a global state, which (like the abbot’s project) ignore 
the question of the peaceable global acceptance of the envisioned institu-
tional arrangements and modes of representation, let us cite Rousseau’s 
sceptical observation: “these were the [military] means that Henry IV 
assembled in order to create the same institution that Abbé de Saint-Pierre 
wanted to found with help of a book” Rousseau (1981:403-404). 
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There does not seem to be any evidence that, besides Rousseau’s “Ex-
tract,” Kant also knew his “Comment” (“Gutachten”) on the said peace 
project, but Kant’s (at least objective) agreement with the “Comment” is 
so apparent that further proof is not necessary. What is still interesting 
substantively is, however, Kant’s commensurate treatment of the violent 
foundation of a global condition of law. As we know—regarding the ju-
ridical conditions within states—Kant’s justification of a categorical ju-
ridical duty to realize the idea of a republic in asymptotic approximation is 
connected to the acceptance of a crude beginning. The “difference be-
tween the particular wills of all” is an obstacle not to the established re-
public (on this, see Maus, 1992) but to the foundation of an initial juridical 
condition, so that “realizing this juridical condition... can begin only with 
force, and this coercion will subsequently provide a basis for public Right” 
(Kant, 1983:123, italics omitted). Leaving the state of nature obtaining 
between individuals leads first to the establishment of a state, which in the 
extreme case is solely the executive or, better, solely the monopoly of 
force that in the course of historical development is increasingly constitu-
tionalized in law until finally, with the establishment of a republic, the 
state apparatus can be subjected to democratically legislated law. Neither 
this gradualism nor the violent beginnings exist in Kant’s conception of 
peace. Leaving (Kant, 1991:121;124) the state of nature with respect to 
constitutional law has an equivalent regarding international law: states find 
themselves like savages in a “lawless condition” from which they are 
“under obligation to leave” (Kant, 1991:151). Thus, corresponding to the 
categorical imperative of law there is a categorical peace imperative.6 
Leaving the state of nature between states is enabled not by initiating a 
juridification through coercive laws but by a treaty on constituting a fed-
eration of peace. The following statement by Kant refers to this difference: 
 
nor can one say of states what one can say of men in a condition of law-
lessness, according to natural law, that ‘they should abandon this condi-
tion. (For as states they already have an internal, legal constitution...) 
(Kant, 1983:116). 
 
With the help of this latter aspect one can explain the contradictory 
counterpointing that Kant, on account of the systematic structure of his 
Doctrine of Right, has to introduce between the (acknowledged) violent 
foundation of a state and the (rejected) violent establishment of peace: 
without individuals entering into an initial “constitution as such,” devel-
opment toward a future republic is unthinkable. In contrast to that, existing 
constitutions within states would be destroyed by the transition to a global 
state, while the functioning of a global constitution would be uncertain. 
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There would—to use Kant’s customary formulation—“be an intervening 
moment in which any rightful condition would be annihilated” (Kant, 
1991:161), that means, the return of the state of nature. 
Thus, according to Kant’s conception, establishing peace by setting up 
a global state would be the opposite of founding a state. It would lead not 
out of but back into a state of nature. Establishing peace in this manner is 
analogous not to founding a state but to a revolution which fails and leads 
to a state of nature because it does not succeed in preserving legislative 
and constitutional sovereignty as a presupposition of the new constitution-
alization.7 If Kant demanded of every revolutionary practice that the 
choice of means not conflict with its goals (democracy—to put it in mod-
ern terms—is never to be established using undemocratic means),8 then 
the same applies to every step going beyond constitutions that found indi-
vidual states: Kant’s requirement that “the realization [of an Idea] is re-
stricted to the condition of accord of its means with ... morality” (Kant, 
1992:157n) applies to the idea of peace too. When establishing a global 
order of peace, the risk of war must be avoided. Precisely because practice 
must correspond completely to theory, it was possible for the conflict to 
arise that the global state is approved “in thesis” but rejected “in hypothe-
sis.” 
Kant’s giving preference to a federation of states over a global state 
has a further, purely normative justification. The global state contradicts 
Kant’s philosophy of freedom in general and the principle of civil (staat-
bürgerlich) autonomy, that is, popular sovereignty, in particular. The pro-
posed federation of states serves, according to Kant, not the acquisition of 
power but the securing of freedom (Kant, 1983:116-117), whereas creating 
a global monopoly of force leads to a “soulless despotism” because the 
functioning of laws becomes progressively uncertain with a continuous 
enlargement of the state (Kant, 1983:125); what makes up the core of the 
republic is thus destroyed: the subjection of the state apparatus to democ-
ratic law. The “graveyard” painted on the Dutch innkeeper’s sign as a 
variant of perpetual peace—with the mention of which Kant commences 
his peace text—symbolizes not only the victims of the last war to establish 
peace, which Kant rejects, but also the despotism of a global state—it is 
the “graveyard of freedom” (Kant, 1983:125). 
As the pejorative equating of global monarchy and global republic 
demonstrates,9 Kant’s strong judgment is directed not against a specific 
structure of a global state but against its size as such. The thesis of the 
inevitable despotism of “oversized states” was well known in the 18th 
century, in which—as with Montesquieu or Rousseau (1973: book II ch. 9; 
book III ch. 1—forms of government were determined in close correlation 
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to the expansion of states. Over and above this, Kant has a specific case in 
mind. As demonstrated by his explicit reference to the American founda-
tion of a union as a counterexample of his own concept of a congress of 
states (Kant, 1983:156), Kant’s international-law arguments are exactly 
analogous to the constitutional-law arguments of the American Antifeder-
alists. Their defence—motivated largely by concerns of grassroots democ-
racy—of the North American confederation of states on the basis of the 
Articles of Confederation of 1777 against the federation set down in the 
Constitution of 1787 was directed at the ultimately victorious alternatives 
of the Federalists, which brought about a considerable shift of political 
competence from the individual states to the federal state. The Antifederal-
ists’ argument referred to the “oversize” of the Union: Only in the small 
political communities of the individual states is it possible for the people 
to steer political decisions; the sheer expansion of the Union makes effi-
cient democratic control impossible. In this context, the Antifederalists 
forecast that the central authorities would become increasingly independ-
ent of the rest of the Union; above all they predicted the continuous un-
dermining of the competencies of the individual states still granted by the 
Constitution; this then took place by means of the constitutional jurispru-
dence of “implied powers.” Kant’s strong republicanism, which aims at a 
complete juridification of the monopoly of force and the subjection of the 
state apparatus to the legislature of the people, had to agree objectively 
with the arguments criticizing the Union; it also found its justification in 
the structural contradictoriness of the types of constitution in discussion. 
While many constitutions of the individual states in America, Pennsyl-
vania’s in particular, are characterized by a consistent mistrust of all state 
apparatuses and officials and attempt to prevent them from becoming 
independent of popular will, the Constitution of 1787 is characterized by 
the converse mistrust of the people. It is not desired that the people and 
their representatives in the legislature control government authority by the 
laws enacted; rather, the President and the Supreme Court are empowered 
to engage in a corrective manner in the legislative process. The vertical 
control of all government authority by the law-making people—as it corre-
sponded to the logic of some state constitutions and the separation of pow-
ers in John Locke, Rousseau, and Kant—was replaced by the horizontal 
balancing of semi-sovereign government powers—as in Montesquieu’s 
model. It is above all this structural difference from Kant’s principles of 
constitution that foreordains the Constitution of 1787 to be the counterex-
ample to his own conceptions of state and international law. It is also why 
Kant speaks only of one, already established republic that could be the 
departure point for the gradual development of a peace confederation of 
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republics, even though the constitutions of the French Revolution fail to 
meet in some respects Kant’s requirements for an “attainable” republic. 
The fact that his text on peace begins with a possible tension between 
peace and freedom—by way of ironic reference to the image of graveyard 
stillness—is a first indication of a further, central aspect in Kant’s norma-
tive construction. Perpetual peace is the “final end of the doctrine of 
Right,” the “highest political good” (Kant, 1983:161), but for that very 
reason a material principle that is directed by the “highest principle,” free-
dom, as a formal principle. Perpetual peace is an “end” that we are simply 
obligated to realize, but this obligation can be derived not from the end 
itself but only from the purposeless principle of freedom (Kant, 1983:132). 
What applies to all goods subject to the doctrine of happiness applies to 
the highest ethical good, peace, namely, that they can be more easily at-
tained, the more the principles of freedom have already been realized. This 
explains why Kant believes that peace cannot be realized under the even 
temporary suspension of freedom; on the contrary, it is only to the “moral 
politicians,” who take their orientation from the principles of public law 
and the idea of republicanism, that the “end (the blessing of perpetual 
peace) will come ... of itself” (Kant, 1983:133). Kant’s determination of the 
relation between formal and material principles justifies once again the 
high normative position of a federation of states in contrast to a global 
state. This distinction reaches its high point in the passage already cited: 
the agreement of politics and morality is possible “only in a federative 
union” that serves the avoidance of war without affecting freedom (Kant, 
1983:138). The relationship between republican freedom and peace in Kant 
is therefore not at all like the one frequently determined from the perspec-
tive of current globalization tendencies. The normative requirement of 
republicanism in Kant is so strong not because it remains the sole guaran-
tee of peace—in the absence of an international coercive authority (Mull-
holand, 1987:36); rather, the opposite applies: because republicanism is 
given such a strong normative status, peace cannot be realized in a global 
state. 
III 
Kant’s strong republicanism is discomforting for current conceptions 
of the global organization of politics that either defend a model of the 
global state or favour an intermediary solution between a league of nations 
and a global state. Popular sovereignty, which cannot be realized at a 
global level, is thereby ignored or identified as a tyrannical principle. The 
“undivided” sovereignty of the people, that is, the exclusive right of the 
Kant’s Reasons Against a Global State 163
people (or its representatives) to make its laws and the rigid separation of 
the state’s monopoly of force, remain unrecognized in their freedom-
securing intention when global (and supranational) conceptions of politics 
envision sovereignty-sharing arrangements that are based on network 
structures and neutralize accountable political responsibility and appropri-
ate control functions. The recent prominence of the medieval idea of a 
Reich in these contexts (Held, 1991:223–24; Cf. Held, 1995; Möllers, Ch. 
2003:19) indicates—contrary to its advocate’s intentions—that democratic 
forms of legitimation and decision making are being questioned radically. 
The fact that the category of sovereignty is cast aside as “antiquated” 
(in favour of premodern forms of politics) is reflected in the present-day 
treatment of the UN Charter, which is to be understood as the positiviza-
tion of Kant’s text on peace. His philosophical project and the current 
codification of international law have been reinterpreted on pressing occa-
sions in recent years to justify intervention—while pointing to human-
rights violations, which have nonetheless remained way below the crimes 
perpetrated in Nazi Germany. 
Yet, the same connection between state sovereignty and popular sover-
eignty that Kant laboriously justified can be found in the UN Charter. The 
Charter refers to the sovereign equality of all member states, which is 
valid independently of their size, and contains the ban on acting with force 
against the political independence of any state. Military intervention is 
permitted for protecting the sovereignty of every state, that is, it is allowed 
in accordance with Chapter 7 if a state has been attacked by another. As 
with Kant, “sovereign equality” is related to the given principle of the 
“equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (Art. I. 2 and II. 1). All 
this explains why the UN Charter at no point authorizes the enforcement 
of human rights but presents the goal of “promoting and encouraging re-
spect for human rights.” (Art. I. 3). 
This strong emphasis on sovereignty has historical reasons and sys-
tematic presuppositions. The UN Charter was drafted after the Second 
World War as a peace order that as such reacted equally to violations of 
human rights and violations of sovereignty that were directly connected to 
German war conduct. Holocaust research is largely in agreement that the 
planned murder of Jews—that is, the most extreme violation of human 
rights—was possible only under the canopy of war. In that the sovereignty 
of states was violated by the occupying Germany forces, all civil auton-
omy and democratic self-determination were annulled. That is why the UN 
Charter assumes, like Kant’s text on peace, that human rights, democratic 
freedom, and peace are not isolated from one another but can be realized 
only by way of reciprocal optimization. If the Charter wishes not to en-
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force but to “promote” human rights, then this is an indication of an addi-
tional time factor, one systematically justified in a complex manner by 
Kant. It has to do with the resolution of the alleged paradox that both 
Kant’s categorical requirement of reason—every state ought to be republi-
can—and the high human-rights and democracy standards of the UN Char-
ter fail in their immediate implementation when it comes to the sover-
eignty of individual states. 
In this connection Kant introduces a theoretical construct that, analo-
gous to the schematism of pure reason or the principles of politics, enables 
a mediation between pure concepts or a priori principles and the objects of 
the world of experience. It is a construct that takes on an additional media-
tion in the dimension of time: reason’s “law of permission.” Kant’s law of 
permission states that bad social institutions, poor conditions of Right, and 
weak political constitutions are to be tolerated as long as they cannot be 
changed without the risk of a return to a “state of nature” that is barbaric 
(i.e., completely lawless and without a constitution). It is this law of per-
mission that mediates in a temporal respect between the ideal of a republic 
and the poor reality of autocratic systems, without acknowledging this 
reality as such.10 The law of permission shaped Kant’s evaluation of revo-
lutions and contributed to the judgment against the global state on the 
basis of the “principles of politics” in that it justified the acceptance of 
considerable time requirements for establishing republics in all individual 
states. It is important to recall this peace-oriented time perspective in view 
of a current interventionism that has so far destroyed bad (or just inade-
quate) constitutions in individual states and has left behind the horrors of 
the “state of nature.” 
Kant’s law of permission urges us to be patient with the temporary de-
viations of existing political systems from our projected goals of democ-
racy, the rule of law, and human rights, so that the means—impatient in-
tervention—do not harm the goals themselves. Today, there seems to be is 
a lack of “Urteilskraft” (judgment) to correctly apply normatively correct 
principles to real conditions. 
Notes 
1. Kant (1968:113). Kant answers the question posed in the text affirmatively in 
the succeeding passages. 
2. As a representative of many others, see Mulholland (1987:34;25n). 
3. See Williams (1983). Likewise, Cavallar (1992:211). Similarly, Lutz-Bachmann 
(1997:74). More nuanced is Bohman (1997:179–200), who sees development 
toward cosmopolitan democracy as being present in an innovative cosmopolitan 
public sphere. 
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4. Kant (1983:77); Kant (1997:641–42). For more details on this argument, see 
Maus, (1998:96-97), “Volkssouveränität und das Prinzip der Nichtintervention in 
der Friedensphilosophie Immanuel Kants.” 
5. Rousseau (1981:404).The “instead” in this sentence rejects the reverse option 
mentioned a little earlier. 
6. As Höffe has fittingly put it, (Höffe, 1995:19;21) for a somewhat weaker formu-
lation. 
7. For more details on this, see Maus (1992:81n;115n). 
8. Thus, for instance, Kant’s publicity principle rules out not revolution as such but 
revolution by an “enlightened avant garde” that must shrink from the publicity of 
its plans because it does not have the mass of the population on its side; that is, it 
has to assert its principles against this majority and is therefore in danger of pro-
voking either “anarchy,” that is, a “state of nature” or civil war concerning the 
legal order that is to be constituted. On this, see Maus (1992:125n). 
9. At the same time, Kant suspects a “cosmopolitan constitution,” like a global 
monarchy, of being a “most terrifying despotism” (Kant, 1983:88). 
10. Thomas McCarthy raises the objection of such an acknowledgement against 
John Rawls’ lowering of the human-rights standards that qualify a political system 
as a “well-ordered society.” While Rawls’ generalizing statements neglect prima 
facie the universalist character of human rights but implicitly raise the threshold 
for military intervention, McCarthy’s critique emphasizes the standards and elimi-
nates the peace aspect. Here, it is a matter of a difference that can scarcely be 
resolved outside a temporal perspective. See Rawls (1993:41–82); McCarthy 
(1997:201–217). 
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KANT’S VISION, EUROPE,  





In “Perpetual Peace,” Kant officially endorses the ideal of a pacific 
federation of sovereign states, but then also states that such a federation is 
only a “negative surrogate” for a world republic and cannot make peace 
truly secure. The reason for his ambivalence is that both models are 
flawed: A federation fails to achieve a thoroughgoing juridical condition, 
while a world government is unrealistic and dangerous. Had Kant been 
able to shed his unsound belief in the indivisibility of sovereignty, he might 
have endorsed a superior intermediate ideal of a vertical (and horizontal) 
dispersal of sovereign powers. The emerging European Union exemplifies 
this intermediate model—though, from a Kantian point of view, it still 
needs to be perfected in four important respects before it can serve as a 
ideal for the world at large. 
I 
In his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace,” Kant considers two ideas for 
overcoming the state of war among states. The first is a federalism of free 
states (Föderalism freier Staaten) or pacific federation (Friedensbund, 
foedus pacificum). The second is an international state (Völkerstaat, civitas 
gentium) or, more specifically, a world republic.1 For Kant, these two 
ideals are sharply distinct: With a federation, each member state continues 
to have its own sovereign, while in an international state there is only a 
single, global sovereign. 
Kant conceives sovereignty in the traditional way prevalent also in 
Hobbes and Rousseau: A sovereign is a person or group of persons having 
ultimate political authority within a particular jurisdiction (normally de-
fined in territorial terms). Its authority is (almost) unlimited and extends, 
in particular, to the promulgation/recognition, to the interpreta-
tion/adjudication, and to the enforcement of laws. It is crucial for this 
notion of sovereignty that political power be exercised through and under 
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laws. Without laws, persons can subject others to their will, but such sub-
jection without legal rights and duties does not count as sovereignty or 
political authority: Rule without rules still counts as a state of nature (as 
opposed to a juridical condition).2 
Ideally, in a republican constitution, sovereignty rests with the people, 
who should legislate through representatives and should delegate execu-
tive and judicial authority to magistrates and judges (whom they retain the 
right to depose and replace). Constitutions under which sovereign power, 
including the power to decide about war and peace, does not rest with the 
people, and also constitutions under which executive or judicial authority 
are not delegated by the sovereign, are despotic. All constitutions exem-
plify one of these two forms of government (Regierungsform, forma 
regiminis): republican or despotic. 
While it is clear that Kant meant to endorse republicanism over despot-
ism, it is much more difficult to determine whether he meant to endorse 
the ideal of a pacific federation of free republics or that of a world repub-
lic.  His Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace demands that inter-
national law be founded upon a federalism of free states. But Kant’s dis-
cussion of this article nonetheless ends with a ringing endorsement of a 
world republic: 
 
For states in their relation to one another, there cannot be any reason-
able way out of their lawless condition which entails only war except that 
they, like individual human beings, should give up their savage (lawless) 
freedom, adjust themselves to public coercive laws, and thus establish a 
continuously growing international state (civitas gentium), which will ul-
timately include all the nations of the world. But under their idea of the law 
of nations they absolutely do not wish to do this, and so reject in practice 
what is correct in theory. If all is not to be lost, there can be, then, in place 
of the positive idea of a world republic, only the negative surrogate of an 
alliance which averts war, endures, spreads, and checks the force of that 
hostile inclination away from law, though such an alliance is in constant 
peril of its breaking loose again (EF 357/105). 
 
The tension in Kant’s text can be explained. The highest ideal is that of 
a world republic, because only through a world state with a single, global 
sovereign can humankind achieve that which alone can make peace truly 
secure: a fully juridical condition. A fully juridical condition is one in 
which each person’s domain of external freedom is legally delimited 
against that of every other person (with whom he might come into contact) 
and in which there are common enforcement mechanisms through which 
these domains (legal rights) can be protected, and common adjudication 
mechanisms through which disputes about (the alleged violation of) legal 
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rights can be authoritatively settled. A federation of free states falls short 
of achieving a fully juridical condition, because any enforcement and 
binding adjudication mechanisms governing disputes among such states 
would be inconsistent with their sovereignty (i.e. with each of them having 
its own sovereign). To see this, suppose the contracting states commit 
themselves to a body of international law and institute an international 
court to adjudicate international disputes. Then disputes are possible about 
whether some particular dispute falls under the jurisdiction of this interna-
tional court or under that of some national authority. If the international 
court is decisive in such meta-disputes, then it can arrogate all decisions to 
itself, thereby annihilating national sovereignty. If national authorities are 
decisive, then the international court can settle disputes only insofar as the 
relevant national authorities in all of the states involved recognize its au-
thority and decision. One might think that this dilemma can be solved 
through a higher court authorized to decide which disputes fall under the 
jurisdiction of the international court and which under the jurisdiction of 
this or that national authority. But such a higher court merely repeats the 
dilemma on a higher level: It can fulfil its role only if it is authorized to 
overrule national claims to jurisdiction; but such authority would annihi-
late national sovereignty. 
While a federation of free states leaves some relations—namely rela-
tions among sovereigns and international relations among national authori-
ties backed by their respective sovereigns—unadjudicated and unpoliced, 
it is nevertheless far superior to a pure state of nature in which all relations 
among persons are of this kind. I have called it a semi-juridical condition: 
a condition that is juridical insofar as each person is subject to some sov-
ereign (and thereby stands in well-regulated relations with the other sub-
jects of this same sovereign) and nonjuridical insofar as persons are sub-
ject to diverse sovereigns (and thereby fail to stand in well-regulated rela-
tions to the subjects of other sovereigns) (Pogge, 1988:428;430). 
If Kant considers a fully juridical condition to be morally superior to a 
semi-juridical one, then why does he not endorse the former clearly and 
unambiguously? One possible reason is indicated in the passage I have 
quoted: States “absolutely do not wish” to “give up their savage (lawless) 
freedom [and to] adjust themselves to public coercive laws.” With the road 
to a world republic blocked for the foreseeable future, Kant thought it 
important to develop the morally inferior but far more realistic ideal of the 
best possible semi-juridical condition: the ideal of a pacific federation of 
free states. He may even have thought that dwelling too much on the best 
but, for now, unrealistic ideal of a world republic would make it too easy 
to dismiss his thoughts as a philosopher’s pipe dream (as, he realized, had 
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been the fate of the similar proposals formulated by St. Pierre and Rous-
seau, IAG 24/47, GTP 312f/92). 
This would explain why Kant, in an essay primarily addressed to pre-
sent and future rulers and politicians, firmly endorses the ideal of a world 
republic and yet also conceals this endorsement by confining it to a brief, 
marginal passage and by seeming to join in the dismissal of a world state: 
“While natural law allows us to say of men living in a lawless condition 
that they ought to abandon it, international law does not allow us to say the 
same of states. For as states, they already have a juridical constitution, and 
have thus outgrown the coercive right of others to subject them to a wider 
legal constitution” (EF 355f/104). A multiplicity of independent states “is 
still to be preferred to their amalgamation under a single power which has 
overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy. For the laws progres-
sively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soul-
less despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will finally lapse 
into anarchy” (EF 367/113). 
I speak of concealment, because I believe that Kant is not convinced by 
either of these arguments. Concerning the former, he writes two years 
later: “the state of nature among nations, just like that among individuals, 
is a condition that should be abandoned in favour of entering a juridical 
condition” (MS 350/§61); states must not remain in “the condition of natu-
ral freedom [but have] the right to compel each other to abandon this con-
dition of war [and thus must seek] a constitution that will establish an 
enduring peace” (MS 343/§53). The latter argument could succeed only if 
an amalgamation of states were bound to result in a (despotic) universal 
monarchy rather than a universal republic. But this we cannot possibly be 
sure of; and Kant clearly is deeply committed to the view that we must 
never assume that something unachieved in the past is therefore unachiev-
able, nor abandon a morally mandated project unless it is “demonstrably 
impossible” (GTP 309f/89, cf. MS 354f). 
Thinking about Kant’s discussion now, over 200 years later, we can 
see its two most serious flaws: Kant was blind to an intermediate possibil-
ity between his two extreme options of vesting ultimate political authority 
in a world sovereign and of leaving it, territorially divided, with national 
sovereigns. And Kant paid very little attention to economic factors 
which—much more open and controllable than he realized—importantly 
influence the politics and policies of states as well as the welfare and am-
bitions of persons. My next two sections will discuss these two flaws, 
respectively. 
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II 
Kant stands in a long line of distinguished thinkers—reaching from 
Aquinas via Dante, Marsilius, Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau all the way to 
John Austin in this century—who claimed that sovereignty, by its very 
nature, must be absolute: unlimited and undivided.3 The reasoning behind 
this claim is straightforward: Imagine an agency (person or group), A, 
exercising political authority that is limited in some way. Who has the 
authority to judge whether A is acting within its mandate? If this authority 
rests with A itself, then A’s authority is really unlimited, because A then 
has the authority to declare itself to be in charge of any matter whatsoever. 
If this authority rests with some other agency, B, then A has really no 
independent authority at all because any exercise of authority on its part 
depends on B’s acquiescence. To find the true sovereign, one must then 
follow this line of authority from A to B and perhaps farther. Doing this, 
one may arrive at an agency that does have the authority to adjudicate its 
own authority, and thereby also that of any other agency—and this agency 
is the sovereign. One may also find a circle: a plurality of agencies author-
ized to limit one another’s authorities. This would indicate a state of na-
ture: a condition in which there is no authoritative way of settling disputes 
among these agencies. 
The conclusion that sovereignty must be absolute is consistent with the 
idea that the sovereign, too, has religious or moral obligations, so long as 
these obligations are ones that no one else is authorized to adjudicate or to 
enforce. They are then, in Hobbes’s terms, obligations in foro interno, 
which do not in any way constrain the sovereign’s ability to function as 
the last court of appeal which authoritatively determines each agent’s or 
agency’s domain of external freedom: what it is legally authorized to do or 
to omit. In foro externo, in the public realm of legal determination, every 
act of the sovereign must ipso facto count as right and lawful.4 
Though backed by an impressive argument that many of the best minds 
of the last millennium have found convincing, the claim that sovereignty 
must be absolute has now been shoved aside by the plain historical fact 
that modern democratic regimes based on a genuine division of powers 
can actually maintain themselves over extended periods. What cannot 
work in theory does work quite well in practice. There is, to be sure, the 
possibility of ultimate conflicts: of disputes in regard to which even the 
legally correct method of resolution is contested. To see this, one need 
only imagine how a constitutional democracy’s three branches of govern-
ment might engage in an all-out power struggle, each going to the very 
brink of what, on its understanding, it is constitutionally authorized to do: 
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The President might order the arrest of all opposition members of Con-
gress, the Congress might vote the Supreme Court out of existence, or the 
Supreme Court might depose the President and declare itself constitution-
ally authorized to do so. Such possibilities show that we are not insured 
against, and thus live in permanent danger of, a breakdown of our juridical 
condition. But this possibility no longer undermines our confidence in a 
genuine separation of powers: The mere possibility of ultimate conflicts 
does not ensure that they will in fact arise. And even if they do arise, they 
need not lead to a breakdown of the juridical condition: One of the au-
thorities involved in the dispute may eventually retreat, impelled perhaps 
by what Habermas has aptly called the forceless force of the better argu-
ment, by moral suasion, by widespread moral condemnation, by the desire 
to avert a crisis for the benefit of the whole society, or by a sober calcula-
tion that it would lose if the dispute were to be decided by the force of 
arms. There are some examples of such retreats in the American experi-
ence: Marbury v. Madison (where the U.S. Supreme Court successfully 
claimed for itself the authority to interpret the U.S. Constitution), the 1937 
constitutional crisis concerning the New Deal (where Franklin D. Roose-
velt abandoned his attempt to “pack” the U.S. Supreme Court with six 
additional judges and the Court abandoned its practice of invalidating 
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation), and the 1973-74 crisis surrounding the 
Watergate tapes, which ended with Richard Nixon’s capitulation and sub-
sequent resignation. 
These examples show that, with some integrity and good will on the 
part of most of the relevant political actors, law-governed coexistence is 
possible without one supreme political authority. We have learned that 
such crises need not be frequent or catastrophic. From a practical point of 
view, we know that constitutional democracies can endure and can ensure 
a robust juridical condition. 
This same point applies in the vertical dimension as well: We no 
longer suppose that, in a regionally differentiated society, ultimate politi-
cal authority must be concentrated at the centre. As history shows, a genu-
ine federal division of powers can work well in the real world, even while 
such a division must always be incomplete by leaving some possible con-
flicts over the precise allocation of powers without a legal path of authori-
tative resolution. Such deep constitutional crises may not in fact arise or, if 
they do, they may end in a practical resolution in which all relevant dispu-
tants in fact acquiesce. 
The practical possibility of a genuine vertical division of powers shows 
that Kant—quite understandably, of course, in light of the more limited 
historical experience available to him—is operating with a false dichot-
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omy. We need not choose between an international state, in which ultimate 
political authority is concentrated in a single world government, and a 
loose association of free states, each of which is ruled by a government 
that retains full ultimate political authority over the state’s people and 
territory. We can avoid both the danger of a “soulless despotism” (EF 
367/113, cp. GTP 310f/90), which Kant associates with world govern-
ment, and the danger of bellicose inclinations breaking loose again, which 
he associates with a voluntary association of sovereign states (EF 
357/105). There is an intermediate paradigm that Kant did not consider to 
be a genuine possibility: a multilayered scheme in which ultimate political 
authority is vertically dispersed. In such a scheme, there would indeed be a 
world government with central agencies that fulfil certain legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial functions.5 But there would also be smaller political 
units—such as the European Union, Great Britain, Scotland, and the City 
of Edinburgh—whose governmental agencies would also have some ulti-
mate political authority over the unit’s internal affairs and over its rela-
tions with other units of all kinds. The existence of many independent 
political units on several levels greatly reduces the danger of despotism by 
affording plenty of checks and balances which ensure that, even when 
some political units turn tyrannical and oppressive, there will always be 
other, already fully organized political units (above, below, or on the same 
level) which can render aid and protection to the oppressed, publicize the 
abuses, and, if necessary, fight the oppressors.6 
III 
We have before us now three paradigms of global order, which differ 
concerning where ultimate political authority ought to be located. The first 
is Kant’s centralized paradigm of a universal state, in which ultimate po-
litical authority is concentrated in a world government which, ideally, 
should be republican in form. The second is Kant’s associative paradigm 
of sovereign territorial states, in which ultimate political authority is 
vested in national governments which, ideally, should be republican in 
form. The third, finally, is my federal paradigm, in which ultimate politi-
cal authority is vertically dispersed over (ideally: republican) governments 
on a plurality of levels.7 Ideally, such authority would be roughly evenly 
distributed over these levels (global, regional, national, provincial, local), 
so that none of them would have anything like the overwhelming domi-
nance currently located at the level of states. In fact, the number of levels 
could vary in different parts of the world, so that there would not even be a 
fact of the matter whether Luxembourg, say, is on the same level as Pata-
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gonia, or below, or above. There would, in any case, be a genuine diffi-
culty about how to colour a political map of the world, seeing that no terri-
torial political units are clearly more important than those within them or 
those of which they form a part. And there would be a corresponding di-
versity in political loyalties: Most persons would likely develop a plurality 
of quasi-patriotic sentiments for the various nested political units to which 
they belong, and even those few who would develop one dominant alle-
giance would probably differ in regard to its object. (I. e. some of the more 
single-minded residents of Edinburgh would feel primarily Scottish, others 
British, others again would think of themselves as Europeans, as Edin-
burghers, or as citizens of the world.) No political unit would therefore be 
able to mobilize a large majority of its citizens to fight for its honour or 
territorial expansion. Differences among political units would be resolved 
in a law-governed way, securing what Kant sought: perpetual peace. 
In his essay, Kant concentrated on exploring the chances for perpetual 
peace held out by the associative paradigm. He concluded that perpetual 
peace through a free association of independent states is possible, though 
such an association could never be secure against a renewed outbreak of 
“that hostile inclination away from law” (EF 357/105). The hope for per-
petual peace through a free association of independent states is realistic, if 
the states, or most of them, are republican and therefore are, in particular, 
so organized that “the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether 
or not war is to be declared” (EF 351/100; cp. GTP 311/90f, MS 
345f/§55). Few states today are so organized as to satisfy this requirement, 
and modern warfare technologies make it doubtful that states could be 
moved to organize themselves in this way, could be moved to forego the 
substantial advantages of surprise (e.g. in a preemptive strike). Since 
Kant’s alternative paradigm of a universal state seems as unrealistic and 
undesirable as it did at Kant’s time, it is worth examining whether the third 
paradigm, made available by the rejection of the doctrine of absolute sov-
ereignty, might offer superior prospects for perpetual peace. 
In order to evaluate the relative merits of my federal paradigm as com-
pared to those of Kant’s two more extreme alternatives, we will need to 
examine whether the suggested vertical dispersal of sovereignty is practi-
cable on a global scale and how a world order of this kind might peaceably 
be approached from where we are now. The best historical model we have 
with respect to both these questions is the current stage of the European 
Union and the process of European integration since World War Two 
which has led up to it.8 Reflecting on this experience suggests that eco-
nomic factors are of crucial importance for the realization of the federal 
paradigm—though they may be less important for maintaining it in exis-
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tence than they would be for the maintenance of a Kantian free association 
of states.9 
Until recently, the integration achieved in Europe has been primarily 
economic and has been motivated primarily by the hope for economic 
gains. It has been well understood for quite a long time that an interna-
tional division of labour with increasing specialization would enhance 
productivity by exploiting comparative advantages and economies of 
scale. Thus it is hardly the case that European governments have only 
recently come to appreciate the mutual gains that can be realized through a 
reciprocal reduction of trade barriers. Rather, what is only recent is the 
urgency of achieving these gains in order to compete successfully 
against—a new phenomenon—potentially superior rivals such as the US, 
the USSR, Japan, and other emerging economic powers in Asia. This 
competitive context has also heightened the motivational importance of 
mitigating various (quasi-economic) collective action problems: European 
integration can help avoid tragedies of the commons (e.g., excess pollu-
tion), prisoners’ dilemmas (e.g., bidding wars among governments to at-
tract or keep companies through tax incentives, loopholes, etc.), and coor-
dination problems (e.g. those that can be solved by standardizing meas-
ures, currencies, product specifications or by unifying interest rate poli-
cies). 
The process of European integration has recently moved from its first 
main phase of increasing economic interdependence into its second main 
phase characterized by an increasing scope for collective political deci-
sion-making on matters of common, regional concern. The gains of this 
second phase reinforce those of the first by enhancing and stabilizing vari-
ous collateral collective benefits: The economic and political integration of 
Europe tends 
—to facilitate travel, association, and scientific cooperation across 
borders as well as access to information, art, culture, and entertainment; 
—to facilitate cooperation in law enforcement (though crime is also 
made easier through the factors listed under the preceding point); 
—to decrease the likelihood of war in Europe by reducing incentives 
toward aggression as states gradually lose autarky, face increasing costs 
from foregone cooperation, and must expect concerted opposition from the 
rest; 
—to engender partial demilitarization with considerable savings in 
blood and treasure (even though preparedness against outside threats is 
still perceived to be necessary); 
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—to increase the political and military, as well as economic, weight of 
Europeans in world affairs (though whether this is desirable on the whole 
depends on how this increased power is used—more on this later). 
Of all these gains, the reduced likelihood of war is morally by far the 
most important in its own right. But, if I am correct to emphasize its em-
pirical connection with reduced incentives toward aggression, then its 
importance does not detract from, but underscores, the importance of some 
of the other features. 
The gains of European integration discussed so far are by and large in-
tended and welcomed by European citizens and politicians. They are obvi-
ous gains in the dual sense of being easily foreseeable and clearly benefi-
cial. In judging the success of European integration as a model of the fed-
eral paradigm, we will have to attend to four additional, unobvious fea-
tures that, though often ignored by the politicians, are crucial for the 
model’s moral success. (We should help bring these features into exis-
tence, if we want it to succeed.) 
The first of these additional features is the development of an inde-
pendent and truly democratic organ of supranational decision-making—as 
opposed to the central cadre of government ministers and government-
appointed bureaucrats which was dominant during much of the EU’s his-
tory. There are various reasons why this feature is important. Officials at 
several removes from democratic procedures are likely to develop bureau-
cratic interests of their own, to be corrupt, wasteful, and less than commit-
ted to the common interests of Europe’s citizens. They also lack the pres-
tige and independence to push through common solutions and concerted 
actions against reluctant national governments. And they are unlikely to be 
equally responsive to all citizens of Europe. It is therefore desirable that 
there be a financially and politically independent European government, 
including a legislature, executive, and judiciary. These institutions exist in 
outline, but they are still too weak financially and too indirect politically. 
The European parliament, for example, could be greatly strengthened by 
being staffed not by national delegations but by members who are elected, 
without regard to borders, by all Europeans on the basis of proportional 
representation. The authority of such governmental institutions should be 
strictly limited to matters of transnational concern. Other matter should 
remain decentralized in the interest of diversity, pluralism, and meaningful 
democratic control. 
The second additional feature is a decentralization of political decision-
making within the states of Europe. This is desirable to offset the homoge-
nizing influence of European unification in the interest of pluralism and 
diversity, and is necessary also for giving full effect to the central rationale 
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of democratic decision-making, which is to enable persons maximally to 
shape the circumstances that shape their lives. The parameters of our so-
cial world should be shaped equally by those whom they affect: local 
parameters by the locals, national parameters by the citizens of the rele-
vant country, and European parameters by the citizens of Europe at 
large.10 
The third important additional feature is a deep institutional commit-
ment to human rights, which should include, of course, the right to politi-
cal participation and hence much of what was said under the first two 
headings.11 
The fourth important additional feature (which, like the first two, could 
be integrated into a full account of human rights) is a firm institutional 
commitment to economic justice and the eradication of severe poverty. 
This is not much of an issue within the current European Union, though it 
may gain importance as the organization expands Eastward. It is impor-
tant, however, for the relations of Europe with the rest of the world—most 
importantly, perhaps, Africa—and also for future global institutions on the 
European model. It would be a (hardly far-fetched) moral disaster if the 
increased strength (through concerted action e.g. in collective bargaining 
and in the solution of internal collective-action problems) of a unified 
Europe were used to impose upon poor African states more onerous terms 
of trade or to maintain the subservience of African governments to Euro-
pean interests through political and economic pressures or bribes of one 
kind or another. 
The fourth feature brings out a second important historical precondi-
tion for the real success of European integration thus far (the first one 
being the new competitive challenge faced by the European states): The 
countries involved have been rather similar to one another in stage of 
economic development as measured, approximately, by per capita GDP. 
In the absence of such similarity, integration would have been far more 
difficult, because the distribution of its collective benefits would have 
been less foreseeable and less equal. Poorer countries are likely to benefit 
more from integration, as increased trade and mobility across borders tend 
to reduce wage rate differentials and as increased cooperation intensifies 
moral demands for development aid to the poorest areas in the region.12 
Since these inequalities in the distribution of collective gains are at least 
roughly foreseeable, the more affluent countries will tend to be more re-
luctant to go along with integrative projects (as witnessed by the very 
strong opposition to NAFTA within the US). The citizens and politicians 
of such (relatively more affluent) countries may well doubt whether the 
uncertain gains they can expect from integration are worth the risk, and 
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also whether there might not be geographically more far-fetched options of 
economic cooperation with relatively more affluent countries. For the time 
being, these doubts have been overcome as the US has narrowly decided 
to commit itself to NAFTA in addition to the OECD. This has been possi-
ble on account of the very same factor that served as a catalyst in the case 
of European integration: the competitive challenge from potentially supe-
rior rivals (specifically: a united Europe and the fast-growing South East 
Asian region). 
IV 
We have found that the European experience provides a reasonable 
model for what a federal world order might look like and how it might 
peaceably be approached, step by step, from where we are. The great ob-
stacle is motivation, in particular on the part of the more affluent states and 
regions. The two preconditions for integration are simply not fulfilled on 
the global plane: International economic inequalities are huge, and increas-
ing, with per capita GDP differentials well in excess of 100:1. And the 
world at large is not facing a competitive challenge from potentially supe-
rior rivals. Does this mean that there is little realistic hope for perpetual 
peace along the lines of the federal paradigm? 
Whether perpetual peace is achievable through economic and political 
integration along the lines of the federal paradigm crucially depends on 
whether the wealthier and more powerful states (US, Europe, Japan) and 
their governing “elites” have sufficient incentives to support such integra-
tion. For the reasons given, such global integration is likely to benefit the 
poorest populations the most. This gives the more affluent states a moral 
incentive to support integration, as it would dramatically alleviate the 
plight of the global poor—the appallingly widespread and severe deficien-
cies in Third-World nutrition, health care, and education. But this moral 
incentive does not seem to have much impact by itself. Whether integra-
tion will benefit the affluent states economically is at least doubtful: It 
would certainly tend to reduce their relative share of world product; and, 
even if this reduction were to be made up for by an increase in the absolute 
size of world product (through faster growth), the loss in relative economic 
share would entail a loss in political (and in potential military) strength. Is 
it prudent, then, for the wealthy and affluent states to preserve a world of 
independent, sovereign states? 
I believe that, to the contrary, resisting global integration would be im-
prudent. The growth in world population and, much more importantly, the 
increasingly rapid pace of technological development are greatly augment-
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ing the extent to which events within one national territory affect and 
endanger persons elsewhere. One very obvious example of such cross-
border externalities is pollution and environmental degradation, which 
adversely affect our health and quality of life in evident ways. But much 
more important are the less obvious dangers of major disasters, of which 
those associated with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and acci-
dents are only the most dramatic. Such disasters could easily reach beyond 
national borders. If the responsibility to guard against such disasters re-
mains territorially divided over more than 200 sovereign national govern-
ments, their occurrence is a near-certainty even in the medium term (50-
100 years). No state or group of states can protect itself unilaterally against 
all externally induced gradual or catastrophic deteriorations of its envi-
ronment. 
It may be said that an examination of the national institutions, govern-
ments, religious sects, cultures, and emotions prevalent in the developing 
countries today, should indeed inspire fear, but that this fear is a reason to 
keep these countries as poor and undeveloped as possible. But this re-
sponse is surely inadequate. We can perhaps slow the technological ad-
vancement of these countries, but we cannot delay it indefinitely. Sooner 
or later, they will join the club of states that have access to weapons of 
mass destruction, genetic engineering, and the like (not to mention the 
even more advanced technologies we will acquire in the next few dec-
ades): China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, North 
Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Alge-
ria, Libya, and so forth, one after the other. If present trends continue, all 
of humankind, including the developed West, will be facing unprece-
dented dangers (outcomes that are both worse and more probable than 
those we faced during the Cold War) within just a few decades. While 
continuing the status quo may have the relative advantage of postponing 
the problem, global integration has the much greater advantage of being, at 
least potentially, part of a lasting solution. It would, for one thing, tend to 
expand education (literacy!) and reduce socioeconomic inequality within 
the developing countries and thereby tend to make these countries less 
susceptible to primitive ideologies and autocratic rule. 
The present geopolitical constellation offers a unique opportunity for 
bringing the more dangerous and harmful technologies under central inter-
national control. If the most powerful states were to try to impose such 
control unilaterally, they would likely encounter determined resistance and 
would have to resort to force. This scenario is morally and politically un-
feasible. It seems compelling, then, to pursue the same goal in a multilat-
eral fashion, by relaxing the notion of state sovereignty in a more balanced 
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way: We, the most affluent societies, give up the claim that all our great 
wealth is ours alone, fit to be brought to bear in our bargaining with the 
rest of the world so as to entrench and expand our advantage. They, the 
rest, give up the claim that each state has a sovereign right to develop and 
control by itself all the technological capacities we already possess. 
I am not naive enough to believe that global integration with a corre-
sponding decline in national sovereignty would be popular in all develop-
ing countries, let alone with all their current governments. Implementing it 
could well require economic sanctions and even military interventions. My 
point is that its implementation would at least be morally and politically 
feasible (assuming I am right to believe that it could gain significant sup-
port in many developing countries), while instituting a technology control 
regime unilaterally would be neither. So long as the developed world 
shows itself essentially indifferent to extensive and severe poverty abroad, 
it will be much easier for hardliners in the developing countries to gain 
and hold power and to win support for ambitious weapons and technology 
programs. “Only through such programs,” they can plausibly say to their 
compatriots, “can we become a potential threat to the peoples of the afflu-
ent states, and only if we constitute a potential threat to them will they pay 
any attention to our society.”13 
This is my main reason for believing that perpetual peace can really be 
achieved through global integration toward a European-style model of the 
federal paradigm. The affluent and powerful states have sufficient pruden-
tial incentives to support such global integration once they appreciate that 
we, too, like the global poor, have a strong interest in a gradual erosion of 
the doctrine of absolute state sovereignty and a strengthening concern for 
the welfare of humankind at large—though our interest is somewhat less 
immediate than theirs. We want to leave to our children and grandchildren 
a world in which they can feel secure. And the best way to do this, I think, 
is to convince the populations and governments of the developing world of 
our vision of a global federation in which they would enjoy security, re-
spect, political influence and material sufficiency without controlling their 
own arsenals of mass destruction (and would not be threatened by the 
arsenals of others). That our governments will in fact appreciate that we 
have these prudential incentives is, however, by no means a foregone 
conclusion. Here we, academics and intellectuals, have an important task: 
to clarify the relevant moral and prudential incentives toward global inte-
gration to our compatriots and governments. If we can succeed with this 
task, perpetual peace may be within reach. If we fail, our grandchildren 
will likely lead worse lives and face much greater risks and dangers than 
we do now. 
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Notes 
* Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a conference organized by 
ARENA (Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-state) in Oslo, 
Norway, and at a conference celebrating the 200th anniversary of the appearance of 
Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” in Benicàssim, Spain. I am grateful for comments there 
received, especially from Andreas Follesdal, Dagfinn Follesdal, Jon Wetlesen, 
Adela Cortina, Thomas Mertens, and Vincent Martínez Guzman. One version of 
the essay under the title “Kant’s Vision of a Just World Order,” appeared in 2009, 
The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics edited by Tom Hill, Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
1. The phrase “federalism of free states” occurs within the second definitive article 
(EF 354/102), and “pacific federation” in the accompanying text (EF 356/104). 
Kant says clearly that such a federation is not based on coercive laws (EF 
383/127). Kant speaks of an international state and also of a world republic at EF 
357/105, and of a universal state (allgemeinen Staat) at EF 378/123. 
2. It becomes clear here that the distinction between juridical conditions and states 
of nature cannot be drawn as sharply as Kant often suggests. Laws cannot be so 
precise as to settle every conceivable dispute in advance. How precisely, then, do 
domains of external freedom have to be delimited for there to be a juridical condi-
tion? There are indefinite gradations between the rule of law in a modern democ-
racy and the rule of a wholly capricious tyrant (as more or less power may be 
exercised through laws and these laws may be more or less vague). 
The distinction between juridical conditions and states of nature is vague in 
three other dimensions as well. Laws cannot be so effectively enforced that they 
are never violated, or never violated with impunity. How well enforced, then, must 
they be for there to be a juridical condition? Once again, there are indefinite grada-
tions. 
A society cannot be so organized that there can never be any doubt as to who is 
to exercise political authority. Even in an absolute monarchy it can be doubtful 
whether a given person is indeed (say) the deceased monarch’s eldest son. How 
clearly, then, must the holder(s) of political authority be singled out for there to be 
a juridical condition? 
Humankind might be organized as a single global society in which all disputes 
are resolved through a single structure of political authorities. Or we might be 
territorially divided into hundreds, or Millions, of territorially defined “sovereign” 
societies. How large must societies be for there to be a juridical condition? (Here 
Kant might say that even two-member societies create small internal juridical 
conditions within an encompassing state of nature.) 
3. This claim is most fully stated in chapters 14, 26 and 29 of Hobbes (1981); 
Rousseau (1968) endorses it in Book 1, Chapter 6, and Kant states it most clearly 
at GTP 291/75, 299/81 and MS 319. For a detailed history of the idea, see Marshall 
(1957) part 1; Benn and Peters (1959), chapters 3 and 12; and Hart (1961). 
4. Yes, even Hobbes acknowledges that laws promulgated by the sovereign—
though just by definition—are not always good (Hobbes,1981:Chapter 30, espe-
cially the 20§). Of course, Kant postulates far more significant obligations upon 
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those exercising political authority. But he, too, like Hobbes, insists that their 
compliance with these obligations must not be judged by the subjects: “even if [the 
supreme legislative] power or its agent, the chief of state, has violated the original 
contract [...] the subject is still not permitted to offer counter-resistance. The reason 
for this is that the people, under an existing civil constitution, has no longer any 
right to determine how the constitution should be administered. For suppose it did 
have this right, and that it disagreed with the judgment of the actual chief of state, 
who is to decide which side is right? Neither can act as judge of its own cause. 
Thus there would have to be another chief above the chief of state to decide be-
tween the latter and the people, which is self-contradictory” (GTP 299f/81; cp. EF 
382/126f; MS 320). Rousseau takes an analogous position by asserting that the 
general will, though it is not always enlightened, must always be obeyed (Rous-
seau, 1968: Book IV, Chapter 2, in conjunction with Book II, Chapter 6). 
5. Such agencies might well grow out of ones that already exist today—the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council and the International Court of Justice—if 
their powers became less dependent on national governments which, as things 
stand now, are free to quit the UN and to exit the jurisdiction of the International 
Court at their discretion. 
6. I present a detailed case for the desirability of such a scheme in “Cosmopolitan-
ism and Sovereignty” (Pogge, 1992:48-75). Kant would surely have envisioned a 
world republic as containing smaller political units. But his commitment to the 
doctrine of absolute sovereignty prevented him from thinking of these units as 
having any ultimate political authority. In several of his political writings, how-
ever, Kant seems at times to be on the verge of overcoming this constraint upon his 
thinking. Thus he once suggests (MS 311/§43) that public law (Staatsrecht) and 
international law (Völkerrecht) might together lead to the idea of a public law of 
peoples (Völkerstaatsrecht). He writes that a civil society (bürgerliche Gesell-
schaft) “would require—if only human beings were smart enough to discover it 
and wise enough willingly to submit to its coercive power [Zwange]—a cosmo-
politan whole [weltbürgerliches Ganze], i.e. a system of all states that are in dan-
ger of affecting one another detrimentally” (KU 432/§83). He envisions (IAG 
26/49) as the final step of human progress a unification of states (Staatenver-
bindung), which involves a united power (vereinigte Gewalt) that enforces a law of 
equilibrium among states and thereby introduces a cosmopolitan condition of 
public security of states (einen weltbürgerlichen Zustand der öffentlichen Staatssi-
cherheit). And he asserts that “there exists no other remedy against this [oppressive 
burden of military expenditure] except an international law (in analogy to the civil 
or public law of individual men) which is founded upon public and enforceable 
laws to which each state would have to subject itself” (GTP 312/92). The last three 
passages seem especially suggestive, because they clearly juxtapose the continued 
existence of states with the existence of a central coercive mechanism of law en-
forcement. 
7. I have switched terminology here to conform to modern usage. Kant’s second 
model is today better described as a free association of states rather than a federa-
tion, because there is no genuine division of ultimate political authority as each 
state is bound by common decisions only so long as it chooses to be. 
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8. This is not a perfect model of my paradigm, for two reasons. First, the model is 
regional rather than global. And, second, while it does involve a desirable transfer 
of ultimate political authority from states to the Union and thus nicely exemplifies 
supranational federalism, the model does not (yet) provide for a balancing devolu-
tion of ultimate political authority from states to smaller units. 
9. Kant speaks in this context of “the spirit of commerce, which cannot coexist 
with war, and sooner or later takes hold of every people” (EF 368/114). 
10. More support for the desirability of these first two additional features is offered 
in Part III of “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” 
11. In “How Should Human Rights be Conceived?” (Pogge, 1995), I have argued 
that such a commitment can best be expressed through an institutional conception 
of human rights. The basic idea is that asserting that some person P has a human 
right to X amounts to asserting that the society or social system within which P 
lives ought to be so (re-)organized that P has secure access to X and, in particular, 
so that P is secure against being denied X or being deprived of X officially, i.e. by 
her government or its agents or officials. Avoidable insecurity of access—beyond 
certain reasonably attainable thresholds—constitutes official disrespect and tar-
nishes a society’s human-rights record (and significantly more so when it is due to 
official denial or deprivation, i.e. to human rights violations). 
12. Such demands have made significant headway in the European context. 
13. They might adduce as an illustration the technical and economic aid recently 
promised to the North Koreans in exchange for scrapping their fledgling nuclear 
weapons industry. And they might also point out how quickly India and Pakistan 
were “forgiven” their acquisition of nuclear capabilities. 
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WORLD GOVERNMENT,  
INTERNATIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM:  
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE  






Immanuel Kant is often credited with foreseeing the emergence of a 
world wherein the economic and security issues of nations have become 
“globalized”. In such a world, the solutions to problems impacting all 
nations require coordinated and cooperative political action. Kant appears 
to have two models for how such an interdependent world should be or-
ganized. The one presumably correct “in theory” would have nations give 
up their independence to a world sovereign with coercive powers to im-
plement its laws. The other, the “negative surrogate” of the world republic, 
would organize independent nations into a voluntary defensive league 
based upon republican principles of governance and committed to cosmo-
politan principles of right. 
I will not go into the complex literature concerning the relationship be-
tween these two models but will instead investigate the question: what 
does cosmopolitan right add to the model of a defensive league of repub-
lics that can help us understand how global governance is possible in the 
absence of a global state? 
This paper investigates the foundational character of cosmopolitan 
right as one of the three forms of public right in Kant’s theory of right and 
its role in making global governance possible without a global state. While 
on the face of it cosmopolitan right is clearly a significant aspect of Kant’s 
theory of right, appearing in both the Metaphysics of Morals as a form of 
public right and in Perpetual Peace as the third definitive article, tradi-
tional interpretations of Kant’s theory have placed primary emphasis on 
national or political right without sufficient appreciation for the systematic 
context within which all law must develop. Cosmopolitan right, as the 
normative principle that shapes the development of public law regarding 
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the interaction of individuals and states, must in turn shape national and 
inter-state law. I conclude that not only must all law, according to Kant, 
have a foundation in cosmopolitan right but that cosmopolitan right re-
quires the development of democratic institutions at the global interna-
tional level in order to universally secure the public rights of all individu-
als and bring about the “cosmopolitan community” that is the ultimate 
goal of history and politics. 
Kant’s Theory of Public Right 
According to Immanuel Kant all persons or organized groups (states) 
capable of mutual influence must either be governed by principles of right 
or be at war. It is the duty of all such persons to enter into the appropriate 
juridical conditions. The juridical principles governing human relations are 
threefold, i.e. political right forming individuals into states, international 
right regulating the interaction between states and cosmopolitan right 
regulating the interactions between individuals and states and individuals 
across states. Cosmopolitan right extending universally to all individuals is 
the most controversial because it entails a form of global governance con-
structed upon the basis of independent states. Many have puzzled over this 
three-fold system of principles holding that the third level of “right” is 
incompatible with traditional conceptions of “sovereignty” on which the 
independent existence of states depends. They argue that cosmopolitan 
right cannot have strong juridical status because it cannot be coercively 
implemented and that therefore his federation can be nothing but a step-
ping-stone to a world state. 
Clearly, Kant’s tripartite juridical system challenges traditional notions 
of sovereignty build upon “atomistic” concepts of state-independence 
wherein each state defines and defends its “rights” in its own terms. In 
contrast to the traditional “atomistic” conception of state sovereignty I 
shall adopt Kant’s model of a plurality of interacting independent states. 
This model, I shall argue, requires the universal principle of cosmopolitan 
right to balance the contrasting forces of interaction and independence 
(dynamic equilibrium/community). It is this form of law that ensures the 
independence of interdependent states. 
My thesis has three points: that a society of states by virtue of being in 
a juridical condition of dynamic equilibrium is necessarily founded upon 
cosmopolitan right; that cosmopolitan right necessarily has universal juris-
diction; that the implementation of norms of hospitality require global 
institutions based upon democratic representation. 
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First, I maintain that any society of states that has entered into juridical 
relations must acknowledge cosmopolitan right as a condition of their 
association. In addition to the fact that each state must have its borders 
recognized by others as a condition of peaceable federation, all states must 
accept the (moral) fact that offers of commerce remain-part of the original 
right of all individuals. Kant maintains that “the right to present oneself for 
society, belongs to all human beings” as a consequence of the fact that 
originally no one had more right than another to settle any part of the 
globe. All possession of land prior to ratification by a legally constituted 
federation is provisional. Because potential individual activity puts each 
individual in “constant relations with all the rest” and because this remains 
true even after civil society provides internal rules to determine internal 
property the federation has to concern itself with both definitions of bor-
ders and criteria for universal individual-to-individual interactions. 
 
This right, in so far as it affords the prospect that all nations may unite 
for the purpose of creating certain universal laws to regulate the inter-
course they may have with one another, may be termed cosmopolitan (ius 
cosmopoliticum) (Kant, 1970:172). 
 
It is this right “ius cosmopoliticum” that provides the basis for univer-
sal laws regulating international intercourse. Kant’s insistence on the ju-
ridical (a priori) status of cosmopolitan right does not appear to be contin-
gent upon nor subordinate to the recognition of borders. It is derived from 
a more fundamental individual right implicit in the universal and innate 
right to external freedom, which allows us to do anything that does not 
detract from the right of others. Presenting oneself for society does not 
violate anyone’s fundamental rights. 
Cosmopolitan right thus shapes the nature of rightful relations between 
states and thus provides constraints on the form that the federation can 
take. The federation is prohibited by cosmopolitan right from becoming a 
“closed system” of isolationist communities or communities that trade 
only upon conditions of nationalist interest. Isolationist communities 
might be non aggressive but, per argument, would not be committed to 
cosmopolitan norms of hospitality and could slide into violence and war 
should foreigners appear on their borders. Nationalist interests might sup-
port commerce but principally on terms of power, which could result in 
exploitation leading to conquest and war. Kant links peaceable association 
to principles that are universally rooted in individual liberty and cosmo-
politan community. 
The federation then by virtue of forming a juridical association re-
quires specification in positive law of the norms of hospitality implicit in 
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cosmopolitan right. Therefore some form of global law is entailed by the 
very condition of a plurality of interacting independent states aspiring to 
peaceable relations. Secondly, given specification in a global form of 
positive law, cosmopolitan right opens states to the development of juridi-
cal institutions with universal jurisdiction such as a world court with the 
authority to determine violations of cosmopolitan right. Judgments from a 
world court must be self-implemented on pain of loss of membership in 
the (cosmopolitan) society of states and restitution of the state of war be-
tween the federated association and the dissenting state.1 I will discuss 
later in this paper the conditions under which the federation may collec-
tively enforce the norms of cosmopolitan right upon dissenting or dissoci-
ated states. Finally, given the norms of hospitality internal to the concept 
of cosmopolitan right the federation must evolve international institutions 
based upon democratic representation to guide the development of interna-
tional law. Cosmopolitan democratic representation is required so that the 
form of public law that arises from inter-state interactions does not perma-
nently solidify structural exploitation on the part of dominant states. 
If my interpretation is correct, that a cosmopolitan society of states is 
completed by the adoption and implementation of cosmopolitan right, then 
it is unclear in what sense a world state can add anything to Kant’s peace 
project. We may indeed continue to hold that “a republic of republics” is a 
regulative ideal that assists in the formation of practical principles to guide 
political development but any attempt to “jump over” the federation and 
directly consolidate all states under a single executive misconstrues how 
the ideal is to be realized. The republican ideals of freedom, equality and 
independence within and between states must be products of a cosmopoli-
tan principle shaping behaviours at all levels but not imposed from a sin-
gular power. If the main function of a world state is to produce a system of 
public law that could guarantee to each individual and/or state a specific 
sphere of freedom, adjudicate conflict and avoid war then we need not 
envision this system as the product of the coercive imposition of universal 
law from the top-down. Given the collective acceptance of the duty to 
strive toward the end of peace with all of its moral constraints and barring 
the catastrophic destruction of the species, a cosmopolitan system of law 
can emerge from the bottom-up process of historical development under 
the principle of cosmopolitan right. 
 
Cosmopolitan Right, Hospitality and Democratic Representation 
International institutions alone however, do not constitute a cosmopoli-
tan community. International institutions as we know them do not fully 
instantiate the principle of cosmopolitan right because they do not incorpo-
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rate democratic principles of representation which are required by the 
principle of hospitality upon which cosmopolitan right is based. The prin-
ciple of hospitality regulating all commerce between individuals and states 
prohibits fraud, force and exploitation. By providing rich and powerful 
states with positions of permanent power within most international institu-
tions, these institutions solidify policies of economic exploitation and 
military dominance of developed states over underdeveloped states. Since 
the ideal of a republic of republics cannot take the form of a universal state 
under a single ruler, we cannot appeal to a centralized authority to legislate 
the values necessary for a republican system flourish. Rather, the system 
of positive law, international political right, which must accompany and 
supplement the development of international right within the federation, 
must be guided by what is just in the relationship not merely between 
states as “powers” but in the relationship between individuals “as citizens 
of the world.”2 Kant maintains that international right developed under the 
principle of cosmopolitan right transforms the former (national right) and 
produces international political right as “a universal right of humanity” 
(Kant, 1970:103). How does cosmopolitan right transform national right 
and produce international political right? Clearly the cosmopolitan context 
defined by the three definitive articles within which states are portrayed as 
constructing global public laws and global public institutions to regulate 
their interactions is not the former context of power politics but one where 
respect for human right has been internalized in the positive legal systems 
created by the associated states. The need for global institutions which can 
secure universal republican values becomes clearer if we investigate the 
principle of hospitality, the form of cosmopolitan right that Kant stipulates 
in Perpetual Peace as the third “definitive article” of the federation from 
the perspective of what type of interactions violates this principle. 
What Does the Principle of Hospitality Require? 
Hospitality, Kant insists, is a juridical principle, a legal duty (Kant, 
1970:105). Individuals have the right to offer to trade and to communicate 
as part of the original community of land understood as a community of 
reciprocal action (Kant, 1972:172). Kant did not attempt to provide a de-
tailed legal code for these interactions but his examples of what constitutes 
inhospitable interactions provides some guidance on the norms that would 
be constitutive of rightful interactions. Therefore I will unpack the norms 
inherent in these examples to explore the possibility that cosmopolitan 
right must be accompanied by institutional supplements to the federation 
of free nations, in the form of global institutions based upon democratic 
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representation. Cosmopolitan democratic representation is required so that 
the form of public law that arises from inter-state interactions does not 
permanently solidify exploitation on the part of dominant states in viola-
tion of the norms of cosmopolitan right. 
While the principle of hospitality would have no bite without Kant’s 
assumption of a fundamental right to offer to interact with others through 
trade and travel (Kant, 1970:106), Kant’s analysis of the ethical limits of 
expansion into new territories was shaped by his concern for exploitation 
in the relationship between European states and non state peoples in the 
“new world”. In his concern that Europeans not take advantage of their 
superior form of organization to dispossess native peoples Kant appears to 
grant to non state peoples moral standing and rights over the property 
entailed by their ways of life. In asking whether or not states may create 
new settlements as a consequence of exploration in the vicinity of a nation 
(not organized as a state) already settled Kant maintains that the right to do 
so is incontestable with the provision that the new settlement not interfere 
with the use of the land of those already settled. He warns that in many 
cases this will require consideration of the fact that non-state cultures may 
conceive of rightful possession and use of the land differently than states 
that have evolved legal standards for permanent title.  He says: 
 
But if the nations involved are pastoral or hunting peoples (like the 
Hottentots, the Tunguses, and most native American nations) who rely 
upon large tracts of wasteland for their sustenance, settlements should not 
be established by violence, but only by treaty; and even then, there must be 
no attempt to exploit the ignorance of the natives in persuading them to 
give up their territories (Kant, 1972:173). 
 
The social organization of non-state peoples may not yet be “rightful” 
(satisfy Kant’s definition of civil society) but apparently they do have 
some form of provisional (claim) right in relation to peoples not yet settled 
and coercion and exploitation in interactions with them remain moral evils 
that cannot be justified. The inhospitable conduct leading to subjugation 
Kant maintains arose from considering the newly discovered lands as 
“ownerless territories: for the native inhabitants were counted as nothing” 
(Kant, 1970:106). 
Even the potential for “development” (economic and cultural) extend-
ing to future generations does not justify dispossession. “But all of these 
supposedly good intentions cannot wash away the stain of injustice from 
the means which are used to implement them” (Kant, 1972:173). The 
argument that violence was used in the foundation of states themselves, 
which Kant accepts to be generally the case, does not move Kant from his 
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position that cosmopolitan right absolutely forbids the imposition of order 
by coercion. His comparison of this argument to the so-called right of 
revolution for the improvement of political organizations (which he re-
soundly rejects) again suggests that the social organization of non-state 
peoples is not to be regarded as a merely anarchic condition of individuals 
who can be absorbed into another state. The conditions of right are univer-
sal and cannot be annulled and cover every individual, civilized or not. 
Kant subjects commercial interactions as well as settlements to criti-
cism on the grounds of the principle of hospitality. In discussing the in-
hospitable conduct of the commercial states he goes so far as to equate 
“visiting” foreign countries and peoples with “conquering” them. He 
states: 
 
America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc. were 
looked upon at the time of their discovery as ownerless territories; for their 
native inhabitants were counted as nothing… This led to oppression of the 
natives… and the whole litany of evils which can afflict the human race 
(Kant, 1970:106). 
 
Given these experiences Kant concludes that the decisions of China 
and Japan to restrict the interactions between their states and people with 
European commerce is both justified and “wise.” From these examples we 
can infer that for the principle of hospitality to take effect, all forms of 
coercion and exploitation must be excluded. Those who accept the offer of 
interaction must do so not only freely but also with the expectation of fair 
outcomes.3 But coercion and exploitation are not limited to the 18th and 
19th century relations between non-state and state peoples. Exploitation 
clearly can and does occur in modern state-to-state relationships particu-
larly between highly developed and underdeveloped states. Such exploita-
tive interactions I would argue violate the principle of hospitality and are 
contrary to cosmopolitan right. 
In the 21st century, non-state peoples have been generally incorporated 
into states and states have been organized in various ways within interna-
tional organizations. Thus our contemporary political system would seem 
to more closely approximate the Kantian ideal of a cosmopolitan condi-
tion. Yet states do not uniformly represent the interests of their people/s 
and within the state the interests of different groups are often given differ-
ential weight. In World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge claims 
that in underdeveloped states a rich store of natural resources is systemati-
cally correlated with dictatorships and poverty. He argues that within un-
derdeveloped states the lure of personal power and wealth corrupts politi-
cal leadership and that this corruption is supported by the current terms of 
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the international recognition of sovereignty (Pogge, 2002). In this context 
national right provides no disincentives to the development of dictator-
ships thereby securing for those in power continuous access to great per-
sonal wealth at the expense of internal development. Indeed, by allowing 
that whoever holds power has the right to sell the nation’s resources, cur-
rent international law and practice tends to support this type of political 
corruption. 
This alliance of international recognition of dictatorial power with in-
ternal underdevelopment is no mere accident of history. Given the manner 
in which developed nations tend to use their superior military and eco-
nomic power to gain advantages in all international forums it is to the 
advantage of developed nations to continue to support regimes willing to 
provide access to natural resources on terms favourable to themselves 
regardless of the “representative” character of the government in power. 
Thus, the economic gap between developed and underdeveloped countries 
has grown despite the efforts of some international organizations to pro-
vide funds for “development.” These organizations are not constituted in a 
manner to offset the effects of the dominance of developed nations and 
therefore cannot genuinely affect the type of internal development that 
would systematically reduce global poverty.4 
Given the negative impacts of the policies of these organizations on the 
most vulnerable, global theorists such as David Held have argued that in 
addition to international law founded on state based international organiza-
tions; cosmopolitan law must be founded directly upon international de-
mocratic institutions whose representatives would be accountable to indi-
viduals as “world citizens” (Held, 1997; see also Held, 1995). Such institu-
tions would provide a forum within which ordinary citizens could critique 
the policies of their governments and could form alliances with the citi-
zens of other states to address issues of global concern particularly in the 
areas of peace, poverty and environmental degradation. 
Power politics, Held argues in Kantian fashion, affect the capacity of 
any and all states to develop their internal values. Internal democracy has 
little chance to develop where autocrats have the power to offer natural 
resources on favourable terms to developed nations. Power elites within 
underdeveloped states thus reflect the overall power differentials between 
states. While Kant stressed universal republicanism and the equality of 
states under international law as necessary conditions for the evolution of 
cosmopolitan law, Held adds to these two conditions the need to establish 
international democratic institutions. A level of cosmopolitan democratic 
law is required if cosmopolitan right is ultimately to be achieved because 
commerce (at least under the conditions of global capitalist markets) tends 
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to have differential effects across states with respect to individuals/groups 
that undermines the ability of those adversely affected to have equal stand-
ing (as republicanism requires) in their respective political communities.5 
In a system of interaction shaped by powerful elites, Held argues, democ-
racy (or republican equality) within must be supplemented by democracy 
without. 
 
Clearly the current organization of international relations does not re-
flect the principles of a cosmopolitan federation. Structural exploitation, 
economic and cultural, underlies many contemporary struggles for politi-
cal realignments as well as movements primarily aimed at retribution and 
destruction.6 If Kant is correct in his theory concerning the way to peace, 
and granted that peace is accepted as the desirable goal (which some have 
rejected both in theory and practice)7 then the nature of the reforms re-
quired is clear. 
But in what sense does a cosmopolitan federation once given appropri-
ate institutional form “guarantee” peace? Because such a federation, even 
in its cosmopolitan formation, retains a dynamic character with potential 
for dissent leading to dissociation and war it can be objected that it cannot 
fulfil Kant’s imperative of perpetual peace. It has been argued that only 
the republic of republics, or word state, can fully realize perpetual peace 
and in rejecting the world state Kant violates his own principles. Is there 
then an inconsistency in Kant’s own theory? In “Kant’s Arguments for a 
League of States”, Pauline Kleingeld provides an interesting and sensible 
defence of the league. She argues that the republic of republics is best 
understood as the ideal, which can only be approximated through the use 
of practical/juridical principles such as cosmopolitan right. She concludes 
that the cosmopolitan federation is not a “second best” solution that is 
substituted for the republic or republics but the form that the latter takes in 
the historical world (Kleingeld, 2006). Perpetual peace may not be fully 
realizable but it is possible in a practical sense to strive for it. 
How Can Cosmopolitan Right Be Implemented? 
One of the most innovative features of cosmopolitan right is that 
through this principle individuals become juridical persons (citizens of the 
world) and are guaranteed the right to have rights without recourse to a 
world state. But what institutional mechanisms are appropriate to the im-
plementation of these rights? Does cosmopolitan right go beyond public 
criticism and open up the possibility of military interventions into the 
internal affairs of states which would seem to be prohibited not merely by 
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preliminary article 5 of Perpetual Peace but also by the defensive purpose 
of the Federation which is to secure the freedom of each state? Given a 
commitment to cosmopolitan right would the internal violation of human 
rights on the part of one state authorize the military intervention of other 
states? Would such a “pre-authorized” intervention count against the pro-
hibition on interference? Alyssa Bernstein supports the enforceability of 
cosmopolitan public law by arguing that for states who remain signatories 
to the cosmopolitan league but also engage in systematic violation of the 
basic rights of their citizens, interventions to end such violations are not 
external aggression but simply “law enforcement” (Bernstein, 2009). 
Although the cosmopolitan federation may not be without conflict I 
would argue that it is a different configuration than other forms of associa-
tion built on self-interest and power. Because of its juridical character such 
an association can rightfully defend itself against “unjust enemies.” The 
thorniest issue arises from those states, internally powerful, whose pub-
licly expressed policies are hostile to cosmopolitan values and interna-
tional law of any kind and who refuse to join or remain within any peace 
oriented league. Applying a notion developed by Georg Cavallar, Bern-
stein takes her argument for the enforcement of cosmopolitan public law a 
step further stating that openly hostile states stand in a relation to interna-
tional right as that of an “unjust enemy” (Bernstein, 2009). This is I be-
lieve an interesting distinction which draws our attention to the fact that 
such an enemy could only be recognized and defined from inside the con-
dition of international right (from the perspective of a pacific federation) 
and not from the traditional assumption of a state of nature between na-
tions wherein such a concept would be at best a redundancy. With the 
cosmopolitan federation we find Kant finally accepting a type of just war 
theory, a theory he could not accept in so far as states refused commitment 
to cosmopolitan principles and insisted on their individual rights to deter-
mine the justice of their causes. 
 
An unjust enemy then is one whose publically expressed policies are 
hostile to cosmopolitan values and international association. Should such a 
“rogue” state simply be isolated and left alone? Clearly, if a state simply 
prefers a condition of dissociation and expresses no hostile intentions 
towards the federation, the federation would have no “just” grounds to 
coerce its continued association. However the price of such dissociation is 
that no interaction between such a state and any member of the federated 
association would have any juridical foundation and such dissociated 
states would in effect become closed and isolated systems. While the prin-
ciple of hospitality appears to permit such dissociation as long as it re-
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mains non hostile, such a state does others a high degree of “wrong” be-
cause it refuses to allow the exercise of the right of “commercium” and 
blocks the path to permanent peace and a cosmopolitan community. 
 
But what if such a dissociated state engages in violence against it sub-
jects? Should that be viewed as simply internal discord? It can be argued 
that the refusal to recognize human rights internally on the part of states 
that have already rejected international law and association can be taken as 
a sign that this state cannot be trusted to respect the external peace and can 
therefore be treated as an imminent threat to all. States with expressed 
hostile intentions whether those intentions are internally or externally 
expressed become “unjust enemies” because the denial of rights is not 
simply “internal discord” but a form of violence that cannot be expected to 
have simply an “internal intention.” It is as though such violations given 
the values of cosmopolitan community, is a direct challenge to rights eve-
rywhere. It was clearly the connection between genocide and Hitler’s war 
of European domination that motivated the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights and subsequent treaties internationalizing genocide as a crime 
against humanity.8 
 
When faced with an “unjust enemy” Kant argues that other states are 
permitted to deprive the unjust state of its power “to act in a similar way 
again.” While Kant does not discuss the full range of permissible means of 
redress against such a state he does mention the institution of constitu-
tional change (but not dissolution of the civil union of the people) that 
presumably would be designed to eliminate the despotic qualities of the 
constitution responsible for the aggressive tendencies of the state. Without 
the assumption that the despotic qualities of such a state indicate a general 
disposition against the peace, externally initiated constitutional change 
would clearly violate the strictures of non-intervention. Action against an 
unjust enemy cannot be based merely upon aggressive rhetoric but must be 
a response to actual unjust conduct of a serious and threatening kind. Thus 
UN condemnations and other responses, such as sanctions, to abuses of 
human rights have required that abuses be “grave” and “systematic” rather 
than occasional. The distinction between occasional and systematic abuse 
is an attempt to identify and respond to the settled “character” of a regime 
rather than to a particular problem. Of the unjust enemy Kant states: “For 
they are a threat to their freedom and a challenge to them to unite against 
such misconduct and to deprive the culprit of the power to act in a similar 
way again” (Kant, 1972:170). 
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Conclusions 
Short of responding to the violent and/or aggressive dissociated state, 
the defensive federation remains committed to peace and respect for the 
freedom and self-determination of its members. Although initially limited 
to the principle of hospitality such a league may also commit itself to vari-
ous international rules facilitating intercultural and economic exchanges. 
In so far as the growing community of interaction can be expected to result 
in a further development of both national and interstate law, cosmopolitan 
or world law will be a “necessary supplement” bringing interstate laws 
into compliance with cosmopolitan right. Global (international) law at this 
level while voluntarily negotiated will require the development of legal 
expertise and courts for the exercise of judgments, independent of the 
states that may be a party to particular disputes, concerning just implemen-
tation of its rules. These legal decisions cannot be considered interferences 
with the sovereignty or freedom of states that are in this manner “associ-
ated”. Much of this international political law will shape how states articu-
late the rights of individuals who enter into these exchanges and thereby 
influence the formation of domestic law as well.9 The pull of cosmopolitan 
principles will be in the direction of republican freedoms without the re-
quirement that an individual republic take on the task of “exporting” re-
publican values. 
Certainly as Kant projected in Idea For a Universal History such de-
fensive associations will go through many transformations before all states 
are able to perfect their internal civil constitutions and commit themselves 
to the 1st Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace but if cosmopolitan right 
leads the way in the early instantiations of the defensive league it will have 
laid the groundwork for the stable and universal institution of republican-
ism and it will be unnecessary for individual republics to make war to save 
the peace. Thus I conclude that cosmopolitan right implemented by inter-
national institutions under conditions of cosmopolitan democratic law can 
provide a structure of global governance without a global state. Although 
this paper has been primarily concerned with the juridical structure of a 
cosmopolitan community lest it appear that I believe that a cosmopolitan 
community is nothing but a thin legal framework I want to point out that 
thicker conceptions of cosmopolitanism are possible depending upon the 
type of multicultural “cultures” that arise within peaceable, open and in-
teractive communities. But those are richly complex issues going far be-
yond the topic of this paper. A cosmopolitan peace will not be a simple 
task that can be completed within any finite historical period. 
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Notes 
1. It may be objected that since states may voluntarily terminate their membership 
in a juridical federation the traditional conception of sovereignty persists, i.e. that 
states cannot be coerced to submit to any universal principles. Yet, in the context 
of a juridical federation pledged to no longer pursue the “rights” of states through 
war, the public repudiation of judgments concerning international justice would 
constitute the dissenting state as an “unjust enemy”, a term not applicable in the 
prior state of nature where unregulated sovereignty was the norm. In the Meta-
physical Elements of Justice (1972:170), Kant maintains that unjust enemies con-
stitute a threat to all other states and that states may rightfully unite to deprive the 
“offending state” of the power to act in a similar way again. 
2. It is arguable that international trade agreements that ignore worker’s rights and 
the health and environmental impacts of trade are exploitative and constitute unfair 
relations between individuals and not simply unfair relations between states. 
3. Kant’s references to unjust commercial interactions assume that injustice in 
these interactions has a universal impact—that is, that the community at stake is 
not limited to the immediate agents. This is because all have this right to interact 
with all and injustice in international dealings is in effect injustice to everyone. 
4. (Anderson-Gold, 2001:ch. 7). Globalization and Development traces the nega-
tive impact of the neo-liberal economic policies of the 1980s on the development 
policies of the IMF and World Bank. 
5. Although Kant accepted some degree of economically based political inequality 
(active v. passive citizen) within even a justly constituted state he maintained that it 
must be possible to work one’s way out of dependence. Permanent structural eco-
nomic inequality violates this principle. 
6. Culturally based discriminations must also not be allowed a foothold in law 
since these will tend to become permanent and structural features of association. 
This means that in multicultural contexts certain limits on majority rule must be 
recognized that protect minority interests. 
7. Some forms of fascist and Nazi ideology portray struggle and war as a perma-
nently desirable condition and jihad or holy war is for some a quasi-permanent 
condition to be embraced at least until the last infidel has been converted. Al-
though for different reasons, none of these theories accept the basic Kantian prin-
ciple of universal human rights. 
8. (Anderson-Gold, 2001:ch. 4). “Human Rights and the Transformation of Sover-
eignty.” 
9. The experience of the European Union’s Court on Human Rights provides an 
excellent example of how this can work in practice. Critics are likely to point out 
that this success has been built upon a common history and shared values. But this 
simply means that there may have to be multiple jurisdictions for such courts with 
regional scope mapping onto similarly shared histories and values. A supreme or 
“world court” is of course a more difficult institutional matter ultimately determin-
ing the inside/outside of the federations membership. 
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In Metaphysics of Morals, paragraph 44, Kant notes that “before a pub-
lic law condition is established ... individual human beings, peoples and 
states can never be secure against the violence from one another, since 
each has its [?!] own right to do what seems right and good to it (aus 
jedem seinem eigenen Recht, zu tun, was ihm recht und gut dünkt) and not 
to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this.”1 
We should note that here we have an array of “individual human be-
ings”, “peoples”, and “states”. The rest of the paragraph, however, seems 
to deal with us as individuals, in a direct manner, and only indirectly with 
the “peoples” and “states”.2 
There is a powerful ambivalence here, especially if we compare the 
very strong wording at the beginning of the paragraph 44: “It is not ex-
perience from which we learn the maxim of violence..., it is not some deed 
(Faktum) that makes coercion through public law necessary....—on the 
contrary... it lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (a condi-
tion that is not rightful).” The ambivalence is here perhaps not yet visible, 
except in the shift from a set of three (individuals, peoples, and states), 
none of which can be secure from violence, to a formulation which seems 
to shrink to individuals who must leave the state of nature and, at all costs, 
enter a civil condition. This paragraph in Metaphysics of Morals is in full 
accord with the Seventh Thesis from the “Idea for Universal History with 
a Cosmopolitan Intent”: “...establishing a perfect civil constitution is de-
pendent on foreign relations,” because the state of nature present in exist-
ing anarchical international affairs is making security against violence still 
very far ahead—and there is no “civil condition”, i.e. “rightful condition” 
in the international arena.3 The concepts of “a priori” and “independence 
of any factuality”—very strong concepts, to be sure – appear to have the 
same validity on all three levels: of individuals, peoples, and states. It 
seems that abandoning the state of nature at only one level of those three 
would not suffice for a rightful, lawful condition to be established before 
the state of nature has been abandoned at all three levels. This means that 
before the state of nature has been overcome in international affairs, do-
mestic rights in states are doomed to be provisional, tentative and uncer-
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tain, which is the opposite of what they are supposed to be. Does this mean 
that at on the international level each may compel the other by force to 
leave the state of nature by introducing universally obligatory, peremptory, 
laws?4 The “other” here are states with established internal civil conditions 
and valid and effective laws (Cavallar, 1999:5). Accordingly, peoples and 
states should also leave the state of nature for peace to be secured. Until 
then, there will be a right to impel them to it by force. This means, quite in 
line with the definition of the state of nature, that war is a default state of 
affairs, whereas peace is only a goal for which to strive. Consequently, a 
peace that exists within states only, one which is not also a world peace, 
would be both incomplete and uncertain. 
The ambivalence seems to become visible in a tension between this “a 
priori” approach and the logic by which the laws, necessary to leave the 
state of nature and enter a civil condition, have to be articulated: they have 
to be articulated in freedom, in autonomy of the agents which “enter” the 
new condition, and this manifests itself through consent. We know this 
fact, but it is still odd: in order to be just, the laws must be endorsed, au-
thorized, not imposed, and this regardless of all other characteristics or 
features they have. Laws relate to our external freedom, but external free-
dom is still freedom: it is part of the totality of freedom, the same one that 
we brought (actually have to bring) from the state of nature (as the same 
freedom that we had, or have had, in that state). External freedom is not 
supposed to be a kind of slavery, or a domain in which freedom has lost its 
essence of being the capacity to decide, a capacity which is a kind of 
power. In a civil condition, freedom is limited. It is only part of what it 
was in the state of nature—but that part is still freedom and the best part of 
it indeed. In a practical sense, freedom is efficiently, in a practical sense, 
working in both parts, designating the legitimate freedom part (1) and the 
restricted part (2). In the area of legitimate freedom we can freely set our 
goals and attempt to realize them—resuming responsibility for the success 
and failure in their realization. 
In the area of freedom that is restricted by laws, freedom is present in 
the structure of the necessity of consent: without consent the restriction is 
not valid, but at the same time the consent has to be free, not enforced by 
compulsion or coercion. There is no real necessity in the requirement for 
the consent to be given, and the act of giving consent is a fact, not a matter 
of analytical truth! The normative reasoning power driving for the provi-
sion of consent contains necessity, but of a normative kind. Moreover, the 
necessitation we have in the “necessity” contained in duty, as Kant says: 
“Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for the law”—is not a real 
necessity but only a normative one [not that something necessarily will be 
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realized but that it is necessary that it ought to be realized, and this inde-
pendently of the difference “from duty”/“in accordance with duty” distinc-
tion] (Kant, 4:400n). But, of course, it did not have to be realized. Thus, 
the normative necessity to give consent to laws is not a factual necessity 
but only a pressure of reasons directing our decision to a rational conclu-
sion to give consent. 
This pressure is not even primarily of a moral kind but rather purely ra-
tional, based in autonomy but expressing our (best) heteronomy: rational 
self-interest. All that pressure, however, is not sufficient to entail a real 
necessity in the sense that the result, the act of giving consent, could be 
“derived” from the content of the laws. What laws will be, will depend in a 
crucial part on what the real interests are. And the real interests depend on 
who’s interests these are, and what happened before. Too many uncertain-
ties, and one variable is determining the most basic interests of anyone. 
Uncertainties refer to the events that “happened before,” and the variable 
is the identity of the person(s) who is or are the holder(s) of freedom. We 
may conclude that the “necessity” we deal with here is at most an urgency 
to give consent, without specifying what the content of this consent is. 
Taking this into account, it is arrogant to presume that everyone’s decision 
will be the same, that the interests and their hierarchy will be the same in 
all humans. The pressure to make a civil condition should suffice to facili-
tate the decision, but which decision it will be in full precision has not yet 
been determined in this process. 
Hence, on one side we have a normative thesis setting up a priori prin-
ciples that say that before we leave the state of nature we do not have full 
peace (Kant, 6:312), that any legal constitution is better than none at all 
(Kant, 6:320), that we must leave the state of nature and establish true 
peace, thereby overcoming war (Kant, 6:344). This is a demand of reason 
(Kant, 6:312). The realization of this demand takes time, and it can be 
incomplete or deficient. These problems, i.e. deficiency and incomplete-
ness, are signs of the presence of some remnants of the state of nature. 
This is most visible in the international arena where we still have a kind of 
anarchy. The demand of reason is to put an end to such a state of affairs by 
establishing a truly global juridical condition. 
On the other side, we have what Kant calls “truce”, a “mere truce, a 
suspension of hostilities, not peace” (Kant, 8:343), a state of temporary 
peace, even if it is a result of a peace treaty with the victory of one and 
capitulation of the other side (Kant, 8:355). Truce is a solid concept in 
Kant, much richer in content than our first impression might suggest. It 
also might be different from the dictionary meaning of the term. It is a 
concept worth exploring. There are two moments I have in mind here. 
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First, Kant’s peace treaty, or peace pact (depending on the translation) as 
the end of a particular war, may have as a result that “a current war can be 
brought to an end but not a condition of war” (Kant, 8:355, emphasis J.B.). 
Our normal linguistic intuition is that truce is only a pause in an ongoing 
war. According to Kant, however, a peace treaty cannot end the condition 
of war, because “right cannot be decided by war and its favourable out-
come, victory“.5 A possibility of future conflicts, namely, always remains 
an option. Even after the end of war (concluded with a peace treaty) we 
still have only a “truce,” a kind of state of nature, not real peace.6 Second, 
states have already abandoned the state of nature, and “what holds in 
accordance with natural right for beings in a lawless condition, [i. e.] ‘they 
ought to leave this condition’, cannot hold for states in accordance with 
the right of nations (since, as states, they already have a rightful constitu-
tion internally and hence have outgrown the constraint of others to bring 
them under a more extended law-governed constitution...” (Kant, 8:355, 
my emphasis). Thus truce, which characterizes the anarchical international 
society, is not a state of nature! And the ambivalence is fully visible now. 
Truce of this kind is the true nature of the world: wars are always possible, 
and peace, which actually is a truce, is a state of affairs in which that pos-
sibility has been successfully avoided. War is a latent but real possibility—
a very expensive and often also unnecessary, immoral, even absurd possi-
bility, similar to many related ones we all always have within our reach, in 
the domain of our freedom (but not such to be considered as the objects of 
prospective decisions). Nearly all of these options, however, can in some 
extraordinary circumstances become feasible (like, for example, to cry and 
shout aloud: it would be very improper for me to do that here at my  desk, 
or in the middle of the lecturing, but if I am falling from a cliff it would 
suddenly become very proper and feasible). 
In other words, being in a state of truce is in a way sufficient for us to 
say that we are not in a pure state of nature. Truce is more than the ab-
sence of any constraint. Precisely because of that the right “to impel the 
other by force to leave the state of nature by introducing obligatory, per-
emptory, laws,” which is a feature of the state of nature, does not seem to 
be applicable in the state of truce. Truce seems to be more a kind of peace 
than a segment of a war. Were it not, we would have a right to impel (all?) 
others to abandon this condition in order to reach true peace. It would have 
to proceed in two steps: first, individuals would need to relinquish their 
wild, unrestricted freedom for a limited but guaranteed freedom provided 
by the laws of the state. Afterwards, the states, which are to be taken as 
(artificial?) moral persons, would need to move further and finalize the 
process by entering a lawful state of cosmopolitan peace which would not 
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be any kind of “truce.” The problem with this is the following: it would be 
hard to avoid destroying internal law and order in the process of creating a 
viable global juridical condition. This might be the reason why Kant 
claims that, in regarding the state of nature, what holds for individuals 
cannot hold for states: it seems very unlikely, or impossible, not to destroy 
the structure of order and peace already created by the abandonment of the 
lawless natural condition in the renewed process on the second level 
(Maus, 2010, p. 161). Strictly speaking, if this new world order is to be 
created according to the demand of reason, all states and their laws should 
be reconsidered and revised. Otherwise, the strongest state(s) would im-
pose its (their) laws as the unquestioned authority of what is to be consid-
ered as the sole normative standard. In the process all other authorities 
would have to withdraw or be cleared. Many pitfalls are looming here. For 
example, no one would know if one is obeying the law, if in what she is 
doing she is acting in accordance with any domestic law, because it could 
turn out later that this is different from the newly, ex post facto, created 
global law. The result would be utter uncertainty regarding any transitional 
period (except perhaps the ones buried in the deeper past). But this is only 
one example. 
The main point is that the internal, domestic laws, by losing their nor-
mative authority, would lose their role in facilitating “the abandonment of 
the state of nature.” It seems that any attempt to realize a world peace 
would then imply a kind of revolution which necessarily would destroy 
most of order and peace attained so far. This would be at odds with Kant’s 
claim that “any legal constitution, even if it is only in small measure law-
ful, is better than none at all” (Kant, 8:373n). The other, even more far-
reaching problem, could be the question whether the goal of a world state 
is attainable at all. Another issue is: is such a goal worthwhile - a point 
which finds its explicit corroboration in Kant’s idea of “soulless despot-
ism” of a world empire.7 Either way, this is a subject worth of further 
exploration.  
My own thesis is that “peace” is a name for a state of affairs which ac-
quires its meaning only in relation to its opposite, i.e. to the absence of 
peace. According to Kant, that absence is the state of nature defined as the 
state of war (Kant, 6:344). What really is “eternal” here are only possibili-
ties, both of peace and war. Peace and war are to be defined in relation to 
each other.  
Peace is, prima facie, positive, war negative. But this is only prima fa-
cie; because peace can be unjust, contain slavery, humiliation, discrimina-
tion, inequality, exploitation, disrespect, etc. We may object that all these 
are features of peace as truce—not of real, true peace, which would be the 
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total opposite of anything contained in war. But what is contained in war? 
What is the purpose and meaning of war, the purpose and meaning which 
may lead to some justification of it? Putting aside notions of the (possible) 
eschatological purpose of war (according to which war is a necessary and 
appropriate means that leads to ultimate peace),8 adequate descriptions of 
peace and war ought to be connected with a specification of the role laws 
play in both schemes. More to the point, both war and peace have to be 
articulated in two ways in the context of time. First, in time as the frame of 
possibilities at a specific chronological point defined through previous 
time and thus determining what is possible and feasible at that point (in 
that context). Second, in time that is generally understood as the basis of 
changes and differences. 
Laws are susceptible to all these influences of time. They are the result 
of previous traditions, which are subject to change. This fact establishes 
the content of what peace is and why it has to be temporary. Temporari-
ness is a very important component of the structure of peace. It brings 
changes which produce differences. War is a borderline point of some of 
those changes in its potential to produce some of those differences. From 
the other side, war can thus also be regarded as a defence of the status quo. 
From the point of established justifications—those justifications that are 
based in accepted reasons and the justificatory force of those reasons—
there is a certain asymmetry which gives a principled primacy to the status 
quo in comparison to a change: an existing state of affairs, as already 
established, presumably has some justificatory reasons at its base, and the 
force of those reasons (the way that reasons function when they direct us 
to decide and do what we do) has already functioned as a motivational 
force for this state of affairs to be formed and accepted. The entire process 
is in a way accomplished in the past and what we have at the present mo-
ment thus has its raison d’être. Change-in-view, however, is not real, and 
as a process change at first is only a beginning (or even something that 
precedes beginning, something only conceived), its reality is in the future 
and uncertain. The power of some reasons to direct the action to its pro-
duction is not in the same position as the same power of the justificatory 
reasons contained in something that already exists, it is necessarily under-
privileged, and this power has to be proportionately stronger, strong 
enough, to facilitate the change. 
Opening a process of change implies opening a conflict with the status 
quo. And it is possible that this conflict at some point cannot proceed in a 
purely rational way and therefore will be unable to avoid violence, or rely 
only on the rational strength of reasons at some point of time. It is also 
possible that the conflict is such that it is not easy, or even possible, to end 
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it and return to the starting point (or rather to the point before the starting 
point of the conflict). This is why it may be much easier to start an action 
such as a war than to stop it. In that case we may resort to violence as a 
path that allows the continuation of the conflict until its resolution. Thus, 
the defence of the status quo is rather obvious: the constitution, the laws, 
have to be defended. If one is under attack, defence is not just one of many 
options standing at her disposal, equal to all other options—it is the default 
action in response. One may give up defence, of course, but not in ad-
vance. This means that the status quo, which is always a particular peace 
with a specific structure of power distribution, is the subject of defence by 
default. This implies, however, that recourse to force is an option at all 
times; that war, not peace, has a priority here in a sense in which means 
have a priority over ends. Hence, a part of the definition of peace is that it 
is a state of affairs in which war has been avoided. “Avoided” does not 
denote any necessity here: we just have been successful in not allowing 
war to occur. But we cannot say that war is an “avoided peace”. Peace is 
the goal, war is not. War is only a means—a means to peace. There is no 
possibility of success in “avoiding peace,” comparable to that of avoiding 
war: in a way this dialectical aspect of their relation is their dynamics. But 
the dynamics is strong: peace presupposes war, as a shield, as a refuge, as 
a defence. 
Unlike war, which is per definition temporary as a state of affairs that 
should end (the aim of war is to reach its conclusion!) peace has been 
normatively conceived as a permanent state of affairs. If we associate war 
with death, as we often do, we may associate peace with life. Let us there-
fore say that peace is the home of life. Obviously we do not think of abso-
lute peace, one we have in graveyards, as Kant would say (Kant, 8:343)—
we have peace there, even absolute peace, but no life!—but a more dy-
namic state of affairs, one resembling life as usual. What makes peace so 
valuable is that it gives what is most important for and in life. For our 
purposes here and phrased in the shortest way, peace is giving us control 
of time: through peace, we attain predictability. If we define life as the 
activity of setting goals and attempting to realize them, then it is obvious 
that life is future oriented and dependent on (some) capacity to control our 
future time. This is what laws give to us. Laws require and are dependent 
on peace. The main part of the definition of war corroborates this: it is per 
definition a suspension, a temporary suspension, of some important laws, 
and for that matter of some important rights and liberties. There is no 
controlled future in war: it is more as if the future during war resides in 
two periods, divided by a single point. That point is the end of war—the 
point of victory or defeat, the point of established peace. By giving us 
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control of (future) time, peace is a central issue of social power, as well as 
an expression of its articulation and structure. 
The entire mechanism functions in the following way: the constitution 
and the laws in general have to be considered as worth the defence and 
defendable, and as in fact defended (as if the peace is the result of a suc-
cessful defence, regardless of the fact that the peace is an outcome of a 
factual war). The attempt to defend the laws is always a strong motiva-
tional underpinning. Laws cannot function if they are proclaimed to be 
non-enforceable. Moreover, accepting non-defence would destroy all their 
enforceability. Every state has a legal duty to defend itself. This duty is 
also a moral duty, as long as the existence of (some, or any) laws has a 
moral justification. Hence, the interpretation of Kant’s text as one imply-
ing a right (and duty?) to impel all (other) states to comply to one unique 
and unified law, to compel recalcitrant states to comply in order to “enter” 
a global juridical condition analogous to the civil condition, while pro-
claiming noncompliant states as outlaws (because they have a different 
articulation of their peace) and presuming the very reason that stands 
behind it—appears very totalitarian! For the freedom contained in laws, 
peace has to be taken as a “truce”—not as a perfect, final, ideal state of 
affairs from the end of time! That would destroy the difference between 
jurisprudence and morality, as well as the difference between legality and 
morality that is founded in the Categorical Imperative. Such morality 
states that the perfection of others must not be my concern, meaning that 
others may have whichever different motives for their actions as long as 
their actions conform to my external freedom. Consequently, privacy 
would be destroyed, while our lives would be policed. Furthermore, our 
entitlement to interfere in the domain of the freedom of others would be 
our right, even our duty. This logic is quite visible in the contemporary 
practice of humanitarian military interventions. Such actions strongly 
resemble police actions where the distribution of power and entitlement is 
totally asymmetrical: all legitimate power and authority are exclusively on 
one side. 
Peace is a thick web of constraints created through mutual agreements, 
established expectations, threats of sanctions, laws, etc. All these con-
straints make many of our less than good ends much harder to realize, but 
they do not make those ends really impossible to achieve. The power of 
restricting freedom contained in laws is not perfectly efficient—freedom 
always will be a reservoir of both of autonomy and violence. That is so 
because the civil condition is one of a repressed state of nature—repressed 
but not “abolished” and “overcome.” Hence, if it is confronted with the 
abovementioned totalitarian ideal of pure and absolute peace, this re-
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pressed state of affairs might erupt as either total resignation, apathy (im-
plying a passively approached lack of any possible consent), or as pure 
violence—being an expression of despair and helplessness, thereby indi-
cating a lack of consent in an even stronger way. This would signal that 
peace has lost its formative power. It would be a sign that control has 
become unbearable and akin to slavery. The point of being free is to be 
what you are, not to be something else, nor to be under the control of 
something you do not identify with, something that is not you. And to be 
ruled is even more than to be controlled. If you are ruled by others without 
your (sincere) consent – regardless whether “you” are an “I” or a “we”, an 
individual human being or a people (and for that matter a state)—you are 
not free. 
The remedy here is simple: tolerance. There is no necessity, real or 
normative, that my constitution must be everyone’s constitution. There is a 
pluralism of our appetites and desires (to survive, to be safe, to prosper—
quite Hobbesian)9 and what is necessary is not universal obedience but 
universal tolerance. It is the limits of possible identification that make 
tolerance necessary: I, as an autonomous individual, can delegate or trans-
fer my freedom through my laws (confirmed through my consent) to my 
state, and in doing so I identify myself with a “we” for whom these laws 
are “our” laws. Universal identity does not seem to be possible: it would 
make any difference impossible and, what is more important, it would 
preclude dissent. This preclusion of dissent would make any consent re-
dundant and irrelevant. The difference between my voluntary (free) par-
ticipation in a collective legislative “we” and my involuntary participation 
in it would be on a par, while my contribution in making collective deci-
sions would become completely negligible and also redundant. Thus, the 
difference between freedom and slavery would be lost—not because it is 
empirically difficult for humankind to become that legislative “we” that 
we all identify with, but because of a stronger logical matter: because there 
is a need for others in a process of  identity formation (and identity is what 
a holder of autonomy has). 
It is easy to conceive that humans on Earth would unite in a possible 
defence against some danger coming from outer space. But the nature of 
this unification seems to be rather different depending on the nature of this 
danger: in case of a natural danger some form of cooperation and joint 
action would suffice. We should then expect the old system (or at least 
some state of affairs similar to the old one) to be re-established after the 
looming danger passes Only if the danger were an attack, meaning an 
attack carried out by some other rational beings, only then would it make 
sense to conceive of a unification which would create one nation on Earth, 
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forcing all of us to unite not only in cooperation but also politically. And it 
is equally easy to conceive that this union, the result of this unification, 
would survive if the assaulting party also continues to constitute a threat. 
But, if we were to succeed in destroying the attackers entirely, it is very 
questionable whether the memory of what happened would suffice to 
transform the newly created union into a lasting nation! 
We can find a very fine corroboration of this in Kant. In paragraph 61 
of his The Metaphysics of Morals he says the following: “...if an interna-
tional (emphasis – J.B.) state... extends over too wide an area of land, it 
will eventually become impossible to govern it and thence to protect each 
of its members, and the multitude of corporations this would require (my 
emphasis) must again lead to a state of war. It naturally follows that per-
petual peace, the ultimate end of all international right, is an idea incapa-
ble of realization” (Kant, 6:350; Nisbet’s translation (Reiss, 1971:§171). 
My own stance is that war is a necessary means to defend laws and 
peace. It is the matter of an articulation of the structure and distribution of 
social power: what will be the structure and the hierarchy of possibly le-
gitimate ends, what will be the structure of the legitimate distribution of 
results and achievements, as well as which criteria will be accepted and 
applied to this. This defines who will rule and how, and what will be pro-
hibited. In the end we can conclude that the structure of peace consists in 
who and what we are, what the content of our life is: which ends we set 
and attempt to realize. Those ends have to be rational (based on reasons) to 
be realizable, even if we were a society of devils (Kant, 8:366). They have 
to be arranged and ordered in a web of achievements and holdings, and 
this all is a specific structure and articulation of power. But all of this is 
possible because existence of laws allows predictability. Thus, this struc-
ture is in fact our heteronomy—a very important part of us. It also includes 
a real possibility of war. Peace is what we are, but war is its part. The 
capacity to choose evil is an inevitable and necessary part of our freedom 
(Babić, 2004:248). We have good reasons not to fall prey to that part, but 
it will always be with us—as long as we are free. Therefore, despite peace 
being a state of affairs that successfully avoids war, its achievement is by 
definition temporary. It cannot become permanent. Kant seems to say the 
same, at least in The Metaphysics of Morals and Toward Perpetual Peace. 
Notes 
* A version of this paper was read at the Symposium “Law, Democracy, and 
Kant’s Three Dimensions of Right”, held at NTNU, Trondheim, Norway, Decem-
ber 12-13, 2008. I wish to thank Audun Oefsti and the audience for all their com-
ments. 
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1. Kant, (1999:456); Kant, “Metaphysik der Sitten (1797),” hereafter quoted in an 
abbreviated form according to the pagination in Kant’s Werke, Akademie Ausgabe, 
Bd. VI, S. 312 as: (Kant, 6:312) or for “Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten 
(1785)” in Bd. IV, S. 400 as (Kant, 4:400). 
2. Kant (6:312). Mary Gregor, whose translation has been used regularly through-
out this article if not indicated otherwise, obscures this by translating the German 
“ihm” and “man” by “it”: “Mithin das erste, was ihm zu beschliessen obliegt, wenn 
er nicht allen Rechtsbegriffen entsagen will, der Grundsatz sei: man muesse aus 
dem Naturzustande, in welchem jeder seinem eigenen Kopfe folgt, herausge-
hen...—“So, unless it wants to renounce any concept of right, the first thing it has 
to resolve upon is the principle that it must leave the state of nature, in which each 
follows its own judgment....”—cf. two other and different translations, first an 
older one, afterwards one among the latest: 1) Nisbet (in Reiss, 1971:137) trans-
lated this part as follows: “Thus the first decision the individual is obliged to make, 
if he does not wish to renounce all concepts of right, will be to adopt the principle 
that one must abandon the state in nature in which everyone follows his own de-
sires”; 2) David L. Colclasure’s translation (Kleingeld, 2006:111-112) of the same 
is: “Hence the first principle that one must decide upon if one is not to renounce all 
concepts of right is the following: one must emerge from the state of nature in 
which each follows only his own thoughts...”. It is in order to note that Mary 
Gregor’s and David Colclasure’s translations are less precise than Nisbet’s. Nisbet 
distinguishes between the German “ihm” and “man”, rightly translating them with 
“him” and “one”. Gregor and Colclasure conflate the two German terms, translat-
ing them exclusively by “it” and “one” respectively. 
3. Kant (8:24). Nisbet’s translation (Reiss, 1971:47); D. L. Colclasure’s translation, 
(Kleingeld, 2006:11). Cf. also Cavallar (1999:5). 
4. This can mean two very different things: 1) “ideal” law—one law, final peace, 
no war possible (after one successful final war to introduce this universal and ideal 
law in the whole world), or 2) impelling “others”—i. e. other states—to enforce 
some viable law, i. e. their own law, and not allow a territory to be without any 
law; in this second case a lawlessness, or for that matter the incapacity to enforce 
the law, but not a fact that it is a different law, can be a casus belli. 
5. Kant (8:355); but see also Nisbet translation: “rights cannot be decided by mili-
tary victory” (Reiss, 1971:104). 
6. Kant (8:348-9): “A State of peace among men living together is not the same as 
the state of nature, which is rather a state of war.” Nisbet’s translation: Reiss, 
1971:98). 
7. The translation here is Nisbet’s, which again seems to be more appropriate than 
Mary Gregor’s. The opposite standpoint would clearly violate the principle of 
moral equality of all those past, present and future humans with those who live 
prior to the establishment of the final lawful state of affairs, regarding respecting 
the decisions contained in their laws, including any feature of obligatoriness im-
plied in those decisions and laws. 
8. Kant (8:365, my emphasis): “Even if a people were not forced by internal dis-
cord to submit to the constraint of public laws, war would still force them from 
without to do so…” Cf. Ludwig (2004:74ff). 
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9. Cf. for instance, Hobbes, 1981: Part I, Chapter VI, § 6. 
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THE LEGITIMACY OF GLOBAL  
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS∗ 




“Legitimacy” has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To say 
that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to assert that it has 
the right to rule—where ruling includes promulgating rules and attempting 
to secure compliance with them by attaching costs to non-compliance 
and/or benefits to compliance. An institution is legitimate in the sociologi-
cal sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule.1 When people 
disagree over whether the WTO is legitimate, their disagreements are 
typically normative. They are not disagreeing about whether they or others 
believe that this institution has the right to rule; they are disagreeing about 
whether it has the right to rule.2 This essay addresses the normative di-
mension of recent legitimacy discussions. 
We articulate a global public standard for the normative legitimacy of 
global governance institutions. This standard can provide the basis for 
principled criticism of global governance institutions and guide reform 
efforts in circumstances in which people disagree deeply about the de-
mands of global justice and the role that global governance institutions 
should play in meeting them. We stake out a middle ground between an 
increasingly discredited conception of legitimacy that connotes legitimacy 
with international legality understood as state consent, on the one hand, 
and the unrealistic view that legitimacy for these institutions requires the 
same democratic standards that are now applied to states, on the other. 
Our approach to the problem of legitimacy integrates conceptual analy-
sis and moral reasoning with an appreciation of the fact that global gov-
ernance institutions are novel, still evolving, and characterized by reason-
able disagreement about what their proper goals are and what standards of 
justice they should meet. Because both standards and institutions are sub-
ject to change as a result of further reflection and action, we do not claim 
to discover timeless necessary and sufficient conditions for legitimacy. 
Instead, we offer a principled proposal for how the legitimacy of these 
institutions ought to be assessed—for the time being. Essential to our 
account is the idea that to be legitimate a global governance institution 
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must possess certain epistemic virtues that facilitate the ongoing critical 
revision of its goals, through interaction with agents and organizations 
outside the institution. A principled global public standard of legitimacy 
can help citizens committed to democratic principles to distinguish legiti-
mate institutions from illegitimate ones and to achieve a reasonable con-
gruence in their legitimacy assessments. Were such a standard widely 
accepted, it could bolster public support for valuable global governance 
institutions that either satisfy the standard or at least make credible efforts 
to do so. 
“Global governance institutions” covers a diversity of multilateral enti-
ties, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), various environmental institutions, such as the 
climate change regime built around the Kyoto Protocol, judges’ and regu-
lators’ networks, the UN Security Council, and the new International 
Criminal Court (ICC).3 These institutions are like governments in that they 
issue rules and publicly attach significant consequences to compliance or 
failure to comply with them—and claim the authority to do so. Nonethe-
less, they do not attempt to perform anything approaching a full range of 
governmental functions. These institutions do not seek, as governments 
do, to monopolize the legitimate use of violence within a permanently 
specified territory, and their design and major actions require the consent 
of states. 
Determining whether global governance institutions are legitimate—
and whether they are widely perceived to be so—is an urgent matter. 
Global governance institutions can promote international cooperation and 
also help to construct regulatory frameworks that limit abuses by nonstate 
actors (from corporations to narcotraffickers and terrorists) who exploit 
transnational mobility. At the same time, however, they constrain the 
choices facing societies, sometimes limit the exercise of sovereignty by 
democratic states, and impose burdens as well as confer benefits. For ex-
ample, states must belong to the WTO in order to participate effectively in 
the world economy, yet WTO membership requires accepting a large 
number of quite intrusive rules, authoritatively applied by its dispute set-
tlement system. Furthermore, individuals can be adversely affected by 
global rules—for example, by the blacklists maintained by the Security 
Council’s Sanctions Committee4 or the WTO’s policies on intellectual 
property in “essential medicines.” If these institutions lack legitimacy, 
then their claims to authority are unfounded and they are not entitled to 
our support. 
Judgments about institutional legitimacy have distinctive practical im-
plications. Generally speaking, if an institution is legitimate, then this 
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legitimacy should shape the character of both our responses to the claims it 
makes on us and the form that our criticisms of it take. We should support 
or at least refrain from interfering with legitimate institutions. Further, 
agents of legitimate institutions deserve a kind of impersonal respect, even 
when we voice serious criticisms of them. Judging an institution to be 
legitimate, if flawed, focuses critical discourse by signalling that the ap-
propriate objective is to reform it, rather than to reject it outright. 
It is important not only that global governance institutions be legiti-
mate, but that they are perceived to be legitimate. The perception of le-
gitimacy matters, because, in a democratic era, multilateral institutions 
will only thrive if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics. If 
one is unclear about the appropriate standards of legitimacy or if unrealis-
tically demanding standards are assumed, then public support for global 
governance institutions may be undermined and their effectiveness in 
providing valuable goods may be impaired. 
Assessing legitimacy 
The Social Function of Legitimacy Assessments 
Global governance institutions are valuable because they create norms 
and information that enable member states and other actors to coordinate 
their behaviour in mutually beneficial ways.5 They can reduce transaction 
costs, create opportunities for states and other actors to demonstrate credi-
bility, thereby overcoming commitment problems, and provide public 
goods, including rule-based, peaceful resolutions of conflicts (Keohane, 
2005). An institution’s ability to perform these valuable functions, how-
ever, may depend on whether those to whom it addresses its rules regard 
them as binding and whether others within the institution’s domain of 
operation support or at least do not interfere with its functioning. 
It is not enough that the relevant actors agree that some institution is 
needed; they must agree that this institution is worthy of support. So, for 
institutions to perform their valuable coordinating functions, a higher-
order coordination problem must be solved (Fearon, 1998). 
Once an institution is in place, ongoing support for it and compliance 
with its rules are sometimes simply a matter of self-interest from the per-
spective of states, assuming that the institution actually achieves coordina-
tion or other benefits that all or at least the more powerful actors regard as 
valuable. This is a major theme of Russel (1999). Similarly, once the rule 
of the road has been established and penalties for violating it are in place, 
most people will find compliance with it to be rational from a purely self-
interested point of view. In the latter case, no question of legitimacy arises, 
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because the sole function of the institution is coordination and the choice 
of the particular coordination point raises no issues on which people are 
likely to disagree. Global governance institutions are not pure coordination 
devices in the way in which the rule of the road is, however. Even though 
all may agree that some institution or other is needed in a specific domain 
(the regulation of global trade, for example), and all may agree that any of 
several particular institutions is better than the no institutional alternative, 
different parties, depending upon their differing interests and moral per-
spectives, will find some feasible institutions more attractive than others. 
The fact that all acknowledge that it is in their interest to achieve coordi-
nated support for some institution or other may not be sufficient to assure 
adequate support for any particular institution. 
The concept of legitimacy allows various actors to coordinate their 
support for particular institutions by appealing to their common capacity to 
be moved by moral reasons, as distinct from purely strategic or exclu-
sively self-interested reasons. If legitimacy judgments are to perform this 
coordinating function, however, actors must not insist that only institutions 
that are optimal from the stand-point of their own moral views are accept-
able, since this would preclude coordinated support in the face of diverg-
ing normative views. More specifically, actors must not assume that an 
institution is worthy of support only if it is fully just. We thus need a stan-
dard of legitimacy that is both accessible from a diversity of moral stand-
points and less demanding than a standard of justice. Such a standard must 
appeal to various actors’ capacities to be moved by moral reasons, but 
without presupposing more moral agreement than exists. 
 
Legitimacy and Self-Interest 
It is one thing to say that an institution promotes one’s interests and 
another to say that it is legitimate. As Andrew Hurrell points out, the rule-
following that results from a sense of legitimacy is “distinguishable from 
purely self-interested or instrumental behaviour on the one hand, and from 
straightforward imposed or coercive rule on the other” (Hurrell, 2005). 
Sometimes self-interest may speak in favour of treating an institution’s 
rules as binding; that is, it can be in one’s interest to take the fact that an 
institution issues a rule as a weighty reason for complying with it, inde-
pendently of a positive assessment of the content of particular rules. This 
would be the case if one is likely to do better, from the standpoint of one’s 
own interest, by taking the rules as binding than one would by evaluating 
each particular rule as to how complying with it would affect one’s inter-
ests. Yet clearly it makes sense to ask whether an institution that promotes 
one’s interests is legitimate. So legitimacy, understood as the right to rule, 
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is a moral notion that cannot be reduced to rational self-interest. To say 
that an institution is legitimate implies that it has the right to rule even if it 
does not act in accordance with the rational self-interest of everyone who 
is subject to its rule. 
There are advantages in achieving coordinated support for institutions 
on the basis of moral reasons, rather than exclusively on the basis of 
purely self-interested ones. First, the appeal to moral reasons is instrumen-
tally valuable in securing the benefits that only institutions can provide 
because, as a matter of psychological fact, moral reasons matter when we 
try to determine what practical attitudes should be taken toward particular 
institutional arrangements. For example, we care not only about whether 
an environmental regulation regime reduces air pollutants and thereby 
produces benefits for all, but also whether it fairly distributes the costs of 
the benefits it provides. Given that there is widespread disagreement as to 
which institutional arrangement would be optimal, we need to find a 
shared evaluative perspective that makes it possible for us to achieve the 
coordinated support required for effective institutions without requiring us 
to disregard our most basic moral commitments. Second, and perhaps most 
important, if our support for an institution is based on reasons other than 
self-interest or the fear of coercion, it may be more stable. What is in our 
self-interest may change as circumstances change and the threat of coer-
cion may not always be credible, and moral commitments can preserve 
support for valuable institutions in such circumstances. 
For questions of legitimacy to arise there must be considerable moral 
disagreement about how institutions should be designed. Yet for agree-
ment about legitimacy to be reached, there must be sufficient agreement 
on the sorts of moral considerations that are relevant for evaluating alter-
native institutional designs. The practice of making legitimacy judgments 
is grounded in a complex belief—namely, that while it is true that institu-
tions ought to meet standards more demanding than mere mutual benefit 
(relative to some relevant non-institutional alternative), they can be worthy 
of our support even if they do not maximally serve our interests and even 
if they do not measure up to our highest moral standards.6 
Legitimacy requires not only that institutional agents are justified in 
carrying out their roles, but also that those to whom institutional rules are 
addressed have content-independent reasons to comply with them, and that 
those within the domain of the institution’s operations have content-
independent reasons to support the institution or at least to not interfere 
with its functioning.7 One has a content-independent reason to comply 
with a rule if and only if one has a reason to comply regardless of any 
positive assessment of the content of that rule. For example, I have a con-
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tent-independent reason to comply with the rules of a club to which I be-
long if I have agreed to follow them and this reason is independent of 
whether I judge any particular rule to be a good or useful one. If I ac-
knowledge an institution as having authority, I thereby acknowledge that 
there are content-independent reasons to comply with its rules or at least to 
not interfere with their operation. Legitimacy disputes concern not merely 
what institutional agents are morally permitted to do but also whether 
those to whom the institution addresses its rules should regard it as having 
authority. 
The debate about the legitimacy of global governance institutions en-
gages both the perspective of states and that of individuals. Indeed, as 
recent mass protests against the WTO suggest, politically mobilized indi-
viduals can adversely affect the functioning of global governance institu-
tions, both directly, by disrupting key meetings, and indirectly, by impos-
ing political costs on their governments for their support of institutional 
policies. Legitimacy in the case of global governance institutions, then, is 
the right to rule, understood to mean both that institutional agents are mor-
ally justified in making rules and attempting to secure compliance with 
them and that people subject to those rules have moral, content-
independent reasons to follow them and/or to not interfere with others’ 
compliance with them. 
If it becomes widely believed that an institution does not measure up to 
standards of legitimacy, then the result may be a lack of coordination, at 
least until the institution changes to conform to the standards or a new 
institution that better conforms to them replaces it. Thus, it would be mis-
leading to say simply that the function of legitimacy judgments is to 
achieve coordinated support for institutions; rather, their function is to 
make possible coordinated support based on moral reasons, while at the 
same time supplying a critical but realistic minimal moral standard by 
which to determine whether institutions are worthy of support. 
 
Justice and Legitimacy 
The foregoing account of the social function of legitimacy assessments 
helps clarify the relationship between justice and legitimacy. Collapsing 
legitimacy into justice undermines the valuable social function of legiti-
macy assessments. There are two reasons not to insist that only just institu-
tions have the right to rule. First, there is sufficient disagreement on what 
justice requires that such a standard for legitimacy would thwart the emi-
nently reasonable goal of securing coordinated support for valuable insti-
tutions on the basis of moral reasons. Second, even if we all agreed on 
what justice requires, withholding support from institutions because they 
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fail to meet the demands of justice would be self-defeating from the stand-
point of justice itself, because progress toward justice requires effective 
institutions. To mistake legitimacy for justice is to make the best the en-
emy of the good. 
Competing standards of legitimacy 
Having explicated our conception of legitimacy, we now explore stan-
dards of legitimacy: the conditions an institution must satisfy in order to 
have the right to rule. In this section we articulate three candidates for the 
appropriate standard of legitimacy—state consent, consent by democratic 
states, and global democracy—and argue that each is inadequate. 
 
State Consent 
The first view is relatively simple. Global governance institutions are 
legitimate if (and only if) they are created through state consent. In this 
conception, legitimacy is simply a matter of legality. Legally constituted 
institutions, created by states according to the recognized procedures of 
public international law and consistent with it, are ipso facto legitimate or 
at the very least enjoy a strong presumption of legitimacy.8 Call this the 
International Legal Pedigree View (the Pedigree View, for short). A more 
sophisticated version of the Pedigree View would require the periodic 
reaffirmation of state consent, on the grounds that states have a legitimate 
interest in determining whether these institutions are performing as they 
are supposed to.9 
The Pedigree View fails because it is hard to see how state consent 
could render global governance institutions legitimate, given that many 
states are non-democratic and systematically violate the human rights of 
their citizens and are for that reason themselves illegitimate. State consent 
in these cases cannot transfer legitimacy for the simple reason that there is 
no legitimacy to transfer. To assert that state consent, regardless of the 
character of the state, is sufficient for the legitimacy of global governance 
institutions is to regress to a conception of international order that fails to 
impose even the most minimal normative requirements on states. Indeed, 
once we abandon that deeply defective conception of international order, it 
is hard to see why state consent is even a necessary condition for legiti-
macy. 
It might be argued, however, that even though the consent of illegiti-
mate states cannot itself make global governance institutions legitimate, 
there is an important instrumental justification for treating state consent as 
a necessary condition for their legitimacy: doing so provides a check on 
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the tendency of stronger states to exploit weak ones. In other words, per-
sisting in the fiction that all states—irrespective of whether they respect 
the basic rights of their own citizens—are moral agents worthy of respect 
serves an important value. This conception of the state, however, is not a 
fiction that those who take human rights seriously can consistently accept. 
The proponent of state consent might reply as follows: “My proposal is 
not that we should return to the pernicious fiction of the Morality of States. 
Instead, it is that we should agree, for good cosmopolitan reasons, to re-
gard a global governance institution as legitimate only if it enjoys the 
consent of all states.” Withholding legitimacy from global governance 
institutions, no matter how valuable they are, simply because not all states 
consent to them, however, would purport to protect weaker states at the 
expense of giving a legitimacy veto to tyrannies. The price is too high. 
Weak states are in a numerical majority in multilateral institutions. Gener-
ally speaking, they are less threatened by the dominance of powerful states 
within the institutions than they are by the actions of such powerful states 
acting outside of institutional constraints. 
 
The Consent of Democratic States 
The idea that state consent confers legitimacy is much more plausible 
when restricted to democratic states. On refection, however, the mere fact 
of state consent, even when the state in question is democratic and satisfies 
whatever other conditions are appropriate for state legitimacy, is not suffi-
cient for the legitimacy of global governance institutions. 
From the standpoint of a particular weak democratic state, participation 
in global governance institutions such as the WTO is hardly voluntary, 
since the state would suffer serious costs by not participating. Yet “sub-
stantial” voluntariness is generally thought to be a necessary condition for 
consent to play a legitimating role.10 Of course, there may be reasonable 
disagreements over what counts as substantial voluntariness, but the vul-
nerability of individual weak states is serious enough to undercut the view 
that the consent of democratic states is by itself sufficient for legitimacy. 
There is another reason why the consent of democratic states is not suf-
ficient for the legitimacy of global governance institutions: the problem of 
reconciling democratic values with unavoidable “bureaucratic discretion” 
that plagues democratic theory at the domestic level looms even larger in 
the global case. The problem is that for a modern state to function, much 
of what state agents do will not be subject to democratic decisions, and 
saying that the public has consented in some highly general way to what-
ever it is that state agents do is clearly inadequate. The difficulty is not in 
identifying chains of delegation stretching from the individual citizen to 
Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane 222 
state agents, but rather that at some point the impact of the popular will on 
how political power is used becomes so attenuated as to be merely nomi-
nal. Given how problematic democratic authorization is in the modern 
state and given that global governance institutions require lengthening the 
chain of delegation, democratic state consent is not sufficient for legiti-
macy. 
Still, the consent of democratic states may appear to be necessary, if 
not sufficient, for the legitimacy of global governance institutions. Indeed, 
it seems obvious that for such an institution to attempt to impose its rules 
on democratic states without their consent would violate the right of self-
determination of the people of those states. Matters are not so simple, 
however. A democratic people’s right of self-determination is not abso-
lute. If the majority persecutes a minority, the fact that it does so through 
democratic processes does not render the state in question immune to 
sanctions or even to intervention. One might accommodate this fact by 
stipulating that a necessary condition for the legitimacy of global govern-
ance institutions is that they enjoy the consent of states that are democratic 
and that do a credible job of respecting the rights of all their citizens. 
This does not mean that all such states must consent. A few such states 
may wilfully seek to isolate themselves from global governance (Switzer-
land only joined the UN in 2002). Furthermore, democratic states may 
engage in wars that are unnecessary and unjust, and resist pressures from 
international institutions to desist. It would hardly delegitimize a global 
governance institution established to constrain unjust warfare that it was 
opposed by a democratic state that was waging an unjust war. A more 
reasonable position would be that there is a strong presumption that global 
governance institutions are illegitimate unless they enjoy the ongoing 
consent of democratic states. Let us say, then, that ongoing consent by 
rights-respecting democratic states constitutes the democratic channel of 
accountability.11 
However valuable the democratic channel of accountability is, it is not 
sufficient. First, as already noted, the problem of bureaucratic discretion 
that attenuates the power of majoritarian processes at the domestic level 
seems even more serious in the case of global bureaucracies. Second, not 
all the people who are affected by global governance institutions are citi-
zens of democratic states, so even if the ongoing consent of democratic 
states fosters accountability, it may not foster accountability to them. If—
as is the case at present—democratic states tend to be richer and hence 
more powerful than nondemocratic ones, then the requirement of ongoing 
consent by democratic states may actually foster a type of accountability 
that is detrimental to the interests of the world’s worst-off people. From 
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the standpoint of any broadly cosmopolitan moral theory, this is a deep 
flaw of domestic democracies as ordinarily conceived: government is 
supposed to be responsive to the interests and preferences of the “sover-
eign people”—the people whose government it is—not all people or even 
all people whose legitimate interests will be seriously affected by the gov-
ernment’s actions (Buchanan, 2003). For these reasons, the consent of 
democratic states seems insufficient. The idea that the legitimacy of global 




Because democracy is now widely thought to be the gold standard for 
legitimacy in the case of the state, it may seem obvious that global govern-
ance institutions are legitimate if and only if they are democratic. And 
since these institutions increasingly affect the welfare of people every-
where, surely this must mean that they ought to be democratic in the sense 
of giving everyone an equal say in how they operate. Call this the Global 
Democracy View. 
The most obvious difficulty with this view is that the social and politi-
cal conditions for democracy are not met at the global level and there is no 
reason to think that they will be in the foreseeable future. At present there 
is no global political structure that could provide the basis for democratic 
control over global governance institutions, even if one assumes that de-
mocracy requires little direct participation by individuals. Any attempt to 
create such a structure in the form of a global democratic federation that 
relies on existing states as federal units would lack legitimacy, and hence 
could not confer legitimacy on global governance institutions, because, as 
has already been noted, many states are themselves undemocratic or lack 
other qualities necessary for state legitimacy. Furthermore, there is at 
present no global public—no worldwide political community constituted 
by a broad consensus recognizing a common domain as the proper subject 
of global collective decision-making and habitually communicating with 
one another about public issues. Nor is there consensus on a normative 
framework within which to deliberate together about a global common 
interest. Indeed, there is not even a global consensus that some form of 
global government, much less a global democracy, is needed or appropri-
ate. Finally, once it is understood that it is liberal democracy, democracy 
that protects individual and minority rights, that is desirable, the Global 
Democracy View seems even more unfeasible. Democracy worth aspiring 
to is more than elections; it includes a complex web of institutions, includ-
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ing a free press and media, an active civil society, and institutions to check 
abuses of power by administrative agencies and elected officials. 
Global governance institutions provide benefits that cannot be pro-
vided by states and, as we have argued, securing those benefits may de-
pend upon these institutions being regarded as legitimate. The value of 
global governance institutions, therefore, warrants being more critical 
about the assumption that they must be democratic on the domestic model 
and more willing to explore an alternative conception of their legitimacy. 
In the next section we take up this task. 
A complex standard of legitimacy 
Desiderata for a Standard of Legitimacy 
Our discussion of the social function of legitimacy assessments and our 
critique of the three dominant views on the standard of legitimacy for 
global governance institutions (state consent, democratic state consent, and 
global democracy) suggest that a standard of legitimacy for such institu-
tions should have the following characteristics: 
 
1. It must provide a reasonable public basis for coordinated 
support for the institutions in question, on the basis of moral rea-
sons that are widely accessible in spite of the persistence of signifi-
cant moral disagreement—in particular, about the requirements of 
justice. 
2. It must not confuse legitimacy with justice but nonetheless 
must not allow that extremely unjust institutions are legitimate. 
3. It must take the ongoing consent of democratic states as a 
presumptive necessary condition, though not a sufficient condition, 
for legitimacy. 
4. Although the standard should not make authorization by a 
global democracy a necessary condition of legitimacy, it should 
nonetheless promote the key values that underlie demands for de-
mocracy. 
5. It must properly reflect the dynamic character of global gov-
ernance institutions: the fact that not only the means they employ, 
but even their goals, may and ought to change over time. 
6. It must address the two problems we encountered earlier: the 
problem of bureaucratic discretion and the tendency of democratic 
states to disregard the legitimate interests of foreigners. 
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The standard of legitimacy must therefore incorporate mechanisms for 
accountability that are both more robust and more inclusive than that pro-
vided by the consent of democratic states. 
 
Moral Disagreement and Uncertainty 
The first desideratum of a standard of legitimacy is complex and war-
rants further explication and emphasis. We have noted that a central fea-
ture of the circumstances of legitimacy is the persistence of disagreement 
about, first, what the proper goals of the institution are (given the limita-
tions imposed by state sovereignty properly conceived), second, what 
global justice requires, and third, what role if any the institution should 
play in the pursuit of global justice. Moral disagreement is not unique to 
global governance institutions, but extends also to the appropriate role of 
the state. 
There are two circumstances in the case of global governance institu-
tions, however, that exacerbate the problem of moral disagreement. First, 
in the case of the state, democratic processes, at least ideally, provide a 
way of accommodating these disagreements, by providing a public process 
that assures every citizen that she is being treated as an equal, through the 
electoral process, while, as we have seen, democracy is unavailable at the 
global level. Second, although there is a widespread perception, at least 
among cosmopolitans broadly speaking, that there is serious global injus-
tice and that the effective pursuit of global justice requires a significant 
role for global institutions, it is not possible at present to provide a princi-
pled specification of the division of institutional labour for pursuing global 
justice. In part the problem is that there is no unified system of global 
institutions within which a fair and effective allocation of institutional 
responsibilities for justice can be devised. How responsibilities for justice 
ought to be allocated among global institutions and between states and 
global institutions depends chiefly on the answers to two questions: What 
are the proper responsibilities of states in the pursuit of global justice, 
taking into account the proper scope of state sovereignty (because this will 
determine how extensive the role of global institutions should be), and 
what are the capabilities of various global institutions for contributing to 
the pursuit of global justice? But neither of these questions can be an-
swered satisfactorily at present, in part because global governance institu-
tions are so new and in part because people have only recently begun to 
think seriously about achieving justice on a global scale. So the difficulty 
is not just that there is considerable moral disagreement about the proper 
goals of global governance institutions and about the role these institutions 
should play in the pursuit of global justice; there is also moral uncer-
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tainty.12 A plausible standard of legitimacy for global governance institu-
tions must somehow accommodate the facts of moral disagreement and 
uncertainty. 
 
Three Substantive Criteria 
We begin with a set of institutional attributes that have considerable in-
tuitive appeal: minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, and insti-
tutional integrity. 
 
Minimal Moral Acceptability. Global governance institutions, like in-
stitutions generally, must not persist in committing serious injustices. If 
they do so, they are not entitled to our support. On our view, the primary 
instance of a serious injustice is the violation of human rights. We also 
believe that the most plausible conception of human rights is what might 
be called the basic human interest conception. This conception, which we 
can only sketch in broad outlines here, builds on Joseph Raz’s insight that 
rights generally are normative relations (in particular, duties and entitle-
ments), which, if realized, provide important protections for interests, see 
Joseph Raz (1986: n 17). On this view, to justify the claim that R is a right, 
one must identify an interest, support the claim that the interest is of suffi-
cient moral importance to ground duties, explain why the duties are owed 
to the right holders, and make the case that if the normative relations in 
question are satisfied, significant protection for the interest will be 
achieved. Certain rights are properly called human rights because the du-
ties they entail provide especially important protections for basic human 
interests, given the standard threats to those interests in our world. 
What the standard threats are can change over time. For example, when 
human societies create legal systems and police and courts to enforce laws, 
they also create new opportunities for damaging basic human interests. For 
this reason, the content of particular human rights, and even which rights 
are included among the human rights, may also change, even though the 
basic interests that ground them do not. For example, all human beings, 
regardless of where or when they exist, have a basic interest in physical 
security, but in a society with a legal system backed by the coercive power 
of the state, adequate protection of this interest requires rights of due proc-
ess and equal protection under the law. 
There is disagreement among basic interest theorists of human rights as 
to exactly what the list of human rights includes and how the content of 
particular rights is to be filled out. There is agreement, however, that the 
list includes the rights to physical security, to liberty (understood as at 
least encompassing freedom from slavery, servitude, and forced occupa-
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tions), and the right to subsistence. Assuming that this is so, we can at 
least say this much: global governance institutions (like institutions gener-
ally) are legitimate only if they do not persist in violations of the least 
controversial human rights. This is a rather minimal moral requirement for 
legitimacy. Yet in view of the normative disagreement and uncertainty that 
characterize our attitudes toward these institutions, it might be hard at 
present to justify a more extensive set of rights that all such institutions are 
bound to respect. It would certainly be desirable to develop a more mean-
ingful consensus on stronger human rights standards. What this suggests is 
that we should require global governance institutions to respect minimal 
human rights, but also expect them to meet higher standards as we gain 
greater clarity about the scope of human rights. 
For many global governance institutions, it is proper to expect that they 
should respect human rights, but not that they should play a major role in 
promoting human rights. Nonetheless, a theory of legitimacy cannot ig-
nore the fact that in some cases the dispute over whether a global govern-
ance institution is legitimate is in large part a disagreement over whether it 
is worthy of support if it does not actively promote human rights. A pro-
posal for a standard of legitimacy for global governance institutions must 
take into account the fact that some of these institutions play a more direct 
and substantial role in securing human rights than others. 
When we see the injustices of our world and appreciate that ameliorat-
ing them requires institutional actions, we are quick to attribute obligations 
to institutions and then criticize them for failing to fulfil those obligations. 
It is one thing to say that it would be a good thing if a particular global 
governance institution took on certain functions that would promote hu-
man rights, however, and quite another to say that it has a duty to do so 
and that this duty is of such importance that failure to discharge it makes 
the institution illegitimate. There are two mistakes to be avoided here. The 
first is “duty dumping,” that is, arbitrarily assuming that some particular 
institution has a duty simply because it has the resources to fulfil it and no 
other actor is doing so (Buchanan and DeCamp, 2006). Duty dumping not 
only makes unsupported attributions of institutional responsibility; it also 
distracts attention from the difficult task of determining what a fair distri-
bution of the burdens—among individuals and institutions—for protecting 
the human rights in question would be. The second error derives from the 
first: if one uncritically assumes that the institution has a duty to provide X 
and also assumes that X is a central matter of justice (as is the case with 
human rights), then one may conclude that the institution’s failure to pro-
vide X is such a serious injustice as to rob the institution of legitimacy. 
But the fact that an institution could provide X and the fact that X is a 
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human right does not imply that in refraining from providing X the institu-
tion commits a serious injustice. That conclusion would only follow if it 
were established that the institution has a duty of justice to provide X. 
Merely pointing out that the institution could provide X—or even showing 
that it is the only existing institution that can do so—is not sufficient to 
show that it has a duty of justice or any duty at all to provide X. 
We seem to be in a quandary. Contemporary institutions have to oper-
ate in an environment of moral disagreement and uncertainty, which limits 
the demands we can reasonably place on them to respect or protect par-
ticular human rights. Furthermore, to be sufficiently general, an account of 
legitimacy must avoid moral requirements that only apply to some global 
governance institutions. These considerations suggest the appropriateness 
of something like the minimal moral acceptability requirement, understood 
as refraining from violations of the least controversial human rights. On 
the other hand, the standard of legitimacy should somehow reflect the fact 
that part of what is at issue in disputes over the legitimacy of some of 
these institutions is whether they should satisfy more robust demands of 
justice. In other words, the standard should acknowledge the fact that 
where the issue of legitimacy is most urgent, there is likely to be deep 
moral disagreement and uncertainty. 
In our view, the way out of this impasse is to build the conditions 
needed for principled, informed deliberation about moral issues into the 
standard of legitimacy itself. The standard of legitimacy should require 
minimal moral acceptability, but should also accommodate and even en-
courage the possibility of developing more determinate and demanding 
requirements of justice for at least some of these institutions, as a princi-
pled basis for an institutional division of labour regarding justice emerges. 
Comparative Benefit. This second substantive condition for legitimacy 
is relatively straightforward. The justification for having global govern-
ance institutions is primarily if not exclusively instrumental. The basic 
reason for states or other addressees of institutional rules to take them as 
binding and for individuals generally to support or at least to not interfere 
with the operation of these institutions is that they provide benefits that 
cannot otherwise be obtained. If an institution cannot effectively perform 
the functions invoked to justify its existence, then this insufficiency un-
dermines its claim to the right to rule. 
“Benefit” here is comparative. The legitimacy of an institution is called 
into question if there is an institutional alternative, providing significantly 
greater benefits, that is feasible, accessible without excessive transition 
costs, and meets the minimal moral acceptability criterion. The most diffi-
cult issues, as discussed below, concern trade-offs between comparative 
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benefit and our other criteria. Legitimacy is not to be confused with opti-
mal efficacy and efficiency. The other values that we discuss are also 
important in their own right; and in any case, institutional stability is a 
virtue. Nevertheless, if an institution steadfastly remains instrumentally 
suboptimal when it could take steps to become significantly more efficient 
or effective, this could impugn its legitimacy in an indirect way: it would 
indicate that those in charge of the institution were either grossly incompe-
tent or not seriously committed to providing the benefits that were invoked 
to justify the creation of the institution in the first place. For instance, as of 
the beginning of 2006 the United Nations faced the issue of reconstituting 
a Human Rights Commission that had been discredited by the membership 
of states that notoriously abuse human rights, with Libya serving as chair 
in 2003.13 
 
Institutional Integrity. If an institution exhibits a pattern of egregious 
disparity between its actual performance, on the one hand, and its self-
proclaimed procedures or major goals, on the other, its legitimacy is seri-
ously called into question. 
The United Nations Oil-for-Food scandal is a case in point. The Oil-
for-Food Program was devised to enable Iraqi oil to be sold, under strict 
controls, to pay for food imports under the UN-mandated sanctions of the 
1990s. The purpose was both to prevent malnutrition in Iraq and to counter 
Iraqi propaganda holding the United Nations responsible for the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children, without relieving the pressure on 
Saddam Hussein’s regime to get rid of its supposed weapons of mass de-
struction. Yet it led to a great deal of corruption. Oil-for-Food became a 
huge program, permitting the government of Iraq to sell $64.2 billion of 
oil to 248 companies, and enabling 3,614 companies to sell $34.5 billion 
of humanitarian goods to Iraq. Yet more than half of the companies in-
volved paid illegal surcharges or kickbacks to Saddam and his cronies, 
resulting in large profits for corporations and pecuniary benefits for some 
program administrators, including at least one high-level UN official.14 
The most damning charge is that neither the Security Council oversight 
bodies nor the Office of the Secretary-General followed the UN’s pre-
scribed procedures for accountability. At least when viewed in the light of 
the historical record of other, perhaps less egregious failures of account-
ability in the use of resources on the part of the UN, these findings have 
raised questions about the legitimacy of the Security Council and the se-
cretariat. 
It also appears that an institution should be presumed to be illegitimate 
if its practices or procedures predictably undermine the pursuit of the very 
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goals in terms of which it justifies its existence. Thus, for example, if the 
fundamental character of the Security Council’s decision-making process 
renders that institution incapable of successfully pursuing what it now 
acknowledges as one of its chief goals—stopping large-scale violations of 
basic human rights—this impugns its legitimacy. To take another example, 
Randall Stone has shown that the IMF during the 1990s inconsistently 
applied its own standards with respect to its lending, systematically relax-
ing enforcement on countries that had rich and powerful patrons (Stone, 
2004:577–591; see also Stone, 2002). Similarly, if the WTO claims to 
provide the benefits of trade liberalization to all of its members, but con-
sistently develops policies that exclude its weaker members from the bene-
fits of liberalization, this undermines its claim to legitimacy. If an institu-
tion fails to satisfy the integrity criterion, we have reason to believe that 
key institutional agents are either untrustworthy or grossly incompetent, 
that the institution lacks correctives for these deficiencies, and that the 
institution is therefore unlikely to be effective in providing the goods that 
would give it a claim to our support. 
Integrity and comparative benefit are related but distinct. If there are 
major discrepancies between an institution’s behaviour and its prescribed 
procedures and professed goals, then we can have little confidence that it 
will succeed in delivering the benefits it is supposed to provide. Integrity, 
however, is a more forward-looking, dynamic virtue than comparative 
benefit, which measures benefit solely in terms of the current situation. If 
an institution satisfies the criterion of integrity, there is reason to be confi-
dent that institutional actors will not only deliver the benefits that are now 
taken to constitute the proper goals of institutional activity, but also that 
they will be able to maintain the institution’s effectiveness if its goals 
change. 
 
Epistemic Aspects of Legitimacy 
Minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, and institutional in-
tegrity are plausible presumptive substantive requirements for the legiti-
macy of global governance institutions. It would be excessive to claim that 
they are necessary conditions simpliciter, because there might be extraor-
dinary circumstances in which an institution would fail to satisfy one or 
two of them, yet still reasonably be regarded as legitimate. This might be 
the case if there were no feasible and accessible alternative institutional 
arrangement, if the non-institutional alternative were sufficiently grim, and 
if there was reason to believe that the institution had the resources and the 
political will to correct the deficiency. How much we expect of an institu-
tion should depend, inter alia, upon how valuable the benefits it provides 
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are and whether there are acceptable, feasible alternatives to it. For exam-
ple, we might be warranted in regarding an institution as legitimate even 
though it lacked integrity, if it were nonetheless providing important pro-
tections for basic human rights and the alternatives to relying on it were 
even less acceptable. In contrast, the fact that an institution is effective in 
incrementally liberalizing trade would not be sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption that it is illegitimate because it abuses human rights.15 
Our three substantive conditions are best thought of as what Rawls 
calls “counting principles”: the more of them an institution satisfies, and 
the higher the degree to which it satisfies them, the stronger its claim to 
legitimacy (Rawls, 1971). 
There are two limitations on the applicability of these three criteria, 
however. The first is the problem of factual knowledge: being able to make 
reasonable judgments about whether an institution satisfies any of the 
three substantive conditions requires considerable information about the 
workings of the institution and their effects in a number of domains, as 
well as about the likely effects of feasible alternatives. Some institutions 
may not only fail to supply the needed information, however; they may, 
whether deliberately or otherwise, make such information either impossi-
ble for outsiders to obtain or make obtaining it prohibitively costly. Even 
if the institution does not try to limit access to the relevant information, it 
may not be accessible, in suitably integrated, understandable form. 
The second difficulty with taking the three substantive conditions as 
jointly sufficient for legitimacy is the problem of moral disagreement and 
uncertainty noted earlier. Even if there is sufficient agreement on what 
counts as the violation of basic human rights, there are ongoing disputes 
about whether some global governance institutions should meet higher 
moral standards. As emphasized above, there is not only disagreement but 
also uncertainty as to the role that some of these institutions should play in 
the pursuit of global justice, chiefly because we do not have a coherent 
idea of what the institutional division of labour for achieving global justice 
would look like. 
Furthermore, merely requiring that global governance institutions not 
violate basic human rights is unresponsive to the familiar complaint that 
rich countries unfairly dominate them, and that even if they provide bene-
fits to all, the richer members receive unjustifiably greater benefits. Al-
though all parties may agree that fairness matters, however, there are 
likely to be disagreements about what fairness would consist of, disputes 
about whether fairness would suffice or whether equality is required, and 
about how equality is to be understood and even over what is to be made 
equal (welfare, opportunities, resources, and so on). So, quite apart from 
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the issue of what positive role, if any, these institutions should play in the 
pursuit of global justice, there is disagreement about what standards of 
fairness they should meet internally. There is also likely to be disagree-
ment about how unfair an institution must be to lack legitimacy. A pro-
posal for a public global standard of legitimacy must not gloss over these 
disagreements. 
In the following sections we argue that the proper response to both the 
problem of factual knowledge and the problem of moral disagreement and 
uncertainty is to focus on what might be called the epistemic-deliberative 
quality of the institution, the extent to which the institution provides reli-
able information needed for grappling with normative disagreement and 
uncertainty concerning its proper functions. To lay the groundwork for 
that argument we begin by considering two items that are often assumed to 
be obvious requirements for the legitimacy of global governance institu-
tions: accountability and transparency. 
 
Accountability. Critics of global governance institutions often com-
plain that they lack accountability. To understand the strengths and limita-
tions of accountability as a gauge of legitimacy, we start with a skeletal 
but serviceable analysis of accountability. Accountability includes three 
elements: first, standards that those who are held accountable are expected 
to meet; second, information available to accountability holders, who can 
then apply the standards in question to the performance of those who are 
held to account; and third, the ability of these accountability holders to 
impose sanctions—to attach costs to the failure to meet the standards. The 
need for information about whether the institution is meeting the standards 
accountability holders apply means that a degree of transparency regarding 
the institution’s operations is essential to any form of accountability. 
It is misleading to say that global governance institutions are illegiti-
mate because they lack accountability and to suggest that the key to mak-
ing them legitimate is to make them accountable. Most global governance 
institutions, including those whose legitimacy is most strenuously denied, 
include mechanisms for accountability (Grant, R. W. and Keohane, R. O. 
2005:29–44; see also Keohane R. O. and Nye J. S. in Kahler, M. and Lake, 
D. A. eds., 2003:386–411). The problem is that existing patterns of ac-
countability are morally inadequate. For example, the World Bank has 
traditionally exhibited a high degree of accountability, but it has been 
accountability to the biggest donor countries, and the Bank therefore has to 
act in conformity with their interests, at least insofar as they agree. This 
kind of accountability does not ensure meaningful participation by those 
affected by rules or due consideration of their legitimate interests (for a 
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discussion see Woods, 2003: 69–80). A high degree of accountability in 
this case may serve to perpetuate the defects of the institution. 
So accountability per se is not sufficient; it must be the right sort of ac-
countability. At the very least, this means that there must be effective 
provisions in the structure of the institution to hold institutional agents 
accountable for acting in ways that ensure satisfaction of the minimal 
moral acceptability and comparative benefit conditions. But accountability 
understood in this narrow way is not sufficiently dynamic to serve as an 
assurance of the legitimacy of global governance institutions, given that in 
some cases there is serious disagreement about what the goals of the insti-
tution should be and, more specifically, about what role if any the institu-
tion should play in the pursuit of global justice. The point is that what the 
terms of accountability ought to be—what standards of accountability 
ought to be employed, who the accountability holders should be, and 
whose interests the accountability holders should represent—cannot be 
definitively ascertained without knowing what role, if any, the institution 
should play in the pursuit of global justice. 
Therefore, what might be called narrow accountability—accountability 
without provision for contestation of the terms of accountability—is insuf-
ficient for legitimacy, given the facts of moral disagreement and uncer-
tainty. Because what constitutes appropriate accountability is itself subject 
to reasonable dispute, the legitimacy of global governance institutions 
depends in part upon whether they operate in such a way as to facilitate 
principled, factually informed deliberation about the terms of accountabil-
ity. There must be provisions for revising existing standards of account-
ability and current conceptions of who the proper accountability holders 
are and whose interests they should represent. 
 
Transparency. Achieving transparency is often touted as the proper re-
sponse to worries about the legitimacy of global governance institutions 
(Florini, 2003). But transparency by itself is inadequate. First, if transpar-
ency means merely the availability of accurate information about how the 
institution works, it is insufficient even for narrow accountability—that is, 
for ensuring that the institution is accurately evaluated in accordance with 
the current terms of accountability. If information about how the institu-
tion operates is to serve the end of narrow accountability, it must be (a) 
accessible at reasonable cost, (b) properly integrated and interpreted, and 
(c) directed to the accountability holders. Furthermore, (d) the accountabil-
ity holders must be adequately motivated to use it properly in evaluating 
the performance of the relevant institutional agents. Second, if, as we have 
suggested, the capacity for critically revising the terms of accountability is 
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necessary for legitimacy, information about how the institution works 
must be available not only to those who are presently designated as ac-
countability holders, but also to those who may contest the terms of ac-
countability. 
Broad transparency is needed for critical revisability of the terms of 
accountability. Both institutional practices and the moral principles that 
shape the terms of accountability must be revisable in the light of critical 
reflection and discussion.16 Under conditions of broad transparency, in-
formation produced initially to enable institutionally designated account-
ability holders to assess officials’ performance may be appropriated by 
agents external to the institution, such as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and other actors in transnational civil society, and used to support 
more fundamental criticisms, not only of the institution’s processes and 
structures, but even of its most fundamental goals and its role in the pur-
suit of global justice. 
One especially important dimension of broad transparency is responsi-
bility for public justification.17 Institutional actors must offer public justifi-
cations of at least the more controversial and consequential institutional 
policies and must facilitate timely critical responses to them. Potential 
critics must be in a position to determine whether the public justifications 
are cogent, whether they are consistent with the current terms of account-
ability, and whether, if taken seriously, these justifications call for revision 
of the current terms of responsibility. To help ensure this dimension of 
broad transparency, it may be worthwhile to draw on, while adapting, the 
notice and comment procedures of administrative law at the domestic 
level. See Stewart, R. B. (2003:437–60); Kingsbury, Kirsch, and Stewart 
(2005). See also Esty (2005); Wickham (2000:617–46); Salzman 
(2000:769–848); OECD (2004). 
Earlier we noted that although comparative benefit, minimal moral ac-
ceptability, and integrity are reasonable presumptive necessary conditions 
for legitimacy, it may be difficult for those outside the institution to de-
termine whether these conditions are satisfied. We suggest that broad 
transparency can serve as a proxy for satisfaction of the minimal moral 
acceptability, comparative benefit, and integrity criteria. For example, it 
may be easier for outsiders to discover that an institution is not responding 
to demands for information relevant to determining whether it is violating 
its own prescribed procedures, than to determine whether in fact it is vio-
lating them. Similarly, it may be very difficult to determine whether an 
institution is comparatively effective in solving certain global problems, 
but much easier to tell whether it generates—or systematically restricts 
access to—the information outsiders would need to evaluate its effective-
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ness. If an institution persistently fails to cooperate in making available to 
outsiders the information that would be needed to determine whether the 
three presumptive necessary conditions are satisfied, that by itself creates a 
presumption that it is illegitimate. 
Legitimate global governance institutions should possess three epis-
temic virtues. First, because their chief function is to achieve coordination, 
they must generate and properly direct reliable information about coordi-
nation points; otherwise they will not satisfy the condition of comparative 
benefit. Second, because accountability is required to determine whether 
they are in fact performing their current coordinating functions efficiently 
and effectively requires narrow transparency, they must at least be trans-
parent in the narrow sense. They must also have effective provisions for 
integrating and interpreting the information current accountability holders 
need and for directing it to them. Third, and most demanding, they must 
have the capacity for revising the terms of accountability, and this requires 
broad transparency: institutions must facilitate positive information exter-
nalities to permit inclusive, informed contestation of their current terms of 
accountability. There must be provision for ongoing deliberation about 
what global justice requires and how the institution in question fits into a 
division of institutional responsibilities for achieving it. 
 
Overcoming Informational Asymmetries 
A fundamental problem of institutional accountability is that insiders 
generally have better information about the institution than outsiders. 
Outsiders can determine whether institutions enjoy the consent of states, 
and whether states are democratic; but it may be very difficult for them to 
reach well-informed conclusions about the minimal moral acceptability, 
comparative benefit, and integrity conditions. Our emphasis on epistemic 
institutional virtues is well suited to illuminate these problems of asym-
metrical information. 
First, if institutional agents persist in failing to provide public justifica-
tions for their policies and withhold other information critical to the 
evaluation of institutional performance, we have good reason to believe 
the institution is not satisfying the substantive criteria for legitimacy.18 
Second, there may be an asymmetry of knowledge in the other direction as 
well, and this can have beneficial consequences for institutional account-
ability. Consider issue areas such as human rights and the environment, 
which are richly populated with independent NGOs that seek to monitor 
and criticize national governments and global governance institutions and 
to suggest policy alternatives. Suppose that in these domains there is a 
division of labour among external epistemic actors. Some individuals and 
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groups seek information about certain types of issues, while others focus 
on other aspects, each drawing on distinct but in some cases overlapping 
groups of experts. Still others specialize in integrating and interpreting 
information gathered by other external epistemic actors. 
The fact that the information held by external epistemic actors is dis-
persed will make it difficult for institutional agents to know what is known 
about their behaviour or to predict when potentially damaging information 
may be integrated and interpreted in ways that make it politically potent. 
The institutional agents’ awareness of this asymmetry will provide incen-
tives for avoiding behaviour for which they may be criticized. A condition 
of productive uncertainty will exist: although institutional agents will 
know that external epistemic actors do not possess the full range of knowl-
edge that they do, they will know that there are many individuals and 
organizations gathering information about the institution. Further, they 
will know that some of the information that external epistemic actors have 
access to can serve as a reliable proxy for information they cannot access. 
Finally, they will also know that potentially damaging information that is 
currently harmless because it is dispersed among many external epistemic 
agents may at any time be integrated and interpreted in such a way as to 
make it politically effective, but they will not be able to predict when this 
will occur. Under these conditions, institutional agents will have signifi-
cant incentives to refrain from behaviour that will attract damning criti-
cism, despite the fundamental asymmetry of knowledge between insiders 
and outsiders. 
This is not to say that the effects of transparency will always be benign. 
Indeed, under some circumstances transparency can have malign effects. 
As David Stasavage points out, “open-door bargaining… encourages rep-
resentatives to posture by adopting overly aggressive bargaining positions 
that increase the risks of breakdown in negotiations” (Stasavage, 
2004:667–704). 
 When issues combine highly charged symbolic elements with the need 
for incentives, conflicts between transparency and efficiency may be se-
vere. Our claim is not that outcomes are necessarily better the more trans-
parent institutions are. Rather, it is that the dispersal of information among 
a plurality of external epistemic actors provides some counterbalance to 
informational asymmetries favouring insiders. There should be a very 
strong but rebuttable presumption of transparency, because the ills of too 
much transparency can be corrected by deeper, more sophisticated public 
discussion, whereas there can be no democratic response to secret action 
by bureaucracies not accountable to the public. 
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Furthermore, if national legislatures are to retain their relevance—if 
what we have called the democratic accountability channel is to be effec-
tive—they must be able to review the policies of global governance insti-
tutions.19 For legislatures to have information essential to performing these 
functions, they need a flow of information from transnational civil society. 
Monitoring is best done pluralistically by transnational civil society, 
whereas the sanctions aspects of accountability are more effectively car-
ried out by legislatures. With respect both to the monitoring and sanction-
ing functions, broad transparency is conducive to the principled revisabil-
ity of institutions and to their improvement through increasingly inclusive 
criticism and more deeply probing discussion over time. 
Institutional agents generally have incentives to prevent outsiders from 
getting information that may eventually be interpreted and integrated in 
damaging ways and to deprive outsiders of information that can serve as a 
reliable proxy to assess institutional legitimacy. The very reasons that 
make the epistemic virtues valuable from the standpoint of assessing insti-
tutional legitimacy may therefore tempt institutional agents to ensure that 
their institutions do not exemplify these virtues. But institutional agents 
are also aware that it is important for their institutions to be widely re-
garded as legitimate. Outsiders deprived of access to information are likely 
to react as does the prospective buyer of a used car who is prevented from 
taking it to an independent mechanic. They will discount the claims of the 
insiders and may conclude that the institution is illegitimate. So if there is 
a broad consensus among outsiders that institutions are not legitimate 
unless they exemplify the epistemic virtues, institutional agents will have a 
weighty reason to ensure that their institutions do so. 
 
Contestation and Revisability: Links to External Actors and Institutions 
We have argued that the legitimacy of global governance institutions 
depends upon whether there is ongoing, informed, principled contestation 
of their goals and terms of accountability. This process of contestation and 
revision depends upon activities of actors outside the institution. It is not 
enough for the institutions to make information available. Other agents, 
whose interests and commitments do not coincide too closely with those of 
the institution, must provide a check on the reliability of the information, 
integrate it, and make it available in understandable, usable form, to all 
who have a legitimate interest in the operations of the institution. Such 
activities can produce positive feedback, in which appeal to standards of 
legitimacy by the external epistemic actors not only increases compliance 
with existing standards but also leads to improvements in the quality of 
these standards themselves. For these reasons, in the absence of global 
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democracy, and given the limitations of the democratic channel described 
earlier, legitimacy depends crucially upon not only the epistemic virtues of 
the institution itself but also on the activities of external epistemic actors. 
Effective linkage between the institution and external epistemic actors 
constitutes what might be called the transnational civil society channel of 
accountability. 
The needed external epistemic actors, if they are effective, will them-
selves be institutionally organized.20 Institutional legitimacy, then, is not 
simply a function of the institution’s characteristics; it also depends upon 
the broader institutional environment in which the particular institution 
exists. To borrow a biological metaphor, ours is an ecological conception 
of legitimacy. 
All three elements of our complex standard of legitimacy are now in 
place. First, global governance institutions should enjoy the ongoing con-
sent of democratic states. That is, the democratic accountability channel 
must function reasonably well. Second, these institutions should satisfy the 
substantive criteria of minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, 
and institutional integrity. Third, they should possess the epistemic virtues 
needed to make credible judgments about whether the three substantive 
criteria are satisfied and to achieve the ongoing contestation and critical 
revision of their goals, their terms of accountability, and ultimately their 
role in a division of labour for the pursuit of global justice, through their 
interaction with effective external epistemic agents. 
The Complex Standard frames the legitimacy of global governance in-
stitutions as both dynamic and relational. Its emphasis on the conditions 
for ongoing contestation and critical revision of the most basic features of 
the institutions captures the exceptional moral disagreement and uncer-
tainty that characterize the circumstances of legitimacy for this type of 
institution. While acknowledging the facts of moral disagreement and 
uncertainty, the Complex Standard includes provisions for developing 
more robust moral requirements for institutions over time. The Complex 
Standard also makes it clear that whether the institution is legitimate does 
not depend solely upon its own characteristics, but also upon the epis-
temic-deliberative relationships between the institution and epistemic 
actors outside it. 
 
A Place for Democratic Values in the Absence of Global Democracy 
Earlier we argued that it is a mistake to hold global governance institu-
tions to the standard of democratic legitimacy that is now widely applied 
to states. We now want to suggest that when the Complex Standard of 
legitimacy we propose is satisfied, important democratic values will be 
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served. For purposes of the present discussion we will assume, rather than 
argue, that among the most important democratic values are the following: 
first, equal regard for the fundamental interests of all persons; second, 
decision-making about the public order through principled, collective 
deliberation; and third, mutual respect for persons as beings who are 
guided by reasons. 
If the Complex Standard of legitimacy we propose is satisfied, all three 
of these values will be served. To the extent that connections between the 
institutions and external epistemic actors provide access to information 
that is not restricted to certain groups but available globally, it becomes 
harder for institutions to continue to exclude consideration of the interests 
of certain groups, and we move closer toward the ideal of equal regard for 
the fundamental interests of all. Furthermore, by making information 
available globally, networks of external epistemic actors are in effect ad-
dressing all people as individuals for whom moral reasons, not just the 
threat of coercion, determine whether they regard an institution’s rules as 
authoritative. Finally, if the Complex Standard of legitimacy is satisfied, 
every feature of the institution becomes a potential object of principled, 
informed, collective deliberation, and eligibility for participation in delib-
eration will not be restricted by institutional interests.21 
 
Consistency with Democratic Sovereignty 
One source of doubts about the legitimacy of global governance insti-
tutions is the worry that they are incompatible with democratic sover-
eignty. Our analysis shows why and how global governance should con-
strain democratic sovereignty. The standard of legitimacy we propose is 
designed inter alia to help global governance institutions correct for the 
tendency of democratic governments to disregard the interests and prefer-
ences of those outside their own publics. It does this chiefly y in two ways. 
First, the emphasis on the role of external institutional epistemic actors in 
achieving broad accountability helps to ensure more inclusive representa-
tion of interests and preferences over time. Second, the requirement of 
minimal moral acceptability, understood as non-violation of basic human 
rights, provides an important protection for the most vulnerable: if this 
condition is met, democratic publics cannot ignore the most serious “nega-
tive externalities” of their policy choices. Global governance institutions 
that satisfy our standard of legitimacy should not be viewed as undermin-
ing democratic sovereignty, but rather as enabling democracies to function 
justly. 
A legitimate global order will include human rights institutions that 
promote the conditions for the proper functioning of democracy (the right 
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to basic education, the right to freedom of expression and association, and 
so on) in countries that are democratizing and help sustain these conditions 
in countries that already have democratic institutions. Critics of global 
governance institutions that claim they are illegitimate because they con-
strain democratic sovereignty either beg the question by assuming that the 
“will of the people” should not be constrained so as to take into account 
the interests of those outside their polity or they underestimate the extent 
to which democracy depends upon global governance institutions. 
Having articulated the Complex Standard, and indicated how it reflects 
several key democratic values, we can now show, brie y, how it satisfies 
the desiderata for a standard of legitimacy we set out earlier. 
 
1. The Complex Standard provides a reasonable basis for coordinated 
support of institutions that meet the standard, support based on moral rea-
sons that are widely accessible in the circumstances under which legiti-
macy is an issue. To serve the social function of legitimacy assessments, 
the Complex Standard only requires a consensus on the importance of not 
violating the most widely recognized human rights, broad agreement that 
comparative benefit and integrity are also presumptive necessary condi-
tions of legitimacy, and a commitment to inclusive, informed deliberation 
directed toward resolving or at least reducing the moral disagreement and 
uncertainty that characterize our practical attitudes toward these institu-
tions. In other words, the Complex Standard steers a middle course be-
tween requiring more moral agreement than is available in the circum-
stances of legitimacy and abandoning the attempt to construct a more ro-
bust, shared moral perspective from which to evaluate global governance 
institutions. In particular, the Complex Standard acknowledges that the 
role that these institutions ought to play in a more just world order is both 
deeply contested and probably not knowable at present. 
2. In requiring only minimal moral acceptability at present, the Com-
plex Standard acknowledges that legitimacy does not require justice, but at 
the same time affirms the intuition that extreme injustice, understood as 
violation of the most widely recognized human rights, robs an institution of 
legitimacy. 
3. The Complex Standard takes the ongoing consent of democratic 
states to be a presumptive necessity, though not a sufficient condition for 
legitimacy. 
4. The Complex Standard rejects the assumption that global govern-
ance institutions cannot be legitimate unless there is global democracy, but 
at the same time promotes some of the key democratic values, including 
informed, public deliberation conducted on the assumption that every indi-
vidual has standing to participate and the requirement that key institutional 
policies must be publicly justified. 
5. The Complex Standard reflects a proper appreciation of the dy-
namic, experimental character of global governance institutions and of the 
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fact that not only the means they employ but even the goals they pursue 
may and probably should change over time. 
6. The Complex Standard’s requirement of a functioning transnational 
civil society channel of accountability—an array of overlapping networks 
of external epistemic actors—helps to compensate for the limitations of ac-
countability through democratic state consent. 
 
The central argument of this essay can now be summarized. The Com-
plex Standard provides a reasonable basis for agreement in legitimacy 
assessments of global governance institutions. When the comparative 
benefit condition is satisfied, the institution provides goods that are not 
readily obtainable without it. These goods, however, can be reliably pro-
vided only if coordination is achieved, and achieving coordination without 
excessive costs requires that the relevant agents regard the institution’s 
rules as presumptively binding—that is, that they take the fact that the rule 
is issued by the institution as a content-independent reason for compliance. 
The instrumental value of institutions that satisfy the comparative benefit 
condition also gives individuals generally a content-independent reason 
not to interfere with the functioning of the institutions. Satisfaction of the 
minimal moral acceptability condition rules out the more serious moral 
objections that might otherwise undercut the instrumental reasons for 
supporting the institution. Satisfaction of the other conditions of the Com-
plex Standard, taken together, provides moral reasons to support or at least 
not interfere with the institution. Among the most important of these rea-
sons is that the institution has epistemic virtues that facilitate the develop-
ment of more demanding standards and the progressive improvement of 
the institution itself. Thus, when a global governance institution meets the 
demands of the Complex Standard, there is justification for saying that it 
has the right to rule, not merely that it is beneficial. 
Conclusion 
In this essay we have offered a proposal for a public standard of le-
gitimacy for global governance institutions. These institutions supply 
important benefits that neither states nor traditional treaty-based relation-
ships among states can provide, but they are quite new, often fragile, and 
still evolving. Politically mobilized challenges to the legitimacy of these 
institutions jeopardize the support they need to function effectively, in 
spite of the fact that these challenges are typically unprincipled and possi-
bly grounded in unrealistic demands that confuse justice with legitimacy. 
A principled global public standard of legitimacy could facilitate more 
responsible criticism while at the same time providing guidance for im-
Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane 242 
provement, through a process of institutionalized, collective learning, both 
about what it is reasonable to expect from global governance institutions 
and about how to achieve it. Our hope is that the proposal offered in this 
paper serves these purposes. 
Notes 
* The authors are grateful to Sahar Akhtar, Christian Barry, Thomas Christiano, 
Michael Doyle, Nicole Hassoun, Andrew Hurrell, Nan Keohane, Avery Kolers, 
Joseph S. Nye, John Tasioulas, and two anonymous referees for their helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper, and to William Alford, Ryan Good-
man, and Gerald L. Neuman for valuable criticisms and suggestions when such a 
version was presented at Harvard Law School, November 3, 2005. We are particu-
larly grateful to comments by Charles Beitz and a number of other colleagues 
made at a workshop on the normative and empirical evaluation of global govern-
ance, Princeton University, February 17–18, 2006. Further useful comments were 
made at the conference on “Legitimacy and International Law” at the Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Ger-
many, June 13–14, 2006. The text has been previously published in Ethics & In-
ternational Affairs, Volume 20.4, Winter 2006. 
1. A thorough review of the sociological literature on organizational legitimacy can 
be found in Suchman (1995:571–610). 
2. For an excellent discussion of the inadequacy of existing standards of legitimacy 
for global governance institutions, see Bodansky (1999:596–624). For an impres-
sive earlier book on the subject, see Franck (1990). Franck’s account focuses on 
the legitimacy of rules more than institutions and in our judgment does not distin-
guish clearly enough between the normative and sociological senses of legitimacy. 
3. A large and growing literature exists on global governance. See, for example, 
Prakash and Hart (1999); Nye and Donahue (2000); Held and McGrew (2002). 
4. Erika de Wet, “The Security Council as Legislator/Executive in Its Fight against 
Terrorism and against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Ques-
tion of Legitimacy” (presentation at the conference “Legitimacy and International 
Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 
Heidelberg, Germany, June 14, 2006). 
5. The emphasis here on the coordinating function should not be misunderstood: 
global governance institutions do not merely coordinate state actions in order to 
satisfy pre-existing state preferences. As our analysis will make clear, they can also 
help shape state preferences and lead to the development of new norms and institu-
tional goals. 
6. Legitimacy can also be seen as providing a “focal point” that helps strategic 
actors select one equilibrium solution among others. For the classic discussion of 
focal points, see Schelling (1960:ch. 3). For a critique of theories of cooperation on 
the basis of focal point theory, and an application to the European Union, see 
Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Construct-
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ing the European Community’s Internal Market,” in Goldstein and Keohane, eds. 
(1993:178–85). 
7. Most contemporary analytic philosophical literature on legitimacy tends to focus 
exclusively on the legitimacy of the state and typically assumes a very strong 
understanding of legitimacy. In particular, it is assumed that legitimacy entails (1) 
a content-independent moral obligation to comply with all institutional rules (not 
just content-independent moral reasons to comply and/or a content-independent 
moral obligation to not interfere with others’ compliance), (2) being justified in 
using coercion to secure compliance with rules, and (3) being justified in using 
coercion to exclude other actors from operating in the institution’s domain. See, for 
example, Wellman and Simmons (2005). It is far from obvious, however, that this 
very strong conception is even the only conception of legitimacy appropriate for 
the state, given what is sometimes referred to as the “unbundling” of sovereignty 
into various types of decentralized states and the existence of the European Union. 
Be that as it may, this state-centred conception is too strong for global governance 
institutions, which generally do not wield coercive power or claim such strong 
authority. For a more detailed development of this point, see Allen Buchanan, 
“The Legitimacy of International Law,” in Besson and Tasioulas (2010). 
8. This view was forcefully expressed by Professor Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv 
University, in comments on a draft of this essay. 
9. For a more detailed discussion, see Buchanan (2003) especially chapter 5. 
10. For a perceptive discussion of how consent to new international trade rules in 
the Uruguay Round (1986–94) was merely nominal, since the alternatives for poor 
countries were so unattractive, see Steinberg (2002:339–74). 
11. How the requirement of ongoing consent should be operationalized is a com-
plex question we need not try to answer here; one possibility would be that the 
treaties creating the institution would have to be periodically reaffirmed. 
12. For a valuable discussion that employs a different conception of normative 
uncertainty, see Monica Hlavac, “A Developmental Approach to the Legitimacy of 
Global Governance Institutions” (unpublished paper). 
13. In March 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the replacement of 
the Commission on Human Rights (fifty-three members elected from slates put 
forward by regional groups) with a smaller Human Rights Council elected by a 
two-thirds vote of members of the General Assembly (see his report “In Larger 
Freedom,” A/59/2005, § 183). 
14. For the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations 
Oil-for-Food Program (the Volcker Committee), dated October 27, 2005, see 
www.iic-offp.org/story27oct05.htm. 
15. We are indebted to Andrew Hurrell for this example. 
16. For a discussion of the role of critical revisability in practical reasoning, with 
parallels to theoretical reasoning, see Buchanan (1975:395-408). 
17. For an illuminating account of the legitimacy of health care institutions that 
emphasizes responsibility for justifications, see Daniels and Sabin (1997:303–50). 
18. The analogy in the economics of information is to the market for used cars. A 
potential buyer of a used car would be justified in inferring poor quality if the 
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seller were unwilling to let him have the car thoroughly examined by a competent 
mechanic. See Akerlof (1970:488–500). 
19. On the role of legislatures with respect to the legitimacy of an international 
legal order, see Wolfrum, R. “Legitimacy in International Law: Some Introductory 
Considerations” (paper prepared for the conference “Legitimacy in International 
Law” at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law, Heidelberg, Germany, June 13–14, 2006). 
20. We use the term “external epistemic actor” here broadly, to include individuals 
and groups outside the institution in question who gain knowledge about the insti-
tution, interpret and integrate such knowledge, and exchange it with others, in 
ways that are intended to influence institutional behaviour, whether directly or 
indirectly (through the mediation of the activities of other individuals and groups). 
21. On our view, the legitimacy of global governance institutions, at present at 
least, does not require participation in the critical evaluation of institutional goals 
and policies by all who are affected by them; but if the standard of legitimacy we 
recommend were accepted, opportunities for participation would expand. 
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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PIRACY 




“Piracy” is frequently referred to as the quintessential example of “in-
ternational criminal law.” But, despite the rhetoric, examples of any legal 
results flowing from that characterization are very rare. The First Ameri-
can statute relating to “piracy” was passed in 1790 and immediately ran 
into difficulties. It provides, in its section 12, for example, for designating 
as “pirates” those giving assistance to “pirates.” Among the first defen-
dants were two pilots (surnamed Howard and Beebee) in Delaware who 
had guided a suspicions vessel to anchorage (in 1818 the case is in 3 
[Bushrod] Washington 340). The two defendants were acquitted by a jury. 
The second statute, which survives today (18 U.S. Code §1651), was 
passed in 1819 (3 Stat. [1850 ed.] 510) and continued in 1820 (3 Stat. 
[1850 ed.] 600). It tries to avoid the problems of the 1790 statute by mak-
ing criminal at United States law “piracy as defined by the law of nations.” 
Since, as noted below, there is no clear definition of piracy under the pre-
sumed “law of nations,” this amounts to delegating to judges the capacity 
to define a “crime” after it is committed. But “common law crimes,” while 
theoretically possible, have not been considered a proper basis for criminal 
prosecution in the United States since 1816 (U.S. v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. [1 
Wheaton] 415 [1816]). It is an interesting sidelight on this discussion that 
the American jurist most insistent on maintaining the validity of the statute 
of 1819 was Joseph Story (see U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. [5 Wheaton] 20 
[1820]), who dissented from U.S. v. Coolidge in 1816. Above the current 
(1936) codification of the law of 1820, the following note appears: “In 
light of far reaching developments in the field of international law and 
foreign relations, the law of piracy is deemed to require a fundamental 
reconsideration and complete restatement, perhaps resulting in drastic 
changes by way of modification and expansion...” There has been no 
known criminal conviction under the 1820 statute for over a century, al-
though it has been discussed in several cases. 
Although “common law crimes” survive theoretically in the United 
Kingdom, “piracy” was defined there by statute in 1700. 11 & 12 William 
III c. 7 (1700). But the British definition seems to have had “pirates” sub-
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ject to British courts in mind rather than a generality. Indeed, article VIII 
of the Statute expressly refers to “Pirates” as those who are “natural-born 
Subjects, or Denizens of this Kingdom” committing “any Act of Hostility, 
against others his Majesty's Subjects... under Colour of any Commission 
from any foreign Prince or State.” There are repeated references to the 
reach of the Parliament of England, presumably a reference to jurisdiction 
to prescribe. 
Attempts at codification have been made internationally. The League 
of Nations attempted one in 1926. This purported codification was se-
verely criticized and eventually dropped as not “of sufficient real interest 
in the present state of the world to justify its inclusion in the programme of 
the (proposed) conference” and the Assembly of the League requested the 
Council to arrange for the codification conference without including “pi-
racy” in its proposed agenda. 
The Harvard Research was the result. A Committee was set up by the 
Harvard Research program to consider the international law of “piracy” 
independently of the efforts of the League and its Reporter (M. Matsuda). 
The Harvard Research reporter was Professor Joseph W. Bingham of Stan-
ford University.1 
The result of this effort was a full draft Convention of 19 articles, the 
last one, obviously relevant to “piracy” and de lege ferenda, being a com-
mitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes arising out of the interpreta-
tion or application of the Convention and referring to arbitration by a panel 
set up in 1907 or adjudication by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice set up in 1920. 
The Harvard Researchers recognized immediately that the public inter-
national law relating to “piracy,” if any such existed, had to be analyzed 
separately from municipal law: “[P]iracy under the law of nations [by 
which the authors clearly meant public international law, although the 
coincidence of the two is subject to challenge, but this is not the place to 
analyze the matter further] and piracy under municipal law are entirely 
different subject matters and... there is no necessary coincidence of fact-
categories covered by the terms in any two systems of law” (“Harvard 
Research,” 1932:749; the Researchers recognized this split at “Harvard 
Research,” 1932:752;754). The Harvard Researchers adopted the view that 
“pirates are not criminals by the laws of nations, since there is no interna-
tional agency to capture them and no international tribunal to punish them 
and no provision in the laws of many states for punishing foreigners 
whose piratical offense was committed outside the state’s ordinary juris-
diction...” (“Harvard Research,” 1932:756). 
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The Harvard Researchers adopted this view not only for purposes of 
discussion, but as the jurisprudential basis for their draft Convention: “The 
theory of this draft convention, then, is that piracy is not a crime by the 
law of nations. It is the basis of an extraordinary jurisdiction in every state 
to seize and to prosecute and punish persons, and to seize and dispose of 
property, for factual offenses which are committed outside the territorial 
and other ordinary jurisdiction of the prosecuting state and which do not 
involve attacks on its peculiar interests” (“Harvard Research,” 1932:760). 
As to the key jurisdictional point, the Harvard Researchers do not seem 
to have undertaken the research proper to their product. Instead, resting on 
argumentative secondary sources, much of it by scholars who do not seem 
to have done much primary research either, the Harvard Researchers said: 
“Indeed it is difficult to find cases of exercises of jurisdiction over piracy 
which would not be supported on one or more of the ordinary grounds. 
They are very rare” (“Harvard Research,” 1932:761). Recourse is then had 
to writers who support “universal jurisdiction” not on the basis of state 
practice, real incidents, diplomatic correspondence and municipal court 
cases referring to what was asserted to be international law by a municipal 
judge, but on the basis only of the writers’ conceptions of the structure of 
the international legal order and filtered interpretations of state practice 
asserted to exist but difficult to demonstrate in particulars. Thus “natural-
ist” scholars, such as Judge Joseph Story, are quoted extensively, but their 
conclusions and jurisprudential viewpoint are not adopted. 
Instead, the most influential single publicist whose views are cited at 
length and for many points of approach is a German “positivist,” Paul Stiel 
(see Stiel, 1905). Stiel regarded the jurisprudential split between “natural-
ists” and “positivists” as a split between Anglo-American jurists, whom he 
regarded as “naturalists” despite the cases and the writings of John Mar-
shall, Richard Henry Dana and others, and the “Kontinentalen” as positiv-
ists despite the writings of Grotius, Pufendorf and others. From this point 
of view, and without much detailed analysis, Stiel concluded that a defini-
tion is possible: “Piracy is a non-political professional course of forcible 
robbery against nearly all countries undertaken at sea.” From this he iso-
lated the elements of the legal concept, including location (high seas, the 
word “high” seems to have been inserted by him here), physical means 
(force), intention (to take property), and whom (anybody, disregarding his 
own modifying word, “nearly”), purpose (private enrichment), etc. Since 
this framework excludes private erring or the regular course of raiding 
attributed (falsely) by many European publicists to the Barbary States 
before 1830 and to others, and yet such activities had been routinely been 
called “piracy” by many European scholars and some European (and 
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American) courts, Stiel had some difficulty. He resolved this not by recon-
sidering his definition or breaking the concept into parts but simply by 
asserting the old state-authorized “piracy” to be obsolete, even though 
there seemed to him to be some similarities between the acts for which a 
“piracy” conviction was obtained by English officials in Singapore in 1858 
and the Roman practice against Illyrian raiders. His analysis is not deep 
and his assertion about the Malayan case of 1858 is unattributed and not 
evidenced in any other known source; his citation to Roman practice is not 
to any original source, but to the great nineteenth century German histo-
rian of Rome, Theodore Mommsen. This leads Stiel into further difficul-
ties when he finally corns to consider the doctrinal aspect of Sir Stephen 
Lushington’s opinion in The Serhassan (Pirates) case, and those difficul-
ties are avoided rather than solved by relegating the discussion to the sec-
tion on political ends, denying that the legal concept of “piracy” applies to 
political actors but finding some states to be capable of being classified 
“piratical” because they lack political goals for their takings. It is not at all 
clear that the desire of The Serhassan communities to be free of British 
visits and other influences, which prompted the attack on British warships 
that led to the punitive raid held by Lushington to entitle the victors to the 
bounty paid under British statutory authority to those who engage “pi-
rates,” was non-political, and Stiel does not explain why he classifies it as 
such. 
Similarly, the British position in the Huascar correspondence with Peru 
is not analyzed. In that correspondence between the British and Peru, the 
British suggestion that unrecognized “rebels” can be properly considered 
“pirates” as a matter of international law is dismissed by Peru and British 
non-governmental experts (see Rubin, 1998:291-304; the primary sources 
are all cited there) as questionable because as long as the rebels’ victims 
are only government vessels of their own, state nobody would consider 
them “pirates,” and an ad hoc denomination as “pirates” solely because of 
the nationality of the victim vessel seems more than any criminal law 
conception should bear. 
Now, none of this analysis of Stiel diminishes the utility of Stiel’s pro-
posal de lege ferenda for the law of “piracy” as it might have been accept-
able to states in the early years of the 20th century, and the use of Stiel’s 
suggestions regardless of the doubtful soundness of the historical and legal 
evidence on which they rest is justified for that purpose. Indeed, there is 
much in Stiel’s work that could as well have been based on a more thor-
ough analysis, and, regardless of soundness, seems consistent with the 
conclusions possible to reach from cases and jurisprudential discussions. 
In taking the general orientation proposed by Stiel as the basis for their 
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own draft, the Harvard Researchers thus did not necessarily diminish the 
value of their proposal as an exercise de lege ferenda. 
In their use of earlier scholarship in general, however, the Harvard Re-
searchers themselves seemed somewhat confused. Long quotations from 
Stiel are preceded or followed with what appear to be supporting quota-
tions from a variety of sources addressing different problems from differ-
ent jurisprudential perspectives and at different times. Article 3, the defini-
tion of “piracy” for purposes of, the draft Convention, quotes at some 
length from what seem to be 54 different sources in addition to Stiel, 
mostly European publicists of the 19th century, who were supposed to 
support in one way or another various parts of the proposed definition. 
There is no apparent attempt to evaluate those writings by jurisprudential 
view or any other clue as to their relative persuasiveness; there is no 
chronological consistency or indication that perhaps the rules found per-
suasive in Italy or other states deriving their experience from Roman or 
Mediterranean interactions were rejected by world-stage actors, like Eng-
land in the 17th century and later, because of possible differences in the 
political structure of the overall society whose trade was to be protected 
from interference, or the self-image of the state accepting or denying the 
role of world policeman against “piracy.” Thus, the Harvard draft must be 
evaluated on its own merits as a legislative proposal, and cannot be sup-
ported as a reflection of a scholarly analysis of precedent and theory, In-
deed, the Researchers themselves seem to throw up their hands in dismay 
with regard to the definition of “piracy”: 
 
An investigation finds that instead of a single relatively simple prob-
lem, there are a series of difficult problems which have occasioned a great 
diversity of professional opinion. In studying the content of the [definition] 
article, it is useful to bear in mind the chaos of expert opinion as to what 
the law of nations [sic] includes, or should include, in piracy. There is, no 
authoritative definition. Of the many definitions which have been pro-
posed, most are inaccurate, both as to what they literally include and as to 
what they omit. Some are impromptu, rough descriptions of a typical pi-
racy (“Harvard Research” 1932:769). 
 
In these circumstances, the legal analysis implicit in the Harvard draft 
is of minimal interest. 
As an exercise in proposing a legal formulation taking due account of 
the confusions of the period regarding “piracy” and the persistence of the 
concept as a factor in justifying some legal results, the Harvard draft has 
had a major impact on the development of legal thought. For present pur-
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poses only the definitional article and the articles dealing with jurisdiction 
seem important. They say: 
 
Article 3: Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a place not 
within the territorial jurisdiction of any state: 
1. Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, 
rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or de-
stroy property, for private ends without a bona fide purpose of asserting a 
claim of right, provided that the act is connected with an attack on or from 
the sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected with an attack which 
starts from on board ship, either that ship or another ship which is involved 
must be a pirate ship or a ship without national character. 
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with 
knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship. 
3. An act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an act described 
in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this article. 
 
Article 4: 
l. A ship is a pirate ship when it is devoted by the persons in dominant 
control to the purpose of committing an act described in the first sentence 
of paragraph 1 of Article 3, or to the purpose of committing any similar act 
within the territory of a state by descent from the high sea, provided in ei-
ther case that the purposes of the persons in dominant control are not defi-
nitely limited to committing such acts against ships or territory subject to 
the jurisdiction of the state to which the ship belongs… 
 
Article 6: In a place not within the territorial jurisdiction of another 
state, a state may seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by piracy and possessed 
by pirates, and things or persons on board. 
 
Article 7: 
1. In a place within the territorial jurisdiction of another state, a state 
may not pursue or seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by piracy and pos-
sessed by pirates; except that if pursuit of such a ship is commenced by a 
state within its own territorial jurisdiction or in a place not within the terri-
torial jurisdiction: of any state, the pursuit may be continued into or over 
the territorial sea of another state and seizure be made there, unless prohib-
ited by the other state… 
 
Article 9: If .a seizure because of piracy is made by a state in violation 
of the jurisdiction of another state, the state making the seizure shall, upon 
the demand of the other state, surrender or release the ship, things and per-
sons seized, and shall make appropriate reparation… 
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Article 13: 
1. A state, in accordance with its law, may dispose of ships and other 
property seized because of piracy.  
2. The law of the state must conform to the following principles: 
(b) Claimants of any interest in the property are entitled to a reasonable 
opportunity to prove their claims… 
 
Article 14: 
1. A state which has lawful custody of a person suspected of piracy 
may prosecute and punish that person.  
2. Subject to the provisions of this convention, the law of the state 
which exercises such jurisdiction defines the crime, governs the procedure 
and prescribes the penalty… 
3. A state may intercede diplomatically to assure [fair and humane 
treatment] to one of its nationals, who is accused in another state. 
 
Weaknesses in the draft are immediately apparent. As to the substance 
of the offense, why are “rape,” “wound,” “enslave,” and “imprison” there? 
There seem to be no cases supporting any such inclusions however horri-
ble those acts may be. Participation in the slave trade had been expressly 
ruled out of European (including British) definitions when the trade was a 
serious matter in international commerce (see The Le Louis [1817] 2 
Dods. 210: “No lawyer, I presume, could be found hardy enough to main-
tain that an indictment for piracy could be supported by the mere evidence 
of trading in slaves. Be the malignity of the practice what it may...” Cf. 
The Antelope, 23 U.S. [10 Wheaton] 66 [1825]). And if “rape,” “wound” 
and “imprison” should be included merely because they are serious and 
violent offenses, why not “torture” or even generally “assault”? 
Why is there a distinction drawn between acts “committed in a place 
not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state” for the purpose of defin-
ing the offense, and an act otherwise within the definition (indeed, more 
broadly stated in Article 4 also to include “any similar act”) “within the 
territory of a state by descent from the high sea” for the purpose of defin-
ing a “pirate ship”? The definition of what is “piracy” in article 3 includes 
an implied definition of who is a “pirate” (whoever commits an act of 
defined “piracy” as well as any of the fringe connections specified in para-
graphs 2 and 3 of that article). Article 4 defines a “pirate ship” more 
broadly. It would seem that there could conceivably be a “pirate ship” with 
no “pirates” on board and that had never been involved in the commission 
of an act of “piracy” if all its assaults were raids ashore. Presumably to 
make sense of this, it was to establish a category for ships not wholly lack-
ing nationality from which an act of “piracy” within the definition of arti-
cle 3 could be committed. But why, if the attacking vessel had national 
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character, should the law of “piracy” come into play at all? At least, it is 
not clear why a ship which had been involved in shore raids should be 
considered a base of piratical acts when it acted at sea, and the identical 
vessel that had not previously committed shore raids would not be consid-
ered a base for “piratical” acts on the high sea unless it had first lost its 
national character. And if any vessel had first lost its national character, it 
would seem to be within the definition of a base of “piratical” acts at sea 
whether or not it had first been involved in shore raids. Article 4 seems 
senseless. 
As to jurisdiction, clearly territorial jurisdiction is dominant and pur-
suit into the territorial waters of any state can be forbidden under article 7. 
The language shifts the burden to the territorial sovereign to prohibit the 
chase, rather than limiting the authority of the policing state to pursuit of a 
“pirate,” but that seems to be as far as the Harvard Researchers were will-
ing to go to meet the British position in principle (it might be pointed out 
that in the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference the British 
argued for a definition regarding jurisdiction over “piracy” that Peru ar-
gued against (see Rubin, 1998:391). Article 9 seems to take even that 
concession back by providing not only for a turning over to the territorial 
sovereign of the persons and property seized, but even the paying of repa-
rations. 
Finally, as to “universal” jurisdiction, article 13 refers back to the law-
fulness of the seizure to determine if the seizing state can apply its own 
law to property seized. If the seizure was “lawful,” then the seizing state 
can apply its own 1aw, apparently even if there is no identifiable national 
interest in the incident beyond the fact of the seizure by its officials. Arti-
cle 6 appears to make lawful (although the word is not used) the seizure of 
“a pirate ship” or a ship “taken and possessed by pirates,” and the property 
connected with it; but the same seizure of the same ship and property 
would appear to be unlawful if the ship had been used for depredations 
only “against ships or territory subject to the jurisdiction of the state to 
which the ship belongs” (article 4). In that latter case, the ship would not 
be classifiable as a “pirate ship” and whether the ship's company were 
“pirates” could not be determined until after the seizure; the seizure itself 
could not be regarded as “lawful” when done. And if the ship had not in 
the first instance been “taken by piracy,” but had been lawfully acquired, 
or even taken by robbery under the law of some territorial state while not 
on the high sea and not by descent from the high sea, then it is not clear 
that any taking by a second country's officials would be “lawful” in the 
sense of article 6. And if article 6 not did make the seizure “lawful,” then 
article 13 would apparently not apply. This construction opens up compli-
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cations of a magnitude that cannot repay further analysis in this place since 
the Convention has never been adopted. But it is clear that the provisions 
as drafted do not represent a simple assertion of universal jurisdiction over 
ships and property involved in “piracy,” or of universal jurisdiction with a 
simple exception. This gingerly handling of ships and property involved in 
alleged “piracy” is particularly interesting as showing a complete denial of 
the concepts of a universal international law (or law of nations) despite the 
use of the phrase “law of nations” by Blackstone and the framers of the 
American Constitution; concepts which included all maritime law with the 
“law of nations” and denied the legal significance of the place or sovereign 
authority of the tribunal erected to apply that supposedly universal law. 
The implication is not only that there is a cloud on the notion of universal 
jurisdiction over the goods involved in suspected “piracy” cases but that 
the same rules of “standing” applied to determine which sovereigns’ courts 
should even hear the case; that standing ratione materiae and standing 
ratione personae must both be present in any “piracy” adjudication. 
Article 14 seems to attempt to change that situation with regard to 
criminal trials, but again the universality of the jurisdiction is made to rest 
on the “lawfulness” (without defining what “law” applies) of the “cus-
tody”; and that lawfulness seems to depend on the interpretation of article 
6. In the Researchers’ commentary to article 6 no clue is given as to the 
complications involved; the Researchers seem to have thought that article 
6 merely codified an ancient “right of any state to capture on the high sea a 
foreign ship which has committed piracy or is the booty of pirates” (“Har-
vard Research” 1932:832). But there is no citation to any case or writer to 
support this grand assertion, and it seems wrong both historically and 
legally to the degree that it ignores the general international law of “stand-
ing.” It seems to reflect the misconceptions of the time growing out of 
British assertions of a world-wide policing jurisdiction taken as a matter of 
policy and applies to foreign military vessels of non-European subordina-
tion in the absence of animum furandi, and not applied by any state to 
“pirates” in the context of the Harvard Research, i.e., persons acting animo 
furandi within article 3 as “criminals” under the laws of all states. 
There are many other peculiarities and questions raised by the Harvard 
Research draft Convention on Piracy, but since it was presented de lege 
ferenda and was not in fact adopted as such, it seems unnecessary to ana-
lyze it further in this place. 
In 1931, while the Harvard Research was still underway, there was an 
incident in the Far East that resulted in jurisdiction being exercised over 
accused “pirates” in the absence of a link to some traditional basis for 
jurisdiction to prescribe. The incident occurred between Chinese vessels 
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on the high seas and the capture of the accused “pirates” was effected by a 
British naval vessel, H.M.S. Somme, apparently (the report is not entirely 
clear) also on the high sea (as defined by the British). The accused were 
taken in to the British tribunal in Hong Kong and there convicted of “pi-
racy” by a British criminal court. The question was referred all the way to 
the highest British tribunal with jurisdiction over colonial courts, the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council. The opinion there was unanimous 
among the five British judges, and delivered by Viscount Sankey, the Lord 
Chancellor. It does not mention any jurisdictional doubts (see In re Piracy 
jure gentium [1934] A.C. 586; British International Law Cases, 
1964:§836). As to the point of substance, the opinion seems to treat British 
precedents and writings, as if evidentiary of the evolving public interna-
tional 1aw regarding “piracy” and not merely evidence of an evolving 
British municipal law. The Huascar correspondence is referred to with a 
single sentence reciting the facts, followed by another single sentence 
saying merely: “The British Admiral justly considered that Huascar was a 
pirate and attacked her” (the sole citation to the case is to Parliamentary 
Paper, Peru No. 1 1877, presumably Parliamentary Papers 1877 
LXXXVIII 613 [Peru No. 1]). Dr. Lushington’s opinion in both the Ser-
hassan (Pirates) and the Magellan Pirates cases, and the American case, 
the Ambrose Light are cited for the proposition that an actual robbery is 
not required for the crime of “piracy” to be completed. There is no notice 
of the fact that in all three cases there was no animus furandi at all, and 
that this lack might indicate that something other than the English crime of 
“piracy” might have been involved; the assumption is unstated that the 
legal word “piracy” covers both the acts descended from the English no-
tion of robbery within the jurisdiction to prescribe, enforce and adjudicate 
of English Admiralty tribunals and acts of interference with ocean ship-
ping whatever the motive, and some assumption of British legal rights to 
police the seas. The confusion of concepts seems to have been complete. 
It is noteworthy that the case is a British case, and adopts the British 
view of natural law and British jurisdiction as an incident of an assumed 
universal jurisdiction. Although both the Harvard Research draft Conven-
tion and the League of Nations draft are cited with approval, there is no 
analysis of either except on the must superficial level. Other European 
publicists are cited; it appears that all the citations to sources other than the 
usual English sources were taken from the Harvard Research, at least all 
those cited seem on cursory inspection to appear also in the Harvard Re-
search and the comprehensiveness of the Harvard Research is praised by 
Viscount Sankey. 
The Privy Council’s conclusion was: 
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A careful examination of the subject shows a gradual widening of the 
earlier definition of piracy to bring it from time to time in consonance with 
situations either not thought of or not in existence when the older juriscon-
sults were expressing their opinions... [Their Lordships] having examined 
all the previous cases, all the various statutes and all the opinions of the 
various jurisconsults cited to them, they have come to the conclusion that 
the better view and the proper answer to give to the question addressed to 
them is.... that actual robbery is not an essential element in the crime of pi-
racy jure gentium (In re Piracy jure gentium 600, 3 British International 
Law Cases, 1964:§843). 
 
One other case was rescued from oblivion in 1932 and should be men-
tioned as evidentiary of the tendency of Anglo-Americans at the time to 
assert universal jurisdiction even where unnecessary to support the par-
ticular adjudication, and to cover all “piracy” cases with verbiage of a 
generality unnecessary and inappropriate by current standards to criminal 
proceedings. In 1922 an American court in the Philippines affirmed a 
conviction for “piracy” against “certain Moros from the Philippines” who 
boarded a Dutch boat in the territorial waters of an island in the Dutch East 
Indies, raped the women and sank the boat with the men on board (who 
escaped to shore). An appeal on the basis of lack of jurisdiction was disal-
lowed and the prison term was changed to a death penalty for the one of 
the two defendants (Lol-Lo) who had committed the rape (Peop1e v. Lo1-
Lo and Saraw, 43 Philippine Islands 19 as reported in 1 Annual Digest of 
Public International Law Cases, Case No. 112 [Williams and Lauterpacht, 
1932:164-165]). As reported, the decision says: “Nor does it matter that 
the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign 
state,” because “The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes has no 
territorial limits.” Since the actual conviction of Lol-Lo was for rape, and 
it was for the rape, not for “piracy,” that he was sentenced to death, this is 
very difficult to understand. Why was a rape within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the Dutch authorities within the jurisdiction of the American au-
thorities also? It is especially difficult to understand when the definition 
given by the tribunal of the “crime of piracy” was: “Piracy is robbery or 
forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done 
animo furandi, and in the spirit of universal hostility.” Even if “rape” fits 
the definition of “forcible depredation” (which seems doubtful not only as 
a matter of definition, but because the sentence for “piracy” was life im-
prisonment and the sentence for rape was death; it is hard to see a crime 
with a greater penalty as a lesser included offense of a crime with a lighter 
penalty), it is incomprehensible that “on the high seas” means also “within 
the territorial waters of a foreign state.” 
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In fact, if the Spanish-rooted law of the Philippines, which is reported 
to have been the law applied, could have been construed to apply to Phil-
ippine defendants acting abroad, and jurisdiction could have been based on 
the personal power of a sovereign to prescribe rules binding on his sub-
jects wherever they are, the jurisdiction was easily supportable on the basis 
of the nationality of the actor(s), not universality. As reported, no mention 
is made of the established Constitutional limits to American prescriptive 
jurisdiction as pronounced by the United States Supreme Court in 1820 
(U.S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. [(5 Wheaton] 76; for a fuller background of 
the case, see Rubin, 1998:153-154) or the long course of American prac-
tice that by 1922 for a hundred years had followed that result despite the 
constant reiteration of the theoretical possibility of universal jurisdiction 
which was never asserted to lie within the territorial jurisdiction of a for-
eign sovereign, but only on the high sea. It must be concluded that the case 
is a unique, or nearly unique, example of a colonial court, this time an 
American one, making up a convenient law for itself regardless of prece-
dent, logic or the political need to accommodate to the legal powers of 
neighbouring sovereigns. It is probably not accidental that the incident 
occurred and was decided on the far fringes of two empires where the 
legal and political problems would not likely be significant. 
Nonetheless, it is odd and significant for the trend of thinking in the 
United States that the “piracy” section in the major compilation and 
American (and some foreign) legally significant practice published in 
1941 (Hackworth, 1941:681-695) section 203, normally a source of bal-
anced reportage and minimal comment (for example, a statement that U.S. 
v. Smith is the leading American case supporting the notion that there is 
such a thing as an international law of “piracy” and that it is properly in-
corporated into American law by mere reference in the Act of 1819 is 
immediately followed by a long excerpt from Lenoir, Piracy Cases in the 
Supreme Court, 25 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 532 (1934-1935), includ-
ing the passage: “It is doubtful whether the Court would hold this view 
today, nor is it considered a correct statement of the present international 
law on piracy,” reasoning that Justice Livingston’s dissent was more per-
suasive than the majority opinion and that in near universal practice “pi-
racy” was not only punished, but, for sound jurisprudential reasons, de-
fined only by Municipal Law. Id. 552-553), quotes the passages set out 
above from both In re Piracy jure gentium and People v. Lo1-Lo and Sa-
raw without any counterbalancing comment (Hackworth: 1941:686;687). 
Universal jurisdiction seems to have been adopted as the official American 
position by 1941, and the contrary cases and logic forgotten. There is some 
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evidence that this position maintains its influence among American offi-
cials.2 
As part of a more or less complete review of the law of the sea, with an 
eye to eventual codification, the United Nations General Assembly asked 
the International Law Commission to prepare a text that could form the 
basis for international agreement on the law of the sea (see Briggs, 
1965:298-301). The text, originally prepared by J.P.A. Francois, the 
Commission’s Special Reporter, titled Regime of the High Seas, was pub-
lished on 1 March 1952, 2 Year Book of the International Law Commis-
sion [hereinafter YBILC]. The Report is denominated Doc. A/CN.4/79 in 
the United Nations archives and contains six articles dealing directly with 
“piracy.” Article 23 is the definition. It is Francois's French translation of 
article 3 of the Harvard Research draft Convention (YBILC: 1954:15). The 
French text is not directly identified as a mere translation in the Report, 
but in the discussion at the International Law Commission's 290th meeting 
on 12 May 1955, the English text is set out, 1 YBILC, 7th Session 
(1955:39n3). It is verbatim the text of the Harvard article quoted above 
except for changing the word “a” to “the” in the phrase “for private ends 
with a [the] bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right.” Oddly, in the 
un-annotated text of the Harvard Research draft Convention, reproduced 
above, the text of article 3 differs from the annotated text set out here with 
a third variation on that sentence; the un-annotated text has neither “a” nor 
“the” but says merely “private ends without bona fide purpose.” (The 
confusion sees inconsequential). The other five articles are French transla-
tions of articles 4(1), 5, 6, 10 and 12 of the “Harvard Research” draft (the 
English version of M. Francois’ draft, identical to the corresponding arti-
cles of the “Harvard Research” draft except for stylistic changes, is set out 
in 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 1955:31-51n1). 
Thus the current language of the “piracy” provisions of the 1958 Ge-
neva Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 Montego Bay Convention 
on the Law of the Sea are identical in substance, and neither can be said to 
make sense (see Rubin, 1976:70) 
What seems to be involved in this confusion is not any issue of sub-
stance. It seems widely agreed that the taking of property without the 
blessing of a legal order creates legal consequences in the international 
legal order, perhaps a claim for damages. The issue is in the designation of 
an appropriate legal order to determine the legal results of the taking. Ail 
municipal legal orders authorize some takings, perhaps as “eminent do-
main,” “reception,” “confiscation” or some other category established by 
the legal order to cover action by the state or even self-help by aggrieved 
individuals in some circumstances. The problem with “piracy” seems to be 
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the imposition on foreign “takers” of notions of a municipal legal order 
that the foreigners deny has purview over the property in question. Calling 
the taking a violation of “the law of nations” or of “international law” 
assumes the universality of rules relating to “takings” that is not evident in 
either the cases or diplomatic correspondence. And yet, all agree that “pi-
rates” go too far. 
Another complication is the frequent use of the word “pirates” to de-
scribe a particular regime’s political enemies in order to deny them author-
ity to establish a legal order, to legislate and enforce their (the “rebels”) 
rules. Thus, “rebels” like the American John Paul Jones, have been la-
belled “pirates” by the authorities seeking to withhold from them the au-
thority they seek despite their having commissions from what ultimately 
became the government of a “state” in the international legal order (see 
Rubin, 1998:172n140). 
In sum, the legal conception of “piracy” has been so seriously abused 
over the centuries that it is doubtful that the word retains any useful con-
tent in law, whatever its value in morality or politics. None of which is to 
support takings of property without the backing of a legal order responsi-
ble for abuses of discretion by its subjects. 
To resolve these issues, it can be suggested that the word “piracy” 
should be abandoned in law; that the notion of “piracy” or other property 
takings be considered per se a violation of international law should also be 
abandoned. Instead, effort should be put to pressuring states and belliger-
ents and others purporting to operate under a legal order, to provide rules 
for the preservation of “property rights” and “human rights” within that 
order (including a right to personal safety; to be free of murder, rape, as-
sault), and to respond to complaints that persons subject to that legal order 
have violated its rules. 
Notes 
1. See “Harvard Research” (1932:5;738), hereinafter cited as “Harvard Research”, 
giving the background of the Harvard Research effort and listing those concerned 
with the “Piracy” Report. With no disrespect intended toward the Californians, 
who included many scholars, of the 15 named advisers only three were resident 
outside of California, and they included one from the West Coast, one from Idaho, 
and Professor Harold Sprout of Princeton. 
2. See the review of Rubin (1998) by CDR Bowman (1990) even that CDR Bow-
man overlooks a great deal both in that book and outside it. 
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 “PIRATES” AND THE WORLD  





Before I explain this complicated title, especially the quotation marks 
around the word “Pirates,” and before I reveal my intention and attempt to 
provisionally justify it (in the title I discretely introduce and transform 
Fichte’s Closed Commercial State into a great world state or empire, al-
ways open and borderless; I assume that a world as such cannot be closed), 
I will first cite a part of the 54th paragraph from Kant’s 1797 work The 
Metaphysics of Morals. My intention is not to simply evoke Carl Schmitt’s 
critique of Kant’s ideas concerning preemptive war and the unjust en-
emy—as we all know, these ideas were not Kant’s nor is their critique 
original (Schmitt, 2006:168-171) after all, both Kant and Schmitt are sim-
ply brilliant compilers in international law—rather, I want to preliminarily 
demonstrate that every project concerning the constitution of an empire, 
league of nations or world government (or world governance) implies a 
paradoxical existence of an ambiguous “exterior” (“outside,” “without”). It 
seems that the existence (or nonexistence) of something “outside” of the 
world or “outside” of borderless sovereignty, is a precondition for any 
theory of world governance. 
In the chapter which deals with public right (the Right of Nations), 
Kant presents four basic elements of natural rights. We are interested in 
the third element: 
 
A league of nations in accordance with the idea of an original social 
contract is necessary, not in order to meddle in one another’s internal dis-
sensions but to protect against attacks from without (Kant, 1996:482-483). 
 
Two editors of Kant’s works believed that Kant did not provide an ob-
ject to which this sentence is referring. Vorländer believed that “enemies” 
(outside enemies) [gegen Angriffe der äußeren Feinde zu schützen] should 
be added, while Natorp thought that “nations,” were in question, meaning 
that attacks come from other nations/people. I find the existence of any 
“outside”/“without”, any sort of space for an enemy or nation (for a terror-
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ist, pirate or alien) problematic because a union of nations, as well as an 
empire, surely assumes that all nations are already inside and together. 
Why does a project concerning the union of all nations presume the exis-
tence of another space? How is it possible that something else exists, an-
other entity or figure, that does not take part in finalizing this new com-
munity and new unity? Does every fusion and union presuppose omission 
and exclusion? 
When one constructs the difficulty with Kant’s sentence, found in § 54, in 
such a way, it becomes quite trivial and uninteresting to conclude that 
Kant’s “league of nations” or his “perpetual peace” projects refer to only a 
few of the most important (at the time) European states (the rest of the 
world is completely excluded). Within Kant’s lectures from Anthropology, 
which have only recently been published, we find that Poland is his “un-
just enemy” (his Iraq or Iran) (should be preemptively attacked and its 
territory divided, as the Polish do not have a middle class and are incapa-
ble of writing a constitution) and that this “league of nations,” nor does it 
have room for the barbarous Turkey. I think that what is perhaps most 
important and what we should insist upon, from Kant until today or from 
Rome to NATO,1 is that the understanding and paradox of this out-
side/without (äußeren or “äußeren”) is the first mark of the imperial. It is 
possible to add, to Kant’s doubts and asymmetric strategies—for everyone 
to unite against the “outside”/“without”; that danger and attack come from 
outside/without; that the union of states or world government defends 
itself or rather brings safety to everyone; that to advance and attack is to 
defend from future attack—many more constructions of imperial space 
and imperial danger. All these forms could have relatively similar charac-
teristics. For an intention and/or an act to be imperial—I begin with the 
simple fact that these acts produce a subject (emperor), who is essentially 
a warrior who won a battle (who is stronger than others in one instance 
and in one space)—it is necessary that they imply superiority and expan-
sionism. The confusion between hegemony and empire (Münkler, 
2005:35-79) could perhaps be overcome by insisting that the imperial is in 
fact a constant action or process (Heidegger, 1992:40-41).2 An empire is a 
fight for an empire. For example, if we were to define global war or impe-
rial wars as eternal and as wars that produce no order (nomos), then it 
necessarily follows that the “imperial” already contains: (a) the production 
or emission of asymmetry (asymmetric powers, forces, conflicts) 
(Münkler, 2004:649-660; Münkler, 2006:151-168); (b) constant exposure 
of borders and danger in time and space (the outside/without is anywhere; 
“outside” is not on the margins of (the empire’s) power but inside and in 
different places); (c) the use of military or police actions and expeditions; 
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and (d) the constant changing of laws and norms (the emperor continually 
creates new norms; this is precisely how he differs from the legislator). 
I would like to transform these four elements, which in my opinion 
could explain the expression “Imperial Wars” (or “Imperial Acts”, “Impe-
rial Intentions”), into one imaginary encounter and examination between 
the “emperor” (or “sovereign”) and the “pirate.” The fact that this is possi-
ble—St. Augustine, while describing the Emperor Alexander’s conversa-
tion with a bandit, reveals the similarities of these two figures (both pillage 
and work primarily for themselves)—shows us that this register could 
perhaps be the fifth element of the imperial “gesture” or “principle” 
(Johns, 2009:11). For now, I will set aside the quotation marks around the 
word “emperor” or “sovereign”—I insist that the “imperialization” or 
constant imperial action fatally weakens and deteriorates the attribute 
“sovereign” and sovereignty—and direct my attention towards the roman-
tic figure of the “pirate” (die Figur des Piraten, is Schmitt’s syntagm) 
(Schmitt, 1994:241). 
There are four propositions I can suggest concerning the “pirate:” 
First: here I attempt to follow Gilbert Gidel’s 1932 differentiation be-
tween two sorts of piracy: “piraterie proprement dite ou piraterie du droit 
de gens” and “piraterie par analogie.” (Gidel, 1981:301-348). When I use 
the word “pirate” with quotation marks, it is my intention, among others, 
to find a true gesture (not a figure) that appears to resist the empire. If an 
act resists the empire in a completely asymmetric way, then it can be 
called and treated as being piratical. This is in reality a legal fiction, just as 
the famous definition of pirates (a definition which is not a definition) is in 
reality “Rhetorical Invective” (Tindall, 1694:25-26) or “eine Floskel” 
(Stiel, 1905:42): Pirata est hostis humani generis.3 
Second: “pirate,” as a complicated and confusing name for a space 
“outside/without” and forever devoid of empire, can be a synonym for 
quite a large group of differing regulations and figures that an empire 
constantly distributes. Again, I use the word “pirate,” because the “pirate” 
(or “criminel cosmopolit,” (Gidel, 1981:332), universal enemy, “Welt 
Feind,” “solidarische Feind”)4 is the unconditional condition for the exis-
tence of international law and a union of all States (anyone can punish and 
destroy him because he is the enemy of the world order). All of these fig-
ures, coming from completely different times, are asymmetric in relation 
to the empire (it is as if asymmetry creates superfluous space) and all of 
them constitute the empire in a future time. I will list them in no particular 
order: dissidents, bandits, refugees, sans papiers (or hackers) are imperial 
figures par excellence; differing groups which do not recognize the Roman 
Empire during its rule and unsuccessfully attempt to constitute communi-
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ties, Coke and Blackstone name them “confederates” (Rubin, 2006:359),5 
today we would call these undefined entities “failed states” or perhaps 
states which are dominated by corruption; then we have terrorists (we 
should not forget that towards the end of the 19th century (1892), terrorist 
or anarchist acts on the seas, as some called them, were grouped with 
pirate acts; international law termed these acts as non-political, despite 
these acts not having the characteristics of acts which have as their goals 
self interest) (Gidel, 1981:326); Barbarian states (Republiques Bar-
baresques; Raubstaaten) (Stiel, 1905:83) or the Barbary powers (Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya, Morocco), who Vattel terms the “common enemy of the 
human race” and calls for, just as Kant did, the unification of Christian 
states to repress such nations, also appear much later (Cf. Mössner, 
1972:201-202; Rubin, 2006:277).6 Discussions concerning whether the 
soldiers of these barbarian states are pirates, how to treat them, are today 
replaced with unending discussion concerning just and unjust warriors. 
Christian Wolff, similarly to Locke and Vattel, writes about soldiers who 
do not wage war but rather destroy the security of all nations: 
 
Therefore, the right to punish them belongs to all nations, and by this 
right they can remove from their midst those wild monsters of the human 
species [ista fera humani monstra] (Wolff, 1934:319; Cf. Heller-Roazen, 
2009:117, 218). 
 
The final figure which is quite judiciously distributed by the empire is 
certainly that of the left, nervous, hysterical critic of the empire. 
I think that it would be quite appropriate to construct the third and 
fourth proposition of piracy as well. I will proceed by using Carl Schmitt’s 
published texts and several dossiers that concern pirates that I consulted 
and found in his Düsseldorf’s Archives. Both the third and fourth (and 
perhaps fifth) points which Schmitt pays close attention to can be found in 
the statements published a year ago, of a certain Asad “Booyah” Abdulahi, 
who has captured ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean: 
 
When the money is delivered to our ship we count the dollars and let 
the hostages go. If we get $1.8m, we would send $380.000 to the invest-
ment man who gives us cash to fund the missions, and then divide the rest 
between us. Our community thinks we are pirates getting illegal money. 
But we consider ourselves heroes running away from poverty. We don’t 
see the hijacking as a criminal act but as a road tax because we have no 
central government to control our sea. With foreign warships now on patrol 
we have difficulties. But we are getting new boats and weapons. We will 
not stop until we have a central government that can control our sea.8 
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Quite easily, perhaps too easily, Abdulahi utters the sentence that 
represents the core of piracy: “Our community thinks we are pirates get-
ting illegal money.” The institution animus furandi (Rubin, 2006:82;116)9 
(l’esprit du lucre; acting for private motives), used by Gilbert Gidel 
(1981:317) in his book, will help Schmitt draw a clear distinction, in his 
1963 book about partisans, between partisans and pirates. The pirate 
steals, works for himself, has no “institutional potential” and is non-
political. This final characteristic is precisely—to paraphrase Schmitt—
what keeps the figure of the pirate still theoretically interesting [noch ein 
theoretisch ganz interessantes] (Schmitt, 1994:241), and nothing more; 
every other aspect is all too insufficient. This is why quotation marks are 
necessary when one speaks of piracy and pirates! 
Before I end by demonstrating that all our doubts concerning world 
governance and imperial wars (prosecutions) today have come from 
Schmitt’s short 1937 text “Der Begriff der Piraterie”—the reason for the 
quotation marks in the title of my text are found only in the Italian transla-
tion of this text10—it is important to address the confusion regarding the 
“pirate” Abdulahi (“Our community thinks we are pirates getting illegal 
money”) on three points: theft, the political (meaning Abdulahi as a self-
proclaimed taxman of a nonexistent state, a revolutionary, nouveau riche, 
proletarian, partisan, hero) and the non-political. These three terms repeat-
edly appear in 20th century books and manuals concerning pirates. At the 
beginning of the text “Der Begriff der Piraterie” Schmitt copies a key 
feature from his favourite Paul Stiel book, 1904’s Der Tatbestand der 
Piraterie: “An undertaking that pursues political aims is not piracy” [Ein 
Unternehmen, das politische Zwecke verfolgt, ist nicht Piraterie] (Schmitt, 
1994:240). To speak of pirates implies exclusively animus furandi. Only 
the actions of revolutionary parties, only rebellions which have a clear 
political goal and follow the laws of war—continue Stiel and Schmitt—
should not be considered piracy. 
Why is it necessary to follow all the intricacies and corrections in 
Schmitt’s understanding of “world governance” (pirates, sea, earth, no-
mos) from the 1937 text to the 1963 book on partisans? The complexity 
and urgency of this task is emphasized by the fact that during the existence 
of the Reich the great majority of Schmitt’s lectures concerned the sea.11 
Schmitt’s resistance to the pirate is, in fact, resistance to the empire (to 
Britain, rather Britain and America). I would leave aside what is most 
important: first, England, as well as other states had completely rid itself 
of pirates by the 18th century, and that since then the states themselves 
have became the bearers of war; up until then, at a time in which the 
aforementioned barbarian states existed, there was nothing strange about 
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differing groups carrying on private wars and actions without any sort of 
authorization (or “self-authorization” as done by our hero Asad “Booyah” 
Abdulahi); second, England is again clouding international law by reintro-
ducing the problem of piracy (several international conferences concerning 
piracy are the reason for Schmitt’s 1937 text) and that for several months 
Germany’s complaint has gone unanswered (it is unknown if Schmitt 
participated in the formulation of this document); and third, there is no 
space for the figure “pirate” in the Mediterranean or anywhere else, as 
there are no high sea and “non-political spaces” left, because states have 
completely occupied the European space.12 In response to an imperial act 
by Britain (and not only Britain; this is a concept which Schmitt has con-
tinuously resisted since the end of World War I) that a submarine attack on 
commercial vessels should be treated as an act of piracy—which assumes 
that everyone will unite and join the fight against the “pirate”—Schmitt 
convincingly demonstrates that such new measures in international law 
create a new order among European states and leads to the possibility of 
joint expeditions for retribution and lynching in the name of humanity. 
 
Should the English conception of submarine piracy be established as a 
general concept of the law of nations [Völkerrechtsbegriff], the concept of 
piracy will have changed its place in the system of international law [Völk-
errechts]. It will have been displaced from the empty space of non-political 
action into the space of intermediary concepts between war and peace, 
which is typical of the after-war period (Schmitt, 1994:243; the translation 
of D. Heller-Roazen (2009:145). 
 
Schmitt’s defence of symmetry and the right to war—which he adds to 
his argumentation in the second step—while being quite well known, was 
never truly taken into consideration when the limits of imperial wars or 
imperial expeditions were being discovered. Schmitt says that with such 
changes to international law, true total wars are avoided between total 
states, open war and true peace. Conversely, Schmitt’s “imperial acts” and 
asymmetric strategies, even after 1937, can easily be integrated into one 
great imaginary history of the imperial. Here I do not simply mean the 
clear indications and comparisons of the Jew as a citizen of the world 
[Jude als Weltbürger] with the figure of the pirate, who does not have the 
protection of any state and who is not authorized by any state, from the 
lecture “Volksgruppen—nicht Minderheitenrecht”, held in Flensburg in 28 
April 1938.13 Rather I am referring to Schmitt’s great campaign, which 
begins with a lecture on “Völkerrechtliche Grossraumprinzipien”, in Kiel 
on 3 April 1939. Basing his statement on a speech by the Führer from 
1938, Schmitt here, for the first time, formulates his idea that states are not 
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the true bearers and creators [Träger und Gestalter] of international law, 
but rather that the Reich is (in the plural, Reiche). The English daily The 
Times, on 5 April 1939, transmits Schmitt’s words: 
 
Only nations with the mental and moral qualifications, as expressed in 
their discipline and organization, to hold firmly in their hands the compli-
cated apparatus of a modern community are entitled to form a State which 
will be a first-rank subject of international law. The states formed by other 
nations can only be objects of international law.14 
Notes 
1. In the text “In the course of its 60 years, NATO has united the West, secured 
Europe, and ended the Cold War” (Foreign Affairs, September/October 2009), 
Zbigniew Brzezinski writes: “To remain historically relevant, NATO cannot—as 
some have urged—simply expand itself into a global alliance or transform itself 
into a global alliance of democracies. German Chancellor Angela Merkel ex-
pressed the right sentiment when she noted in March 2009, “I don’t see a global 
NATO… It can provide security outside its area, but that doesn’t mean members 
across the globe are possible” (Brzezinski,2009: 20). 
2. Heidegger, in his seminar on Parmenides (1942-43) while trying to compare the 
Greek pseudos and the Latin falsum, searches for the original meaning of the word 
imperium. Beginning with the word command, Befehl (he recommends that this 
word be written Befelh), Heidegger moves on to the word to cover [bergen] or to 
“commit” (command), to send [befehlen] the dead to the earth or into the fire (to 
send something in such a way as to have it covered by something else). “Imparare 
(im-parare) is to arrange [einrichten], take necessary measures [die Vorkehrung 
treffen], to occupy in advance, and so to take possession of the occupied territory 
and to rule it. „Imperium is the territory [Gebiet] founded on commandments [Ge-
bot], in which the others are obedient [botmässig]“. Heidegger continues: “Com-
mand, as the essential ground of domination, includes being-superior, which is 
only possible as the constant surmounting of others, who are thereby the inferiors. 
[…] The essence of the imperium resides in the actus of constant “action” [im 
actus der ständigen ‛Aktion’].” 
3. There are a few recent papers about this “definition” already used by Cicero, Sir 
Edward Coke and William Blackstone, which origin is uncertain. Two books 
systematically treat this issue: Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Rubin, 
2006:55) and Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of Law. Piracy and the Law of 
Nations (2009:16-17 et passim). 
4. “Der solidarische Feind müsse den solidarischen Widerstand erzeugen.” (See 
Binding, 1885:379). 
5. Confederate(s) is a member of gang or a combination of persons to do an unlaw-
ful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. Hugo Grotius analyzes, in detail, 
the institution of “declaration of war” in the book The Rights of War and Peace 
(Book 3, § 3, 1-2), as well as a community or group within whose backgrounds are 
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evil and crimes: “Neither does a State immediately cease to be a State, tho’ it 
commits some Acts of Injustice, even by public Deliberation; nor is a Company of 
Pirates and Robbers  to be reputed a State [coetus piratarum aut latronum civitas 
est], tho’ perhaps they may observe some kind of Equity among themselves, with-
out which no Body can long subsist.” (Grotius, 2005:1247); Cf. Rubin, 2006:26-
27; 58-59). 
6. In the text “Deutschland und der Weltkrieg” (29.08.1914) Friedrich Meinecke 
says that Austria and Germany were provoked into war because the country and 
people of Serbia were unable to lead an honorable and loyal war [loyale Krieg], 
rather they instigated fanatical, barbarian and criminal politics. Meinecke insists 
that he understands completely the Serbian wish to establish a nation state, but 
contends that for a people to be able to do so successfully they must prove that 
they are a cultured people [Kulturvolk] (Meinecke, 1958:96-97). 
7. The three files are marked RW 265. 19904, 19905, 19906. Carl Schmitt-Archiv. 
Landesarchiv NRW, Abteilung Rheinland. The files contain Schmitt’s detailed 
notes used in the writing of his texts “Der Begriff der Piraterie” (autumn 1937), 
texts concerning the sea and the state in a time of war, books on Nomos and books 
on the partisans. Schmitt analyzes, in detail, the expression “hostis generis hu-
mani”, Cicero’s fragments and Robespierre’s speeches. He systematically reads 
Paul Stiel’s books, texts concerning piracy from the American Journal of Interna-
tional Law from 1932 and 1935, and Philip Gosse’s book The History of Piracy 
from 1932. In 1943 Schmitt works in the Berlin library. Found in file RW 265. 
19906 is a photocopy of a chapter on piracy from Gilbert Gidel’s book, Le droit 
international public de la Mer. It is interesting that in a lecture titled “Land und 
Meer. Ist Seeherrschaft in der bisherigen Form noch möglich?,” held in Hamburg 
on January 12, 1945, one of many lectures concerning the sea he holds during the 
war in different cities across Europe, Schmitt speaks about “an end to the oceanic 
space and a new space in the air [Luftraum]. This is the end of English power. In 
the space of the English island a great quasi island of North America appears (the 
United States and Canada). North America creates ein Luftimperium over the 
world.” (Tommissen, 1996:85). 
8. The Guardian, Saturday 22.11.08, p. 1. 
9. The Latin word furandi is translated as stealing, an animo means “with intent.” 
10. In the original there are no quotes around der Piraterie. In the Italian transla-
tion, published in February 1939 in the journal La vita italiana (Anno XXVI, p. 
189-193), quotation marks appear around the word piratería [Il concetto di “pirate-
ria”] yet they should not be present according to Italian orthography. At the end of 
Schmitt’s text, a work that was quite freely translated, the translator is not named. 
The author of these “reverse” quotations could be Julius Evola who appears at the 
end of Schmitt’s text (p. 193-194), writing in the name of the editors about the 
debate which Schmitt’s text su la Guerra totale caused upon its publication in 
December 1938. 
11. Carl Schmitt-Archiv. Landesarchiv NRW, Abteilung Rheinland RW 265. 20105, 
20067. 
12. “Whoever calls to mind the specific state and political condition of the con-
temporary Mediterranean must immediately confront the question of where, then, 
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the non-political sea-thieves [unpolitische Seeräuber] could find an empty space of 
complete statelessness [Nichtstaatlichkeit] in which to run their business.”(Schmitt, 
1996:241). The translation is taken from a book by D. Heller-Roazen (2009:143). 
13. Flensburger Nachrichten, 29.04.1938. Carl Schmitt-Archiv. Landesarchiv 
NRW, Abteilung Rheinland RW 265. 20105. 
14. Carl Schmitt-Archiv. Landesarchiv NRW, Abteilung Rheinland RW 265. 20067. 
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THE RIGHT TO BE SUBJECT  





A major problem that non-citizens continue to face is arbitrary detention. 
Although arbitrary detention is prohibited under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, non-citizens—especially asylum seekers, un-
documented immigrants, and victims of trafficking—continue to be placed 
in detention for indefinite periods. 
—Weissbrodt, 2008:3-4 
 
In this paper I look for guidance from Magna Carta for disputes in 
contemporary international law.1 Magna Carta was slightly amended in 
1225 to include, after “desseised,” the words “of any free tenement or of 
his liberties or free customs.” When added to the idea of outlawry already 
in the original version of Magna Carta, this was understood to mean also 
the right not to be deprived of citizenship rights (see Thompson, 1948:68). 
As we move slowly toward an international legal order, one of the key 
rights will be something like the right to be a subject of international law, 
and the right not to be forced to lose the protection of one’s rights as a 
“citizen of the world.” Related to these rights is the idea, also from Magna 
Carta, that something like trial by jury of one’s peers is crucial for the 
protection of all of one’s other rights. I am not proposing that the category 
of “world citizen” is yet established in practice today, but only that as we 
move slowly toward such a global order there are various procedural rights 
that will need to be secured to guarantee to all persons the equal protection 
of international law. The positive right to be subject to international law, 
or the negative right not to be excluded from the protection of international 
law, is of the highest priority for the progressive development of some-
thing like global citizenship rights that correspond to human rights. 
The idea explored in this paper, is for international courts or other in-
stitutions to step in and offer relief when detainees have been allowed to 
slip between the cracks of extant legal systems or rights-enforcement re-
gimes. In addition, I would also argue that something like trial by jury in 
criminal matters should be an acknowledged international right, which can 
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be overridden only in rare cases. And this is probably the most controver-
sial of the various proposals to adopt Magna Carta’s procedural rights. 
For there have not yet been major international instruments that have rec-
ognized trial by jury as a requirement of criminal proceedings. This was 
one of the lynchpins of the evolving Magna Carta doctrine. The right to a 
jury by one’s peers is crucial for justice, or so it was thought over time as 
procedural justice developed in England in the centuries after Magna 
Carta. Yet today there are no international jury trials, so this right is a long 
way from being recognized and enforced, although the recently decided 
United States Supreme Court decision in Boumediene seems to be on the 
road to recognizing this right.2 
In this paper, I will first examine the idea of being an outlaw or a State-
less person as someone who is effectively rightless. Second, I will explain 
what it means to be rendered an outlaw in international law. I will argue 
that each human person has a right not to be outlawed in this way. Third, I 
will connect the right not be outlawed to something like the right to trial 
by a jury of one’s peers. I will acknowledge that in some cases it is very 
difficult to allow for such a right in international law, but nonetheless 
argue that the cases where the right to jury is denied should be few. 
Fourth, I will argue that once these rights are recognized, we will have 
progressed quite far toward a full version of the international rule of law. 
Finally, I will address an objection to my proposal for seeing the world 
peopled by global citizens. In addressing this objection, I outline my gen-
eral normative view which falls somewhere between a state-centric and an 
individual-centric position about global justice. 
I. The Concepts of Outlawry and Statelessness 
The term outlaw literally refers to the status of being outside the law. 
At the time of Magna Carta, a person could escape from the sanctions of 
the State by leaving its jurisdiction, which meant going to the parts of 
England where the King’s armies did not reach. But there is a more inter-
esting way to become an outlaw, namely by being made into an outlaw by 
the King’s act of stripping a person of his or her effective citizenship 
rights and forcing him or her out of the protective jurisdiction of the 
King’s law. And among the things that this meant was that a person was 
no longer able to petition to have a jury of one’s peers determine if he or 
she had been properly deprived of rights or wronged in other ways. Out-
laws could be killed without risk of State sanction, but nonetheless became 
folk heroes in England and many other societies emerging out of feudal-
ism (see Hobbsbawn, 1972). 
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The somewhat mythical “Robin Hood” story illustrates both senses of 
being an outlaw. He is said to have escaped the King’s sanctions, perhaps 
at the time of Magna Carta itself in the early thirteenth century, by retreat-
ing into Sherwood Forest where the King’s men could not easily get to 
him. But it is also alleged, on his behalf, that the King, perhaps either 
Edward or John, improperly issued sanctions against Robin Hood and 
thereby forced him into outlaw status (see Dobson and Taylor, 1977). 
What I am interested in is the latter type of case although I recognize that 
sometimes it is difficult to sort out the causes of a person’s becoming an 
outlaw. In this sense, there is a close parallel between Robin Hood and the 
detainees at Guantanamo who were forced out of the protection of all legal 
systems, and became effectively rightless. 
The term outlaw today is more commonly used to refer to those who 
spurn the legal requirements of civilized societies, by voluntarily choosing 
not to conform to legal standards. Robin Hood may have been a case in 
point, although as I said it is not clear. In any event, historically, pirates 
are those who have often been declared to be outlaws, in the sense of hav-
ing placed themselves outside of the obligations of the law. In this sense, it 
is also true that the “outlaw” status is often claimed to trigger a kind of 
reaction, both domestically and internationally, not to respect the rights of 
these people who are outside the law. I have previously argued that this is 
a grave mistake (see May, 2007: ch. 14; May, 2008, ch. 15). 
I would like to revive the older idea of an outlaw as someone who has 
been forced outside of the protection of the law, and to reserve the term 
bandit for those, like pirates, who have voluntarily chosen to be outside of 
the protection and obligation of the law. Magna Carta was an agreement 
or charter between King John and the feudal barons. Chapter 39 (normally 
referred to as Chapter 29, in the 1225 revised version of King Henry III) 
says: 
 
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or desseised or exiled or out-
lawed or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. 
 
One of the least commented on parts of Magna Carta was the right not 
to be made an outlaw as one of the rights that was to be protected by the 
King. This right was clearly related to the right not to be exiled. Indeed, 
both of these ideas, exile and outlawry, are attempts by the leaders of the 
State to remove a citizen or subject from the protection of the laws into a 
realm, whether it be outside the territorial borders of the State or outside 
the domestic reach of the State. It might be thought that today, becoming 
an outlaw is not much of a problem because there are no longer places 
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within States that are not subject to the legal protection of the State. Yet, 
Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Air Base are examples today, as are the 
detention centres for those who are unsuccessful asylum seekers, as well 
as refugee camps. 
In the remainder of this section I will briefly explore the reasons for 
thinking that there is a right not to be arbitrarily made into an outlaw. The 
most important point here is that when one is placed outside of the protec-
tion of the State one has effectively lost one’s rights as a member of that 
State, whether subject, citizen, or resident. To render someone an outlaw is 
most significantly to render ineffective this person’s civil rights. There is a 
sense in which a person never really loses rights merely when they are not 
protected. But rights have little meaning except as hortatory unless there is 
a political body that recognizes that it must respond when claims are made 
on the basis of one’s rights. 
In the case of human rights, it is even clearer that one cannot literally 
lose one’s rights, since they are premised on being a member of the human 
community. But as in the case of civil rights, if no State or other institution 
protects these rights then it is as if one has indeed lost these rights. Being 
made an outlaw is then equivalent to being deprived of the right to be 
subject to a legal regime where one’s other rights are protected or at least 
given uptake, or recognized, by some institution in the claims one makes. 
And this is simply one of the very worst things that can happen to a per-
son, nearly equivalent to ceasing to be a person altogether. 
Conceptually, it is not necessary that a person be a citizen of a particu-
lar State in order to be effectively a rights-bearer. This is especially true if 
we are talking of legal rights rather than moral rights. But even in the case 
of legal rights, a person who is Stateless could still be a rights-bearer if 
there is some political entity other than a State of which the person is a 
citizen. If there were to be a world government that had the ability to grant 
world citizenship status to those who are not formally citizens of any na-
tional State, then people could be effectively rights-bearers even though 
not citizens of any national State. 
In my view, rights-bearers must have some political institution to 
which they can appeal if their rights are not respected or their rights-claims 
are not heard. James Hathaway has summarized the issue in respect to 
refugees: “Refugee status is a categorical designation that reflects a unique 
ethical and consequential legal entitlement to make claim on the interna-
tional community.”3 To have international rights, such as the right to be 
protected as a refugee, means being able to make claims against the inter-
national community, since refugees are seeking national citizenship status 
but currently lack it. 
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For purposes of analytic clarity, we can distinguish between de jure 
and de facto statelessness. People who are de jure stateless literally have 
no official citizenship in any national State, having either lost their official 
citizenship status or never having been granted such status. People who are 
de facto stateless may be people who have left their country of habitual 
residence in order to seek asylum, or who have lost their citizenship pa-
pers, or who are attempting to return to their country of habitual residence 
but are blocked from doing so. Such people are de facto stateless since it 
may be true that they formally are citizens of a State, but that they cannot 
exercise their rights as citizens for various reasons (perhaps because they 
are detained in another State) and are thereby effectively rendered state-
less. 
Being a person, a moral subject, is to occupy the status of having both 
rights and duties—indeed, there is a sense that the rights and duties corre-
late with each other, so that if one has obligations without also having 
rights one has ceased to be a full moral subject. This is similar to how 
those who are languishing in prison had no hope of getting out. In such 
cases, the jailer has no accountability for the treatment of the prisoner, 
who has “disappeared” as a person, and may as well be dead. Of course, 
these people have the benefit of not having actually died, but as far as their 
rights go, it is very much like they have indeed died. The disappeared are 
just one of many contemporary cases of being made an outlaw. And as we 
will explore in the next section, such cases are a major affront to the idea 
of human rights and to international, as well as to domestic, protections of 
the rule of law. 
Outlawry is not often discussed anymore, but I believe that a return to 
this idea can help illuminate what is especially problematic about States 
that hold detainees for indefinite duration, effectively depriving them of 
rights of subjects or citizens. Such actions are very much like exiling or 
deporting someone, but doing so in such a way that the detainee remains 
within the territory of the State. This is precisely what it meant in late 
Medieval England to force a person to be an outlaw.  I will draw on the 
insights about this idea from English history to discuss the idea’s modern 
day equivalent in international law. 
II. Outlawry and Statelessness in International Law 
The term outlaw does not have a technical definition in international 
law. Perhaps the closest idea is that of being an outlaw or rogue State, 
namely a State that does not subscribe to the main provisions of interna-
tional law. There are two other popular meanings of individuals who are 
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outlaws that are also not technical usages in international law. First, a 
person could be an outlaw in the sense that he or she is stateless. As a 
stateless individual, and hence without the protection of the laws of any 
State, the person is both outside the laws of States and also to a certain 
extent outside international law, insofar as international law is formed by 
the agreements of States. Second, a person could be an outlaw in the sense 
of being expelled from a State and not allowed to enter any other State, 
perhaps destined to remain in the high seas, and hence not in the territory 
of any State. In this latter sense, a person can be an outlaw in international 
law in the same way that Robin Hood was an outlaw in Sherwood Forest 
in the 13th Century. 
Currently, there are many people who are stateless and in that sense 
they are the modern equivalent of outlaws. Some of these people are in 
refugee camps, having been expelled from their home country but now not 
recognized as members of the State in which they reside. Some of the 
people are in detention centres in countries like the United States and 
Australia, having arrived on the soil of these countries but then having 
been denied asylum. With no State willing to accept them, they are placed 
into detention centres (often some of the most gruesome prisons) to wait 
for some State to accept them, or their asylum decisions to be overturned 
on appeal. 
In the current regime of international law, one is not necessarily unpro-
tected if one is stateless, but it certainly is harder for one’s rights to be 
protected without some sort of membership or citizenship status in an 
existing State. Various treaties have attempted to protect those who are 
Stateless including many who would otherwise be outlaws. The Geneva 
Conventions tried to protect all those who suffered from the ravages of 
war, including those who had become displaced during war from their 
original States. The Refugee Convention and the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination singled out displaced persons 
for special protection. And the Convention Relating to the Status of State-
less Persons, which was modelled on the Refugee Convention, is quite 
explicit in setting out a regime to protect the rights of stateless persons. 
But as I will argue later, these various regimes suffer from the fact that 
there is no effective international institution to which people can appeal 
when they are deprived of what the regimes are supposed to secure. 
There is one class of outlaws that has remained virtually unprotected, 
namely those who have been expelled from the protection of law because 
of their alleged illegal activities or the danger they pose to the State in 
question. Indeed, the Stateless Persons Convention explicitly rules out the 
application of the treaty to those who “have committed a serious non-
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political crime outside the country of their residence prior to their admis-
sion to that country” (Article 1.2 [iii] b). This is a major gap in the protec-
tion of human rights, and especially of procedural rights. 
Those who are not citizens of a given State and have been detained 
within that State, and whose detention is for an indefinite period of time, 
are some of the clearest cases of individuals who fall through the cracks of 
the system of protection afforded by States. These people may not be 
strictly “stateless” in a de jure sense. Yet since there has been no determi-
nation that their asylum status may not be revived or that there might not 
be a State that can be found to accept them, they may be de facto stateless. 
If a State offers security reasons for not granting asylum or for not trans-
porting the person to another State, the person in question is in a kind of 
limbo, and the major international instruments on statelessness do not 
seem able to grant to these people the protection they need. 
Another category of people who do have recognized protection, al-
though not enough, are those refugees who have been forced to flee their 
home States and who have not been accepted as subjects or citizens of the 
State in which they find themselves. The refugee camps of the world are 
largely centres of “detention” if that term is used a bit more broadly than 
normal, where the inhabitants are also effectively rightless in that no State 
is willing to protect them from the most severe of human rights threats, 
including the threat of death, rape, and other serious harm. While these 
people are recognized as stateless, and there are international treaties that 
afford them rights protection, there are so many gaps here that being in a 
refugee camp most closely resembles being in a Hobbesian state of nature 
rather than in a state of civil society. 
One of the reasons for the problem of rights enforcement in refugee 
camps is that some of the people in these camps may indeed be people 
who have a criminal past, even as the overwhelming majority of these 
people are innocent men, women, and children. But the fact that there are 
some miscreants in these camps has given the host State the ability to 
mount a claim that it does not have to protect these folks since they pose a 
threat to the safety or security of that State. Worse yet, it has sometimes 
given the host State what it believes is its right to attack the people in the 
refugee camps. 
There is a specific provision of the Refugee treaty that should govern 
some of these matters, but also seemingly has a gap. The problem relates 
to the interplay of rights protection and security issues. As Matthew Gib-
ney puts it, there is a clash of perspectives here that is hard to reconcile. 
In the first, the view of the person forced from his country, to be a 
refugee is to be “lost.” The refugee is forced to eke out an existence in a 
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place where the social and political markers that enable orientation in the 
world are alien and difficult to decode. In the second, the perspective of 
the receiving country, the refugee is an interloper, someone from whom 
any request is “impertinent,” or … “shameless.” He is a person who, be-
trayed by his own state, is forced to rely on the sufferance of others.4 
From this clash of perspectives it is hard to see how to proceed without 
some kind of adjudicatory board that could decide whether the rights of 
the refugee or the interests of the State should prevail. Suffice it here to 
say that if to be a refugee one must cross into a given State, then it is in the 
interest of some if not many States to keep potential refugees from ever 
getting that foothold on their claimed rights. 
In the discussion of the application of the Geneva Conventions, The 
ICRC Commentary authors state that the clear intention of the Geneva 
Convention drafters was that the Geneva Conventions would not have gaps 
such that some people would not be protected in the aftermath of war 
(Pictet, 1958:51). I will here make a similar argument for the gapless reach 
of international law. It should not matter whether one is in a refugee camp 
in an adjacent State or on the soil of a given State in terms of whether 
refugee status can be claimed, assuming that the basis of the claim is a 
good one. And in general, there should not be some people whose States 
protect their rights but where other people are effectively rendered right-
less because no State will protect them. 
My main point is that if human rights have meaning it is that people 
have significant rights, and should also have protections, merely by being 
members of the human or world community. When a person is deprived of 
human rights protection by falling through the cracks of the regime of 
international rights protection that person is effectively rendered not fully 
human. I will expand on this idea later in this paper and I will also later 
address the fourth and most controversial of the Magna Carta legacy 
rights, trial by a jury of one’s peers, and connect this right to the right not 
to be outlawed. Before addressing that topic let me briefly discuss what is 
meant by my claim that individuals should be subject to international law. 
III.  Being a Subject of International Law 
There are of course two meanings of the term “subject” in the expres-
sion “subject to international law.” People are subject to a legal regime 
when they have obligations to obey the legal rules of that regime. And 
people also are subject to a legal regime when they have legal rights that 
are enforced in that regime. In the Stateless Persons Convention, the obli-
gations are listed first, before the lengthy discussion of rights. I believe 
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that this is no accident, since like all multilateral treaties, the drafters 
wanted to make it as appealing to States as they could. As in matters of 
corporate governance generally, those in control of corporate power have 
looked for a linking of rights with responsibilities. And the international 
domain is no exception here, with global leaders as well as national lead-
ers all looking for a way to bind people to arrangements that increase secu-
rity as well as rights globally. 
As international law becomes less infirm and more like domestic legal 
systems, procedures are needed guaranteeing that individuals are subject to 
international law in both senses of the term “subject.” There are currently 
significant impediments to recognizing that all persons are subject to in-
ternational law in both of these ways. Not the least of these impediments is 
that international law relies heavily on States to enforce the provisions of 
international law. States are sometimes quite reluctant to enforce interna-
tional law when it conflicts with domestic law or where its enforcement is 
against one of its own nationals, especially high ranking political and 
military leaders who are its nationals. And because of this reluctance, 
especially when the State in question also does not feel bound to protect 
the rights of the individual in question as a matter of domestic law, the 
individual ends up being effectively rightless. 
Think again of people who are truly stateless in that they have been 
forced out of their home State and have not been accepted as subjects or 
citizens of another State, perhaps now eking out a bare existence in a refu-
gee camp on the border of their previous home State. David Miller has 
argued that no one has a right to become a member of a particular State 
(Miller, 2007:ch. 8). But what if one is now denied membership in any 
State? One could agree with Miller that no State has an obligation to ac-
cept this person and still feel that the person has the right to be subject to 
some legal order. So if no State will grant the person citizenship, then at 
very least the person needs to have minimal citizenship rights protection 
extended in some sense by the international community. 
Miller argues that States have the right to decide who can become its 
subjects or citizens. And that this is important both for national identity 
and for meeting national responsibilities. In this work I will not take a 
stand on whether Miller is correct about this or not, although I would dis-
agree with him about a number of aspects of his position and its support-
ing arguments. But even Miller would have to admit that in some cases the 
State’s complicity in the statelessness of a person could affect whether that 
State has obligations to the stateless person. But the very difficult case is 
when no State thinks it has special obligations to a given stateless person, 
and yet when the rights of the person call for some kind of protection. My 
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view is that if international protection of human rights was not so infirm, it 
might make sense in the way that Miller suggests that no State has an 
obligation to protect this person’s rights, but that the person is not effec-
tively rightless since the international community does have such an obli-
gation. 
For international law to recognize that all humans are subjects of inter-
national law, in terms of looking to international law for protection of their 
rights, the most obvious thing to do, and what I have proposed throughout 
this work, is for there to be a special international court or other institution 
that looks to the protection of procedural rights that would indeed guaran-
tee that all people are subjects before the law and have access to the equal 
protection of the international law. Indeed, the somewhat expanded notion 
of the rights of detainees that I defended above called for there to be 
minimal due process in the sense that everyone was recognized as equal 
before the law. The idea is that everyone should be seen as equal before 
international law as well, as in a sense citizens or subjects of the world. 
But as we will see, some have challenged this idea, arguing that it is uto-
pian to talk of there being a category of citizenship of the world. I address 
this concern in the final section of this paper. But first I discuss a very 
controversial, although quite important, right. 
IV. Trial by Jury 
The most controversial of all of the rights I have discussed in this book 
is the right to trial by jury of one’s peers. At the moment such a right is not 
recognized in international law and is generally not offered in international 
tribunals. Instead, even trial courts at the international level are staffed by 
panels of judges. And in addition, trial by jury is the least like a procedural 
right of all of the Magna Carta legacy rights as well. Yet, as I will argue in 
this section, trial by jury is intimately related to the more widely recog-
nized procedural rights, like habeas corpus and non-refoulement that de-
rive from Magna Carta. Indeed, Magna Carta contained at least a rudi-
mentary idea of trial by jury as one of the four rights enshrined in the fa-
mous Chapter 29. And in my view there was good reason to have trial by 
jury linked to the other rights, especially the right to be subject to law. 
One might think of Magna Carta’s reference to trial by a jury of one’s 
peers as equivalent to what that idea means today. But this is a mistake—
rather it is the way that this right developed especially in the 17th century 
that is like the right today. At the time of Magna Carta, trial by jury in its 
modern sense was not what was at stake. What the barons sought to secure 
was the practice “known as recognitio or inquisitio, which was introduced 
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into England by the Normans and was simply the practice of obtaining 
information on local affairs from the sworn testimony of local men.” It is 
true that very soon thereafter the information was then institutionalized as 
the basis of the initial indictment, and that another group of men was then 
asked to render a verdict in place of trial by ordeal. But according to many 
historians, what the barons called for at Magna Carta is not the same insti-
tution as what we now call trial by jury (McKechnie, 1914:134-138). The 
idea, though, of having a group of men decide the legitimacy of the in-
dictment and also the verdict is clearly related to the inquisitio that was 
indeed one of the main rights of Magna Carta. And it is still historically 
uncontested that such a right had influence on the emerging right of trial 
by jury that has come down to us today. 
In an excellent study of trial by jury, Michael Hill and David Winkler 
describe a long-term project on juries that sought input from scholars 
across the globe. Here is one of their conclusions: 
 
History apart, there appear to be two principle justifications for having 
juries: 
They are independent decision-makers. 
They respect society in the disposition of criminal cases and, as such, 
they satisfy one (at least) of the socio-political imperatives … [that] gov-
ernment is “by the people” (Hill and Winkler, 2000:397-443;411). 
 
Hill and Winkler argue that jury trials can be defended in terms of fair 
trials although they acknowledge that there may be other ways to achieve 
fair trials, and that various societies in the past seemed to achieve fair trials 
without the institution of the jury trial as we understand it today in western 
societies. 
There are serious costs in a jury system—and “Practitioners working in 
an existing jury trial system ignore the cost argument at their (and the 
system’s) peril” (Hill and Winkler, 2000:412). As the Dutch have seen, in 
some cases efficiency can be maintained and cost can better be contained 
when professional judges make decisions rather than lay juries (Hill and 
Winkler, 2000:413-414). And professional judges are much less likely to 
disregard the law and engage in “nullification” than are lay juries. In addi-
tion, in societies without a history of trial by jury, legitimacy of verdicts is 
far more likely to be recognized by the public if juries are not employed. 
And there has never been a system that relied exclusively on juries in any 
event, giving rise to the idea that at very least juries are not in and of 
themselves stable enough to sustain fair trials. 
In my view, despite its potential pitfalls, trail by jury is worth defend-
ing at the international level. In the long history of Anglo-American juris-
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prudence from Magna Carta until today, the right to trial by jury has been 
seen as highly significant in the general protection of the law that should 
be afforded to all persons who fall under the law’s jurisdiction. At least in 
part, this is because trial by jury of one’s peers is likely to be less subject 
to political manipulation and abuse than trial by a “jury” of social and 
political elite judges. Underlying this position is the idea that there is more 
of a commonality of interest between a person and his peer group than 
between elites and persons standing in the dock. 
Commonality of interest between those who risk conviction and those 
who do the convicting is important in trials so that those risking conviction 
have the sense that the proceedings have been fair ones. Of course, those 
who share commonalities of interest can be unfair to one another. But the 
kind of unfairness that comes from people having unreasonable expecta-
tions or not knowing the normal expectations of people in a particular 
society can be blunted by making sure that people from the same society 
as the accused are in the group that decides on conviction. Even judges 
that come from the same region as the accused do not necessarily have 
commonality of interest since such commonalities are a function of socio-
economic status as well as region. 
Trial by jury of one’s peers also gives expression to the idea that those 
who are accused and those who accuse are part of the same community. 
This is important because it means that the duties that a person is accused 
of having violated are specifically correlated with rights to a fair process in 
determining whether those duties were in fact violated. Such correlations 
can be maintained by those who are not one’s peers. But the thought is that 
peers will respect such rights because they can better identify with what it 
is like to have these rights not respected. The idea that one has peers, and 
that they are the ones who have convicted the accused, is important for 
establishing the respect for the accused as a rights-holder. 
There is though a very important practical problem—namely that in in-
ternational criminal law, a true jury of one’s peers would have to be drawn 
from the community the complaining party comes from, and that may well 
be half a world away from where the trial is to take place. And these jury 
members would have to be transported to The Hague, for instance, and 
housed for potentially several years. In addition, many parts of the world 
do not have a tradition of trial by jury, and if the complaining party comes 
from that part of the world, then there is a serious problem about how to 
get the members of his society to the point where they understand what it 
means to sit as a jury of his peers. And finally, there is the problem that 
issues in international law tend to be rather more complex than domestic 
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issues and so there is reason to think that a jury of one’s peers will find it 
difficult even to understand the issue to be decided upon. 
One way to respond to some of these objections is to restrict the scope 
of such trials, or perhaps initially to make them more like administrative 
hearings rather than full-blown trials. Hearings sometimes have small 
juries, and this would make things easier given the above difficulties. In 
addition, those hearings could be held initially in situ, as a fact-finding 
matter, and then the determination of applicable international law could be 
determined back in the place where the international tribunal or adminis-
trative panel regularly meets. 
What is more important is that the spirit of trial by jury prevails rather 
than the letter. So, in this context what is crucial is that there are some 
people who are deciding major issues of the trial, especially factual mat-
ters, who are not merely drawn from the elite of the society and thus may 
not have much sympathy for a marginalized member of that society who 
appears before them. Indeed, the role of juries is to decide factual issues 
rather than issues of law in any event, so the complexity of the law is not 
necessarily an impediment to having trials with juries instead of merely 
trials with banks of jurists drawn from regions of the world that are quite 
different from the region where the defendant resides. 
The issue of whether to have trial by juries is primarily one of afford-
ing to the individual defendant some kind of guarantee that his or her in-
terests will not be significantly discredited because the people judging do 
not share those interests or even understand them. And there are various 
ways to help here, perhaps if we construct a progressive list of things that 
would lead to robust jury trials but would also include less robust institu-
tional checks. On this list would be: 
 
1) multiple-judge panels that have some jurists from the defendant’s region; 
2) multiple-judge panels that have some jurists from the defendant’s State; 
3) preliminary hearing panels that contain defendant’s peers; 
4) juries that contain some of defendant’s peers; 
5) juries that contain mainly defendant’s peers. 
 
In each of these alternatives, we move progressively closer to true 
trial by jury in international trials. 
If we think even more creatively, we can imagine other types of hear-
ings, especially administrative hearings, which can partially serve the 
spirit of the principle of trial by jury of one’s peers.5 In domestic contexts 
it is common to have these proceedings conducted by members of the 
professional class. But this need not be the case, as is sometimes true in 
small claims courts in the United States or in alternative dispute resolution 
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proceedings. In such proceedings, it is possible to give the defendant a 
veto power over the mediator, or even to give the defendant a more direct 
say in who would be the mediator, chosen from a list of approved media-
tors. The principle undergirding trial by jury can be seen here in these 
various alternatives to proper trials as well. It is commonly objected that 
international law cannot accommodate the procedure of trial by jury of 
one’s peers. But as I have argued this is too simplistic a response. In spirit, 
if not in letter, this procedure can be accommodated to various degrees in 
international law today. And in doing so, it will be possible to embrace the 
principles that undergird trial by jury of one’s peers. 
It is also the case that the spirit of trial by jury of one’s peers is related 
to the idea that no one should be deprived of being subject of international 
law. The very idea of a person being judged by those who are his or her 
co-nationals, or fellow members of a smaller group such as state member-
ship in a federal system of states, is an idea that implicates the right to be a 
subject of the law. For without being a subject of a legal regime, there 
really aren’t peers that one has that could constitute a jury of one’s peers. 
This does not rule out, as I argue at the end of this paper, that one can be 
subject to more than one legal regime.  What has motivated my study is 
the idea that some people have been denied the protection of legal subject 
status. And part of what this means is that such other rights as the right to 
trial by jury is also called into question when a person is deprived of being 
a legal subject. On the other hand, having the right to be judged by a jury 
of one’s peers makes it harder for a person to be systematically deprived 
of legal status. 
V. Citizens of What? 
The objection I wish to take up at the end of this paper has to do with 
the idea of world citizenship with which I began. For there to be citizens 
of the world there must be a world community that would in some sense 
correspond to a nation-state, or else there would not be any entity or 
“State” for the people to be citizens of. Indeed, there seems to be some-
thing of a category mistake to say that there are citizens and yet for it to be 
unclear what political community these citizens are connected to. I shall 
address this objection by suggesting that there is enough of a world com-
munity for the idea of world citizens to begin to make sense, but that this 
does not commit me to full-scale cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitanism is the thesis that international morality only or pri-
marily concerns individuals. According to this view, the rights of indi-
viduals in the world, human rights, are not to be subjugated to the interests 
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or rights of States. The State has no, or very little, moral standing and 
indeed should not count in moral deliberations. Most cosmopolitans then 
make the leap to politics and argue that the individual is also the main unit 
of global politics, with the State greatly reduced in importance. And cos-
mopolitans are highly critical of attempts to talk of even a society of 
States. Yet, their perspective, much more so than mine, falls prey to the 
charge that it is simply utopian to think that there is anything like a global 
community that would be morally or politically prior to communities in 
States. 
I subscribe to the view that is often called “the society of States” per-
spective (see Caney, 2005:10-13). The international community is a com-
munity composed primarily of Sates and only secondarily of individuals. 
Nonetheless, there are human rights that are the rights of people qua hu-
man, not merely civil rights that are rights of State citizenship. The ques-
tion is what to make of claims about world citizenship. My view is that 
such claims are partly metaphor and partly reality, but that it is indeed 
utopian to talk of full-scale world citizenship. People have citizenship 
rights that relate to the States they are members of. But people also have 
subsidiary citizenship rights to the global community that their States are 
the primary members of. Human rights are normally mediated through 
States, although there are important exceptions when it comes to those 
who are stateless or whose rights are not being protected by their States. In 
my view, there is enough of a global community to speak non-
metaphorically of global citizenship insofar as we focus on the community 
or society of States. 
People are “citizens of the world” in two senses of that term. First, 
most people are citizens of some State that is part of a society of States. 
Second, for those who are not citizens of States or for whom States do not 
protect their rights, these people have a non-mediated right of citizenship 
in the world community. This latter category of citizenship is of a limited 
sort. The rights in question are rights to basic human rights and basic pro-
cedural rights, including the Magna Carta legacy rights I have been dis-
cussing. And when these rights are abridged, either States should redress 
their infringement, or failing that, these people still can pursue their rights 
directly in the international arena. The international “community” is then a 
stand-in for the society of States plus the protection mechanisms set up to 
deal with gaps that exist when people are stateless or when States have 
clearly demonstrated that they will not protect the human rights of their 
citizens. 
People are citizens of the world metaphorically in that they have hu-
man rights that their States should protect creating a situation in which it is 
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as if there were true citizenship rights of the world. And in those cases of 
statelessness or failure of a State to protect the human rights of its citizens, 
there is a non-metaphorical sense in which people are global citizens inso-
far as they can press their human rights claims for direct redress by various 
international institutions. In this way it is possible to answer the question 
of what people are citizens of when it said that they are citizens of the 
world. 
It could still be objected that there is not enough of a world commu-
nity for there to be anything other than the metaphorical sense of being a 
global citizen. In the remainder of this section I will attempt to respond to 
this variation of the objection I discussed above. There is a rudimentary 
international community in the sense that there are interlocking institutions 
that facilitate trade and health information and aid around the world. And 
such a community is as much as we need in order for there to be sufficient 
community of interest around the globe.  In fact, the emerging consensus 
about the most important substantive rights in international law, gives one 
hope that a similar consensus could emerge about procedural rights in 
international law as well. Such a consensus would provide fuel to the idea 
that there is generally an emerging idea of global citizenship. 
A related objection is that in thinking about the problems of this book 
in global terms I have neglected the fact that many global problems result 
from what States have done and it is States that can and should be the ones 
to remedy those problems. This is the position that David Miller defends 
in his book, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Miller, 2007). 
Miller argues that we must treat individuals as agents and not merely as 
patients in terms of global problems having to do with those who are poor 
or refugees. The poor or those who are refugees are inhabitants of States, 
and often those States have contributed to their problems. Such considera-
tions are not irrelevant. Indeed, it may mean that refugees do not have an 
absolute right to leave their home States and become members of another 
State. 
My response to this objection is to point out that pursuing global solu-
tions does not rule out also considering State-based solutions. Indeed, 
since I am not a cosmopolitan I do not have to worry about attacks like 
those of Miller as much as cosmopolitans do. My model remains that of 
the International Criminal Court, with its principle of complementarity. In 
many ways, this international court is really only a back-up and deterrent 
device to prod States to redress substantive rights violations. The various 
models concerning how to redress procedural rights violations are also 
meant to be back-up alternatives to what States can often do best if prop-
erly motivated. There is, of course, the special case of people who have no 
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State to appeal to, where international courts or other institutions will be 
the primary forum for their complaints.  But these cases will be excep-
tional. 
My view is that there is nothing wrong with the idea that most people 
are citizens or subjects of multiple legal realms. The two most important 
memberships are State and global. Being a citizen of the United States and 
also a citizen of the world is not significantly different from being a citizen 
of Missouri and a citizen of the United States, or perhaps the better anal-
ogy is to those people who hold dual citizenships. In any event, as I have 
indicated, being a citizen of the world in the sense that one has significant 
rights by virtue of being human does not necessarily indicate where those 
human rights are best protected, and certainly does not mean that one can 
press such rights claims only, either internationally or nationally. 
David Weissbrodt has stated: “The architecture of human rights law is 
built on the premise that all persons, by virtue of their essential humanity, 
should enjoy all human rights” (Weissbrodt, 2008:45). This right to equal-
ity before the law has been promulgated by various international bodies 
including the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee. But in the case 
of non-citizens, whether “migrants, refugees, stateless persons, and others, 
they share common experiences of discrimination and abuse” (Weissbrodt, 
2008:241). Few deny that human rights protections should be extended to 
all; what is at issue is how this should be implemented, and especially to 
what extent a State’s security interests can trump the protection of the right 
to equal protection of international law to all. 
In this paper, I have discussed the right not to be outlawed or removed 
outside the protection of law, the rights of those who are stateless, proce-
dural rights against discrimination and abuse of non-citizens of various 
kinds, and the related right to have a trial by jury of one’s peers. And I 
have ended by addressing the vexing question of what entity or “State” 
individuals are primarily subjects of when questions of international law 
are in play. Throughout, I have argued that one of the most important 
rights is the right to be a legal subject, and that one of the most important 
international rights that one has is the right to be subject to international 
law. The right to be subject to international law is a procedural right that 
has its roots in certain aspects of Magna Carta and also is a linchpin in the 
international rule of law. 
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Notes 
1. This paper is cut from Chapter 10 of my book-manuscript, Global Justice and 
Due Process. 
2. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2256 (2008). Kennedy cites Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Reid as criticizing Ross in wondering “whether jury trial 
should be deemed a necessary condition of the exercise of Congress’ power to 
provide for the trial of Americans overseas.” 
3. Hathaway (2007:352). Also see the discussion of this issue in Keebone 
(2009:304-308). 
4. Gibney (2006:139). Also see, Lane in Gibney (2006:171-172). 
5. For a discussion of related issues about who is the subject of the administrative 
regulatory action see Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005:24). 
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WORLD GOVERNMENT  





There is at present no such thing as a world government. But what, for 
a long time, was considered to be its antithesis, namely strong national 
sovereignty, has been considerably eroded. That erosion has taken many 
forms, but what has been one of the most interesting has been the estab-
lishing of an International Criminal Court. The ICC of course cannot work 
without a substantial degree of compliance on the part of largely autono-
mous nations. But domestic courts too cannot work without a substantial 
degree of compliance on the part of those over whom they claim jurisdic-
tion. In the case of most domestic legal systems there is such compli-
ance—secured, no doubt, by various means. Whether there is such com-
pliance in the case of the ICC is, at best, unclear, and the ICC, along with 
other erosions of national sovereignty, should perhaps be considered an 
experiment whose outcome is not yet known. My purpose in this paper is 
to suggest that, whatever may be true about the practicalities, we should in 
principle welcome at least this particular erosion of national sovereignty. 
1 
The ICC deals with “the most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community as a whole.”1 It is, however, “complementary to national 
criminal jurisdiction” (RSICC, Article 1). and most of those who have 
been punished for the crimes over which it has jurisdiction have been 
prosecuted by their own courts, or courts set up by an occupying authority 
after a war.2 Despite the largely woeful record of local courts in prosecut-
ing their own war criminals,3 that war crimes trials should be carried out in 
this way is no doubt, at present, the default presumption.4 But we need to 
be clear about what generates this presumption, and what follows from it. 
It has two possible sources. One is based upon local contingencies, 
considerations of what is possible, or even convenient, legally, politically, 
financially, and so on at a particular time and place; such considerations 
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alone could not provide a principled reason against international courts. 
The other source is based upon theoretical concerns about the rights of 
jurisdiction and the sovereignty of states, and is supposed to deliver a 
principled reason against international criminal jurisdiction.5 
The force of the latter concern is indicated by the fact that it is shared 
even by many who do not oppose international criminal courts, perhaps 
most notably by Larry May. It will be useful to examine May’s work; I 
think we shall find that the concern is misplaced and anyway cannot be 
allayed by the sort of argument with which we are familiar. Here is May 
contrasting international courts with humanitarian intervention: 
 
When the security of a person has been jeopardized by that person’s 
own state, then it is permissible for sovereignty to be abridged so as to ren-
der the individual secure. But when we ask about international tribunals 
that hold some individuals criminally liable for the violations of the secu-
rity of other persons, more needs to be shown than just that a person’s se-
curity has been breached. There must be some compelling reason why the 
international community is warranted in prosecuting individuals as op-
posed to states.6 
 
May thinks that the “compelling reason” must be found in a concern 
specific to “the international community,” a concern that gives the interna-
tional community a legitimate interest in prosecution. But why should we 
demand such a compelling reason? 
One argument is supposed to work by analogy with domestic law: the 
domestic community may legitimately punish offenders only if it has a 
legitimate interest in doing so, and it has such an interest only if an offense 
harms the community. By analogy, the international community is held to 
have a legitimate interest in punishing only those who cause harm to the 
international community.7 
But this argument seems wrong from the start. If we took seriously, 
and substantively, the claim about domestic criminal law, then domestic 
criminal law would have little work to do. Most offenses do not, in any 
real way, harm the community; they harm only the direct victims and 
some of those who are close to them in various ways. May says: “Often 
what is meant [by harming the community] is that [the community’s] resi-
dents are made less secure by the crime” (May, 2005:82), “just as when a 
woman is raped merely because she is a woman there is a sense in which 
all women are put in jeopardy and harmed.”8 Given that rape, so de-
scribed, is necessarily a recidivist crime, there is indeed a sense in which 
the fact that a woman has been raped “merely because she is a woman” 
raises the probability that other women will be raped too. But of course a 
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woman is not usually raped “merely because she is a woman”; there are 
usually other factors in play too. These factors will normally be universal 
properties and so the risk to the class of women possessing these proper-
ties will, everything else equal, necessarily be raised. But this class will 
rarely include the whole community. The community certainly has a le-
gitimate interest in preventing this risk; but that is not because the risk 
affects the whole community. What the community has a legitimate inter-
est in preventing is the harm done to particular people if they are raped. 
We prohibit rape, and punish it, in order to protect individual people from 
the harm that actually being raped would do to them. And if an action 
could be guaranteed to have no harmful effects on anyone other than its 
direct victim, the interest of the domestic community would remain largely 
intact. 
May further holds that that in domestic law it is a necessary condition 
of an offense being a public matter that it target the individual on the basis 
of group-membership: “criminal prosecutions should only go forward 
when group-based individual harm is alleged.” (May, 2005:82). We could 
make this trivially true: almost all offenses are committed against someone 
because of their possession of some universal property or other, and so 
because of their membership in a “group.” But if we don’t make this trivi-
alizing move, then it is surely false: a murder victim doesn’t have to be-
long to any specially significant group—a race, or gender, say—before his 
murderer should be prosecuted. Indeed, if it is possible to target someone 
as a victim under a description that involves no universal properties at 
all—if my aim is simply, as Kripke might have put it, to kill Nixon—then 
he doesn’t have to belong even to a trivial group. 
It is important here not to be misled by a theoretical fiction. It is often 
said that what distinguishes public from private law is that in the latter it is 
harm to the community that is of concern, not harm to the individual vic-
tim. But, in the sense in which this is true, the word “harm” carries a 
purely formal, theoretical meaning, bearing no more content than is re-
quired by the phenomenon it is intended to describe: the state lays down 
certain prohibitions and the harm to the community just is the violation of 
a prohibition. In this purely theoretical sense of “harm” it is a tautology 
that the state may punish only behaviour that harms the community, and 
that tautology can do none of the explanatory work that May requires.9 
If the first part of the argument is wrong then the argument by analogy 
fails. But imagine that the first part of the argument were correct. We 
should still need to be shown how international crimes affect the interna-
tional community and thus provide it with the “compelling reason” that 
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May requires. That is what he tries to show: international crimes must 
harm “the world community, or humanity”.10 
According to May, “harm to humanity” can arise in either of two ways: 
first when someone is wronged because he is a member of a group, and 
second when someone is wronged by the state. In the “ideal case,” there 
will be both (May, 2005:89). But since May’s emphasis on the second is 
largely the result of the fact that, according to him, it usually involves the 
first, I shall concentrate on the first.11 
May suggests that “the most promising” way to explain how group-
based offenses “harm humanity” is through the idea that “some significant 
characteristic of humanity is harmed, perhaps by harming it within each 
member of humanity” (May, 2005:85). That in turn is explained like this: 
group-based offenses show a “callous disregard for the individuality of the 
individual”, the “unique features of the individual” (May, 2005:85). The 
rough idea is that if you harm someone merely because they are a member 
of a group which they have not chosen to join then you are not harming 
them because of something unique to them. That is trivially true.12 But it 
clearly does not follow, and nor is it true, that you are harming them on the 
basis of something common to all humans. And still less does it follow 
that you have harmed something common to all humans. 
A different argument suggests that “all humans in all political commu-
nities” have a “shared interest” in peace and the protection of basic human 
rights (May, 2006:375). Each thus shares the interest of everyone else in 
peace and the protection of basic human rights and so when, say, some-
one’s basic human rights are violated, everyone’s interests are harmed. 
In fact, there may be communities, and people, who thrive on warfare. 
But let that pass. A different problem is that the notion of a shared interest 
is unclear here. 
Here is one reading: A group of people might have a shared interest in 
X in the sense that each has an interest in getting X. But of course it does 
not follow from this that each has an interest in any of the others getting X. 
So from the fact that each of a group of people has an interest in being at 
peace it does not follow that each has an interest in any of the others being 
at peace. This is surely what we often see in international affairs: it can be 
in the interest of one country to foment war between other countries. If it 
cannot, that is certainly neither a priori nor obvious. 
Perhaps May has in mind a stronger reading: each member of a group 
may have an interest in all members of the group getting X. In a two-
person case, this would presumably give us the result that May requires, at 
least as far as peace, or lack of conflict, is concerned. (It would not, how-
ever, apply to the protection of human rights.) But the two-person case is 
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obviously irrelevant to the question at issue, where we have many com-
munities and even more people; and the argument does not work except in 
the two-person case. As I said, it is neither a priori nor obvious that a 
community cannot have an interest in other communities being at war 
amongst themselves. 
May also has a different argument: 
 
Group-based harms are likely to be either more widespread, in the 
sense of not being restricted to isolated victims, or more systematic, in that 
they display more than just motivations of hatred or cruelty, than harms 
that are individually based. Group-based harms are of interest to the inter-
national community because they are more likely to... risk crossing borders 
and damaging the broader international community.13 
 
I shall make two comments on this. 
First, even when they affect a large proportion of a population, group-
based offenses—merely as such—have no more significant tendency to 
spread across borders than any other large scale persecution (random kid-
napping of people as slaves, for instance, or just widespread oppression). 
And indeed the vast majority of group-based persecutions have not spread 
across international borders in any significant way (racial discrimination in 
the US for example). It is really only a problem in special cases—when, 
for instance, the group itself is spread across borders, or when the group 
has significant support in other countries, or when it is sufficiently large 
and well-organized to create a destabilizing civil war, or large refugee 
problem. Most socially significant groups do not satisfy any condition of 
this sort. 
Secondly, the mere fact that group-based persecution spills across a 
border could not explain why the international community should have an 
interest that it did not already have. Take, for example, Idi Amin’s perse-
cution of his East Asian population. Many of them had British passports 
that were thought to give them a right to enter the UK, and many wished to 
do so. So the persecution did, in one sense, cross borders, since it faced the 
British government with a relatively small influx of refugees of Asian 
origin. But if the persecution was not already of concern to the interna-
tional community, then the mere fact that Britain would have to cope with 
this influx of Asian citizens could not make it so. It is true that this was a 
relatively small problem and was unlikely to lead to significant global 
instability. But it illustrates a larger point: group-based persecution hardly 
ever affects the international community rather than simply some proper 
subset of it. The wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, for instance, did not 
significantly affect, say, India or Brazil or a multitude of other member 
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states of the UN.14 I do not mean to imply that such countries had no sig-
nificant interest in those events. But their interest did not stem from the 
fact that borders were crossed. 
So far, May’s argument has been that the international community has 
a legitimate interest in war crimes because they cause “harm to humanity.” 
In War Crimes and Just War, the argument shifts: “humanity” now be-
comes “humaneness”: “War crimes are crimes against humaneness... [and 
they] affect an interest of the international community to minimize suffer-
ing by preventing inhumane treatment.”15 But now the wheel of humanity 
is turning idly. The international community certainly has “a legitimate 
interest” (suitably defined) in preventing suffering; that is just to say that it 
has a moral right to prevent suffering, and that is true simply because 
everybody has that right. But it doesn’t have a special right to prevent 
suffering caused by inhumane treatment. It has, for instance, exactly the 
same right to prevent suffering caused by injustice (again, suitably de-
fined). 
May starts this wheel spinning because he holds that soldiers may, as a 
matter merely of justice, do “nearly” anything in self-defence against an 
unjust aggressor: “when one side fights without just cause, the other side 
owes them nothing.”16 On that view, one will need to explain why there 
are moral restrictions on what soldiers may do to each other. May’s an-
swer is that those restrictions arise from “the duty of humanity,” i.e. the 
duty to act with mercy and compassion. But if this is not merely a termino-
logical stipulation about the scope of words such as “humaneness” and 
“justice,” then it is surely quite implausible. There are limits of justice on 
what one may do to an unjust aggressor in self-defence; if a co-worker 
tries to steal my ball-point pen and I spray his legs with bullets to prevent 
this, I shall not simply have failed in the virtue of mercy; I shall have done 
him a wrong, an injustice, and that reveals itself in the fact that he would 
have, in morality, and in most legal systems, a right to redress. There 
seems no reason to think that the situation is different with soldiers. Cer-
tainly, the international community has an interest in minimizing the rav-
ages of war. But that has nothing specially to do with humaneness, nor 
anything special to do with the international community, properly speak-
ing, nor even, really, with war. 
2 
As is perhaps already clear, I do not think that we need the contortions 
that May puts us through. The mistake is to assume that the burden of 
proof lies on those who support the internationalization of criminal law, 
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rather than those who question it. The correct starting point is to ask: why 
should the international community not have a right to prosecute and pun-
ish certain behaviour? Everyone has a right, within limits, to prevent peo-
ple from aggressing against others. That is simply a commonplace exten-
sion of the right of self-defence. It is a right the exercise of which we are 
happy to cede, in part, to our government, and that is, in my view, the 
normative underpinning of penal institutions. And there is no reason—in 
principle—why we should not cede to our government our right to prevent 
aggression wherever it occurs, and by whom, and upon whom, it is perpe-
trated; nor is there any reason, in principle, to refuse to cede it to any other 
trustworthy body. So what needs justifying is not the fact that the interna-
tional community, or the UK government, has a legal right to, say, prose-
cute Chileans who torture Chileans in their own country; what needs justi-
fying is that, for instance, the government of the UK has no legal right to 
prosecute Chileans who steal from Chileans in their own country. Now 
that can be justified—very easily—but the justification is not philosophi-
cally deep or very interesting; it has to do merely with practicalities, legal, 
political, financial and bureaucratic, for instance (and, no doubt, traditional 
habits of thought). 
It will seem otherwise, I think, only if one attributes more depth to the 
notion of the sovereignty of states than that notion actually merits, and 
thus thinks that international jurisdiction needs a special sort of justifica-
tion, or just an especially strong one, as does May. There are two ways in 
which one might attribute more depth to the notion of state sovereignty 
than it merits. 
First, one might attribute to the state a sort of intrinsic value, i.e. a 
value that does not depend upon causal consequences. The most natural 
way to do this is to link the value of states to the value of individual, 
autonomous agency. And the value of individual, autonomous agency 
involves at least the capacity for freely and rationally determining the 
means to one’s ends. What the connection is between freedom and ration-
ality, and whether autonomy requires rationally determining one’s ends, 
are matters that can be put aside for now. Individual, autonomous action, 
so understood may be thought to have intrinsic value. 
Now, to make plausible the idea that the state might have intrinsic 
value, we need to distinguish two sorts of intrinsic value: basic, and de-
rived. Few will nowadays attribute to the state a basic intrinsic value. But 
intrinsic value need not be basic; it may derive from a more basic value 
and yet still be intrinsic. In the present case, the most plausible candidate 
for basic value would be, I take it, individual autonomy. So, one might 
think that such autonomy has a basic, intrinsic value, and that the activities 
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of a group may derive intrinsic value from this. A group activity may, for 
instance, express the unanimous will of the members of the group and so 
will inherit whatever intrinsic value attaches to the autonomy of each 
member. Or, differently, a group may do something that it is impossible 
for an individual to do alone (participate in cooperation, for instance); in 
such a case, one might think that the activity has value as enhancing the 
possibilities of individual autonomy. In cases like these, we may say that 
the value of group autonomy is, though derived, nonetheless intrinsic. 
I have spoken so far of the intrinsic value of a group, but one may 
think, more specifically, that this value can transmit to the state too. The 
thought is that individual autonomy has an intrinsic value that transmits to 
self-governing groups, and that this value transmits in turn to the sover-
eignty of the state that is an expression of it. Given this thought, one might 
think that there is a principled, though perhaps rebuttable, objection to 
international courts, or at least those which claim jurisdiction over citizens 
who do not recognize them. 
But it is surely difficult to see that “group self-governance,” at the level 
of states anyway, is really of intrinsic value in the way outlined above. If a 
group “governs itself” through some process that results in un-coerced and 
unanimous agreements, then it is plausible to think that the value of indi-
vidual autonomy transmits—trivially—to the autonomy of the group. But 
that is not what happens in even the most democratic societies. Decisions 
are virtually never reached by unanimous consent; policies are often 
adopted that conflict with the convictions of some citizens. The most that 
could be hoped for would be that the decision-making machinery itself 
would have unanimous, thoughtful endorsement. But that too cannot be 
relied upon. Perfectly reasonable people object strongly to, for instance, 
the “first-past-the post” voting system in the United Kingdom, or the insti-
tution of the “Presidential College” in the United States. Many people 
object even to democratic processes altogether. And many have not delib-
erated rationally about the nature of the democratic process at all. Many 
such citizens often participate in political decisions involving these 
mechanisms. But many objecting citizens refuse to participate, and they 
have no alternative but to have others make their political decisions for 
them. Such a system cannot simply inherit the intrinsic value of individual 
autonomy. 
But perhaps the argument is supposed to work by analogy: the value of 
self-governing groups is in some important way like the value of autono-
mous, individual agents. As I mentioned earlier, self-governing groups can 
make possible rational deliberation, which can seem like the sort of delib-
eration that autonomous individuals go through. But if this is to work, it 
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must at least work in the standard case. And the standard case, even in the 
best democracies, is where rational deliberation does not produce unanim-
ity but only a majority view. But if we think of the group by analogy with 
the individual, then a group that acts on a mere majority preference is, at 
most, like an individual with a fractured will rather than an individual 
guided by reason in the way that is supposed to generate intrinsic value. 
But let us, for a moment, assume that group self-government has in-
trinsic value; it is a further step to assert that the sovereignty of states has 
intrinsic value; and this for two reasons. 
First, the legal doctrine of state sovereignty does represent a certain 
right of “self-government”; but it has nothing to do with, say, individual 
Englishmen each organizing their own lives; it represents only the bare 
right of, say, “the English” to be ruled by “the English.” But that would be 
achieved by an absolutist monarchy so long as the monarch and his or her 
subjects were all English. Something like that is pretty much the situation 
of many members of the United Nations and whatever value this may have 
it certainly does not have the sort of intrinsic value that derives from the 
value of individual autonomy outlined above. 
Second, one may think, as I do, that no particular value attaches to the 
notion of group self-government other than political accommodation to 
historical facts and their residue. But even if one denies that, it is impor-
tant to note that a group can “govern itself” in all the ways that it is legiti-
mate to demand without having state sovereignty. That is to say, no plau-
sible moral right to self-government, if there is one, extends to state sover-
eignty as that is understood even in recent international law. The Welsh, 
for instance, could govern themselves in every way that it is legitimate for 
them to demand without seceding from the United Kingdom. That is be-
cause the moral right to self-government does not extend to matters that 
impinge seriously on one’s neighbours. The moral right of the Welsh to 
self-government would not entitle them, for example, to go to war in de-
fence of Anglesey, in a way that was disastrous for the English; or so I 
should think. But in international law, Welsh state-sovereignty would 
grant just this right so long as the state was acting in self-defence and was 
not in breach of other provisions of international law. 
This brings us to the second of the two ways in which I said that one 
might attribute more depth to the notion of state sovereignty than it merits. 
On this way of thinking, the value that state sovereignty has is purely 
instrumental. And it must surely follow from this that the value attaching 
to international courts is also instrumental, and no special reason is re-
quired in order to justify them. The question is simply whether the lives of 
(enough) individuals go (sufficiently) better by recognizing them. And the 
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argument here surely inherits the results of our earlier arguments. Until we 
are given reason to think otherwise, we should presume that the threat of 
prosecution and punishment by suitably established and authoritative in-
ternational bodies will have some deterrent effect; and until given reason 
to think that the costs of particular such bodies are unacceptably high, we 
shall be justified in our adherence to them. 
May seems to address this point when he says that the point of states is 
to secure the protection of individuals and to ensure peace and harmony 
amongst states; and so long as a state is “conforming to this normative 
aim” there is a presumption against interference by other states.17 But as 
soon as we press “conforming to” this argument collapses under the 
weight of a dilemma. We may take it to mean “actually and wholly con-
forming to.” But since not even the most willing state has ever wholly 
secured the protection of all of its citizens, and could not possibly do so, 
the presumption would be utterly weak. We might modify the claim, then, 
and say that a state should be immune from interference as long it achieves 
this aim as far as it can, say, or to a reasonable degree. But now the claim 
will seem unmotivated, at least to those whose lives and wellbeing the 
state is not, as a matter of fact, willing or able to protect: why should one 
of those unfortunates not seek—and be entitled to get—protection else-
where? Remember that we are not now talking of one state invading an-
other on behalf of the downtrodden, but of an international legal order 
which, in some circumstances, might provide them deterrent protection 
and redress. To suggest that the citizens of a state that is doing only more 
or less what states ought to do should have no right to such a legal order, 
or even that there is a presumption in favour of this proposition, would be 
as if one were to say that, since the primary responsibility for the welfare 
of children falls upon parents, the children of those parents who care for 
them only more or less, or who are incompetent to care for them properly, 
should not normally be entitled to look to the law for protection from the 
harm that their parents allow to befall them. 
May perhaps offers a reply when he says, “Social stability requires ex-
clusive legal control over a population.” But though (some degree of) 
social stability may be a necessary condition of the protection of individ-
ual rights, they are not the same thing. And it is anyway, I think, plainly 
false that social stability requires exclusive legal control over a population 
(cf. Luban, 2006:356). The legal doctrine of state sovereignty is, after all, 
a relatively recent development in world history, and it has hardly ever 
been the case, and certainly is not now, that a state has “exclusive legal 
control over a population”. And those who have most vociferously laid 
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claim to it in the twentieth century have all too often had anything in mind 
but the protection of individual rights. 
Notes 
* This article was partly published as Anthony Ellis, 2010, “War Crimes, Punish-
ment and the Burden of Proof,” Res Publica, vol. 16:181–196. 
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [RSICC], Article 5. It has 
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and, some time in 
the future, international aggression. I shall refer to all of these crimes, somewhat 
inaccurately, as war crimes. 
2. Or local courts largely supported by an occupying power as with the Iraqi High 
Tribunal, largely overseen by the Regime Crimes Liaison Unit (a US Justice De-
partment agency located in the US Embassy in Iraq). 
3. It can be woeful in more than one way. After WWI, German prosecution of war 
crimes was derisory. In Rwanda, in the aftermath of the genocide, more than 
100,000 people have been imprisoned in dire conditions. 
4. But in somewhat remote circumstances, the ICC can take jurisdiction of a case 
from a local court (see the RSICC, Articles 13–19). 
5. Actually, virtually no sensible person objects to international criminal jurisdic-
tion as a whole; it’s a very old idea. The objection is really to the International 
Criminal Court and other UN tribunals. 
6. May (2005:81). May is speaking explicitly of international crimes generally, not 
just war crimes. He is largely followed in this view by Drumbl (2007:6;34;182). 
7. May (2005:82): “In domestic settings, criminal prosecutions should only go 
forward when group-based individual harm is alleged—that is, harm that affects 
not only the individual victim but also the community… In international criminal 
law, harms that are prosecuted should similarly affect… the world community, or 
humanity.” 
8. May (2006:374). I suspect that perhaps May means “harmed by being put in 
jeopardy.” At any rate, for this discussion I shall accept that being put at risk 
counts as a harm. 
9. Husak also holds that the criminal law has a legitimate interest only in behaviour 
that wrongs “the community itself”. But he glosses that as whether “given wrongs 
are done not only to individual victims but also to the shared values and interests 
of communities” (Husak, 2008:136n). It is, surely, barely intelligible to speak of 
doing a wrong to a value or interest. It is, presumably, simply another way of 
saying that “the whole community has a stake in reducing violence” (136), and 
cannot explain that claim. 
10. I take it that May intends “world community” and “humanity” to be co-
referring here. 
11. “In this second way that harms are group-based, it is not that the victim is 
experiencing group-based harm but rather that there is State involvement... in the 
harmful acts, thereby making these acts systematic rather than random” (May 
2005:8). 
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12. Or false: it is unique to each that he has not voluntarily joined the group. 
13. May (2006:83). Cf. “...when attacks on individuals are based on group charac-
teristics rather than the individual characteristics of the victims, there is a much 
greater likelihood that the harms will be spread throughout a population rather than 
focused exclusively on a particular victim” (86). 
14. Of course, the independence of Kosovo in 2008 was greeted with alarm by a 
number of states—including India—that had no significant interest in the Balkans 
save for the possible precedent effect of recognizing Kosovo. 
15. May (2007:42). May recognizes the shift in his book published in 2008 (p. 4). 
16. May (2007:56; see also 57;59). I am not sure what “nearly” is supposed to rule 
out (or “very little if anything” on p. 59). May here speaks only of self-defence in 
war; whether he intends it more generally I am not sure. It’s also a little unclear to 
what extent May subscribes to this view himself or is simply attributing it to 
Grotius, or the C17 thinkers generally. Note also that on p. 57 May says, “On this 
Grotian account, we owe people more than natural justice would dictate” (my 
emphasis); so we do presumably owe them more than nothing. 
17. But the statute of the International Criminal Court allows direct “interference” 
in only very remote circumstances. 
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The chances of the United States relinquishing its sovereignty to a 
world government in the foreseeable future seem approximately nil. And 
the likelihood of there being a world government without the United 
States, even given the U.S.’s current decline, seems comparably low for 
the foreseeable future. So I will not even consider the desirability, or not, 
of a world government that might turn tyrannical, or homogenize all dis-
tinctive cultural achievements into marketable products, or multiply cor-
rupt bureaucracies on a global scale. Or keep the peace and save the envi-
ronment. 
I will consider instead a much more feasible substitute, and that is in-
ternational law. After a grievous hiatus, especially damaging during the 
administration of George W. Bush, the trend in United States policy may 
again turn toward greater acceptance of international law. And if so, this 
will go some distance toward dealing with the violent conflicts that some 
look to world government to control. 
We need to be concerned with the world as it is, here and now, and 
with how to prevent and alleviate its terrible ills. Futile hopes for an ideal 
future contribute relatively little. Support for international law, however, is 
badly needed and may be worth providing. I will argue that for the fore-
seeable future, violence should be contained through the use of interna-
tional law. I will pursue the arguments from the perspective of the ethics 
of care. 
The Ethics of Care and Violence 
I have come to believe that the ethics of care can provide the basis for a 
comprehensive moral theory, though many aspects of this new approach in 
moral theorizing remain to be developed. The ethics of care can provide 
moral guidance for people in all their connections with others, from their 
closest connections as members of families and small groups to their most 
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distant and even global relations as members of states and as fellow human 
beings. Care is most obviously a familiar practice and primary value in the 
personal interactions of family and friendship. It can immediately be rec-
ognized as essential in its most direct form, since no child can survive 
without a great deal of care for many years. We all have experience with 
what we can recognize as the values of care. Care is increasingly recog-
nized as relevant also for political and international interactions and for 
both the close and the most general ties of civil society. 
The ethics of care especially values caring relations between persons, 
obviously at the personal level within families and among friends, and less 
obviously at the most general level of relations between all human beings.  
It understands the value and necessity of caring labour and the values of 
empathy, sensitivity, trust, and responding to need. It cultivates practices 
such as the building of trust, and practices of responding to actual needs. It 
offers critical analyses and evaluations of existing practices, whether prac-
tices of care which have traditionally been exploitative or practices lacking 
care where it ought to be more evident. The conception of persons at the 
centre of the ethics of care is a view of persons as interrelated, in contrast 
with the model of the independent, self-sufficient liberal individual. Grow-
ing out of feminist appreciations for the enormous amount of overlooked 
but utterly necessary labour involved in bringing up children and caring 
for the ill or dependent, the ethics of care articulates especially the values 
involved and the guidance they provide. 
The ethics of care has developed care as a value at least as important as 
justice. It is based on experience that really is universal, the experience of 
having been cared for, since no person can exist without having received a 
great deal of care. It compares favourably in this regard with contractual 
views only claimed to be universal. It rests not on religious views that are 
divisive, but on common experience. 
Where such other moral theories as Kantian morality and utilitarianism 
demand impartiality above all, the ethics of care understands the moral 
import of our ties to our families and groups. It evaluates such ties, differ-
ing from virtue ethics in focusing on caring relations rather than on the 
virtues of individuals. How such more traditionally established values as 
justice, equality, and individual rights should be meshed with the values of 
caring relations is being worked out. 
The ethics of care can conceptualize that within the more distant and 
weak relations of care that can be formed, we can develop political and 
legal ways to interact, and here the more familiar moral theories may be 
suitable. Traditional and dominant moral theories such as Kantian ethics 
and utilitarianism, with their deontological and consequentialist ap-
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proaches, are still suitable, I think, for many issues within the realm of the 
legal or political when these are seen as embedded within a wider network 
of relations between human beings, though they are less satisfactory than 
usually thought when expanded into comprehensive moral theories. For 
violence arising within political conflict and being dealt with in political 
and legal ways, the more familiar approaches often remain appropriate. 
However, for longer-term evaluations of political institutions and prac-
tices, of groups and the violence they often now employ, and of how these 
domains should be configured within wider societies including potentially 
a global one, the ethics of care would, I think, be more promising (see 
especially, Held (2006: ch. 7-10). Considerations of care should always to 
be taken into account in situating the political and legal in a wider context. 
Our deepest considerations should be ones that ask what appropriate car-
ing for all human beings requires. 
The ethics of care provides a strong basis for valuing nonviolence over 
force in regional and global conflicts. This concern is relatively missing in 
the familiar political and moral theories that have been devised for the 
interactions of citizens of a given state with each other and then expanded 
to interstate contexts. Questions of which persons or groups are to be in-
cluded in the contract have never been adequately addressed in the social 
contract tradition or in the moral theories such as Kantian ethics and utili-
tarianism that have accompanied its history. Answers to such questions 
have merely been assumed. In fact, force and violence have played an 
overwhelming role in establishing the boundaries and memberships of 
states. Nationalism and imperialism rather than contractual agreements 
have permeated their development and continue to be dominant in the 
ways states interact. 
The ethics of care insists that we promote our policies and seek change 
and maintain order as non-violently as possible. It does so in a way that 
addresses the world as it is, in contrast with ideal theories based on hypo-
thetical contracts between states. When the principles worked out for citi-
zens’ relations with each other are universalized as moral theories, or even 
as theories of international relations, they remain abstract and nearly inap-
plicable to a world already carved up into thoroughly unequal states. In the 
world as it is, the powerful often exploit and impose their will on others 
rather than respect weak states as equals. A moral theory such as the ethics 
of care is needed to provide that we care enough about our fellow human 
beings to actually respect their rights and take appropriate account of their 
interests and especially that we refrain from aggressive violence. 
In the international context, as in that of a state, the ethics of care does 
not recommend that justice be simply replaced by care, either in its institu-
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tions or in the ways we theorize about them and about morality. However, 
it recognizes the gross limitations of law and the superiority of other moral 
approaches for much of human value. It understands the importance within 
states of law and its enforcement in protecting persons from violence, and 
in bringing about implementation of their rights. It can even acknowledge 
that while legal institutions ought to be more caring, justice, as a value, 
ought to have priority over care in the limited domain of law, though care 
may be primary in the comprehensive morality within which law should 
guide specific interactions. Analogously in the international context, care 
can recommend respect for international law while contributing to more 
promising alternatives. 
Care and violence are obviously incompatible. Violence destroys what 
care labouriously creates. Care instructs us to establish the means to curb, 
contain, prevent, and head off the violence that characteristically leads to 
more violence. In bringing up children, this requires a long process of 
nurturing and education: to cultivate nonviolent feelings, self-restraint, 
appropriate trust, and an understanding of the better alternatives to violent 
conflict. In interactions with others at some distance, the primary institu-
tions with which to prevent and deal with violence are political and legal, 
and care can recommend acceptance when appropriate of these institutions 
along with recognition of their limits and of how alternative ways of inter-
acting can be more satisfactory. These understandings can be matched at 
the international level, as care recommends respect for international law 
and recommends also alternative and better ways of fostering interconnec-
tion. We should work to build the interactions that are not primarily politi-
cal and legal—the often non-governmental networks of civil society, with 
their cultural, economic, educational, environmental, scientific, and social 
welfare forms of cooperative institution—that will connect us and address 
our problems. We can gradually extend their reach so that caring can be 
better expressed (see e.g. Held, 2006: ch. 10; Keane, 2003; Robinson, 
1999; Slaughter, 2004). 
To avoid paternalistic domination, care needs to be interpreted from 
the perspective of the recipient as well as of the provider. Based on their 
experience, recipients can make clear how the care they receive should be 
respectful and appropriately empowering rather than demeaning and op-
pressive, within both families and in a global context. Care is sometimes 
provided in ways that are domineering, insensitive, and ineffective, but 
this is not good care. The ethics of care provides guidance for meeting the 
needs of persons, including needs for peace and security from violence, in 
ways that are effective, sensitive, liberating, and responsible. 
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Sara Ruddick has explored how, although actual mothers are often vio-
lent, an ideal of nonviolence “governs the practice” of maternal care (Rud-
dick, 2002). She shows how relevant such practices are for those working 
to promote peace. Mothers, she observes, often “school themselves to 
renounce violent strategies of control…” A politics of peace should be 
“resolutely suspicious of violence even in the best of causes.” Peacemak-
ers seldom call for an absolute renunciation of violence but they “fix on 
inventing myriad forms of cooperation, reconciliation, and nonviolent 
resistance” (Ruddick, 2002:xviii-xix). Of course the claim is not that one 
can deal with terrorists or violent states in the same ways that parents try 
to deal with violent children. The point is rather that the values and prac-
tices of care can provide guidance for both. 
Guided by the ethics of care we would recognize that violence, or the 
threat of it, are expectable aspects of human reality and that we can work 
successfully to contain their presence and decrease the damage they bring 
about. We would seek to restrain rather than destroy those who become 
violent, we would work to prevent violence rather than wipe out violent 
persons, and we would contain violence as non-violently as possible. 
In a recent article examining Simone de Beauvoir’s deep ambiguity 
toward the use of political violence, Kimberly Hutchings reviews various 
feminist writings on the subject (Hutchings, 2007:111-132). She says of 
Sara Ruddick’s discussion that it “illustrates the ongoing tension between 
feminist distrust of political violence and the conviction that in circum-
stances of oppression, the use of political violence may be a necessary 
evil” Hutchings, 2007:114). For Beauvoir, she says, “the condition of 
political action…is…ambiguity, and on this basis, she claims that the 
question of the legitimacy of political violence remains open” Hutchings, 
2007:121). Ruling out violence a priori is as dangerous as the tyrant’s or 
revolutionary’s willingness to embrace it. Beauvoir’s argument suggests to 
Hutchings that, concerning political violence, “there is no stable resolution 
to the ambiguity in feminist responses…We are left with the responsibility 
of judgment” Hutchings, 2007:128-129). My discussion of political vio-
lence fits easily into this tradition. 
Robin May Schott effectively argues against the just war tradition on 
which a great deal of moral thinking about violence usually rests. She 
finds that the just war tradition all too easily normalizes war, suggesting 
that as long as certain limits are observed, war is morally acceptable 
(Schott, 2008). She uses Kant to argue that war is never morally accept-
able, but an ethics of care might even more reliably keep us from forget-
ting that war is always atrocious, even if sometimes better than its alterna-
tives. Which terms one uses to make the distinction between war being 
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sometimes necessary or better than its alternatives but never morally ac-
ceptable is somewhat arbitrary. The point to remember is that it should 
always have been prevented, averted, avoided. If it has become better than 
capitulation against an aggressor or abdication of responsibility in the face 
of genocide, the situation already represents a massive moral failure. 
One could argue that the problems of the just war tradition result more 
from the misuse of its norms, as by the administration of George W. Bush, 
rather than of the norms themselves which do require that war be a last 
resort. But the specific norms have been developed for conflicts between 
the armed forces of states. It is questionable whether they can be applied to 
the kinds of violence engaged in, for instance, by nonstate groups trying to 
achieve liberation from colonial oppression or foreign occupation, or se-
cession from an existing state. The ethics of care can accept various under-
lying norms of the just war tradition such as the requirement than one's 
cause be just and that the violence used must be proportional. It is better 
able to keep in mind the overriding context of caring relations between 
human beings that are so obviously shattered by war. 
The Case for International Law 
There are good reasons to be sceptical of the soundness of international 
law as guidance for arriving at moral evaluations in international affairs. 
By and large, international law has been devised to serve the interests of 
existing states no matter how dubious their claims to legitimacy or how 
questionable their objectives. International law is biased in favour of exist-
ing states and against groups seeking independence for their members, or 
fundamental changes opposed by such states even when such changes 
would be moral improvements. And the enforcement of international law 
has been inadequate. 
However, despite its limitations, international law may be the best 
source of guidance available in the near future for what states ought not to 
do. The attacks on the validity of international law by members and sup-
porters of the administration of George W. Bush have done grave harm 
and ought to be overcome (see e.g. Krauthammer, 1989; Goldsmith and 
Posner, 2005; for discussion of these attacks see Hongju Koh, 1997-1998; 
O’Connell, 2008). International law has serious problems, but ought to be 
improved, not disregarded. 
Among the greatest threats of large scale violence in the world is the 
violence that may occur through military intervention. When we consider 
the issue of when it would or would not be morally justifiable for a state to 
intervene militarily in territory not its own and how one should think about 
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this problem, I conclude after examining various arguments that of the 
sources of recommendation available to us, international law is the most 
promising. And I conclude that the ethics of care would recommend re-
spect for international law in the world as it now exists, though it would 
urge in the longer term less reliance on law and much more development 
of caring alternatives (Held, 2006:ch. 10). These would include various 
kinds of efforts across state boundaries to deal with problems before they 
lead to violence, and efforts to prevent hostilities through international 
arrangements, some formal, some informal. Nongovernmental organiza-
tions of various kinds, efforts to alleviate economic injustices, and agen-
cies to foster peace and head off violence can much better exemplify care 
than can most law and its enforcement, but the latter may still be needed to 
prevent or limit explosions of violence, and the ethics of care would agree. 
Relying on experience, we can conclude that norms that independent 
states agree to and agree to apply to themselves can facilitate progress 
toward a less violent and destructive and threatening and insecure world, 
and that international law is the best available source of such norms. We 
can acknowledge that international law should not always be determina-
tive of policy, and still maintain that it is deserving of a very high degree 
of respect. 
In her book The Power and Purpose of International Law: Insights 
from The Theory and Practice of Enforcement, Mary Ellen O’Connell 
considers how, to many theorists, “all law, including international law, is 
law because of community acceptance” and not only or primarily because 
of its ability to be enforced (O’Connell, 2008:7). Law does serve the inter-
ests of those to whom it applies, but this is not all that supports it. “The 
majority of society must voluntarily comply with the rules for a legal sys-
tem to be maintained” (O’Connell, 2008:11). For international law these 
supports are more problematic, but there is much compliance, there are 
sanctions, and there is adjudication. O’Connell notes some efforts in the 
U.S. to undermine the authority of international law, but offers this con-
clusion: “Any effort to weaken international law only serves to undermine 
the prospects for achieving an orderly world and progress toward fulfil-
ment of humanity’s shared goals…” (O’Connell, 2008:14). There is much 
wrong with international law but our task should be to make it better. The 
ethics of care would support this task and help in the processes of im-
provement. And it would call on us to make other, even more promising 
efforts to care adequately for all persons so that punishing those who break 
the law would become decreasingly necessary. However, can an approach 
supporting international law survive the challenge of terrorism? 
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Terrorism and Unilateralism 
The administration of George W. Bush has claimed that the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 so completely changed the world that its unilateral 
policies of preventive military intervention and disregard of international 
law are needed to defend the U.S. against the threat of terrorism. Using its 
“war on terror” as an excuse, it invaded Iraq in clear violation of interna-
tional law, and insisted on a right to launch preventive wars to protect the 
U.S. from evildoers. In these policies it demonstrated what many of the 
most serious scholars dealing with terrorism consider a disastrous misun-
derstanding of terrorism, and what many of the most persuasive voices on 
international law and international relations consider a grievous threat to 
peace and world order. 
In considering what U.S. policy ought to be, we should begin by reject-
ing the blanket condemnations that demonize all terrorists as exceptionally 
irrational and exceptionally immoral. As Martha Crenshaw, who has stud-
ied terrorism as a political scientist for several decades concludes, “terror-
ism has been an important part of successful struggles for independence 
from foreign domination” (Crenshaw, 1983:7). It is only rational that oth-
ers learn from this experience. “Terrorism,” she continues, “is a highly 
imitable innovation in violent tactics; it combines drama, symbolism, low 
cost, and ease of implementation….Thus powerful models can stimulate 
the imitation of terrorism…” (Crenshaw, 1983:18). 
Mia Bloom, another political scientist, reaches a comparable conclu-
sion in her very useful study of suicide terrorism. She notes that “although 
the individual bombers might be inspired by several—sometimes comple-
mentary—motives, the organizations that send the bombers do so because 
such attacks are an effective means to intimidate and demoralize the en-
emy…. [Such] organizations are rationally motivated and use violence to 
achieve their goals. The operations are carefully calculated and aimed at 
ending a foreign occupation, increasing the prestige of the organization 
that uses them, and leading to regional autonomy and/or independence” 
(Bloom, 2007:3). 
Robert Pape, supporting his view with a vast amount of empirical data, 
shows that the primary goals of nearly all terrorists are to rid the lands of 
the groups with which they identify of foreign military forces (Pape, 
2005). This should certainly be considered in weighing arguments for 
military responses to terrorism. It was entirely foreseeable that invading 
Iraq would produce large numbers of new recruits for terrorism. 
In her important book on terrorism, Louise Richardson makes clear 
how the “war on terror” is misguided. As should have been obvious, “it is 
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very difficult ever to declare victory in a war on terrorism or terror, much 
less evil” (Richardson, 2006:176). If the aim of the war, as Bush suggests, 
is to rid the world of terrorists, it makes it far too easy for them to thwart 
our aims with occasional attacks. Terrorists want to be thought of as sol-
diers at war.1 To grant them this status and excellent recruiting tool, 
Richardson argues, is self-defeating (Richardson, 2006:177). A far better 
goal would be to contain the threat and reduce the appeal of terrorist 
groups to potential recruits. Richardson reviews the history of fighting 
terrorism with military force and “the lesson that has already been taught 
many times” that states cannot translate overwhelming military force into 
victory over terrorists (Richardson, 2006:180). The Russians in Chechnya, 
Israelis in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories, Peru against Shining 
Path, and many other cases provide evidence. 
Richardson shows how terrorism, even religious terrorism, is not new 
and not especially linked with Islam. Like many others who have actually 
studied terrorists, she understands that terrorists are almost never the psy-
chopaths or one-dimensional evildoers they are portrayed to be (Hoffman, 
1998; Pape, 2005a; Pape, 2005b:511). They are usually “human beings 
who think like we do” and who have political goals they are trying to 
achieve (Richardson, 2006:xvii). They are often angry “young idealists 
wanting to do their part” for their country or group and “motivated by a 
desire to right wrongs and do their best” for what they consider a noble 
cause (Richardson, 2006:xv). The U.S. government’s failure to understand 
terrorism or learn from previous experience with it has been disastrous. 
“We cannot defeat terrorism by smashing every terrorist movement,” she 
writes. “An effort to do so will only generate more terrorists, as has hap-
pened repeatedly in the past. We should never have declared a global war 
on terrorism, knowing that such a war can never be won… Rather, we 
should pursue the more modest and attainable goal of containing terrorist 
recruitment and constraining the resort to the tactic of terrorism” (Richard-
son, 2006:xvii; Held, 2008). 
Far from ending the violence of terrorism, massive reprisal attacks 
usually create more terrorists. Mia Bloom notes that “Israel has responded 
to every ceasefire of Palestinian suicide attacks with targeted assassination 
thus unleashing a new round of reprisals and counter attacks” (Bloom, 
2007:190). The reasoning has been that assassinating their operatives saps 
the effectiveness of terrorist organizations. But it has not worked: the 
organizations “are fully capable of replacing operatives as fast as Israeli 
targeted assassination eliminates them” (Bloom, 2007:38) For every one 
killed, another two are available to take their place. The key, instead, in 
Bloom’s view, “is to reduce the Palestinians” motivations for suicide 
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bombing rather than their capabilities to carry them out…. There are no 
military solutions to terrorism” (Bloom, 2007:39-40). The lessons of the 
past, in case after case, are that harsh counter terror tactics have the in-
verse effect. Though they may be politically popular with the supporters of 
those who use them, terrorism has actually been ended when those resort-
ing to it have found other means to pursue their goals. 
There have been recent arguments that we are faced with a new kind of 
terrorism. It is asserted that although terrorists in the past may have been 
open to negotiation and capable of being deterred, the “new terrorism” of 
Islamic fanatics is closed to rational responses and cannot be contained, 
only eliminated. The argument serves to promote the “war” on terror, but 
has been effectively refuted by Martha Crenshaw and others (see e.g. 
Crenshaw, 2007). One of the gravest mistakes of the Bush administration’s 
response to terrorism has been to collapse very different elements of vio-
lent opposition to U.S. policies into one unified “enemy” who is evil. The 
context in which different groups resort to terrorism is important: different 
policies are needed for the very different situations that devolve into vio-
lence. 
We can conclude that terrorism is not uniquely atrocious. It is political 
violence that often, though not necessarily, targets civilians. It often aims 
to create sufficient fear to cause others than those attacked to change their 
policies. It usually causes far fewer civilian casualties than war, and can be 
less unjustifiable than war. It resembles guerrilla war or small war in some 
ways, but it is not the same as war. Terrorist groups use crime to achieve 
their political goals and can be responded to in the short term with the 
apprehension, trial, and punishment of those involved in ways that mini-
mize the appeal of such violence. Responding with wider war magnifies 
not only the violence, with all its moral costs, but also the sympathy felt 
for the war's victims and the terrorist groups who claim to fight for them. 
In the longer term, responses need to involve diplomatic, political, social, 
and economic measures. 
Much is often made of the difference between intentionally targeting 
civilians, as terrorism often or on some definitions does, and only killing 
civilians unintentionally, as does conventional warfare in the view of those 
who think conventional warfare can be morally justified while terrorism 
never can. Together with many others, I do not believe the distinction can 
bear the moral weight it has been assigned. 
The distinction between targeting civilians intentionally and only kill-
ing many more foreseeably as collateral damage means little to those who 
identify with the dead. Even if terrorism does target civilians (in fact it 
often, as well, attacks military targets) it is usually far, far less deadly than 
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conventional warfare. Conventional warfare may proclaim an intent to 
spare civilians, then yield to “military necessity,” bombing whole cities 
and all their inhabitants, as with Dresden or Hiroshima in World War II. 
Or, as weapons become more precise, it may target specific persons and 
only kill civilians inadvertently but in far greater numbers than those killed 
by terrorism. Over many years Palestinian civilian deaths have been very 
many times greater than Israeli civilian deaths resulting from the conflict. 
When the U.S. responded with military force in Iraq to what was 
claimed to be a terrorist threat posed by Saddam Hussein, it caused the 
deaths of some ten thousand civilians in just the initial invasion (Massing, 
2007:82-87). Since then, the war has led to the deaths of many tens of 
thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of civilians (Altman and 
Oppel, 2008:A14). Terrorism, in comparison, has killed relatively very 
small numbers. 
In conventional war, the killing of civilians becomes routine and often 
overlooked. In a review of several books on what the war in Iraq is really 
like on the ground, a reviewer cites the account of a supporter of the war 
who relates that, while his platoon was on its second patrol, “a civilian 
candy truck tried to merge with a column of our armed vehicles, only to 
get run over and squashed. The occupants were smashed beyond recogni-
tion… ripped open and dismembered, their intestines strewn across shat-
tered boxes of candy bars…” The reviewer comments that “this incident is 
notable mainly for the fact that the platoon stopped; from the many ac-
counts I have read of the Iraq war, when a U.S. convoy runs over a car, it 
usually just keeps going” (Massing, 2007:82) 
Certainly, some terrorists commit atrocities that are absolutely horren-
dous. So do some armed forces members in the course of fighting wars. A 
difference is that the latter are much less often reported. 
Terrorism is often associated with murder and terrorists with persons 
having blind and murderous intentions that are beyond rational control. 
Terrorists do not engage in what are often conceptualized as honourable 
contests between opposing armed forces, subject to the laws of war; they 
murder innocents and blow up children. They are not guided by the Just 
War principles that are thought to make it possible for the wars that we 
and our allies fight to be justifiable. 
Consider, however, how the issue might be viewed from the point of 
view of an opponent. The demand that opponents of the U.S. fight the way 
the U.S. does, with armed forces and conventional weapons, amounts to an 
argument that they should meet us on our own ground, where we have vast 
superiority, so that we can defeat them. From an opponent’s point of view, 
it would be highly irrational, suicidal one might say, to do this. The ra-
Virginia Held 314 
tional course of action for anyone confronting the U.S. and its allies would 
of course be to confront the vast military arsenal arrayed against them in a 
way that would help to neutralize such superiority, as terrorism has shown 
itself able to do. Any rational opponent has reason to question a demand 
by states with powerful armed forces and sophisticated weaponry that 
attacks against them be confined to attacks against their armed forces. It 
asks opponents to fight with the weapons of the powerful where they will 
be at an enormous disadvantage. As Lionel McPherson said of Michael 
Walzer’s demand that native groups seeking liberation must “earn” their 
freedom by confining their attacks to members of the armed forces and 
refraining from attacking anyone else: “this reeks of...condescension” 
(McPherson, 2008: typescript 8). From an impartial standpoint it can be 
understood that terrorism is a useful weapon or tactic that helps to neutral-
ize the enormous military power possessed by some states. Using this 
weapon would be the rational course of action for such states’ opponents, 
and not clearly more immoral than war. 
Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, founder and spiritual leader of Hamas who was 
assassinated by Israel in March 2004 expressed the point as follows: 
“Once we have warplanes and missiles, then we can think of changing our 
means of legitimate self-defence, but right now, we can only tackle the fire 
with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves” (The Daily Star [Beirut], 
February 8th 2002 cited in Bloom, 2007:3-4). The secretary-general of the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as summarized by Ehud Sprinzak, put it this 
way: “Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world 
and its army is trained to a very high standard….We have nothing with 
which to repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of mar-
tyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives… [H]uman bombs cannot be 
defeated…” (Bloom, 2007:89-90). 
The goals of some terrorists are, without doubt, morally abhorrent. So 
are the goals of some who use ordinary military power or brutal repres-
sion. If, however, their objectives are justifiable and if violence is only 
used as a last resort, the weapon of terrorism and how it is used are not 
necessarily morally worse than the weapon of conventional military force 
and how it is used. 
The ethics of care would direct us to pay attention to the points of view 
of those who use terrorism, and to counter terrorism with policies that will 
be not only more caring in the ways that they themselves minimize vio-
lence but also more effective in undermining the violence of those oppos-
ing us. 
The administration of George W. Bush instead used the “war on terror” 
as an excuse to invade Iraq and to ignore international law. It has insisted 
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on retaining the right to launch preventive wars to safeguard the U.S. and 
its citizens from “evildoers” who may engage in or aid others to commit 
terrorist attacks against it.  The result has been an extraordinary decline in 
the power of the United States to gain support for and decrease opposition 
to its policies and interests. 
O’Connell discusses how U.S. participation in the making and promot-
ing of international law used to have great influence until the ascendancy 
in the administration of George W. Bush of neoconservative claims of 
U.S. superiority and exceptionalism entitling the U.S. to be above interna-
tional law. Such views are not shared by the rest of the world. The result 
has been that “the U.S.’s reputation has plummeted, and with it the ability 
to influence” (O’Connell, 2008:129-131). 
International law condemns terrorism, but it also rules out responses 
that violate the basic international norms of non-intervention. We do need 
to ask, however, whether preventing or responding to terrorism would be 
legitimate moral grounds for military intervention. Could such interven-
tion be justified for humanitarian reasons? Or could military intervention 
to prevent terrorism be justified on classic grounds of self-defence? 
When Is Military Intervention Justifiable? 
If we look to international law for help in answering questions con-
cerning terrorism, we may find some ambiguous answers but many helpful 
recommendations capable of guiding policymakers and their critics. Al-
ready clearly enunciated are the norms of international law requiring states 
to renounce aggression against one another and to resort to military force 
only on grounds of individual or collective self-defence authorized by the 
UN Security Council. The principles for the so-called Westphalian system 
of world order that was in place for centuries were formulated in the pe-
riod after World War II, incorporated into the United Nations charter and 
subsequent Security Council resolutions and they have been implemented. 
They have been modified to include the allowing of pre-emptive strikes in 
cases of imminent attack, but to rule out the kind of right to launch a pre-
ventive war that the administration of George W. Bush has proclaimed for 
itself (Farer, 2003:621-628).3 Discussions of preventive war have also 
shown how unwise as well as illegal it would be (see e.g. Barber, 2004). 
Also developed has been a considerable literature, starting in the 
1990’s, on intervention for humanitarian reasons, including how military 
intervention to prevent such massive violations of human rights as occur in 
genocide and ethnic cleansing might be reconciled with international law 
(see e.g. Reed and Kaysen, eds., 1993; Hoffmann, 1996; Chesterman, 
Virginia Held 316 
2001; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
2001; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003; Chatterjee and Scheid, 2003). It can 
be concluded that respect for human rights has become part of the re-
quirements recognized in international law, although norms concerning 
intervention to prevent violations of human rights remain in much greater 
uncertainty than the norms for self-defence. As Thomas Franck writes 
concerning contemporary international law, “it has become commonplace 
that the international system may lawfully intervene in situations of cata-
clysmic civil strife and other massive violations of human rights, with or 
without the consent of the government of the place where the violations 
are occurring” (Franck, 2006:99). Considerable disagreement remains on 
how to interpret these norms, but an independent commission did reflect 
some consensus in its report called The Responsibility to Protect (Barber, 
2004). What remain much less clarified are reasonable norms that could be 
incorporated into international law for military intervention to prevent or 
deal with terrorism, and whether any intervention must have Security 
Council approval. 
Contemporary international law pulls in contradictory directions con-
cerning intervention. On the one hand, key and long established principles 
of international law demand respect for sovereignty and hence for non-
intervention. At the same time, an imperative for intervention has devel-
oped: When governments trample egregiously on the rights of those they 
govern, or fail miserably to protect their citizens from such gross viola-
tions of rights as take place in ethnic cleansing or genocide, international 
law permits or even calls upon states to take action. A related international 
norm seems in the process of developing in the wake of the upheavals in 
the Balkans and demands for secession there and elsewhere. It demands 
that in pursuit of self-determination, there must be restraint on the part of 
states resisting secession as well as restraint on the part of those seeking 
independence (see Bayefsky, 2000: especially Pellet, in Bayefsky, 
2000:118). Fairly clearly, sovereignty in international law today does not 
grant states complete immunity from intervention. 
One can agree there is a grave danger in supporting “humanitarian in-
tervention,” as Margaret Denike shows (Denike, 2008:95-121). Enemies 
are demonized as barbaric, inflicting horrors on helpless victims, espe-
cially women and children, thus purportedly justifying Western interven-
tion in the name of civilization. The U.S. invasion of Iraq gives every 
reason to be wary of such narratives. The conclusion, however, should not 
be that we must always avoid intervention, taking no responsibility for 
preventing massacres and genocides. Distinctions need to be made and 
international law is helpful in making them. One might think that because 
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of the contradictory pulls within it, international law would be of little help 
in arriving at moral evaluations of military intervention, but this should 
not be the conclusion. On the contrary, it may offer measured normative 
recommendations for a dangerous actual world. 
Consider, briefly, three cases of military intervention or possible inter-
vention in the grey areas of intervention on other grounds than self-
defence: Rwanda, Kosovo, and Iraq. I do not include Afghanistan, since 
this has generally been interpreted as a case of self-defence against attack 
rather than of intervention (Franck, 2006; Stromseth, 2003). The U.N. 
Security Council determined, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, that 
when a state supports and harbours a non-state terrorist group it opens 
itself up to measures of individual or collective defence that may be taken 
against it, in accordance with accepted international rules, by those such 
groups attack (Franck, 2006:104). Many aspects of the U.S. military re-
sponse in Afghanistan may have been unwise and unjustifiable, but it was 
not the threat to international law constituted by, for instance, the invasion 
of Iraq. Nor was it interpreted as a case of humanitarian intervention, and I 
am limiting the discussion here to military intervention on other grounds 
than U.N. authorized self-defence. 
Concerning Rwanda, something of a consensus has developed that the 
world community should have intervened to prevent the genocide that 
occurred there in 1994, in which perhaps a million people were killed. I 
agree, though perhaps with less conviction than some others, and that 
international law would have accommodated itself to such intervention 
seems relatively clear. 
I also think that the U.S.’s part in the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 
1999 was morally defensible, although much more should have been done 
earlier to curb the violence in the region and to prevent the deterioration in 
the coexistence of ethnic groups that occurred in the breakup of the former 
Yugoslavia. Depending on the interpretation, international law may well 
agree with the conclusion that intervention here was justified. Even though 
the NATO intervention was not in compliance with the requirement of 
Security Council authorization, it seems to have been found permissible 
under international law (Franck, 2003). Strong arguments for intervention 
have been offered by the Independent International Commission on Kos-
ovo, which concluded that the intervention was “illegal, but legitimate” 
(Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Richard Falk, 
himself a member of the commission, writing in the American Journal of 
International Law, said that “in Kosovo the moral and political case for 
intervention seemed strong: a vulnerable and long abused majority popula-
tion facing an imminent prospect of ethnic cleansing by Serb rulers, a 
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scenario for effective intervention with minimal risks of unforeseen nega-
tive effects or extensive collateral damage, and the absence of significant 
non-humanitarian motivations on the intervening side. As such, the foun-
dation for a principled departure under exceptional circumstances from a 
strict rendering of Charter rules on the use of force seemed present” (Falk, 
2003:591) 
The intervention in Iraq, however, was very different. I think it is clear 
that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003 was morally wrong as well as a 
grave violation of international law. International law clearly ruled out this 
violation of sovereignty and has continued to reaffirm that judgment since 
the invasion. There seems to have developed in recent years a kind of 
“retroactive endorsement” or “ex post facto validation” of some interven-
tions (Franck, 2003; Stahn, 2003. For a nuanced and different interpreta-
tion of retroactive justification, see Byers and Chesterman, 2003:804-823). 
For instance, even though NATO’s intervention in Kosovo did not receive 
prior authorization from the Security Council (because of the threat of a 
Russian veto) the Security Council subsequently took action implicitly 
endorsing the intervention. In this and several other cases (Liberia, Sierra 
Leone) although international law was technically violated, it was not 
seriously undermined because the offending action was legitimated after 
the fact. But the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not like this. It not only failed to 
receive Security Council authorization, it was clearly not an expression of 
the “collective will.” And it has not received retroactive justification. 
To many defenders of international law, the system’s refusal to be bullied 
by the U.S. to authorize the invasion of Iraq or even to accommodate itself 
to it by retroactive justification is a sign that the system of international 
law does indeed have considerable strength (Falk, 2003; Franck, 2006; 
Stahn, 2003). Franck notes that “the Security Council has been scrupulous 
in its resolutions pertaining to Iraq to avoid anything that could be inter-
preted as a retrospective validation of the invasion” (Franck, 2006:97n35). 
Retroactive justification is certainly not a very satisfactory expression of 
international legality or of global moral consensus. But it is far better than 
failing to obtain even this. And it may provide the source for a tentative 
normative principle with which to make the necessary distinctions be-
tween different cases of intervention. It allows us to say that only those 
interventions capable of receiving at least retroactive justification in in-
ternational law if not prior Security Council authorization should even be 
considered candidates for morally justifiable intervention. Using this test, 
the invasion of Iraq fails, the NATO intervention in Kosovo passes, and 
intervention in Rwanda would have passed. These are the outcomes I think 
we need to reach, using the version of the method of reflective equilibrium 
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for moral justification that I have advocated, and being mindful of the 
considerations of care articulated by the ethics of care (see especially 
Held, 1989:chs. 4;15; Held, 1993:ch. 2; Held, 2008:ch. 8). 
International Law and the Ethics of Care 
There are different theories of international law, of course. It is amor-
phous and hard to define, yet it can have what scholars aptly call “law’s 
power to pull states toward compliance” (Franck, 2006:90). Morality is 
even more amorphous and hard to define and there are even greater differ-
ences among conflicting theories, yet it also can and obviously should 
affect what we do. International law is not limited to explicit documents, 
resolutions, or decisions. It includes the arguments of scholars and com-
mentators, and the shared principles of the world community. One can 
argue that international law, even more than domestic law, ought to be 
respected as morally compelling because it is more dependent for its inter-
pretations and power on good moral arguments and less dependent on 
flawed and actual institutions. Moral philosophers are accustomed to 
learning much from legal scholars and judicial decisions in domestic law; 
they should become accustomed to doing the same with international law. 
It seems apparent that in a world dominated by states striving to pro-
mote their own interests and threatened periodically by war, terrorism, and 
catastrophe, the rule of law and thus international law ought to be pro-
moted. This can be demanded on many moral grounds, such as Kantian 
ethics and utilitarianism, but it can also be demanded by the ethics of care. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of the ethics of care, international 
law is not as much of an answer to the problems and conflicts of the world 
as many theorists suggest. From the perspective of care, law is a limited 
approach for a limited domain of human activity. For that domain, imple-
menting it may be the best we can hope for in the short run. International 
law may help us escape the worst impending disasters of violent conflicts 
between states and groups, and of imperialism, fanaticism, and ignorance. 
However, as we look ahead to how humanity needs to progress, the ethics 
of care offers hope of something more satisfactory than a world of states 
and groups all pursuing their own interests, at best restrained by interna-
tional law. 
As Fiona Robinson argues, a feminist political ethic of care, with its re-
lational view of persons and attention to actual care, contextualizes the 
human condition. In contrast with neo-liberal policies, it focuses on the 
“social, economic and political contexts in which particular claims… 
arise,” and thus on how these contexts need to be improved (Robinson, 
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2006:14). “A care-based framework for ethical globalization,” she shows, 
“can provide the basis for normative critique, transformative global social 
policy and innovative local and global institutions to address inequality, 
poverty and suffering on a global scale” (Robinson, 2006:22). Joan Tronto 
has suggested that peacekeeping is a kind of care work. She sees an impor-
tant shift in discourse about humanitarian intervention from something like 
a “right to intervene” to a “responsibility to protect.” And she interprets 
this as being in line with a shift in moral discourse about international 
affairs from an ethic of justice to an ethic of care (Tronto, 2007). 
Guided by the ethics of care, we would encourage states to take re-
sponsibility for protecting vulnerable populations and for promoting 
peaceful resolutions of conflicts before they escalate into violence. Nego-
tiating disputes, non-coercively if possible, and addressing the problems of 
those politically disenfranchised or economically exploited can become 
practices of care. They can much better exemplify care than can applying 
sanctions to lawbreaking states or punishing individuals who commit war 
crimes. Properly developed, they should make the need for military inter-
vention, for forces to keep the peace between warring groups, and for 
enforcement of the reasonable restraints of law, to which all can become 
accustomed, ever less demanded. Instead of focusing on rules to be fol-
lowed and violations to be punished, the ethics of care would attend to the 
political and social and economic problems that make the rules so often 
inadequate in their protection of actual persons and groups. It would focus 
our attention on providing for the needs of all, caring for the environment, 
and fostering relations of trust and mutual concern. 
Gradually, within networks of interaction and caring, the need for mili-
tary intervention and the enforcement of international law might be re-
duced, though not eliminated. We can hope and work for this, though 
changes in the direction of the world toward a caring global order will take 
vast, prolonged, and organized efforts.  We can be encouraged, however, 
at how the interest in human rights has transformed international law and 
the policies of many states in a mere half century. This could come to be 
matched by an interest in caring networks. It is caring networks that sus-
tain the human beings whose rights are to be respected and caring net-
works that allow persons to flourish. 
Notes 
* This paper is based in part on my books The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, 
and Global (Held, 2006) and How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political 
Violence (Held, 2008). 
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1. Statements by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed illustrate this. See Liptak (2007: 1; 
23). 
2. Massing writes that “10,000 civilians at a minimum were killed during the inva-
sion, the large majority victims of the coalition.” 
3. For an analysis of the George W. Bush administration’s “aggressive unilateral-
ism,” see Hammond (2005). 
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GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY  
AND INTERNATIONAL MORALITY 




1. The politics of identity, particularly in its nationalist form, pro-
vokes a cosmopolitan reaction. Nationalists hold that we have special 
obligations to our compatriots in view of our shared national identity. 
Cosmopolitans, by contrast, deny this, holding instead that we have the 
same ethical obligations to everyone in the first instance, with the possible 
exception of family and friends. But, more especially, we have no ethical 
obligations deriving directly from our membership of national or similar 
identity groups; none, that is, from the positions we are in corresponding 
to our actual or desired political memberships. We may, of course, have 
political obligations and they may thus give rise indirectly to special ethi-
cal obligations. But this is, broadly speaking, the result of political ar-
rangements justified by administrative convenience, and, perhaps, psycho-
logical constraints. Such special obligations to compatriots are not funda-
mental and thus cannot themselves ground political groupings, which 
would, ideally, be genuinely cosmopolitan. Nor, on the cosmopolitan 
view, can such special obligations be allowed to obscure the fact that our 
fundamental ethical outlook should be that of a citizen of the world “in 
which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the bounda-
ries of our nation by the sun,” as the Stoic philosopher Seneca put it. 
(Dower, 2003:22) 
This view is commonly backed up by a claim seemingly not available 
to the ancient Stoics, namely that we now live in a global civil society, if 
only in an emergent form. This claim is, I think, intended to support cos-
mopolitanism in at least three ways. The first is psychological: we are able 
to think of ourselves as citizens of the world rather than only of smaller 
units, and thus to embrace wider obligations, in view of our sense of being 
members of a worldwide society. The Greeks and Romans, for example, 
with their knowledge of, but lack of contact with, societies beyond their 
own were not in this position, leaving the Stoic aspiration to world citizen-
ship purely notional. The second plank of the argument is normative: on 
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the assumption that the special obligations supposed to derive from na-
tional identity are generated by certain sorts of relationship in which we 
stand to our compatriots, it is held that relationships in no way ethically 
different subsist between members of global civil society, so that the same 
sort of obligations exist among them too. Our fundamental identity, inso-
far as identity is ethically relevant, is a global identity. The third plank is 
political: whatever grounds there are for basing the political arrangement 
of statehood on its correspondence to a civil society carry over in principle 
to global governance and, at the least, to the sort of political equality 
among people generally that exist among members of an equitable state; 
for this sort of claim to shared governance and political equality will de-
rive from their shared membership of a global civil society. 
 
2. There are some large and fairly fuzzy philosophical assumptions 
involved in these lines of thought in favour of a cosmopolitan political 
ethic. My purpose here, however, is only to interrogate the notion of a 
global civil society that they employ. But, in order to see what global civil 
society might be, whether it exists in any form and what ethical conse-
quences would follow, we need to look at what civil society generally 
might involve. And this is not easy, for it is a highly ambiguous and con-
tested concept, so that we will need to identify the specific conception 
congenial to the use made of it by cosmopolitans. 
While the contemporary concept of civil society in all its variations has 
grown a long way from its roots, it has not, I believe, entirely ceased to 
draw from them. In the seventeenth century, of course, civil society was 
contrasted with the state of nature. On the Hobbesian account the state of 
nature is, notoriously, a war of all against all, devoid of social relation-
ships. On the Lockean one there are already social relationships because 
the law of nature requires us to respect the rights of others as well as per-
mitting us to defend our own rights. And Locke allows rights of liberty 
and prosperity in the state of nature, in addition to the Hobbesian right to 
life, in the sense of a right of self-preservation. But for both what were 
lacking were the sorts of relationship than can underpin a modern state. In 
Hobbes’s case this is because something like a state is required for civil 
society to exist at all; in Locke’s, because although people can come to-
gether into a society prior to statehood, that society will then require a 
government which constitutes them as members of a state. For both it was 
the America of their day that was the pre-modern exemplar of what was 
lacking before civil society came into being (see Hobbes, 2008:ch. 13; 
Locke, 1993). What seemed to such thinkers to be lacking there? 
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It is unhelpful when considering the contemporary concept of civil so-
ciety to reply directly to this question that a social contract was missing in 
native American societies which prevented them from qualifying as civil 
society. Rather it was what Adam Ferguson later emphasised (Ferguson, 
1767) as necessary, namely civility itself. Ignorant of the rules that actu-
ally regulated the conduct of native Americans, the thinkers of the seven-
teenth century viewed their relationships as uncontrolled and violent. 
Then, since they thought of the required rules as arising through the kind 
of mutual agreement represented by a contract, they inferred the absence 
of one, and hence a state of nature. It is a continuing feature of conceptions 
of civil society that its members are bound together by the observance of 
common rules. Ferguson himself clearly thinks in these terms while break-
ing with the social contract condition, and, though he does not, like later 
thinkers, contrast state and civil society, he does think of compliance with 
the rules that provide the framework of civil society as achieved otherwise 
than simply by state sanctions, in his case, through the exercise of civic 
virtue. 
Hegel, while contrasting state and civil society, sees the latter as an 
area in which “each member is his own end, everything else is nothing to 
him” (Hegel, 1967:3;ii;182). But to achieve individual ends participation 
in a system of interdependence with others is required, a system requiring 
compliance with rules. Hegel sees this as neither a matter of private moral-
ity, since it can be forcibly required, nor as motivated simply by fear of 
such sanctions. Rather it is a consequence of occupying one’s role in civil 
society; and here Hegel stresses the variety of roles that comprise the sys-
tem of interdependence which civil society involves. Many of these are 
identified in terms of economic factors, and this led Marx to view civil 
society as a site of conflict between competing individual interests.  This 
leads away, of course, from the idea that Hegel preserves from earlier 
accounts of rules required for the functioning of society generally. It is 
perhaps for this reason that contemporary accounts follow Gramsci rather 
than earlier theorists in excluding economic interactions as well as rela-
tions with the state from the sphere of civil society. For economic man is 
taken to be motivated in a more crudely and directly self-interested way 
than Hegel seems to have envisaged, while arguably occupancy of the 
social roles comprising civil society requires a different sort of motivation. 
Thus the usual contemporary account of civil society, which cosmo-
politans take over for their global conception, is of a system of social rela-
tionships other than those of a directly political or economic character. 
And, though this is generally implicit and underspecified, it is the sort of 
system of social relationships which conduces to just political relation-
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ships and fair economic ones. The thought here seems to be that the rules 
governing the social relationships of civil society are in, a broad sense, 
moral rules, incompatible with grossly oppressive or exploitative political 
or economic interactions—a notion that sceptics about civil society like 
Marx have, of course, rejected. It is, however, an important feature of the 
thinking behind the idea of a global civil society. For while such theorists 
discern an absence of those gross political and economic ills within states 
supposedly corresponding to healthy civil societies they detect their pres-
ence at an international level and believe that the growth of a global civil 
society will serve to mitigate them. They claim that this is just what is 
emerging now. 
 
3. How do cosmopolitans see global civil society? There are, I think, 
a number of distinct aspects to the claim that such a society exists, at least 
in a nascent form, common to most cosmopolitans who employ the idea, 
thought they place different emphases upon them. The first is the fact that 
processes of globalisation such as increased access to communication, 
information, travel and trade across state borders has led to the develop-
ment of social relationships between people from different countries on a 
large scale. The second point is that this sort of development has enabled 
people to see themselves not just as citizens of particular states but as 
global citizens.  The third, and not necessarily related, notion is that the 
status of global citizen is bestowed in virtue of the growing extent to 
which international law recognises individuals worldwide as bearers of 
rights and duties. The fourth fact adduced is that there has been a rise in 
social movements with various international objectives including the pro-
motion of human rights, the reduction of world poverty and disease, coun-
tering climate change and so forth. While often realised through associa-
tions of individuals, many become institutionalised as non-governmental 
organisations and as such may be linked to the changes in the status of 
individuals previously mentioned which stem from actions by the United 
Nations and international courts. The final idea that must be mentioned is 
that all the above features of the contemporary scene are taken to reflect a 
growing attachment to a cosmopolitan political ethic, in that the values 
presupposed are global in scope. 
We can, however, leave this last point to one side, since, even if it is 
true, it does nothing to show why we should adopt a cosmopolitan ethic. 
Those growing numbers of people who do so may lack an adequate justifi-
cation. Indeed they may be misguided; falling into a trap set by interna-
tional capitalist elites, as some neo-Gramscians allege (Katz, 2006), and 
abandoning local allegiances which could offer more effective sites of 
Paul H. Gilbert 328 
resistance to the injustices of globalisation. The most the alleged growth in 
a cosmopolitan ethic could show is that there is no psychological barrier to 
it, as some identity theorists may claim. Similar considerations apply to 
the second point mentioned above, namely that people increasingly see 
themselves as global citizens, with the wider loyalties and responsibilities 
which this entails. So far we are given no reason for so thinking of our-
selves. Nor does the mere fact of cross border relationships mentioned in 
the first point provide a justification, only an explanation. What might give 
a reason would be that these relationships mirror those within states in 
establishing an Hegelian system of interdependence that generates recipro-
cal obligations. But it is hard to think what might systematically do this for 
the relationship in question. The best candidates might be economic rela-
tionships; and certainly embarrassment at the conditions under which 
articles consumed in the West are produced elsewhere has led to attempts 
at improvements. Yet such economic relationships are precisely what most 
cosmopolitan theorists exclude from the sphere of civil society. An excep-
tion is John Keane (Keane, 2003). 
The other area excluded is, of course, political relationships and this is 
what disqualifies the third point mentioned from consideration, though this 
seems to escape the theorists who refer to it (see e.g. Dower 2003:141; 
Kaldor, 2003:588). For the supposed status of global citizen that arises 
from being made a legal subject in international law essentially involves a 
political relationship to the agents of those states which have acceded to 
the relevant treaties or in other ways become answerable to international 
legal norms. The notion of citizen is ambiguous as between membership of 
a state or supra-state organisation on the one hand and dweller in a city or 
analogous residential community on the other. It is not that the latter is 
metaphorical usage (pace Dower 2003:26) dependent on the former, but 
rather that the former is a more specialised usage than the latter. And it is, 
surely, the latter notion that the cosmopolitan who thinks of global civil 
society in terms of a collection of global citizens needs, namely the notion 
of people dwelling in the same place—the whole world—in a way that 
produces relationships analogous to those of dwellers in a shared city. 
Here again it would be better for such cosmopolitans to think of this des-
ignation to apply to everyone, as in the inadmissible third point, which 
trades on an equivocation in the sense of “citizen”. For if, as some suppose 
(see Dower 2003:144), it applies only to those who so think of themselves 
then the analogy between the relationships fails. But I shall return to the 
possibility of such an analogy shortly. 
Meanwhile we must consider the fourth point claimed to indicate the 
growth of a global civil society, namely the rise in associations with inter-
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national membership, global objectives and, perhaps, cosmopolitan values, 
together with related institutions such as NGOs. Leaving aside the objec-
tion that these are, for the most part, political organisations which work by 
bringing pressure to bear on particular states, albeit in a concerted way, 
there is, surely, an over-narrow view of what sort of association character-
ises civil society involved here. Although organisations like churches, 
cultural groups, professional associations and trade unions are regularly 
cited as examples of foci of relationships in civil society, they are highly 
formalised ones, presupposing rather than illustrating the civility of civil 
society. For that we need to turn instead to the sort of mundane association 
involved in relationships with neighbours, colleagues and fellow partici-
pants in a wide range of shared activity. Arguably it is this which gives 
rise to the sort of special obligations that cosmopolitans wish to generalise 
to a global scale. Mere membership of formal associations surely does not. 
So if it is membership of such international associations that is taken to be 
expressive of a sense of world citizenship then even the psychological 
claim that this sense enables us to embrace wider obligations is poorly 
supported, let alone the normative or political claims. All in all, then, the 
case made for an emergent global civil society so far fails to advance the 
case for a cosmopolitan political ethic. 
 
4. What has misled cosmopolitans is, I believe, a mistake about the 
sort of morality that is involved in the relationships of civil society. It 
involves an illegitimate shift from the idea that through such relationships 
shared goods are promoted to the assumption that it is valuing such goods 
that motivates the relationships and the patterns of reciprocal obligation 
they involve.  The formulation that it is through such relationships that 
shared goods are pursued ((see e.g. Dower 2003:xii) is ambiguous be-
tween them. Then, cosmopolitans claim, just because soi disant global 
citizens value globally shared goods they can undertake the associated 
obligations and thereby enter the relationships so constituted. Yet these 
relationships, I suggest, are not so easily established.  They are real rela-
tionships founded on actual interdependencies, in particular those involved 
in the performance of certain roles. The obligations involved flow from 
this, irrespective of what the participants value, so that it is immaterial 
whether the participants in them are motivated by the pursuit of shared 
goods or not. All that is required is that they undertaken the relevant roles 
or other rule governed positions. But in the absence of the associated in-
terdependencies on a global scale these positions are simply unavailable to 
soi disant world citizens. Valuing shared goods is no substitute. 
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It is no substitute because it does not institute a regime of rules which, 
however vague and unstated they may be, is what constitutes civil society. 
And it is precisely such a regime of rules that is lacking in the global case. 
This is why, to return to a point mentioned earlier, the analogy between 
citizens of states and so-called global citizens breaks down; not because 
the former are members of a political organisation which is absent for the 
latter, but because their state citizenship is founded on a social role of 
citizen that is unavailable to the latter. This social role stemming from 
occupancy of the same place as others is itself a complex one, involving 
not only behaving in a way that does not harm or offend others but mak-
ing, as it is put, one’s contribution to society, through one’s work and 
other dealings with those with whom one associates. Hence to be a citizen 
in this sense requires occupancy of a variety of other roles, the proper 
performance of which is necessary to being a good citizen—a point that 
Aristotle made by comparing citizenship to membership of a ship’s crew 
each of whom has a different function (Aristotle, 1992:book III). This 
analogy points up the difficulty in the idea of global citizenship. For, while 
one can see how the proper performance of these ordinary roles in life can 
contribute to the good of a city or a country, and the neglect of them be 
damaging to it, it is quite unclear what this would mean on a global scale. 
And this is at least partly because one can see at the more local level that a 
society’s good is constituted by its members’ adherence to its rules, rather 
than their acting in ways so uncontrolled and unpredictable that life in the 
society is intolerable. Yet no universal regime of such rules does, or 
probably could, exist globally. 
Political citizenship is, I have been urging, derived from social citizen-
ship of this sort, its more precise and articulated rules a development of the 
latter’s tacit ones. Since the sort of thing that cosmopolitans mean by 
global civil society does not make such social citizenship available it fol-
lows that the analogy between state citizenship and global citizenship fails. 
And with it fail the political arguments for global governance or related 
arrangements that are founded on the claim that we already have a global 
civil society. If it exists at all it is just not the right sort of thing to support 
such arrangements. 
 
5. There are other, and perhaps better, arguments for cosmopolitan-
ism which do not rely on the idea of a global civil society. But the one that 
I have rejected is aimed to undercut the supposed basis for a politics of 
identity in its nationalist form. Yet nothing I have said about the nature of 
civil society gives any support to such a politics either: it is, indeed, en-
tirely independent of it. In the first place there is no implication in my 
Global Civil Society and International Morality 331
account that the social relationships of civil society are founded on a 
shared national identity, so that the obligations of citizenship are felt in 
virtue of such an attachment. Quite the contrary; for this would, I believe, 
be to make a similar mistake to that with which I charged cosmopolitans, 
namely to base such obligations on the participants’ values. Rather they 
arise from the social roles they play, and the obligations of citizenship 
spring, not from a single source, but from the variety of these roles and the 
way they contribute to a system of interdependence. 
Secondly, though I have hinted that the rules regulating civil society 
will be different in different places, so that no universal requirements for 
world citizenship are forthcoming, this does not imply that these diverse 
rules somehow mirror national differences. Perhaps they sometimes do. At 
others they reflect differences in the variety of occupations and forms of 
social life to be found both within and across national borders. In the latter 
case the mores of élites tend to be more similar than those of other social 
groups, and this has no doubt contributed to the illusion of the possibility 
of world citizenship. In general, however, whether different mores can 
give rise to common citizenship admits of no abstract answer. Connected 
to this, then, is that there seems to be no principle for individuating sepa-
rate civil societies. A fortiori nationhood would not provide such a princi-
ple, even on the questionable assumption that shared national identity is 
conducive to the existence of civil society. 
Yet rejecting a cosmopolitan political ethic founded on global civil so-
ciety does not plunge us into a world bereft of international morality any 
more than it returns us to a nationalist scenario. We do not need the notion 
of global citizenship to ground such a morality. For arguably state citizen-
ship alone is sufficient to support the idea that the citizens of other states 
should be treated with fairness and benevolence in our own state’s rela-
tions with them and in our dealings with them through economic transac-
tions. In the role of citizen one can to some extent affect foreign policies 
and international trade; and it is reasonable to suppose that, other things 
being equal, people will tend to be guided by the thought that they should 
do so in ways that produce amity with others rather than animosity. For, 
especially in conditions of globalisation with increased travel and commu-
nications, people are uncomfortably exposed to the consequences of other 
policies and practices. This is especially true, of course, of the statesmen 
and stateswomen who represent citizens, and who have to meet and nego-
tiate with their fellows. Their dealings need to be governed by interna-
tional rules even if the dealings of ordinary citizens cannot be. 
My overall conclusion, then, is that the supposed benefits of our think-
ing of ourselves as global citizens can be had without this, which is fortu-
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nate since, if I am right, there is no adequate basis for our so thinking of 
ourselves. 
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The No More Deaths volunteer, a recent college graduate who was 
spending her summer conducting humanitarian patrols in search of border 
crossers stranded in the harsh desert of southern Arizona, struggled for 
words. The question grated. “I think that’s ridiculous,” she finally said, in 
response to those who would contend it is wrong to aid unauthorized 
crossers. “One of the first questions a reporter ever asked me was ‘why, as 
an American, are you doing this?,’ That’s always funny to me, when peo-
ple ask that. It’s not really an American thing. It’s a people thing. You 
know, thirsty people should be given water. It seems to me just to make 
sense” (Author interview, 6-05). Her co-volunteer at the No More Deaths 
patrol camp expressed a similar mix of difficulty and exasperation when 
asked why she felt compelled to seek out migrants in distress. “There’s 
this imaginary line drawn across the desert. That doesn’t make any sense 
to me. For someone to become illegal as soon as they cross that line—
They are just people. It’s that simple to me” (Author interview, 6-05). 
Meanwhile, participants in the Minuteman effort, who stand armed vi-
gil on some of the same stretches of desert, hoping to spot unauthorized 
entrants and report them to US authorities, expressed quite a different 
sentiment toward the crossers. “The country belongs to us. The country 
doesn’t belong to them,” said one retiree who had traveled from Eunice, 
New Mexico, to take part in the inaugural Minuteman action on the border 
in southeastern Arizona (Author interview, 4-05). “I didn’t force them to 
come to the United States,” said David Jones, a Minuteman leader in Ari-
zona who had served as “line boss” on several vigils. Addressing a group 
at Minuteman field headquarters on a rural ranch, he indicated a jug of 
murky brown water, likely filled in a cattle tank, that had been taken from 
two crossers his group had helped apprehend. “If they want to come and 
drink that, that’s their problem,” he said, while adding that he would not 
refuse water to a crosser (Author interview, 10-06). 
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In this article, I discuss how the understanding of obligation and hu-
man community expressed by the No More Deaths patrollers captures the 
core of a defensible conception of global citizenship. More centrally, I 
explore ways in which such a conception is necessary to developing a 
comprehensive cosmopolitanism. That is, global citizenship, appropriately 
understood, should be viewed not as separate from or synonymous with 
the cosmopolitan moral orientation, but as a primary component of it. 
Global citizenship is fundamentally concerned with individual moral re-
quirements in the global frame. Such requirements, framed here as belong-
ing to the category of individual cosmopolitanism, offer guidelines on 
right action in the context of global human community. They are comple-
mentary to the principles of moral cosmopolitanism, or those to be used in 
assessing the justice of global institutions and practices, that have received 
the great majority of attention from cosmopolitan political theorists. Con-
sidering principles of individual and moral cosmopolitanism together can 
help to provide greater clarity concerning individual duties in the absence 
of fully global institutions, and individual obligations of justice in relation 
to still-developing institutions in interstate trade, the global environment, 
human rights, and other substantive areas. Ultimately, the fuller incorpora-
tion of global citizenship into the cosmopolitan moral discourse is an im-
portant step toward developing an overarching conception of cosmopolitan 
right, one that would detail appropriate courses of action and reform in 
relation to individuals and institutions in the current global system. 
The Cosmopolitan Moral Orientation 
The concept of global citizenship often has been presented as strongly 
synonymous with, or equivalent to, a cosmopolitan moral outlook (Heater, 
2002; see Carter, 1997). While the global citizen and cosmopolitan orien-
tations share many commonalities, significant insight can be gained by 
recognizing the two as distinct, and by considering the discrete variants of 
both approaches. This section is concerned with identifying the main cur-
rents within recent cosmopolitan thought. I will note first that cosmopoli-
tan moral orientation is generally understood as one in which individuals, 
rather than societies or states, are presumed to be the ultimate units of 
moral concern. All individuals are presumed to have equal status as the 
objects of moral concern and all individuals “are ultimate units of concern 
for everyone—not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such-
like (Pogge, 2002: 169; see Caney, 2005a:3-4). 
Thus, when applied to substantive issues such as distributive justice, a 
conception of cosmopolitanism would hold that obligations to distribute 
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resources to compatriots are not categorically stronger than obligations to 
those who do not share our citizenship. In fact, for those living in affluent 
states, duties to redistribute to those in less-affluent states easily could 
trump duties to compatriots, given the greater exposure of the former to 
hunger and other poverty-related ills (see Beitz, 1999a; Brock, 2005). 
Other substantive concerns include the justice in operation of such global 
institutions as the World Trade Organization (Moellendorf, 2005), as well 
as the defensibility, in a cosmopolitan moral frame, of particular kinds of 
interstate or inter-group conflict (Buchanan and Keohane, 2004; Caney, 
2005a: 201-14). In the context of political justice, theorists of cosmopoli-
tan democracy have argued that respect for individual autonomy in an age 
of eroding state sovereignty requires the creation of suprastate participa-
tory mechanisms better able to afford meaningful input to individuals 
within states (Archibugi, 2004; Held, 2004). 
Important theoretical distinctions are drawn within the cosmopolitan 
approach, in particular between institutional and moral cosmopolitanism, 
and within moral cosmopolitanism itself. Institutional cosmopolitanism is 
understood by most commentators as concerned with the creation of some 
comprehensive network of global governing institutions, i.e., a world state, 
in order to just global distributive and other outcomes (Beitz, 1999b:129; 
see Barry, 1998:144; Waldron, 2000:228-29). Most reject any suggestion 
that a cosmopolitan orientation necessarily entails a specific commitment 
to institutional cosmopolitanism, though some, including this author, have 
argued that in practice something like a global government likely would be 
required to ensure that all individuals had sufficient access to life re-
sources and opportunities (Cabrera, 2004; see Tannsjo, 2008). 
Moral cosmopolitanism has been characterized as primarily concerned 
not with institution building, but with assessing the justice of institutions 
in the existing global system according to how individuals fare in relation 
to them. Further, both Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, probably the two 
most influential recent cosmopolitan theorists, have argued that moral 
cosmopolitanism should be understood as including two categories of 
principles (Beitz, 1999c:519; Pogge, 2002:170).1 The first, which Beitz 
calls cosmopolitan liberalism, essentially is identical to what had been 
called moral cosmopolitanism. It remains an approach to assessing institu-
tions or broad schemes of cooperation by “identifying principles that are 
acceptable when each person’s prospects, rather than the prospects of each 
society or people, are taken fairly into account” (Beitz, 1999c:519). The 
second variant Beitz calls individual cosmopolitanism. It is described as a 
guide for individual conduct consistent with cosmopolitan principles. 
However, Beitz defers any further discussion on individual cosmopolitan-
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ism, and he has not since returned to the topic. Pogge, while noting that 
individual ethical principles may complement principles of justice appli-
cable to global institutions (2002:170-72), has focused almost exclusively 
on the institutional side. My claim again is that individual cosmopolitan-
ism can be understood as global citizenship, appropriately configured, and 
that it is necessary to incorporate a defensible conception of global citizen-
ship into cosmopolitanism in order to present a complete view of cosmo-
politan right. 
Cosmopolitan Right 
The concept of cosmopolitan right is most directly traceable to Kant’s 
political writings (see Reiss, 1970). As outlined in “Theory and Practice,” 
the basic concept of right entails “the restriction of each individual’s free-
dom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else… And public 
right is the distinctive quality of the external laws which make this con-
stant harmony possible” (Kant, 1970:73). By extension, cosmopolitan 
right would address comprehensively the principles that should rightly 
govern global human interactions, primarily intersocietal ones but also 
some at the individual level. 
For Kant, appropriate principles are derived in an approach in which 
all individuals imagine themselves as co-legislators in a global ethical 
commonwealth or “kingdom of ends,” concerned to respect the autonomy 
of all others (Kant, 2001; Linklater, 1999a:41). He also adopts the norma-
tive claim that the earth is a common human holding, and he emphasizes 
empirical tendencies for groups to come into contact and often conflict 
with each other (Waldron, 2000:230). The resulting principles of cosmo-
politan right are most fully elaborated in Perpetual Peace (Kant, 2003; see 
Hayden 2005:21). There, the first definitive article addresses the republi-
can principles that Kant believes should prevail in domestic societies. The 
second definitive article mandates the familiar global federation of repub-
lics, and the third article outlines a duty of universal hospitality that should 
be extended to all individuals, one based in the principle of common own-
ership of the earth. 
Kant’s third definitive article is titled “The Law of World Citizenship 
Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality,” and indeed, his 
ius cosmopoliticum, in its emphasis on not treating strangers as enemies, 
has been seen by some as quite limited. That is in part for its failure to 
attempt a global regulation of individuals who are members of the same 
political community (Benhabib, 2001:43), for an ostensible lack of consid-
eration to distributive relations between societies (though see Loriaux, 
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2007), and for a lack of attention to bringing individuals into some global 
program of actual co-legislation, as per current proposals for cosmopolitan 
forms of democratic rule (Linklater, 1998: ch. 6). Even so, Kant’s concep-
tion of world citizenship, or a common human community, has served as a 
significant model or starting place for many current conceptions (see Ha-
bermas, 2006:123-26), and his multi-level framework offers invaluable 
guidance toward a more encompassing concept of cosmopolitan right. 
A more systematic or detailed framework, and one that has influenced 
the divisions within current cosmopolitanism, is offered by John Rawls. 
Like Kant, Rawls explores within a concept of right moral principles that 
could be appropriately applied at the individual, societal, and intersocietal 
levels (Rawls, 1999a:93-101; see Kokaz, 2007:326). Each set of principles 
is chosen within a discrete original position, the familiar Rawlsian device 
for deriving appropriate moral guidelines by depriving each participant of 
the knowledge of her or his own social standing, particular talents, and 
related information. Rawls gives predominant attention, of course, to the 
principles he believes would be chosen to apply to domestic institutions, 
and he is explicit that those should be the first principles chosen. Princi-
ples of individual duty are to be chosen in a second original position, along 
with principles of individual obligation in relation to institutions. The 
individual principles are expected to be significantly influenced or limited 
by the principles of justice for institutions chosen in the first original posi-
tion. Finally, principles to govern intersocietal relations, or in Rawls’s 
specific term the law of peoples, are chosen in the third original position 
(Rawls, 1999a:331-35; Rawls, 1999b). 
Schematically, each set of principles is seen as necessary to complete a 
concept of right, which itself is a component, alongside concepts of value 
and moral worth, of an overarching concept of practical reason to guide 
moral action in various contexts (Rawls, 1999a:94). I will note that, as was 
the case with Kant, the framework or schematic structure of Rawls’s con-
cept of right is more salient here than the specific conceptions of justice, 
individual duty and obligation, and intersocietal relations that Rawls be-
lieves would emerge from the choosing situations at each of the levels. 
Rawls’s favored principles to govern intersocietal relations, for example, 
would not require the kinds of high-level, trans-state distributions that 
many cosmopolitans have argued are obligatory (Moellendorf, 2002: ch. 2; 
Hayden, 2002). However, giving some attention to the individual ethical 
principles that ostensibly would be chosen will help to make clearer some 
ways in which conceptions of global citizenship would fit within a concep-
tion of right that is specifically cosmopolitan in its orientation. 
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In Rawls’s schema, both natural duties and obligations are incumbent 
on all individuals. Obligations arise within, and are to be defined accord-
ing to, the rules or practices of specific institutions. Natural duties accrue 
to all persons regardless of their membership in specific institutions or 
schemes of social cooperation; include negative duties to avoid injuring 
others and positive duties of mutual respect, mutual aid, and upholding 
justice. Mutual aid, characterized as “helping another when he is in need 
or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to 
oneself” (Rawls, 1999a:98) is particularly significant here, as is the duty to 
uphold justice, which includes a requirement that all persons comply with 
existing just institutions of which they are a part, as well as to “further just 
arrangements not yet established” (Rawls, 1999a:98-99). 
A duty to comply with existing institutions may face special difficul-
ties in relation to gaps in justice between the principles of justice Rawls 
believes would be chosen in the first original position—equal basic liber-
ties and the difference principle—and the justice of any actual scheme of 
institutions (Lyons, 1998), as well as more direct theoretical challenges 
concerned with political obligation per se (Simmons, 1979:145-46; see 
Pogge, 2002:134-39). It will be appropriate to limit the focus here to duties 
of mutual aid and a duty to further or possibly create just arrangements, 
given their strong significance to questions arising in a global frame, 
where no cohesive, comprehensive institutional structure exists. It is here 
where conceptions of global citizenship become salient, in terms of offer-
ing the most discrete and detailed forms of guidance for individual ethical 
action in the absence of a fully elaborated institutional framework. 
Global Citizenship 
Global citizenship, as a theory of citizenship, is fundamentally con-
cerned with appropriate individual action (Dower, 2005:105; see O’Byrne, 
2003). In fact, inherent in the concept of citizenship per se are probably 
the most concrete and comprehensive expressions of individual moral 
requirement. This “legal dimension” of citizenship (Dagger, 1997:99; 
Janoski, 1998:8-11) is formalized domestically in constitutions or sets of 
constitution-like documents, as well as in the subsequent court rulings 
interpreting those documents and giving more detailed substantive content 
to packages of rights. In the same vein, a fully elaborated conception of 
global citizenship holds the promise of delineating both the rights that 
individuals should be presumed to possess in the global human commu-
nity, and the duties and institutionally linked obligations that can be 
Global Citizenship as the Completion of Cosmopolitanism 339
viewed as incumbent on individuals in order to better secure the fulfill-
ment of those rights. 
In this section, I consider three broad ways of thinking about how citi-
zenship above the state might be conceived, formulated, or put into prac-
tice. Throughout, I strive for sympathetic immanent critique, addressing 
the arguments on their own terms as conceptions of global citizenship, and 
developing in context an approach to global citizenship that could both 
encompass core aspects of many of the specific conceptions discussed, and 
serve as a conception of individual cosmopolitanism in the broader 
framework of cosmopolitan right. 
 
International Citizenship 
This approach essentially takes the sovereign states system as it is 
structured and exhorts states, or state leaders, to pursue ethical foreign 
policies, including respecting individual rights, assuming strong foreign 
aid obligations, acting responsibly on environmental issues (see Linklater, 
1992; Carter, 2001:173-74; Williams, 2002). The approach is longstand-
ing, with some significant resonance of Kant’s prescriptions for states in 
Perpetual Peace. Aspects of it are present in the Liberal idealism of Woo-
drow Wilson and others in the early 20th Century, and in current human 
rights doctrine (see Beitz, 1999b:127). 
The statist emphasis of international citizenship might be viewed as 
putting the approach in immediate tension with the inherent universalism 
of a fully global conception of citizenship. It will be useful to consider a 
nuanced recent account, however, to clarify some sources and expressions 
of such tensions, and to move toward a conception of international citizen-
ship that could be compatible with cosmopolitanism. Bryan Turner, one of 
the most prominent current citizenship theorists, has offered an argument 
for international citizenship that could be demanding in its individual 
moral prescriptions, and which, while not rigidly statist, remains rooted in 
a states system (Turner, 2002). For Turner, patriotism, or love of one’s 
country, is compatible with a global citizen orientation, which would con-
sist in large part of the promotion of universal human rights and obliga-
tions to secure them. One first learns to love one’s own country, ideally in 
a way that allows for an ironic, critical distance from it, and the develop-
ment or inculcation of such attachment serves as preparation for the devel-
opment of respect for other state cultures (Turner, 2002:49). 
Noting the difficulties inherent in obtaining compliance from individu-
als with the duties embedded in any conception of global citizenship, 
Turner argues for an emphasis not on a core of rights ostensibly evident 
across all cultures (see Ignatieff, 2001). Rather, he advocates an emphasis 
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on the “unity of human misery,” or a consensus that he sees having 
emerged around actions or events that are considered insufferably wrong 
(Turner, 2002:55). Respect for other cultures is noted as a key value, but 
Turner rejects strong cultural relativism, for example, allusions to “Asian 
values” as a means of critiquing claims for universal human rights (46-47; 
see Sen, 1997; Langlois, 2001). Rather, individuals within specific nation-
states are to be educated in a way that promotes love of country, and at the 
same time educated to adopt a “cool” or thin identification that does not 
preclude support for international citizenship or human rights doctrine. 
Turner’s account is explicitly universalist in its promotion of a rela-
tively strong conception of human rights, yet it emphasizes the importance 
of particular communities in ways that recall more straightforwardly par-
ticularist accounts of community and belonging. For example, Michael 
Walzer would cite principles of state sovereignty, in particular non-
intervention and the ability of a community to admit or exclude outsiders 
as it chooses, as vital in sustaining “communities of character, historically 
stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special com-
mitment to one another and some special sense of their common life” 
(Walzer, 1983:62; see also Walzer, 1977:90). However, for Walzer, the 
presumed uniqueness of the way of life that has been developed within the 
nation-state tends to preclude the development of relatively thick concep-
tions of universal human rights. 
In Turner’s approach, the presumed uniqueness of national communi-
ties is not emphasized. Rather, the state context is a training ground for the 
kinds of values that can encourage individuals to adopt a genuinely uni-
versalistic stance toward human rights. If that is the case, however, it is not 
clear why the state per se must be viewed as the appropriate inculcator of 
global citizenship values, or in Turner’s term, cosmopolitan virtue. For 
example, states and state sovereignty could be seen as merely a means to 
the end of protecting and promoting the interests of individuals. Cosmo-
politan theorists commonly note, with commentators on human rights 
theory and practice, that principles of state sovereignty, especially of non-
intervention, often have facilitated the violation of human rights within 
states (Pogge, 2002:139-44; see Donnelly, 2002), though of course that 
outcome is not categorical (Falk, 2000: ch. 4). However, in a universal 
individualist frame such as cosmopolitanism, if some other global institu-
tional configuration were found to better achieve the promotion of core 
individual rights, or to better promote just outcomes for individuals in 
general, then that system would be viewed as preferable. The advocate of a 
more explicitly universalist form of international citizenship will have 
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difficulty demonstrating why such institutional evolution should not be 
prescribed if it would better promote human rights.  
In fact, an approach to international citizenship that offers such an in-
strumental view, in addition to presaging a remarkable range of insights 
offered by current cosmopolitan and global citizenship theorists, originates 
with John MacCunn (1899). MacCunn, who is most often identified with 
the British Idealists, in his more cosmopolitan vein cited the Westphalian 
system as a frequent impediment to the realization of cosmopolitan ideals, 
as well as their best institutional hope. The core individual duty identified 
by MacCunn, and one that receives current expression in the capabilities-
based cosmopolitanism of Martha Nussbaum (2000), is for individuals to 
help others realize “the capacity for a good life” (1899:155). For Mac-
Cunn, helping others realize that capacity, whether they are compatriots in 
a relatively wealthy state or living in a distant, impoverished state, is our 
fundamental duty as human beings. 
The ideal for MacCunn is a system structured so that one’s duties to 
act as a global citizen are discharged in also acting as a good national 
citizen, i.e., by helping compatriots to realize their capacity for a good life. 
Again the importance of working through the existing institutional struc-
ture is considered instrumental. That is, one could attempt to “walk the 
noble but less effectual path” of the missionary or others delivering direct 
aid to individuals overseas (MacCunn, 1899:167), but the existing states 
system is likely the best available means of fulfilling natural duties of 
mutual aid. 
The state instrumentalism implicit in such an account bears important 
similarities to many cosmopolitan-liberal arguments, where states are held 
to have potentially strong instrumental value as institutions capable of 
securing rights and organizing the discharge of individual obligations, but 
they are not seen as having intrinsic value or interests independent of the 
individuals within them (Beitz, 1999a). It represents a departure from a 
more straightforward international citizenship view, which would see state 
membership as intrinsically significant. Such an approach can be seen as 
an important potential bridge between international citizenship and more 
encompassing conceptions of global citizenship, as well as between the 
global citizenship and cosmopolitan literatures. 
 
Global Citizenship as Moral Orientation 
One more encompassing approach to global citizenship involves the 
promotion of a global ethic or attitude toward the other across national 
boundaries. Examining some particular arguments here may be useful for 
clarifying individual duties, and especially for highlighting a key differ-
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ence between the individual global citizen and the kind of individual moral 
agent that may be presumed within moral cosmopolitanism. That is, moral 
cosmopolitanism, while it may consider the interests of all individuals, 
does not necessarily presume the existence of some actual or potential 
global community of which each individual is in some substantive way a 
member (Van den Anker, 2002:166). Implicit in the concept of the global 
citizen is the understanding that one is part of a discrete global commu-
nity, with duties toward specific others in that community, rather than a 
bearer of essentially abstract rights or duties to all others. As Dower and 
Williams note, in essentially all accounts of fully global citizenship, “what 
is being asserted is that humans are in some fundamental sense members 
of a wider body as contrasted to the membership of a particular political 
community such as the city-state, nation-state, or even an empire. All the 
latter are accidents of one’s birth or circumstance… There is something… 
that ties us together in terms of identity, loyalty or commitment” (Dower 
and Williams, 2002:2). 
That is not to say that the global citizen must be construed as a member 
of some solidarist Republican world state, with some form of global-
national consciousness being promoted by state institutions and absorbed 
by its members. Rather, individuals, by imagining themselves in global 
community with all others, may be more inclined to consider the interests 
of particular, concrete individuals across borders, and may be more in-
clined to engage in open, mutualistic dialogue with them. Likewise, a 
global citizenship approach presumes that, even if some comprehensive set 
of moral principles could be derived from the bare facts of what humans 
need and what they deserve, those principles likely could not be effec-
tively enacted without the actual negotiation of difference through dia-
logue that is inherent in the concept of community. An emphasis on global 
citizenship helps to promote sensitivity to such variation and can help to 
promote an attitude of respect in dialogue where traditions, or local prac-
tices of power or domination, may seem to be at odds with cosmopolitan 
principles (see Nussbaum, 1999). 
So, presuming some sort of membership in a global human commu-
nity, theorists of global citizenship as a moral attitude have been con-
cerned foremost with identifying the ethical orientation most appropriate 
to guiding individual action in that community. Along with offering ac-
counts that are clearly rooted in the Kantian ethical commonwealth (see 
Carter, 1997; Hutchings, 1999), theorists have examined ways in which 
some sort of global loyalty might be inculcated in individuals to promote 
the observance of human rights (Roche, 1997; Midgley, 1999), how a 
global ethic could be formed and promoted around principles shared by 
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the world’s major religions (Küng, 1997), or how a global civic culture 
(Boulding, 1988) might be developed. 
Richard Falk offers an account that is less specific in its moral pre-
scriptions than some, but which may offer the best overall guidance for the 
kind of moral attitude the global citizen could adopt. Falk has developed 
the ideal of the global citizen as “citizen pilgrim” (Falk, 1995; 2002). The 
citizen pilgrim is one who possesses “the spirit of a sojourner, committed 
to transformation that is spiritual as well as material, that is premised on 
the wholeness and equality of the human family” (Falk, 2002:27) Citizen 
pilgrims are not interested in “technical fixes” to improve the efficiencies 
of neoliberal economic integration, while giving insufficient attention to 
what Falk sees as its many harmful effects (2002:27). Nor are they multi-
national elites who consider themselves at home in an intercontinental 
world of posh hotels and restaurants while giving little thought to the 
struggles faced by the less-affluent who constitute most of the world’s 
population (Falk, 2005). 
Citizen pilgrims are expected to act in a way that is resonant in some 
ways of Plato’s guardians. Bearing appropriate values and an orientation 
of solidarity in global community toward others, they will address chal-
lenges and opportunities as they emerge in an integrating global system, 
with an eye to promoting sustainable development and humane govern-
ance (Falk, 2002:28). While Falk does not elaborate specific institutional 
changes that a citizen pilgrim might be expected to undertake, his outline 
of the orientation that should be adopted actually is quite demanding and 
can offer useful guidance for accounts more directly concerned with nec-
essary or appropriate trans-state institutions. In particular, Falk’s account 
can provide a means of understanding how current trans-state activists, 
such as those noted at the beginning of this article, can be viewed as prac-
ticing a normatively and empirically meaningful form of trans-state or 
global citizenship, or at least embodying significant aspects of it. 
 
Global Citizenship and Global Institution Building 
Theorists working within this approach do advocate the creation of su-
prastate institutions capable of enabling a concrete practice of trans-state 
citizenship, and there is a potentially significant link between institutional 
global citizenship and the conception of natural duty outlined by Rawls. 
Recall that in Rawls’s scheme of natural duties, all individuals, regardless 
of their institutional affiliations, would have a duty to further just ar-
rangements (Rawls, 1999a:98), or “to assist in the establishment of just 
arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be done with 
little cost to ourselves” (Rawls, 1999:294). Some cosmopolitan theorists 
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have extrapolated from this a straightforward individual duty to promote 
the creation of global institutions capable of regulating trans-state interac-
tions, though not a comprehensive world state (see Tan, 2004:170). Others 
have identified a closely related duty to promote the creation of global 
institutions generally capable of securing just outcomes (Jones, 1999:69), 
and possibly including a world state (Copp, 2005). 
I have argued elsewhere that, given biases against cosmopolitan dis-
tributive justice inherent in a sovereign states system, the cosmopolitan 
theorist should advocate comprehensive, democratically accountable inte-
gration between states, from the regional to the fully global level (Cabrera, 
2004; 2005). In that context, a conception of global citizenship could iden-
tify the very specific duties incumbent on all to promote the creation of an 
actual global political community, up to and including some comprehen-
sive form of world state. It is not necessary, however, to firmly press the 
institutional claim in order to identify the ways in which a conception of 
global citizenship can help to clarify the parameters of individual cos-
mopolitanism. I will offer here an approach to global citizenship that is 
broad enough to be consistent with a range of particular conceptions, and 
yet is specific enough to play the role identified for global citizenship as 
individual cosmopolitanism. According to this conception, individuals act 
as global citizens when they 
 
a) reach across international boundaries, or internal boundaries of dif-
ferential citizenship  
b) in order to help secure those fundamental rights that would be better 
protected if there were a just system of global institutions in place, and 
c) work to help put such a system in place. 
 
I will note first that implicit in criterion “a” is that such cross-border 
outreach is undertaken in a spirit of community with all others. Individuals 
imagine themselves embedded in a global community, rather than as 
members of discrete, “separate but equal” moral communities, and they 
are concerned to ensure the justice and sustainability of the global com-
munity. Thus, the desert humanitarians noted at the beginning of this arti-
cle cite their sense of belonging to a common humanity as reason enough 
to reach across barriers of citizenship, nationality, and in the frame of 
some more critical observers, criminality, to fulfill felt duties of mutual 
aid. The Minutemen, adopting more a rigidly nationalistic approach to 
membership, express a much different sense of duty to the non-citizen 
other, in particular those attempting to cross a national boundary without 
authorization. 
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Emphasized in criterion “b” is the importance of envisioning a fully 
just system of global institutions and the principles that would obtain with-
in it. It offers an approach to identifying a firm schedule of moral require-
ments, i.e., to conceiving of ourselves as embedded in a framework of just 
institutions that would enable us to move from somewhat weak and vague-
ly specified natural duties of aid, to a clearly delimited set of obligations to 
be discharged in global community: a “legal dimension” of global citizen-
ship. This approach can be seen as positing a duty to act as though one had 
firm obligations of justice within an actually existing scheme of institu-
tions. As such, it would not draw a sharp distinction between individual 
duties and obligations, as discussed below. Finally, under criterion “c,” 
individuals are understood to have a duty to help promote the kind of insti-
tutional transformation under which all in the global human community 
would be offered due protection. It attempts to fill in the contours of 
Kant’s imagined global community of co-legislators by positing actual 
institutions within which members of a global community would engage 
in dialogue, coordinate action and regulate shared practices. 
To reinforce, the characterization offered here would accommodate a 
range of specific conceptions of global citizenship. It is consonant with, 
and could be enriched by, many within the global ethic approach, includ-
ing Falk’s account of the citizen pilgrim. It could accommodate an instru-
mentalist international citizenship such as MacCunn’s, given that it is 
possible to conceive and move closer at least to some ideal form of West-
phalian states system in which all states would be equally empowered to 
protect the rights or vital interests of their citizen charges. The approach 
also would accommodate many discrete conceptions of institutional global 
citizenship. Those would include moderate institutional accounts that 
would stop short of advocating some comprehensive global government 
while still calling for extensive global integration (Van den Anker, 2002), 
or Kantian “constitutionalization” (Habermas, 2006: ch. 8) to secure more 
just outcomes for individuals within states.  
I will close this section by focusing on a particular, discourse-based 
account of institutional global citizenship offered by Andrew Linklater, 
(1998; 1999a; 1999b). Emphasis will be given to its potential significance 
and some important possible challenges to it. Both should provide further 
clarification on the contours of a defensible global citizenship, as well as 
the fit of such a conception within a broader concept of cosmopolitan 
right. 
Linklater argues that Kant’s imaginary kingdom of co-legislators 
should be transformed where feasible into actual transnational citizenries 
(1998:205-06). Like the cosmopolitan democrats, he emphasizes ways in 
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which the processes of economic integration may be reducing the ability 
of those within states to exercise democratic control over a range of policy 
issues (1998:191-92). He gives attention to the harms that may be perpe-
trated by a state on others as further reason to move toward suprastate 
institutions within which a more concrete trans-state citizenship can be 
practiced, and in which individuals “can exercise their moral right to re-
fuse and renegotiate offers” (Linklater, 1999a:51). He is, however, explicit 
that the individual duty to create suprastate institutions arises among 
members of like-minded societies, “in the sense of having broadly similar 
conceptions of citizenship” (1999a:51). 
Linklater’s approach is concerned not only with the kinds of institu-
tions which could embody a conception of trans-state or global citizenship, 
but with the kinds of duties that may be incumbent on individuals to create 
them. It thus offers a route to conceiving of and actually moving toward 
the implementation of forms of trans-state citizenship, and its emphasis on 
converting an imaginary commonwealth of co-legislators into an actual 
process of dialogue and contestation among trans-state citizens is poten-
tially quite significant. There could be, however, significant theoretical 
friction between the universals that underlie the conception of trans-state 
citizenship Linklater advocates, and an implementation scheme that would 
place strong emphasis on interdependence or like-mindedness. 
Consider how the interdependence issue has been addressed in terms of 
cosmopolitan distributive justice. In that frame, Beitz initially argued that 
it was the fact of global economic interdependence that justified speaking 
in terms of a global basic structure to which principles of distributive jus-
tice should be applied, and within which there were recognizable obliga-
tions of justice to extend distributions (Beitz, 1999). Later, however, Beitz 
moved away from a strong emphasis on the actual character of relations 
between states in determining the distributions that individuals within and 
across states owe to one another (Beitz, 1983). Instead, he made reference 
to universal human characteristics. Such a move helps in part to avoid 
circumstances under which individuals could be construed as appropriately 
excluded from trans-state distributions because of wholly contingent fac-
tors that caused them not to be integrally embedded in the global econ-
omy, including their states’ level of development or possession of valuable 
resources, or decisions made by elites in hierarchical states (see Cabrera, 
2004: ch. 3; Caney, 2005b). Others, including Brian Barry (1995:52-67) 
and Jeremy Waldron (1993:21), also have focused on universal human 
characteristics, rather than interstate relations, in developing and defending 
principles of cosmopolitan justice. 
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The guiding aim of the dialogic approach Linklater outlines is to en-
able individuals, especially the vulnerable within states, to engage in dia-
logue as equals in a global public sphere, and by so doing to highlight and 
oppose injustices both within and above states. However, if global citizen-
ship, or regional trans-state citizenship, is presumed to be appropriately 
differentiated according to a state’s level of economic interdependence 
with others, or its “like-mindedness” with nearby states, then the most 
vulnerable may still have no voice. That is not, of course, to pose some 
universal imperative to intervene in hierarchical states or otherwise pursue 
integration by force. Rather, it is to say that a more straightforward em-
phasis on the universalist ethical underpinnings of Linklater’s approach 
could better enable it to achieve its goal of ultimately bringing all indi-
viduals into the global public sphere as interlocutors. 
Objections: Duty and Obligation 
Interdependence and related questions, in fact, speak to the core defen-
sibility of the concept of global citizenship. Consider the challenge to the 
definitional coherence of global citizenship offered by Hannah Arendt, 
among others. It holds that one simply cannot be a global citizen in the 
absence of state-like global institutions. Since there are no such bodies to 
define and enforce citizen duties and rights, to specify participatory proce-
dures, avenues of institutional access and other parameters of concrete 
citizenship practice, there is no global citizenship (Arendt, 1968a:81; see 
Walzer, 1996). The claim also could be understood more narrowly in 
terms of duty and obligation. That is, since concrete obligations of justice 
arise only in the context of institutions, and there are no fully cohesive 
global institutions, it may be incoherent to speak of firm global citizen 
requirements in the current system. Thus, David Held speaks of the institu-
tions of cosmopolitan democracy as potentially a context within which 
“the elusive and puzzling meaning of global citizenship becomes a little 
clearer” (Held, 2004:115). 
First, I will note that Arendt’s claim must be formally true. Individuals 
do not hold membership in cohesive global institutions and thus cannot be 
global citizens. They can, however, act “as” global citizens, and in a non-
trivial sense. As outlined above, they can be viewed as having a natural 
duty to act as though there were a just global institutional frame in place, 
and to discharge their presumed obligations toward others accordingly. I 
will suggest that such an approach is defensible in large part because the 
line between duty and obligation is not so bright as is sometimes claimed. 
To elaborate, I will consider distinctions Thomas Pogge has drawn be-
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tween the two, and some ways in which his firmly obligations-based ap-
proach may rely implicitly on the moral force of natural duties to aid. 
Pogge has argued strenuously that the cosmopolitan should not place 
strong emphasis on individual natural duties of mutual aid, in part because 
it would be difficult to motivate individuals to act on such positive duties 
to others, especially to noncompatriots. He views obligations not to harm 
others as potentially much more capable of motivating action consistent 
with cosmopolitanism, including fulfilling cosmopolitan distributive de-
mands (Pogge, 2002:132-36). For Pogge, those in affluent states are impli-
cated in a range of harms perpetrated through unjust global institutions, 
including the global trade regime, intergovernmental organizations, norms 
regulating interstate borrowing that allow corrupt leaders to enrich them-
selves, and a host of others. Thus “the worse-off are not merely poor and 
often starving, but are being impoverished and starved under our shared 
institutional arrangements, which inescapably shape their lives” (Pogge, 
2002:201). 
Pogge places greatest emphasis on the responsibility of decision-
makers and other influential elites within affluent states to initiate changes 
in the global order (2002:172-73). He maintains, however, that ordinary 
individuals in affluent states also are responsible for institutional harms. 
An analogy is drawn between current citizens of affluent states and those 
living in the slaveholding states of the past. Even if citizens of those states 
did not hold slaves themselves, Pogge asserts, they could be held respon-
sible at some morally significant level for the institutional scheme which 
they helped to uphold through their routine daily actions. Thus, they had 
clear obligations of justice to promote the transformation of unjust societal 
institutions (Pogge, 1989:178). 
A harm interdependence approach is potentially extremely valuable as 
one frame of obligation, not least for encouraging individuals to consider 
the institutional effects their freely made choices could have. However, 
Pogge’s scheme, besides being subject to some of the same critique noted 
above in Beitz’s turn from interdependence, will face specific challenges 
in its emphasis on collective responsibility. First, we can note that Pogge, 
like many who ground cosmopolitan distributive obligations in interde-
pendence or intense mutual influence, appears to presume that there is a 
threshold of mutual influence among states that, once reached, justifies the 
application of some distributive principle that would apply to all equally. 
But it is not clear why, if states are to qualify for some scheme of distribu-
tion based on their level of interaction or influence with other states, some 
variable principle would not be more appropriately applied (Caney, 
2005:396-97; cf. Beitz, 1999a:165). David Hume, for example, argued 
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that, since human interaction or mutual influence was weaker at the inter-
state level than within states, moral principles applied with less force 
above the state (see Cohen, 1984). Such a principle would at least have to 
be considered if individuals were to be included or not in a global distribu-
tive scheme based on some variable status such as their state’s level of 
interaction with other states, rather than on their status as human beings. 
Pogge would hold direct decision makers and influential elites, who 
have a clearer chain of accountability, more responsible for harms im-
posed. All non-elites, however, also would be held accountable at some 
equal baseline level. All are exhorted to promote movement toward a more 
just institutional structure, and institutional transformations of the kinds 
mandated would require significant tax-financed revenues to execute. 
Regardless of their personal participation in the kinds of institutional re-
gimes implicated, all would appear to be held to an equal standard of re-
sponsibility and amount of rectification. 
Further, and perhaps more significantly, in adopting an approach that 
would hold all in a state responsible and obligated to rectify injustices, 
Pogge must show how even very young children and others who cannot be 
said to have participated in imposing harms are justifiably implicated. 
Related critiques have been made of collective-responsibility arguments 
that would reject cosmopolitan distributions on grounds that less-affluent 
states are rightly held responsible for their own policy choices (Rawls, 
1999; Miller, 2004). How, some critics have asked, can ordinary individu-
als, much less children, be implicated in such policy choices? (LaFollette 
and May, 1996:79; Dworkin, 2000:322). A harm-interdependence ap-
proach may fare somewhat better in response to this critique, given that 
children born into affluent states would be held responsible for actions by 
a state that likely can offer them many benefits. Significant questions 
would remain, however, about holding individuals directly responsible for 
events over which they exercise no control, e.g., their luck of birth. 
Finally, and most salient here, implicit positive duties to aid or further 
just institutions actually may be doing much of the work that is claimed 
for obligations not to harm in Pogge’s scheme. Pogge himself has ac-
knowledged that it may not be possible for individuals in affluent states to 
avoid contributing to the harms he identifies. Even so, he states, those in 
affluent countries are obligated to promote institutional transformation. 
“Those presently most disadvantaged have virtually no means for initiat-
ing such reforms. We do. And our responsibility vis-à-vis existing injus-
tices hinges upon our ability to initiate and support institutional reforms” 
(Pogge, 1989:11-12). It is difficult to see, short of re-placing themselves in 
a less-favored position within a less-affluent state, how individuals can be 
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held firmly responsible for harms they could not have conceivably avoided 
causing. It is not the case, for example, that they could or should have 
been more careful prior to some accident that injured others. Rather, all are 
somehow equally implicated by their life placement in an affluent state. 
That being the case, the force of the moral requirement to promote institu-
tional reforms may actually spring from implied positive duties to further 
just institutions. As in the case above, individuals who are so placed as to 
be capable of rendering aid in the form of institutional change are said to 
be required to do so, but the moral requirement does not clearly spring 
from any harms they have caused. 
The foregoing should be sufficient to show that the case for focusing 
almost exclusively on individual obligations to avoid harming is not so 
clear cut. Rhetorically, encouraging individuals to avoid harming others 
may carry more general weight than exhorting them to act on positive 
duties per se. In practice, however, it is not a straightforward matter to 
demonstrate how far or whether any specific non-elite within an affluent 
state can be held responsible for injustices produced by current global 
institutions. More centrally, the insight that individual natural duties of 
mutual aid and furthering just institutions may be implied within a harm 
interdependence approach helps to strengthen the case for treating duties 
and obligations as closely interconnected, or as both vital to the overall 
cosmopolitan project (Caney, 2007). As such, it reinforces the coherence 
of a conception of global citizenship that, in the absence of cohesive glob-
al institutions, would speak in terms of individual duties to act according 
to the obligations, or “legal dimension,” of a fully global citizenship that 
would obtain were a just system of global institutions in place. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued that global citizenship, appropriately un-
derstood, is an integral part of a comprehensive conception of cosmopoli-
tan right. By conceiving of global citizenship as filling the theoretical 
space of individual cosmopolitanism, we can clarify both the parameters 
of a defensible conception of global citizenship and the duties and obliga-
tions that are incumbent in a frame which treats individuals, rather than 
states or other groupings, as the ultimate units of moral concern. 
According to the approach detailed here, individuals are acting as 
global citizens when they reach out to others across international bounda-
ries, or internal boundaries of differential citizenship, in order to help 
secure those fundamental rights that would obtain were there a just global 
system of institutions already in place, and when they work to help put a 
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system in place. Such an approach is consonant with a broad range of 
specific conceptions of global citizenship, including those that would 
argue for the creation of suprastate institutions within which a more en-
compassing, actual global citizenship could be practiced. In positing a 
natural duty to act as though there were a just system of global institution 
already in place, the approach helps to highlight connections between 
individual natural duties and obligations of justice. Thus, it can help to 
clarify individual moral requirements that are unmediated by institutions, 
those that arise in relation to the transformation of existing global institu-
tions, and those that may arise in relation to institutions that do not yet 
exist. 
Notes 
* I would like to thank Patrick Hayden, Christopher Finlay, Shanti Sellz, Simon 
Caney, Christien Van den Anker, Tom Sorell, and Darren O’Byrne for their guid-
ance and helpful comments on issues addressed here. The text has been previously 
published in Journal of International Political Theory, Edinburgh University 
Press, 4(1), 2008:84-104. 
1. Pogge uses different, somewhat singular, terms to express essentially the same 
division. In the interest of consistency with the bulk of the cosmopolitan literature, 
I will follow Beitz’s terminology. 
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